Wesley v. Mooney et al
Filing
49
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) (eo)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DANIEL WESLEY,
Plaintiff,
:
:
:
v.
:
:
SUPT. VINCENT MOONEY, et al., :
Defendants.
:
1:14-cv-0980
Hon. John E. Jones III
MEMORANDUM
February 21, 2017
Plaintiff Daniel Wesley (“Wesley” or “Plaintiff”), a state inmate who, at all
times relevant, was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Coal
Township (“SCI-Coal Township”), commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 on May 22, 2014. The matter is proceeding via an amended complaint (Doc.
38) against the following employees of the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections (“DOC”): Mooney, Superintendent; Shaffer, E-Block Unit Manager;
Sergeant John Doe; and Corrections Officers Bright and Batiuk. (Doc. 1).
Presently pending is Defendants’ motion (Doc. 39) to dismiss the amended
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons
set forth below, the motion will be granted.
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Sergeant John Doe has never been properly identified and, consequently,
never served. The complaint against him will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
In rendering a decision on a motion to dismiss, a court should not inquire
“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to
offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974); Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1996). The court must accept as
true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences
from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Innis v. Wilson, 334 F.
App’x , 454, 456 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). A district court ruling on a motion to dismiss generally
“relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record.” Sands v.
McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). “First, the
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factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated.” Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). Second, the court must then
determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief, which is “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 211 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679); see also
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (directing the court to identify cognizable claims and to
dismiss any portion of the complaint that fails to state a claim). “[W]here the wellpleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but it has not ‘show[n]’ -- ‘that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
B.
28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
Section 1915(e)(2)(B) states, in pertinent part, “the court shall dismiss the
case at any time if the court determines that the action “(I) is frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from suit.” 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e)(2)(B)(i) - (iii). The applicable standard of review for the failure to state a
claim provision is the same as the standard for a motion pursuant to 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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II.
ALLEGATIONS OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
Wesley alleges that subsequent to his transfer from housing unit cell E-2-
Cell-11to a Psychiatric Observation Cell (“POC”), Defendants improperly
removed his personal property from his housing unit cell in the presence of other
inmates, failed to inventory his property, and allowed inmates to remove his
property. (Doc. 38, p. 3). He claims Defendants violated his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights, violated “Department Code of Ethics Section
(B)(7),” and failed to supervise and properly train “their agents, officers and
employees.” (Id. at 2, 3).
He alleges that Defendant Mooney “is Superintendent and responsible for
the operations and conditions and welfare of prisoners.” (Id. at 1). Shafer “is a
Unit Manager and in charge of E-2 Block.” (Id. at 2). John Doe is a sergeant
“stationed at SCI-Coal Township.” (Id.) Batiuk and Bright are correctional
officers “stationed at SCI-Coal Township.” (Id.)
He seeks the return of his personal property and monetary damages. (Id. at
4).
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III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Constitutional Claims
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code offers private citizens a
cause of action for violations of federal law by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. §
1983. The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .
Id.; see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v.
Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state a claim under §1983, a
plaintiff must allege “the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
1.
Official Capacity
Defendants seek dismissal of the complaint against all Defendants in their
official capacity. Personal-capacity suits under section 1983 seek to recover
money from a government official, as an individual, for acts performed under color
of state law. Official-capacity suits, in contrast, generally represent an action
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against an entity of which the government official is an agent. Gregory v. Chehi,
843 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir. 1988); see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690 n. 55 (1978). When suits are brought against state officials in their official
capacities, those lawsuits are treated as suits against the state. Hafer v. Melo, 502
U.S. 21, 25 (1991). However, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, established by
the Eleventh Amendment, protects states, such as the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, from suits by citizens. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100–01, 117 (1984); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 54(1996); Lavia v. Pennsylvania, 224 F.3d 190, 195–96 (3d Cir. 2000). That
immunity runs to state officials if they are sued in their official capacity and the
state is the real party upon which liability is to be imposed. Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 237–38 (1974). Congress has not abrogated the immunity regarding
Plaintiff’s claims; nor has Pennsylvania waived this grant of immunity. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 8521(b). Consequently, any and all counts contained in the complaint
seeking money damages against the Defendants in their official capacity are barred
by sovereign immunity. See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249,
254 (3d Cir. 2010).
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2.
Personal Involvement
Individual liability will be imposed under Section 1983 only if the state actor
played an “affirmative part” in the alleged misconduct. See Evancho v. Fisher,
423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195,
1207 (3d Cir. 1998)). Liability “cannot be predicated solely on the operation of
respondeat superior.” Id. In other words, defendants in Section 1983 civil rights
actions “must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs . . . shown through
allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.”
Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 271 (3d Cir. 2003); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08.
When a plaintiff merely hypothesizes that an individual defendant may have had
knowledge of or personal involvement in the deprivation of his or her rights,
individual liability will not follow. Atkinson, 316 F.3d at 271; Rode, 845 F.2d at
1207-08.
Defendants seek to dismiss the amended complaint against Mooney and
Shaffer based on lack of personal involvement. (Doc. 40, p. 7). Mooney is named
in his capacity as “Superintendent and is responsible for the operations and
conditions and welfare of prisoners.” (Doc. 1, p. 1). Shaffer is named based on
her position as the E-2 Block Unit Manager. (Id. at 2). This is the sum total of the
allegations against these Defendants, which they contend is insufficient to establish
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the requisite personal involvement. (Doc. 40, p. 7). Wesley argues that
Defendants’ “actual knowledge that the Plaintiff is a Z-Coded inmate with a single
cell since 2005, and know that there is not supposed to be any inmate present
packing any cell’s [sic] unless the inmate has a celly [sic]” is sufficient to
demonstrate personal involvement. (Doc. 41, p. 2). However, knowledge of
Wesley’s Z-Code status is insufficient to establish personal involvement as it does
not demonstrate that Defendants were involved in the decision to move the
property or the procedures employed during the actual movement of the property.
To the extent Wesley attempts to impose liability based on Defendants’
failure to train and supervise employees, the allegations fall far short. A plaintiff
must (1) identify with particularity what the supervisory officials failed to do that
demonstrates deliberate indifference and (2) demonstrate a close causal link
between the alleged failure and the alleged injury. Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d
1099, 1118 (3d Cir.1989). As the Supreme Court has stated, the “inadequacy of . .
. training may serve as the basis for Section 1983 liability only where the failure to
train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of the persons with whom the
[official] ... come[s] into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388,
109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). Deliberate indifference may be
established where the need for more or different training is obvious, such as where
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the failure to train has caused a pattern of violations. See e.g. Berg v. County of
Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 23q2000) (discussing failure to train in the
context of municipality liability). Wesley fails to allege and identify with
particularity that these supervisory officials were personally involved in any
conduct or in a pattern of conduct that would demonstrate deliberate indifference.
The amended complaint is devoid of allegations that Mooney or Shafer
were personally involved in constitutional misconduct, or that they knew of, and
acquiesced in, or played an affirmative part in, the alleged underlying
unconstitutional conduct. Consequently, the amended complaint against them is
subject to dismissal.
3.
Loss of Property
Wesley alleges that the mishandling and loss of his personal property by
Defendants Doe, Bright, and Batiuk subsequent to his transfer from his housing
unit cell to a POC, violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
When bringing a § 1983 suit based on a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the plaintiff must identify or allege the deprived protected interest. Sample, 885
F.2d at 1113. Deprivation of inmate property by prison officials does not give rise
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to a cognizable due process claim if the prisoner is afforded an adequate postdeprivation remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding that
“an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not
constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is
available.”).
Through its grievance system, the DOC provides what the Third Circuit has
previously determined to be an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See, e.g.,
Dockery v. Beard, 509 F. App’x. 107, 114 (3d Cir. 2013) (non-precedential)
(stating “[w]e agree that [Plaintiff] received adequate due process for the
deductions . . . taken from his account because he took advantage of an adequate
post-deprivation remedy—the grievance process—to challenge these
assessments.”). In the matter sub judice, Wesley took full advantage of the
grievance system, albeit without success. (Doc. 1, p. 10). Where property has not
been returned to an inmate through the grievance process, as is the case here, the
Third Circuit has noted that adequate post-deprivation remedies are available to
those inmates through state tort law, such as a conversion action. Id. at 113–14
(citing Daniel v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (finding that negligent acts of
officials causing unintentional losses of property do not implicate due process);
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Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533 (stating intentional deprivations of property do not violate
due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss is available);
Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000); see
also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522(a), (b)(3) (waiving sovereign immunity with
respect to a common law action for conversion against the Commonwealth).
Wesley had adequate post-deprivation remedies. This claim is therefore subject to
dismissal.
Wesley also alleges that Defendants failure to comply with DOC policy DC815, Personal Property, State-Issued Items, and Commissary, Section 1, C,
Handling of Property for Transfers, and the DOC’s Code of Ethics, Section (b)(7),
violated his due process rights. (Doc.38, p. 2). The simple adoption and
application of state law procedures, policies and regulations does not ordain those
procedures, policies and regulations with federal constitutional protection. See Lee
v. Schrader, No. 2:13-cv-1757, 2014 WL 2112833, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 20, 2014)
citing United States v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1981). States may, under
certain circumstances, create liberty interests which are protected by the Due
Process Clause. Such liberty interests will be generally limited to freedom from
restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as
to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless
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imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. 472, 483–84 (2003). In this context,
there is no federal constitutional liberty interest in having state officers follow state
law or prison officials follow prison regulations. Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844,
847 (8th Cir. 2003). See also Culbert v. Young, 834 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir.1987)
(finding the adoption of procedural guidelines does not give rise to a liberty
interest; thus, the failure to follow regulations does not, in and of itself, result in a
violation of due process). And clearly, the failure to follow regulations or
procedures did not impose upon Wesley an atypical and significant hardship in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. This claim is therefore subject to
dismissal.
4.
Leave to Amend
The Court recognizes that the sufficiency of this pro se pleading must be
construed liberally in favor of Wesley, even after Iqbal. See Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89 (2007). The federal rules allow for liberal amendments in light of the
“principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the
merits.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (citations and internal
quotations omitted). Consequently, a complaint should not be dismissed with
prejudice for failure to state a claim without granting leave to amend, “unless such
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an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245 (citing
Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). A careful review of the
amended complaint dictates that Wesley, even affording him all the liberalities that
accompany his pro se status, fails to state any claims under § 1983 for which relief
may be granted. The legal and factual deficiencies in the amended complaint
render the pleading incurable. Therefore, affording him leave to amend would be
futile.
B.
State Law Claims
District courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons
for declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1–4). Since the claim that forms the basis of this Court’s
jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 will be dismissed, the court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Wesley’s state law negligence claim.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion (Doc. 39) to dismiss will be
granted.
A separate order will enter.
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