Gadra-Lord v. Vuksta et al

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM ORDER - Upon consideration of the pending motions for discovery (Docs. 26 and 27 .) as well as the motion to stay discovery (Doc. 29 .), IT IS ORDERED that further discovery is STAYED pending resolution of the outstanding dispositive motions filed by the defendant, and the plaintiffs motions for discovery (Docs. 26 and 27 .) are DENIED without prejudice to renewal upon resolution of these potentially dispositive motions. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on March 11, 2016. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JONATHAN GADRA-LORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEPUTY VUKSTA, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 1:15-CV-540

( Judge Kane)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM ORDER
THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:
Presently there are two potentially dispositive motions pending in this prisoner
civil rights lawsuit. (Docs. 18 and 23.) While these motions are pending, the plaintiff
has twice moved for further discovery, (Docs. 26 and 27.), inspiring the defendant to
seek a stay of discovery until these dispositive motions are resolved. (Doc. 29.) For
the reasons set forth below, in the exercise of our discretion we believe that the more
appropriate course is to stay further discovery pending resolution of these potentially
dispositive motions since the resolution of these motions will define in material ways
the scope of further discovery, or the need for any further discovery in this matter.

Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery
dispute. At the outset, the scope of discovery is defined by Rule 26(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides as follows:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope
of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense –
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good
cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)( C ).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the Court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
“committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the
scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the
Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus,
a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel
disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse
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of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983).
This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on
discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and
Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
We also note that our broad discretion over discovery matters extends to
decisions under Rule 26(c) relating to the issuance of protective orders limiting and
regulating the timing of discovery. Indeed, it is undisputed that: “ ‘[t]he grant and
nature of [a protective order] is singularly within the discretion of the district court
and may be reversed only on a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’ Galella v.

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Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d Cir.1973) (citation omitted).” Dove v. Atlantic
Capital Corp., 963 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1992). This discretion is guided, however, by
certain basic principles. One of these cardinal principles, governing the exercise of
discretion in this field, is that the district court may properly defer or delay discovery
while it considers a potentially dispositive pretrial motion, provided the district court
concludes that the pretrial motion does not, on its face, appear groundless. See, e.g.,
James v. York County Police Dep’t, 160 F.App’x 126, 136 (3d Cir. 2005); Nolan v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 973 F.2d 843,849 (10th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. New York Univ.
Sch. of Ed., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Briefly deferring discovery in
such a case, while the Court determines the threshold issue of whether a complaint
has sufficient merit to go forward, recognizes a simple, fundamental truth: Parties
who file motions which may present potentially meritorious and complete legal
defenses to civil actions should not be put to the time, expense and burden of factual
discovery until after these claimed legal defenses are addressed by the Court. In such
instances, it is clearly established that:
“[A] stay of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a potentially
dispositive motion where the motion ‘appear[s] to have substantial
grounds' or, stated another way, ‘do[es] not appear to be without
foundation in law.’ ” In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust
Litigation, 2002 WL 88278, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (quoting
Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp., 137 F.R.D. 209, 209-10
(S.D.N.Y.1991)) (citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 203
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F.R.D. 92, 2001 WL 396422, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2001); AntiMonopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1996 WL 101277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
March 7, 1996)).
Johnson v. New York Univ. School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Guided by these legal tenets we conclude that further discovery should be
briefly stayed at this time until after the court resolves the pending potentially
dispositive motions. We reach this conclusion in accordance with settled case law,
finding that: “[A] stay of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a potentially
dispositive motion where the motion ‘appear[s] to have substantial grounds' or, stated
another way, ‘do[es] not appear to be without foundation in law.’” Johnson v. New
York Univ. School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
An appropriate order follows:
Order
Upon consideration of the pending motions for discovery (Docs. 26 and 27.)
as well as the motion to stay discovery (Doc. 29.), IT IS ORDERED that further
discovery is STAYED pending resolution of the outstanding dispositive motions
filed by the defendant, and the plaintiff’s motions for discovery (Docs. 26 and 27.)
are DENIED without prejudice to renewal upon resolution of these potentially
dispositive motions.
So ordered this 11th day of March 2016.
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S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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