King v. Mansfield University of Pennsylvania et al

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM re pltf's MOTION to Remand 6 filed by Patrick King (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 08/05/15. (ma)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PATRICK KING,
Plaintiff
v.
MANSFIELD UNIVERSITY OF,
PENNSYLVANIA, et al.,
Defendants

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil No. 1:15-CV-0159

Judge Sylvia H. Rambo

MEMORANDUM
Presently before the court is Plaintiff Patrick King’s motion for remand,
wherein he asserts that Defendants’ notice of removal is defective because
Defendants failed to attach the writ of summons issued in the state court proceeding
in violation of 28 U.S.C. Section 1446(a), and because Defendants failed to clearly
aver that all Defendants either joined or consented to the notice of removal, in
violation of 28 U.S.C. Section 1446(b)(2)(A). (Doc. 6.) In the alternative, Plaintiff
argues that, should the court find removal proper, it should remand the state law
claims for lack of supplemental jurisdiction because they do not arise out of the same
nucleus of operative fact as Plaintiff’s federal claim. For the reasons that follow,
Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
Background1

I.

On December 24, 2014, Plaintiff Patrick King (“Plaintiff”) filed a
complaint in the Court of Common Pleas in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, Docket
Number 2014-cv-09560, against Defendants Mansfield University of Pennsylvania
For the purposes of the motion sub judice, the court will accept as true all wellpleaded factual allegations contained in the complaint. (Doc. 1-1.)
1

(“Mansfield University”), the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education
(“PASSHE”), John Halsted, and Christine Shegan (collectively, “Defendants”).2
(Doc. 1, ¶¶ 1-2.) In the complaint, Plaintiff alleged that, while he was a student and
employee of Defendant Mansfield University, he was sexually harassed and sexually
assaulted by another Mansfield University employee, John Estep. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 1523.) Plaintiff also alleged that he reported the sexual harassment and assault to
Mansfield University’s Vice President of Student Affairs, Joseph Maresco, who told
Plaintiff that the complaint would be handled by Mansfield University’s human
resources office. (Id. ¶¶ 24-27.) However, according to Plaintiff, no one from the
human resources office ever followed up with him, and Estep resumed his sexual
harassment. (Id. ¶¶ 28-33.) In 2004, after suffering from depression and moving off
of the Mansfield University campus, Plaintiff reported Estep’s sexual harassment and
assault to Defendant Mansfield Univeristy’s campus police. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 38-39, 48.)
A day or so after reporting Estep’s conduct, Plaintiff received a call from someone
purporting to be from the campus police, but there was never any subsequent follow
up by the campus police or any other law enforcement agency. (Id. ¶ 49.) When
Plaintiff inquired as to the status of his report, no one at Defendant Mansfield

Plaintiff previously filed a related case consisting of several federal and state
discrimination claims that arose out of the same set of facts as the instant case. (See King v. Mansfield
Univ. of Pa., Civ. No. 11-cv-1112, Doc. 33, Am. Compl. (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2013)). Following a
lengthy period of discovery, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff's
federal causes of action were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and that the facts of record
failed to establish the existence of a hostile work environment. (See id. at Doc. 64.) By memorandum
and order dated July 28, 2014, the court granted Defendants’ motion, finding that Plaintiff’s federal
claims were untimely and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). King v. Mansfield Univ. of Pa., Civ. No. 11-cv-1112, 2014 WL
3734551 (M.D. Pa. July 28, 2014). The previous complaint included a § 1983 claim against unknown
defendants listed as “John Doe” and “Richard Roe.” Because Plaintiff was unable to discover the names
of the unknown defendants, the § 1983 claim was dismissed. The complaint in the instant action
includes the same § 1983 claim, now identifying the previously unknown parties as Defendants John
Halsted and Christine Shegan.
2

2

University could locate any record, written or otherwise, of his reports to the human
relations office or campus police. (Id. ¶¶ 55, 93.)
Based on these facts, Plaintiff filed his state court action, asserting
various state law claims for discrimination and a violation of Pennsylvania’s
Criminal History Record Information Act, 18 P.S. § 9101, along with a federal claim
against Defendants Halsted and Shegan for depriving him of his right to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants removed Plaintiff’s action from state court to the Middle District of
Pennsylvania on January 23, 2015. (Doc. 1.)
On February 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand (Doc.
6), followed by a brief in support on March 9, 2015 (Doc. 8). Defendants filed a
brief in opposition on March 26, 2015 (Doc. 9), and Plaintiff replied on April 7,
2015 (Doc. 10). Thus, the motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
II.

Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), defendants may remove a civil action filed

in a state court if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the
action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Defendants seeking removal of an action must file a
petition for removal with the district court within thirty days of plaintiff's service of
the complaint upon defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). A plaintiff, in turn, may
seek to remand the action back to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) for “(1) lack
of district court subject matter jurisdiction or (2) a defect in the removal procedure.”
Ramos v. Quien, 631 F. Supp. 2d 601, 607 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (quoting PAS v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 7 F.3d 349, 352 (3d Cir. 1993)); see also Balazik v. Cnty. of
Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 1995). Upon a motion to remand, the removing
3

defendants bear the burden of proving the existence of federal jurisdiction, In re
Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 836 F. Supp. 2d 290, 294 (E.D. Pa. 2011)
(citing Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 359 (3d Cir. 1995)), as well as
establishing that all pertinent procedural requirements for removal have been met.
Shadie v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 254 F. Supp. 2d 509, 514 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (citing
Boyer v. Snap–On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990)). Moreover, it is
well-settled that courts must “construe removal statutes strictly with all doubts
resolved in favor of remand.” USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 190, 205
n.12 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 (3d
Cir. 1992); Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010
(3d Cir. 1987); Corwin Jeep Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Am. Motor Sales Corp., 670 F.
Supp. 591, 592 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
III.

Discussion
Defendants argue that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s federal claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). (Doc.
1-1 at ¶ 4.) While Plaintiff does not contest the court’s subject matter jurisdiction
over his federal claim, he argues that there were defects in the removal process
warranting remand. Plaintiff further argues that the court should not exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims because they do not form part of
the same case or controversy as his lone federal claim.
In his motion for remand, Plaintiff alleges that there were two defects in
the removal process that dictate his case be remanded to state court. First, Plaintiff
claims that Defendants violated the “rule of unanimity” by failing to provide
4

individual written statements of joinder or consent to removal, as required by 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). (Doc. 8, p. 4 of 20.) Second, Plaintiff claims that
Defendants failed to attach the writ of summons in the state court proceeding to the
notice of removal, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). (Doc. 8, p. 8 of 20.) In
response, Defendants contend that they each provided clear consent to the notice of
removal, as required by the rule of unanimity, because they share the same counsel,
thus making the notice of removal a joint notice among all of the defendants. (Doc.
9, p. 3 of 15.) Although Defendants acknowledge that they failed to attach the writ
of summons from the state court proceeding to their notice of removal, they contend
that the defect was cured when the state court sent the complete record, including the
writ of summons, to this court on February 4, 2015. (Id. at p. 7.) The court will
address these arguments in turn.
A.

Rule of Unanimity

Although not explicitly stated in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), it is well-settled
that the rule of unanimity requires that all defendants in a suit involving multiple
defendants must join in the notice of removal or otherwise consent to the removal
within thirty days. See Balazik, 44 F.3d at 213 (citing Chicago, Rock Island & Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 247 (1900)); see also Di Loreto v. Costigan, 351 F.
App’x 747, 752 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir.
1985)); Ogletree v. Barnes, 851 F. Supp. 184, 186 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citations
omitted). To satisfy this requirement, “there must be some timely filed written
indication from each defendant, or some person or entity purporting to formally act
on its behalf . . . and [with] authority to do so, that it has actually consented to
[removal].” Ogletree, 851 F. Supp. at 188 (quoting Getty Oil, Div. of Texaco, Inc. v.
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1262 n.11 (5th Cir. 1988)).
5

Relying almost entirely on McGuire v. Safeware, Inc., Civ. No. 13-cv3746, 2013 WL 5272767 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2013), Plaintiff argues that the rule of
unanimity requires separate written statements from each individual defendant
evidencing his or her consent to removal. (Doc. 8, p. 7.) Plaintiff’s reliance,
however, is misguided. In McGuire, unlike in the instant case, the defendants were
represented by separate counsel. Counsel representing one of the defendants filed a
notice of removal, to which the remaining two defendants did not consent in any
written submission to the court. McGuire, 2013 WL 5272767 at *2. In ordering the
case remanded, the Eastern District explained that some written indication of consent
to removal must be given by each of the defendants or someone with authority to act
on their behalf, id. at *3 (citing Ogletree, 851 F. Supp. at 188), and added that “most
courts require all defendants to voice their consent directly to the court,” id. (quoting
Michaels v. New Jersey, Civ. No. 96-cv-3557, 1996 WL 787613, *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 8,
1996)). Here, Defendants voiced their consent to removal directly to the court in the
notice of removal, filed by counsel with the authority to act on their behalf. Because
the notice of removal refers only to “Defendants” – plural – and Defendants share the
same counsel, the court finds that the notice provided written indication that all of
the Defendants consented to the removal. Accordingly, Defendants have satisfied
the rule of unanimity and complied with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
B.

Failure to Attach Writ of Summons

Plaintiff next argues that Defendants’ failure to attach the writ of
summons from the state court proceeding to the notice of removal to federal court
amounts to a fatal procedural defect that mandates remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1446(a). (Doc. 8, p. 8 of 20.) Defendants contend that their failure to attach the writ
of summons is not a jurisdictional defect, and was remedied when the state court sent
6

the writ of summons to this court on February 4, 2015. (Doc. 9, p. 7 of 15.) The
court agrees with Defendants.
While § 1446(a) requires a removal notice to include “a copy of all
process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such
action,” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), “[o]missions which are merely formal or modal do not
affect the right to remove and may be subsequently remedied.” Efford v. Milam, 368
F. Supp. 2d 380, 383 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(b)); see Royal Indem.
Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co. Inc., Civ. No. 07-cv-2048, 2007 WL 4171649, *2 (D.N.J.
Nov. 19, 2007) (refusing to remand based on failure to attach all accompanying
documents to the notice of removal). Indeed, the majority of the Circuit Courts
addressing the issue have held that the failure to attach process from the original state
court proceeding, such as a writ of summons, to the notice of removal, is a de
minimus procedural defect that is curable after removal. See, e.g., Kuxhausen v.
BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that failure
to attach complaint from state court proceeding was a “‘de minimus procedural
defect [that] was curable’ even ‘after expiration of the thirty-day removal period.”)
(quoting Countryman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 639 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2011))
(“The majority view is that a removing party’s failure to attach[] the required state
court papers to a notice of removal is a mere procedural defect that is curable.”);
Cook v. Randolph Cnty., Ga., 573 F.3d 1143, 1150 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that the
removing party’s failure to include state court pleadings and process was not a
jurisdictional defect); Riehl v. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 1967)
(stating that failure to include the state court complaint was “a minor irregularity of
no consequence”); Covington v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 251 F.2d 930, 932-33
(5th Cir. 1958) (holding that failure to include all state court pleadings and process
7

was a procedural, not jurisdictional, defect, and missing state court papers could be
provided later); see also 14C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 3733 (4th ed. 2011) (“[T]he failure to file all the state
court papers . . . [is] curable in the federal court”) (footnotes omitted).
The court agrees that Defendants’ initial failure to attach the writ of
summons from the state court proceeding to their notice of removal was a de
minimus procedural defect that does not necessitate remand. The defect was cured
when the court received the full record, including the writ of summons, from the
Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas on February 4, 2015, a mere twelve days
after Defendants filed their notice of removal. Accordingly, the court will not order
remand on this basis.
C.

Supplemental Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims

It is well-settled that in any civil action where a district court has
original jurisdiction over a federal claim, it “shall have supplemental jurisdiction
over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. §1367(a). State and federal claims form
part of the same case or controversy when they “derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact and are such that a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them
in one judicial proceeding.” Arnold v. Kimberly Quality Care Nursing Servs., 762 F.
Supp. 1182, 1186 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). A district court may nonetheless decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if:
1)

the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State
law,

8

2)

the claim substantially predominates over the claim
or claims over which the district court has original
jurisdiction,

3)

the district court has dismissed all claims over which
it has original jurisdiction, or

4)

In exceptional circumstances, there are compelling
reasons for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). “[W]hen deciding whether to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every
stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and
comity.” City of Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (quoting
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)).
Plaintiff does not dispute that his § 1983 claim against Defendants
Shegan and Halsted falls within the court’s original jurisdiction. (Doc. 8, pp. 15-16
of 20.) Rather, Plaintiff argues that the state law claims do not arise out of the same
nucleus of operative fact, or, in the alternative, that the court should decline to
exercise its supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to the factors outlined in 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c). (Doc. 8, pp. 14-20 of 20.) Defendants contend that the state law claims do,
in fact, arise out of the same set of operative fact as the federal claim and therefore
should not be remanded. (Doc. 9, pp. 10-12 of 15.) Defendants further argue that
the interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity would all be
served by the court retaining the state law claims. (Id. at pp. 12-14 of 15.)
After careful review of the complaint, the court concludes that
Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same common nucleus of operative fact such that
Plaintiff ordinarily would be expected to bring them in a single proceeding.3 See

3

In fact, Plaintiff has now brought his claims arising out of the facts alleged in his
(continued...)
9

Arnold, 762 F. Supp. at 1186. Each of Plaintiff’s claims arise out of his allegations
that Estep sexually harassed and assaulted him, that Defendants failed to conduct a
sufficient investigation into his reports regarding Estep’s alleged misconduct,
including allegedly destroying evidence of Plaintiff’s reports, and that, as a result,
Plaintiff suffered discrimination, depression, and severe emotional distress. A
review of each count contained in Plaintiff’s complaint demonstrates the
interrelatedness of the claims.
In Counts I and II of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, by not
adequately investigating his sexual harassment complaints against Estep, Defendants
Mansfield University and PASSHE violated his rights under Pennsylvania law by
failing to provide a workplace and educational environment free of discrimination.
(Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 61, 67.) In Count V, Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim against
Defendants Shegan and Halstead for failing to create—or subsequently
destroying—a record of his report to campus police regarding Estep’s harassment,
thereby violating his right to equal protection of the law. (Id. at ¶ 97.) In Count VI,
Plaintiff asserts a state law claim against Defendants Shegan and Halstead based on
their actions as alleged in Count V. (Id. at ¶¶ 111-25.) Finally, in Counts III and IV,
Plaintiff asserts state law claims against Defendants Mansfield University and
PASSHE for providing a hostile educational environment and failing to
accommodate his disability, i.e., depression, in violation of the Pennsylvania Fair
Education Opportunities Act. (Id. at ¶¶ 70-84, 88-89.)
Thus, as is apparent from the complaint, the court finds that Plaintiff’s
federal and state law claims all arise out of the same common nucleus of operative
3

(...continued)
complaint in a single proceeding twice, both in the instant case and his prior federal suit mentioned in
Footnote 1, supra, which contained substantially similar claims to the instant case.
10

fact and form part of the same case or controversy as required by 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a). Accordingly, the court finds that it may properly exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. The remaining question is whether the
court should nonetheless decline to exercise such jurisdiction pursuant to those
factors contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), or if judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity would best be served by the court retaining jurisdiction over all
claims. See Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350.
As provided above, a district court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims if there are novel or complex issues of state law,
the state law claims substantially predominate over the federal claims, the court has
disposed of all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, or exceptional
circumstances for declining jurisdiction exist. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Although
Plaintiff argues that Subsections 1, 2, and 4 of § 1367(c) weigh in favor of the court
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the court disagrees. As to Subsection
1, Plaintiff argues that his Pennsylvania Criminal History Record Information Act
claim raises a novel issue of state law, specifically, whether a cause of action is
created under the Act “where the person or agency who is legally required to create,
store, and accurately report criminal history record information fails to do so.” (Doc.
8, p. 19 of 20.) While district courts properly defer to state courts for resolution of
complex issues of first impression under state law, Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,
621 F. Supp. 2d 230, 238 (M.D. Pa. 2007), and Plaintiff’s specific claim may,
indeed, be novel, the court finds nothing overly complex about the claim that cannot
be resolved by referring to the plain meaning of the statute. See Winingear v. City of
Norfolk, Va., Civ No. 12-cv-560, 2013 WL 5672668, *4 (E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2013)
(retaining supplemental jurisdiction over claim where statute was clear on its face
11

and not “so complex that it require[d] judicial interpretation.”). Furthermore, §
1367(c) does not require a district court to remand when a claim raises a novel or
complex question of state law. Rather, § 1367(c) “is permissive – it merely allows a
district court to dispose of a state claim over which it could exercise supplemental
jurisdiction.” Isaac v. North Carolina Dep’t of Transp., 192 F. App’x 197, 200 (4th
Cir. 2006). Regarding Subsection 4, Plaintiff argues that exceptional circumstances
are presented because the court previously declined to exercise its supplemental
jurisdiction over the same claims in Plaintiff’s prior related suit. (Doc. 8, p. 20 of
20.) However, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) because it had disposed of all of Plaintiff’s federal claims.
See King, 2014 WL 3734551 at *15. Rather than constituting a compelling reason
for remand, this factor weighs in favor of retaining jurisdiction over the state claims
in the interest of judicial economy due to the court’s familiarity with the underlying
facts. See Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that his state law claims substantially
predominate over his lone federal claim, and therefore the court should decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction. However, the “substantially predominates”
standard of § 1367(c)(2) “was fashioned as a limited exception to the operation of
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction – a doctrine that seeks to promote judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants by litigating in one case all claims
that arise out of the same nucleus of operative fact.” Borough of W. Mifflin v.
Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727.
“Federal courts evaluate the predominance of state claims by reference to three
factors: (1) the evidentiary proof required to advance them, (2) the
comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, and (3) the scope of issues that they raise.”
12

Whitney v. Marut, Civ. No. 07-cv-0089, 2008 WL 919826, *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 3,
2008) (citing Mazurkiewicz v. Doylestown Hosp., 223 F. Supp. 2d 661, 667 (E.D. Pa.
2002)); see also De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 309 (3d Cir. 2003).
Here, the evidence needed to support the state claims, specifically, evidence related
to the lack of investigation and potential destruction of records, is highly relevant, if
not identical, to the evidence needed to support Plaintiff’s federal claim. In addition,
the remedy sought for the state claims is the same as the remedy sought for the
federal claim, namely, compensatory damages related to Plaintiff’s alleged
depression. See Lancaster, 45 F.3d at 789 (“[A]voiding duplicative recoveries is a
factor tending to weigh against litigating related federal and state claims in different
fora.”) (citing Sparks v. Hershey, 661 F.2d 30, 33-34 (3d Cir. 1981)). Finally, the
scope of the issues raised does not differ greatly between the state claims and the
federal claim because the state and federal claims “functionally overlap.” Whitney,
2008 WL 919826, at *3. While it is true that the state law claims outnumber
Plaintiff’s single federal claim, predomination of state claims is not established
“simply by a numerical count of the state and federal claims the plaintiff has chosen
to assert on the basis of the same set of facts.” Lancaster, 45 F.3d at 789.
Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiff’s state law claims do not
substantially predominate over his federal claim. Rather, the court finds that the
interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity will best be served
by retaining jurisdiction over all claims. Not only do Plaintiff’s state law claims and
federal claim overlap in the evidence that would be needed to support them, the
remedies sought for each claim, and the issues raised by the claims, but as Plaintiff
himself states in his supporting brief, “[the c]ourt is very familiar with the facts and
circumstances” of the instant case due to the nearly identical federal action that
13

Plaintiff previously filed in this court. (Doc. 8, p. 1 of 20.) Therefore, the court will
exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the court finds that the procedural

inadequacies in Defendants’ notice of removal did not create a jurisdictional defect
that would invalidate removal. Defendants clearly manifested their joinder and
consent to removal when single counsel representing all Defendants filed the notice
of removal on their behalf, and the court received all pleadings and process in the
state court action when the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas forwarded its
full record on February 4, 2015, a mere twelve days after Defendants filed their
notice of removal. Additionally, the court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s §
1983 claim, as well as supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over
Plaintiff’s related state law claims, which arise out of the same nucleus of operative
fact as his federal claim. Therefore, the court will deny Plaintiff’s motion to remand
in its entirety.
An appropriate order will issue.

s/Sylvia H. Rambo
United States District Judge
Dated: August 5, 2015.

14