Keiser v. The Borough of Carlisle

Filing 103

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part 59 MOTION in Limine TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANTS BOROUGH MANAGERS CLERGY STATUS filed by Michael T. Keiser. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on September 1, 2017. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL T. KEISER,
Plaintiff
v.
THE BOROUGH OF CARLISLE,
Defendant

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Civil No. 1:15-CV-450
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a workplace age discrimination lawsuit brought by the plaintiff
against a local municipality under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621 (“ADEA”). The plaintiff in this action, Michael Keiser, worked for
27 years as the Director of Public Works for the Borough of Carlisle before he was
fired on May 1, 2014, just hours after formally complaining to his supervisor about
what he perceived as his supervisor’s repeated ageist and discriminatory comments
and criticism. Keiser alleges that his firing constituted unlawful age discrimination
and was retaliatory.
The Borough, and Keiser’s supervisor, Mathew H. Candland, Sr., maintain
that Candland was compelled to terminate Keiser’s employment because it had
become impossible to work cooperatively with Keiser; because of fundamental
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disagreements over significant public-works projects; and because morale had
reached an unacceptable low within Keiser’s department. Keiser retorts that these
given reasons are pretextual cover for his unlawful firing, which is belied by
evidence of Candland’s discriminatory comments and other evidence in the record
that cast doubt on Candland’s articulated justification.
With respect to these competing claims and defenses, we have previously
concluded that this case is riddled with factual disputes that make summary
judgment inappropriate. Accordingly, we have scheduled this case for trial in
October, 2017 and in anticipation of that trial the parties have filed an array of
motions in limine, including a motion in limine filed by the plaintiff which seeks to
exclude evidence of Candland’s clergy status from the trial of this case. (Doc. 59.)
The parties have fully briefed this motion in limine, (Docs. 60 and 87), and this
motion is, therefore, ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, this motion in limine will be granted, in part,
as described below.
II.

Discussion

The Court is vested with broad inherent authority to manage its cases, which
carries with it the discretion and authority to rule on motions in limine prior to trial.
See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984); In re Japanese Elec. Prods.
Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 260 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds sub
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nom., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (the
court exercises its discretion to rule in limine on evidentiary issues “in appropriate
cases”). Courts may exercise this discretion in order to ensure that juries are not
exposed to unfairly prejudicial, confusing or irrelevant evidence. United States v.
Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1988). Courts may also do so in order to
“narrow the evidentiary issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial
interruptions.” Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir.
1990) (citation omitted).
However, courts should be careful before indulging in pre-trial rulings
excluding evidence. Parties frequently invite courts to make pre-trial rulings on
issues of prejudice, relevance and admissibility through motions in limine. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has cautioned us, however,
that “pretrial [rulings regarding evidentiary] exclusions should rarely be granted. . .
. Excluding evidence as being more prejudicial than probative at the pretrial stage
is an extreme measure that is rarely necessary, because no harm is done by
admitting it at that stage.” In re Paoli R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 859 (3d
Cir. 1990); see also Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 453 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that
the Third Circuit’s “cautious approach to Rule 403 exclusions at the pretrial stage .
. . .”). Moreover, the Third Circuit has characterized Rule 403, the rule permitting
exclusion of evidence, as a “trial-oriented rule” and has warned that “[p]recipitous
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Rule 403 determinations, before the challenging party has had an opportunity to
develop the record, are . . . unfair and improper.” In re Paoli R. Yard PCB Litig.,
916 F.2d at 859. However, it is also well-settled that “[a] trial court is afforded
substantial discretion when striking a . . . balance with respect to proffered
evidence, and a trial judge’s decision to admit or exclude evidence . . . may not be
reversed unless it is arbitrary and irrational.” McKenna v. City of Philadelphia,
582 F.3d 447, 461 (3d Cir. 2009).
Legally, there are several different bases for motions in limine. First, such
motions are filed when it is alleged that evidence is going to be offered which is
improper under the Federal Rules of Evidence. In considering motions in limine
which call upon the Court to engage in preliminary evidentiary rulings under Rule
403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, we begin by recognizing that these
“evidentiary rulings [on motions in limine] are subject to the trial judge's discretion
and are therefore reviewed only for abuse of discretion ... Additionally, application
of the balancing test under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 will not be disturbed
unless it is ‘arbitrary and irrational.’ ” Abrams v. Lightolier Inc. 50 F.3d 1204,
1213 (3d Cir.1995) (citations omitted); see Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42
F.3d 149, 161 (3d Cir.1994) (reviewing in limine rulings for abuse of discretion).
Yet, while these decisions regarding the exclusion of evidence rest in the sound

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discretion of the district court, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that
discretion, the exercise of that discretion is guided by certain basic principles.
One of these key guiding principles is reflected in the philosophy which
shapes the rules of evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence can aptly be
characterized as evidentiary rules of inclusion, which are designed to broadly
permit fact-finders to consider pertinent factual information while searching for the
truth. The inclusionary quality of the rules is embodied in three cardinal concepts.
The first of these concepts is Rule 401's definition of relevant evidence. Rule 401
defines what is relevant in an expansive fashion, stating:
“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.
Fed. R. Evid. 401.
Adopting this view of relevance it has been held that: “Under [Rule] 401,
evidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.’ [Therefore] ‘It follows that evidence is
irrelevant only when it has no tendency to prove the fact. Thus the rule, while
giving judges great freedom to admit evidence, diminishes substantially their
authority to exclude evidence as irrelevant.’ ” Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F.

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Supp. 620, 626 (D.N.J.1996) citing Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 452 (3d
Cir.1994) (quotations omitted).
This quality of inclusion embraced by the Federal Rules of Evidence is
further buttressed by Rule 402, which generally defines the admissibility of
relevant evidence in sweeping terms, providing that:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of
Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible.
Fed. R. Evid. 402.
Thus, Rule 402 expressly provides that all “[r]elevant evidence will be admissible
unless the rules of evidence provide to the contrary.” United States v. Sriyuth, 98
F.3d 739, 745 (3d Cir.1996) (citations omitted).

These principles favoring

inclusion of evidence are, however, subject to some reasonable limitations.
For example, Rule 403 provides grounds for exclusion of some potentially
irrelevant but highly prejudicial evidence, stating that:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Fed. R. Evid. 403 .

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By permitting the exclusion of relevant evidence only when its probative
value is “substantially outweighed” by other prejudicial factors, Rule 403
underscores the principle that, while evidentiary rulings rest in the sound discretion
of the court, that discretion should consistently be exercised in a fashion which
favors the admission of relevant proof unless the relevance of that proof is
substantially outweighed by some other factors which caution against admission.
Rule 610 of the Federal Rules of Evidence then describes one of those
narrow categories of evidence which is deemed to be too attenuated, potentially
prejudicial, lacking in relevance, or fraught with risks of juror confusion to permit
at trial. That rule notes that: “Evidence of a witness's religious beliefs or opinions
is not admissible to attack or support the witness's credibility.” Fed. R. Evid. 610.
On this score it is well-settled that “ ‘[t]he purpose of the rule is to guard against
the prejudice which may result from disclosure of a witness's faith.’ United States
v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 666 (D.C.Cir.1980); see Contemporary Mission, Inc. v.
Bonded Mailings, Inc., 671 F.2d 81, 84 (2 Cir.1982) (inquiry into genuineness of
witness's church affiliation properly excluded by trial court because of potential
prejudicial effect).” United States v. Kalaydjian, 784 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1986).
Likewise Rule 610 “clearly prohibits such testimony when it is used to enhance the
witness' credibility.” Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Petersen, 553 F.2d 324, 328 (3d

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Cir. 1977). Thus, as a general matter under Rule 610 affirmations of faith may not
be used to either impeach or vouch for the credibility of a witness. Id.
Guided by these legal benchmarks, we will grant this motion in limine, in
part, as follows. Recognizing as a general matter that “[e]vidence of a witness's
religious beliefs or opinions is not admissible to attack or support the witness's
credibility,” Fed. R. Evid. 610, we will preclude counsel and witnesses from
referring to or eliciting testimony regarding the faith or clerical status of any
witness or party without the court’s prior express approval. If counsel believe that
inquiry on any matter of faith or clerical status is appropriate, counsel shall notify
the court outside the presence of the jury prior to eliciting any testimony on this
score and should be prepared to provide a detailed offer of proof explaining why
specific evidence or testimony does not transgress the prohibition established by
Rule 610. We provide this guidance to all parties because we recognize that the
defense has responded to this motion in limine by generally agreeing that it will
refrain from eliciting evidence of Mr. Candland’s clergy status, but has suggested
that certain types of cross examination may make limited testimony on matters of
faith relevant and admissible. Given the categorical language of Rule 610, any
party that believes that it may be entitled to foray into matters of faith shall follow
the procedures outlined in this order prior to engaging in any such inquiry before
the jury.
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An appropriate order follows.
III.

Order

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion in
limine, (Doc. 59), is GRANTED in part as follows: All counsel and witnesses are
prohibited from referring to or eliciting testimony regarding the faith or clerical
status of any witness or party without the court’s prior express approval. If counsel
believe that inquiry on any matter of faith or clerical status is appropriate, counsel
shall notify the court outside the presence of the jury prior to eliciting any
testimony on this score and should be prepared to provide a detailed offer of proof
explaining why specific evidence or testimony does not transgress the prohibition
established by Rule 610.
So ordered this 1st day of September, 2017.

/s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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