Brown v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections
Filing
139
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part 115 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence Pertaining to Claims that were Dismissed. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on January 26, 2021. (kjn)
Case 1:15-cv-00918-CCC Document 139 Filed 01/26/21 Page 1 of 10
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAWN L. BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, DEPT. OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 1:15-CV-918
(Judge Conner)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I.
Factual Background
The plaintiff, Dawn Brown, is a former employee of the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections. In 2015, Brown brought a series of sweeping workplace
discrimination claims against her former employers. This case has been pending for
nearly six years. Over the span of this longstanding litigation, the remaining claims
in Brown’s lawsuit have been narrowed considerably. At this juncture, Brown’s sole
remaining legal claim is an allegation that she was discharged in July of 2015 in
retaliation for the exercise of her First Amendment rights.
With the extant claims in this case framed in this fashion, the defendants have
filed a motion in limine, (Doc. 115), which seeks to preclude Brown, who is now
Case 1:15-cv-00918-CCC Document 139 Filed 01/26/21 Page 2 of 10
proceeding pro se, from referring to or presenting evidence at trial relating to these
claims that have previously been dismissed. This motion is fully briefed by the
parties, (Docs. 116, 122, 123), and is, therefore, ripe for resolution. For her part,
Brown has asserted claims of relevance relating to these matters that have been
dismissed, albeit in terms that cannot be readily understood. (Doc. 116). Upon
consideration of this motion, for the reasons set forth below, the motion is
GRANTED in part as follows: Absent the express approval of the trial judge,
following a proffer of relevance by the plaintiff and a full consideration of the
positions of the parties, the plaintiff shall be precluded from referring to these claims
that have been dismissed.
II.
Discussion
A. Motions in Limine—Guiding Principles
The Court is vested with broad inherent authority to manage its cases, which
carries with it the discretion and authority to rule on motions in limine prior to trial.
See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984); In re Japanese Elec. Prods.
Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 260 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.,
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (the court
exercises its discretion to rule in limine on evidentiary issues “in appropriate cases”).
Courts may exercise this discretion in order to ensure that juries are not exposed to
unfairly prejudicial, confusing or irrelevant evidence. United States v. Romano, 849
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F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1988). Courts may also do so in order to “narrow the
evidentiary issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions.” Bradley
v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
However, courts should be careful before doing so.
In considering motions in limine that call upon the Court to engage in
preliminary evidentiary rulings under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, we
begin by recognizing that these “evidentiary rulings [on motions in limine] are
subject to the trial judge’s discretion and are therefore reviewed only for abuse of
discretion . . . . Additionally, application of the balancing test under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 will not be disturbed unless it is ‘arbitrary and irrational.’ ” Abrams v.
Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see
Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 161 (3d Cir. 1994) (reviewing in
limine rulings for abuse of discretion). One of the key guiding principles governing
the exercise of this discretion is reflected in the philosophy that shapes the rules of
evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence can aptly be characterized as evidentiary
rules of inclusion, which are designed to broadly permit fact-finders to consider
pertinent factual information while searching for the truth. Adopting this broad view
of relevance, it has been held that
Under [Rule] 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” [Therefore] “[i]t follows that evidence is irrelevant only
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when it has no tendency to prove the fact. Thus the rule, while giving
judges great freedom to admit evidence, diminishes substantially their
authority to exclude evidence as irrelevant.”
Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 626 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing Spain v.
Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 452 (3d Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted)). Rule 402 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, in turn, provides that all “[r]elevant evidence will be
admissible unless the rules of evidence provide to the contrary.” United States v.
Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 745 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence then sets legal grounds for
exclusion of some evidence, stating that:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
These broad principles also shape and define the scope of this Court’s
discretion in addressing motions in limine like those filed by the parties here, which
seek a pre-trial ruling excluding evidence on relevance and prejudice grounds. In the
past, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has cautioned against
the preliminary, wholesale exclusion of evidence, noting that it has “made clear that
rulings excluding evidence on Rule 403 grounds should rarely be made in limine.”
Walden v. Georgia–Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 518 n. 10 (3d Cir. 1997). The reason
for this caution is evident: oftentimes a court “cannot fairly ascertain the potential
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relevance of evidence for Rule 403 purposes until it has a full record relevant to the
putatively objectionable evidence.” Id.; see also In re Diet Drugs Products Liability
Litigation, 369 F.3d 293, 314 (3d Cir. 2004). As the Court of Appeals has observed
when advising against excessive reliance on motions in limine to exclude evidence
under Rule 403:
[M]otions in limine often present issues for which final decision is best
reserved for a specific trial situation. American Home, 753 F.2d at 324;
cf. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41–42, 105 S. Ct. 460, 463–64,
83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984) (holding that criminal defendant must testify to
preserve claim of improper impeachment with prior conviction) (“The
[in limine] ruling is subject to change when the case unfolds,
particularly if the actual testimony differs from what was contained in
the defendant’s proffer. Indeed even if nothing unexpected happens at
trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling.”). This is particularly
true when the evidence is challenged as irrelevant or prejudicial; the
considerations weighed by the court will likely change as the trial
progresses. See Rosenfeld v. Basquiat, 78 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 1996)
(“Unlike rulings that involve balancing potential prejudice against
probative value, the ruling in the present case was not fact-bound and
no real purpose other than form would have been served by a later
objection.”). We have also made clear that rulings excluding evidence
on Rule 403 grounds should rarely be made in limine. “[A] court cannot
fairly ascertain the potential relevance of evidence for Rule 403
purposes until it has a full record relevant to the putatively
objectionable evidence. We believe that Rule 403 is a trial-oriented
rule. Precipitous Rule 403 determinations, before the challenging party
has had an opportunity to develop the record, are therefore unfair and
improper.” Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 859; see also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 747 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Paoli II”). Under these and
similar circumstances, if a district court makes a tentative pre-trial
ruling, it has the opportunity to “reconsider [its] in limine ruling with
the benefit of having been witness to the unfolding events at trial.”
United States v. Graves, 5 F.3d 1546, 1552 (5th Cir. 1993).
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Walden, 126 F.3d at 518 n. 10.
There is, however, a caveat to these legal tenets that urge caution in
considering motions in limine. Courts are frequently called upon to consider such
motions in cases like the instant case where it is alleged that a plaintiff is endeavoring
to introduce evidence relating to claims that have been dismissed. Reasoning that
evidence regarding dismissed claims that have failed as a matter of law typically has
little relevance, courts have often excluded evidence of dismissed claims from trial.
See e.g., Branch v. Brennan, No. 2:17-CV-00777, 2019 WL 3892850, at *2 (W.D.
Pa. Aug. 19, 2019); Brown v. Johnson & Johnson, No. CV 12-4929, 2015 WL
12834346, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2015); Moore v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of
Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., No. CV 02-1734, 2005 WL 8165154, at *4
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2005); Devine v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., No. 2:13-CV220, 2015 WL 7301149, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2015). However, those courts that
have excluded this evidence often have done so without prejudice to the plaintiff
presenting some specific and narrowly-tailored offer of proof as to the relevance and
admissibility of particular evidence. Id.
Guided by the principles we turn to consideration of the instant motion in
limine.
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B. The Motion in limine will be Granted in Part.
In this case, the defendants seek something that is commonly granted—an
order forbidding reference at trial to claims that have been dismissed. We note that
Brown has responded to this motion in limine that seeks to exclude evidence of
dismissed claims by arguing that some evidence concerning these previously
dismissed claims is still relevant to her sole remaining claim, a First Amendment
retaliation claim. However, the basis for this assertion of relevance relating to
matters that are not normally deemed admissible is not entirely clear from Brown’s
filings. (Doc. 116). Accordingly, consistent with caselaw governing the exercise of
discretion in this field, this motion in limine will be granted in part as follows: Absent
the express approval of the trial judge, following a proffer of relevance by the
plaintiff and a full consideration of the positions of the parties, the plaintiff shall be
precluded from referring to these claims that have been dismissed.
By adopting this course, we provide clear guidance to Ms. Brown that she
may not refer to claims that have been dismissed at trial without first explaining to
the trial judge why specific evidence is relevant and obtaining the trial judge’s
approval. Following this path avoids the concerns that justify motions in limine,
ensuring that juries are not exposed to unfairly prejudicial, confusing or irrelevant
evidence, United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1988), and
“narrow[ing] the evidentiary issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial
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interruptions.” Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir.
1990) (citation omitted). Yet following this course does not absolutely preclude
Brown from presenting specific evidence if she can first demonstrate its relevance
through a narrowly tailored offer of proof.
An appropriate order follows.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: January 26, 2021
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAWN L. BROWN,
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:
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:
:
:
:
:
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Plaintiff,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, DEPT. OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil No. 1:15-CV-918
(Judge Conner)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
ORDER
AND NOW, this 26th day of January 2021, in accordance with the
accompanying Memorandum, upon consideration of the defense motion in limine
(Doc. 115), which seeks to preclude Brown, who is now proceeding pro se, from
referring to or presenting evidence relating to claims that have previously been
dismissed at the trial of this case, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED
in part as follows: Absent the express approval of the trial judge, following a proffer
of relevance by the plaintiff and a full consideration of the positions of the parties,
the plaintiff shall be precluded from referring to these claims that have been
dismissed.
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S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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