Williams v. Board of Supervisors Conewago Township et al

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM re Mtns to Strike 11 and to Dismiss 13 (Order to follow as separate docket entry) Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 12/4/14. (ma)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAVID WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff
vs.

CONEWAGO TOWNSHIP BOARD
OF SUPERVISORS, et al.,
Defendants

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: CIVIL NO. 1:14-CV-1761
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MEMORANDUM
I.

Introduction
On September 10, 2014, Plaintiff David Williams filed suit against the

Conewago Township Board of Supervisors, alleging that he suffered retaliation in
violation of the First Amendment and that Defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy.
(Doc. 1). On October 2, 2014, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss, arguing
that Plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. (Doc. 13). Plaintiff
contends that he has set forth sufficient facts to meet the pleading standard. (Doc. 19 at
6). For the reasons that follow, we will grant the motion.
II.

Background
The following facts are set forth in Plaintiff’s complaint and are taken as

true, as they must be when considering a motion to dismiss, Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009): Plaintiff, David Williams, is the Chief of Police for the
Conewago Township Police Department. (Doc. 1, ¶ 13). Defendants are members of

the township’s Board of Supervisors. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 3-7). On August 19, 2013, the police
department executed a collective bargaining agreement with Conewago Township. (Id.,
¶ 16). On October 21, 2013, Defendant Krum telephoned Plaintiff and instructed him to
attend a Board of Supervisors Executive Session meeting. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21). At that
meeting, Plaintiff was told to fire one of his detectives–Patrolman Hartlaub–because
Hartlaub had been involved in the negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement and
had filed a grievance. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23). Following this meeting, Defendants repeatedly
asked Plaintiff if he had fired Hartlaub. (Id., ¶ 27). Defendants also asked Plaintiff to fire
Officer Alridge because he suffered a work-related injury and he did not make enough
traffic arrests. (Id., ¶ 57). When Plaintiff refused to fire these officers, Defendants
retaliated against him. (Doc. 1, ¶ 26).
Plaintiff has identified several incidents that he claims constitute unlawful
retaliation. The first instance of alleged retaliation occurred in June 2014, when
Defendants instructed Plaintiff to install a new IT system in the police department,
despite knowing that Plaintiff was not knowledgeable in the area of IT. (Id., ¶¶ 60-63).
Plaintiff properly installed the system. (Id. ¶ 64). Next, Defendants asked Plaintiff to
purchase a new copier/fax machine for the police department, even though this task was
not normally part of his duties. (Doc. 1, ¶ 66). Plaintiff purchased the copier, but was
reprimanded regarding the specifications of the copier during a July 2014 township
meeting. (Id., ¶¶ 67, 73). Plaintiff was also disciplined for using a township vehicle to
drive a short distance to wish another township employee happy birthday. (Id., ¶ 76).

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On an unspecified date, Defendant Bortner instructed Plaintiff not to hire a replacement
officer when one of the officers left the department, even though the collective bargaining
agreement required that the officer be replaced. (Id. ¶¶ 80-83). Contrary to Bortner’s
instructions, Plaintiff hired a replacement officer. (Id. ¶ 85). Despite the fact that it was
cramped, Defendant Bortner refused to expand the police facility. (Id., ¶ 86). Finally,
Plaintiff was given the duty of disposing of the trash at the police department, was
assigned additional overtime, and was required to produce a doctor’s note when he was
absent for more than two days. (Id., ¶¶ 90, 93, 95). As a result of Defendants’ actions,
Plaintiff claims that his employment with Conewago Township is now in serious jeopardy.
(Id., ¶ 26).
III.

Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” Under Rule 12(b)(6), we must “accept all factual
allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be
entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). While a complaint
need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), and
detailed factual allegations are not required, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, (2007), a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

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plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556). “[L]abels and conclusions” are not enough, and a court is “‘not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(quoted case omitted).
In resolving a motion to dismiss, we thus “conduct a two-part analysis.”
Fowler, supra, 578 F.3d at 210. First, we separate the factual elements from the legal
elements and disregard the legal conclusions. Id. at 210-11. Second, we “determine
whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a
‘plausible claim for relief.’” Id. at 211 (quoted case omitted).
B. First Amendment Retaliation Claim (Count I)
To state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, Plaintiff must show: (1)
that the activity in question is protected by the First Amendment, and (2) that the
protected activity was a substantial factor in the alleged retaliatory action. Hill v. Borough
of Kutztown, 455 F.2d 225, 241 (3d Cir. 2006). “A public employee’s statement is
protected activity when (1) in making it, the employee spoke as a citizen, (2) the
statement involved a matter of public concern, and (3) the government employer did not
have an ‘adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other
member of the general public’ as a result of the statement he made.” Id. (quoting
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)).

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Plaintiff claims that his refusal to retaliate against and/or fire the police
officers under his supervision constitutes protected activity. (Doc. 19 at 7-8). In order to
determine whether Plaintiff’s activity is indeed protected, we must decide whether his
speech was made as a citizen or pursuant to his official duties. Here, it is obvious that
Plaintiff’s speech was made in his capacity as the Chief of Police. A citizen would have
no standing to fire or to discipline a police officer. In fact, in his complaint, Plaintiff
explicitly states that he was acting in his capacity as the Chief of Police when he refused
to fire the officers. See Doc. 1, ¶ 101 (stating that Plaintiff “had every right . . . to express
himself in his capacity as Chief of Police of Conewago Township with respect to his
refusal to retaliate . . . against the police officers . . . .”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff
specifically alleges that he had “a duty as Chief of Police, to uphold the law and therefore
was within his First Amendment rights when he articulated his refusal to violate the
Collective Bargaining Agreement . . . .” (Id., ¶ 102). Because Plaintiff’s speech was
made pursuant to his official duties, it is not protected by the First Amendment. We will
dismiss count one of the complaint without prejudice.
C. Section 1985 Conspiracy Claim
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) was originally part of Section 2 of the Klu Klux Klan Act
of 1871, and is intended to provide a federal remedy for those suffering racial or other
class-based discrimination. Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134-35 (3d Cir.
2006). To state a claim under Section 1985(3), Plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy;
(2) for the purpose of depriving any person or class of persons the equal protection of the

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laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is injured or
deprived of his rights. Id. “[A] plaintiff must allege both that the conspiracy was
motivated by discriminatory animus against an identifiable class and that the
discrimination against the identifiable class was invidious.” Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that support a claim of racial or other class-based
discrimination. While Plaintiff appears to be claiming that Defendants discriminated
against him on the basis of his union membership, Section 1985(3) does not protect
against discrimination based on political affiliations, including union membership or nonmembership. See United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 610, AFLCIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 838 (1983); Farber, 440 F.3d at 138-43. Because Plaintiff
has failed to allege any facts regarding a class-based conspiracy, we will dismiss count
two of the complaint without prejudice.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 13) will

be granted. We will issue an appropriate order.

/s/William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge

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