Brown v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections

Filing 150

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS ORDERED as follows: 1. The motion for subpoenas (Doc. 136) is DENIED without prejudice to renewal following a pre-trial conference between the parties and counsel. 2. On or before March 31, 2021 the parties shall conduct a pre-trial conference among themselves. 3. Following this conference, on or before April 7, 2021, the plaintiff may renew her motion for subpoenas. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on February 12, 2021. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAWN L. BROWN,

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Plaintiff,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, DEPT. OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 1:15-CV-918

(Judge Conner)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I.

Factual Background

The plaintiff, Dawn Brown, is a former employee of the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections. In 2015, Brown brought a series of sweeping
workplace discrimination claims against her former employers. The instant case
was not Brown’s first lawsuit against the Department of Corrections. Previously in
2014, Brown had filed a sexual harassment lawsuit against her employer relating to
alleged acts of sexual harassment and retaliation which took place beginning in
2009. Brown v. Dep’t. of Corrections, Civil No. 1:14-CV-201. In 2017, the court
granted summary judgment in favor of all of the defendants, except one defendant

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who had not been served by Brown. Brown then voluntarily dismissed her lawsuit
as to this remaining defendant.
In the meanwhile, Brown filed this second workplace discrimination lawsuit
in 2015. This case has been pending for nearly six years. Over the span of this
longstanding litigation, the remaining claims in Brown’s lawsuit have been
narrowed considerably. At this juncture, Brown’s sole remaining legal claim is an
allegation that she was discharged in July of 2015 in retaliation for the exercise of
her First Amendment rights.
Brown is now representing herself in this lawsuit, her previous counsel
having withdrawn due to irreconcilable conflicts with the plaintiff. (Docs. 104112). In this capacity, acting as her own counsel Brown has filed a spate of
motions, including a pleading styled as a motion for subpoenas. (Doc. 136). While
Brown indicates that she wishes to issue trial subpoenas with our assistance,
Brown does not identify who she intends to subpoena, or what relevant testimony
she may seek from these potential trial witnesses, information that would be crucial
to any informed understanding of the motion. Noting these shortcomings, the
defendants oppose the motion in its current form and recommend that the court
deny the motion without prejudice to renewal of the motion following a pre-trial
conference between the parties, at which time the parties could identify witnesses

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and address these subpoena issues for the court in a fully informed fashion. (Doc.
144).
Since Brown has not provided us with any of the information necessary to
making a determination regarding whether trial subpoenas should issue, we will
DENY this motion without prejudice to renewal in a proper format following the
pretrial conference of counsel.
II.

Discussion and Order

Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of this discovery
dispute. At the outset, “Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes
the rules for discovery directed to individuals and entities that are not parties to the
underlying lawsuit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. A subpoena under Rule 45 ‘must fall within
the scope of proper discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).’” First Sealord Sur. v.
Durkin & Devries Ins. Agency, 918 F. Supp. 2d 362, 382 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (quoting
OMS Invs., Inc. v. Lebanon Seaboard Corp., No. 08–2681, 2008 WL 4952445, at
*2 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2008)). Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
in turn, provides that:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as
follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at
stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative
access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance
of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or
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expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in
evidence to be discoverable.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Rulings regarding the scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest
in the sound discretion of the Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d
81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Therefore, a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of
discovery, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.
Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This farreaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on
discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs.
Nat’l Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572,
585 (D.N.J. 1997). When a magistrate judge’s decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United
States, 943 F. Supp. 501, 502 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). Under that standard, a
magistrate judge’s discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and
is reversible only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic
Commc’ns and Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J. 1996); see also
Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under
abuse of discretion standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v.
Mr. Gold, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that a
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magistrate judge’s resolution of discovery disputes deserves
substantial deference and should be reversed only if there is an abuse
of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
Rule 45 also confers broad enforcement powers upon the court to ensure
compliance with subpoenas, while avoiding unfair prejudice to persons who are the
subject of a subpoena’s commands. In this regard, it is well settled that decisions
on matters pertaining to subpoena compliance rest in the sound discretion of the
trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco v. Philip Morris Inc, 29 F. App’x 880, 881 (3d Cir. 2002).
However, the exercise of this discretion is governed by several
considerations. First, the trial subpoenas must seek information and evidence that
is relevant to the remaining issues in this case. In addition, Brown should
understand that plaintiff will be required to arrange for service of the subpoenas
and must tender the witness fee and the fees for any mileage allowed by law at the
time of service. See 28 U.S.C. § 1821; Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b) (setting forth service
requirements). See also Canady v. Kreider, 892 F.Supp. 668, 670 (M.D. Pa. 1995)
(finding that there is no statutory provision authorizing a federal court to waive or
provide for payment of witness fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1821(a), and
accordingly holding that “a litigant proceeding in forma pauperis is required to
tender witness fees as provided in § 1821 to effect service of subpoenas under Rule
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45(b)(1)”); Lyons v. Beard, No. 3:07-CV-444, 2011 WL 3649977, at *2 (M.D. Pa.
Aug. 18, 2011).
In this case, Brown has not identified any of the witnesses she wishes to
subpoena. Nor has she provided some proffer of relevance in support of this
motion for trial subpoenas. Further, she has not indicated whether she is prepared
to pay the fees associated with any trial subpoenas. Accordingly, due to the lack of
this critical information, we are not in a position to make any informed judgments
regarding this motion for trial subpoenas.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1. The motion for subpoenas (Doc. 136) is DENIED without prejudice to
renewal following a pre-trial conference between the parties and counsel.
2. On or before March 31, 2021 the parties shall conduct a pre-trial
conference among themselves required by Local Rule 16.3 and identify
all witnesses and exhibits they intend to present at trial. L.R. 16.3.
3. Following this conference, on or before April 7, 2021, the plaintiff may
renew her motion for subpoenas, but should identify those witnesses she
wishes to subpoena at trial, advise us of any objections to particular
witnesses, and provide a proffer of the relevant evidence which she seeks
from these witnesses. The defendants may then lodge any objections to
proposed subpoenas on or before April 14, 2021.
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SO ORDERED this 12th day of February 2021.

S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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