Manuel v. NRA Group, LLC et al

Filing 72

ORDER denying NRA's motion to dismiss 64 . (See order for complete details.) Signed by Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner on 11/22/16. (ki)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PETERSON MANUEL,
Plaintiff
v.
NRA GROUP, LLC,
Defendant

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-274
(Chief Judge Conner)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016, upon consideration of the
motion (Doc. 64) to dismiss filed by defendant NRA Group, LLC (“NRA”), wherein
NRA asserts the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), because plaintiff Peterson Manuel
(“Manuel”) does not have Article III standing following the Supreme Court of the
United States’ decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547-48 (2016),
(Doc. 65 at 10-13), and the court observing that constitutional standing
requirements derive from the grant of jurisdiction in the United States Constitution
to federal courts over “actual cases and controversies,” U.S. CONST. art. III; Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992), and the court noting that when a plaintiff
asserts claims for violation of a federal statute, he must satisfy both statutory1 and
constitutional standing requirements, see AT&T Commc’ns of N.J., Inc. v. Verizon,
N.J., Inc., 270 F.3d 162, 170 (3d Cir.2001) (citing U.S. CONST. art. III; Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 560-61), and it appearing that a plaintiff must at minimum show that he suffered

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Statutory standing is not contested sub judice, as it is clearly established by
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).

an injury-in-fact, to wit: “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations and quotations omitted), and it
further appearing that the Supreme Court ruled in Spokeo that a plaintiff does not
automatically satisfy “the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a
person a statutory right . . . [because] Article III standing requires a concrete injury
even in the context of a statutory violation,” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549, and the
court finding that the emerging consensus in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals is
that the Supreme Court’s holding in Spokeo does not preclude a ruling that
invasion of a plaintiff’s privacy interests after receiving automated calls and the
nuisance created thereby constitutes concrete and particularized injury-in-fact, see
Leyse v. Bank of Am., No. 11-07128, 2016 WL 5928683, at *4-5 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2016);
Stoops v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:15-83, 2016 WL 3566266, at *9 (W.D. Pa.
June 24, 2016), and the court concluding that Manuel established invasion of
privacy and nuisance by demonstrating that NRA used an autodialing device to
send him automated calls, as set forth in the court’s memorandum opinion (Doc. 52)
dated August 5, 2016, (id. at 4 n.2), it is hereby ORDERED that NRA’s motion (Doc.
64) to dismiss is DENIED.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania