Coleman v. Wetzel et al

Filing 46

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT 42 of Magistrate Judge Mehalchick, DENYING defts' MTD 34 & REMANDING matter to Magistrate Judge Mehalchick for further proceedings. (See order for complete details.) Signed by Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner on 2/10/17. (ki)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DARREN D. COLEMAN,
Plaintiff
v.
JOHN E. WETZEL, et al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-847
(Chief Judge Conner)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 9th day of February, 2017, upon consideration of the
report (Doc. 42) of Magistrate Judge Karoline Mehalchick, recommending the
court deny the motion (Doc. 34) to dismiss filed by supervisory defendants John
E. Wetzel, Jon D. Fisher, and Mandy Biser, wherein Judge Mehalchick opines
that plaintiff Darren D. Coleman (“Coleman”) pleads sufficient facts to support
his failure to train claim against the supervisory defendants, to wit: that said
defendants were deliberately indifferent to the need to train or supervise their
corrections officers with respect to appropriate procedures for responding to and
protecting inmates from known threats of inmate violence, (see Doc. 42 at 6-9),
that the right to be protected from such threats is clearly established within the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals and our sister circuits, thus precluding a finding of
qualified immunity, (id. at 9-13 (collecting cases)), and that the complaint permits
an inference that the failure to train corrections officers to guard against such
threats was the “moving force” behind Coleman’s injury, (id. at 13), and the
court noting that the supervisory defendants filed objections (Doc. 43) to the

report, see FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2), and Coleman filed a response (Doc. 45) thereto,
and, following a de novo review of the contested portions of the report, see Behar
v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 791 F. Supp. 2d 383, 389 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1106 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989)), and applying
a clear error standard of review to the uncontested portions, see Cruz v. Chater,
990 F. Supp. 375, 376-78 (M.D. Pa. 1999), the court finding Judge Mehalchick’s
analysis to be thorough, well-reasoned, and fully supported by the record, and
finding the supervisory defendants’ objections (Doc. 43) to be without merit and
squarely addressed by the report,1 it is hereby ORDERED that:
1.

The report (Doc. 42) of Magistrate Judge Mehalchick is ADOPTED.

1

Defendants suggest that Judge Mehalchick failed to frame the contours of
the constitutional right at issue with sufficient precision in her qualified immunity
analysis. (See Doc. 44 at 6-11). Defendants (correctly) observe that the Supreme
Court’s per curiam opinion in Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015),
provides a cautionary tale for courts who frame constitutional rights at too high a
level of abstraction. (See Doc. 44 at 9-10). In Taylor, the Court reversed a court of
appeals’ decision extracting from the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
standard an affirmative requirement that prison administrators implement “suicide
screening or prevention protocols.” Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2044. The Court observed
that, although precedent established that prison officials may not act with “reckless
indifference” to known risks of prisoner suicide, no precedent clearly established
that officials must actively screen inmates for such vulnerabilities. Id. at 2044-45. In
other words, Taylor distinguishes the clearly established right to protection against
known threats from the yet unclear right to have potential threats identified. See id.
Contrary to defendants’ suggestion, Judge Mehalchick’s analysis accords
with the guidance of Taylor. Judge Mehalchick does not rely ambiguously on
generic Eighth Amendment standards of care—rather, she collects precedent
distinctly establishing that prison officials must protect inmates from known risks
to their physical safety. (See Doc. 42 at 9-13). Her conclusion that defendants sub
judice had a duty to train corrections officers consonant to that right aligns squarely
with Taylor. We thus reject defendants’ qualified immunity arguments for a second
time at this Rule 12(b)(6) stage. (Doc. 25 at 2 ¶ 2). We note, however, that our
rejection of defendants’ qualified immunity argument is without prejudice to
defendants’ right to reassert the defense if appropriate following discovery.
2

2.

Defendants’ motion (Doc. 34) to dismiss is DENIED.

3.

This matter is REMANDED to Magistrate Judge Mehalchick for
further proceedings.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania