Brown v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections

Filing 200

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 164 Pltf's MOTION IN LIMINE - IT IS ORDERED that the motion is DENIED without prejudice to Ms. Brown making specific offers of proof as to the relevance of evidence relating to previously dismissed claims during the course of the non-jury trial. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on May 14, 2021. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAWN L. BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, DEPT. OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 1:15-CV-918

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I.

Factual Background

The plaintiff, Dawn Brown, is a former employee of the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections. In 2015, Brown brought a series of sweeping workplace
discrimination claims against her former employers. The instant case was not
Brown’s first lawsuit against the Department of Corrections. Previously in 2014,
Brown had filed a sexual harassment lawsuit against her employer relating to alleged
acts of sexual harassment and retaliation which took place beginning in 2009. Brown
v. Dep’t. of Corrections, Civil No. 1:14-CV-201. In 2017, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of all of the defendants, except one defendant who had not been

served by Brown. Brown then voluntarily dismissed her lawsuit as to this remaining
defendant.
In the meanwhile, Brown filed this second workplace discrimination lawsuit
in 2015. This case has been pending for nearly six years. Over the span of this
longstanding litigation, the remaining claims in Brown’s lawsuit have been
narrowed considerably. At this juncture, Brown’s sole remaining legal claim is an
allegation that she was discharged in July of 2015 in retaliation for the exercise of
her First Amendment rights.
Specifically, Brown alleges that she made reports to the FBI and the Governor
of Pennsylvania in December 2014 regarding concerns about inmates using cell
phones at SCI Camp Hill. (Doc. 70-2, at 1-2). She also claims to have told numerous
coworkers that she had made these reports. (Id., at 2). She alleges that her reports to
the FBI and the Governor resulted in more disciplinary action taken against her. In
particular, on January 13, 2015, Brown received disciplinary action for an incident
in which she was accused of leaving her post without proper relief or approval, acting
inappropriately after an incident that involved Brown using her unregistered
personal handcuffs, refusing to follow direct orders given by her superiors, and
possessing a controlled substance without permission. (Doc. 53-5, at 2-5; Doc. 5331). Brown disputes that she acted inappropriately with respect to all of this

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disciplinary action, and thus, she filed a complaint with the EEOC against the DOC
on January 15, 2015. (Doc. 70-2, at 17).
Brown later filed criminal complaints against the DOC in the Magisterial
District Court No. 13-3-02 and with the Cumberland County District Attorney’s
Office in April and July of 2015, respectively. (Id., at 17-18). These complaints
concerned Brown’s allegations of the DOC’s violations of the right-to-know laws
and its failure to investigate an alleged attempted rape of Brown by another
correctional officer. (Id.) Subsequently, on July 30, 2015, Brown spoke with a news
outlet regarding the retaliation she was experiencing at SCI Camp Hill. (Id., at 18).
Brown then received what she alleges was a retaliatory termination letter
dated July 30, 2015, which stated that her employment with the DOC would be
terminated, effective on July 31, 2015. (Doc. 53-5). While Brown insists that the
decision to terminate her employment was taken in retaliation for the exercise of her
First Amendment rights, the termination letter sets forth numerous instances of
misconduct by Brown that the DOC stated were the reasons for Brown’s termination.
These incidents included: the January 13, 2015 incident involving Brown’s use of
personal handcuffs and inappropriate behavior, which included disobeying a direct
order from her superior and her possession of a controlled substance without
permission; her refusal on December 25, 2014 to work a mandated double shift; her
inappropriate email to the Deputy Superintendent on December 7, 2014; and
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inappropriate messages posted on social media, which included the names of
correctional staff and inmates at Camp Hill. (Id.) The letter noted that Brown had
prior instances of discipline in 2012 and 2013 for ethics code violations, which had
included final warnings. (Id., at 5).
Brown is now representing herself in this lawsuit, her previous counsel having
withdrawn due to irreconcilable conflicts with the plaintiff. (Docs. 104-12). In this
capacity, acting as her own counsel, Brown has filed a spate of motions, including a
motion in limine which seeks leave of court to present evidence regarding claims
that have been dismissed in this and other litigation brought by Brown. (Doc. 164).
We had previously addressed this issue in connection with a defense motion in
limine, and had held that absent the express approval of the trial judge, following a
proffer of relevance by the plaintiff and a full consideration of the positions of the
parties, the plaintiff shall be precluded from referring to these claims that have been
dismissed. (Doc. 139).
Recently, there have been a number of recent developments in this case which,
in our view, affect our treatment of this motion. In particular, the parties have
consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction for the trial of this case and have further
agreed to pursue a non-jury trial of this matter. (Doc. 192, 193, 195). All of these
recent events influence us in ruling on this motion, which is a pre-trial ruling
allowing for the admission of evidence relating to dismissed claims previously
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brought by the plaintiff. In particular, the non-jury trial of this case reduces the
urgency and necessity of pre-trial evidentiary rulings like those sought here since:
[A]ny concern about juror confusion is obviated, and the Court is wellpositioned to make judgments regarding the admissibility of evidence
within the context of the trial itself. Indeed, although courts will rule
on motions in limine in advance of bench trials in appropriate cases,
Velez v. Reading Health System, 2016 WL 9776079 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24,
2016), they often will find it unnecessary to do so because the concerns
over prejudice or confusion to a jury are absent. See 9 Charles A.
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil 3d §
2411 (3d ed. 2008); see also United States v. Brown, 2017 WL 219521
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2017) (noting that concerns over the potential for
prejudice from improper evidence “are minimal in bench trials ...
rulings on motions in limine are less important.”); Alan L. Frank Law
Assocs., P.C. v. OOO RM Invest, 2016 WL 9348064 (S.D. Fla. Nov.
30, 2016).
Buhler Versatile Inc. v. GVM, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-00217, 2018 WL 6062307, at *5
(M.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2018).
Nonetheless, recognizing Ms. Brown’s status as a pro se litigant, we are
addressing this motion to provide her with some guidance moving forward in this
litigation. Specifically, we will deny this motion without prejudice to Ms. Brown
making specific offers of proof as to the relevance of evidence relating to previously
dismissed claims during the course of the non-jury trial.
II.

Discussion
A. Motions in Limine—Guiding Principles

The Court is vested with broad inherent authority to manage its cases, which
carries with it the discretion and authority to rule on motions in limine prior to trial.
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See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984); In re Japanese Elec. Prods.
Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 260 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.,
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (the court
exercises its discretion to rule in limine on evidentiary issues “in appropriate cases”).
Courts may exercise this discretion in order to exclude unfairly prejudicial,
confusing, cumulative, or irrelevant evidence. United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d
812, 815 (3d Cir. 1988). Courts may also do so in order to “narrow the evidentiary
issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions.” Bradley v.
Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
However, courts should be careful before doing so.
In considering motions in limine that call upon the Court to engage in
preliminary evidentiary rulings under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, we
begin by recognizing that these “evidentiary rulings [on motions in limine] are
subject to the trial judge’s discretion and are therefore reviewed only for abuse of
discretion . . . . Additionally, application of the balancing test under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 will not be disturbed unless it is ‘arbitrary and irrational.’ ” Abrams v.
Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see
Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 161 (3d Cir. 1994) (reviewing in
limine rulings for abuse of discretion). One of the key guiding principles governing
the exercise of this discretion is reflected in the philosophy that shapes the rules of
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evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence can aptly be characterized as evidentiary
rules of inclusion, which are designed to broadly permit fact-finders to consider
pertinent factual information while searching for the truth. Adopting this broad view
of relevance, it has been held that
Under [Rule] 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” [Therefore] “[i]t follows that evidence is irrelevant only
when it has no tendency to prove the fact. Thus the rule, while giving
judges great freedom to admit evidence, diminishes substantially their
authority to exclude evidence as irrelevant.”
Frank v. Cnty. of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 626 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing Spain v.
Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 452 (3d Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted)). Rule 402 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, in turn, provides that all “[r]elevant evidence will be
admissible unless the rules of evidence provide to the contrary.” United States v.
Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 745 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
This principle is then tempered by Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
which sets legal grounds for exclusion of some evidence, stating that:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
These broad principles also shape and define the scope of this Court’s
discretion in addressing motions in limine like those filed here, which seek invite us
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pre-trial to rule that evidence relating to claims that have been dismissed should
nonetheless be admitted at trial. Reasoning that evidence regarding dismissed claims
that have failed as a matter of law typically has little relevance, courts have often
excluded evidence of dismissed claims from trial. See, e.g., Branch v. Brennan, No.
2:17-CV-00777, 2019 WL 3892850, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2019); Brown v.
Johnson & Johnson, No. CV 12-4929, 2015 WL 12834346, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28,
2015); Moore v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., No.
CV 02-1734, 2005 WL 8165154, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2005); Devine v.
Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., No. 2:13-CV-220, 2015 WL 7301149, at *4 (W.D. Pa.
Nov. 18, 2015). However, those courts that have excluded this evidence often have
done so without prejudice to the plaintiff presenting some specific and narrowlytailored offer of proof as to the relevance and admissibility of particular evidence.
Id. Guided by the principles we turn to consideration of the instant motion in limine.
B. The Motion in limine will be Denied Without Prejudice.
In this case, the plaintiff seeks something that is rarely granted—an order
permitting reference at trial to claims that have been dismissed. We note that Brown
argues that some evidence concerning these previously dismissed claims is still
relevant to her sole remaining claim, a First Amendment retaliation claim. However,
the basis for this assertion of relevance relating to matters that are not normally
deemed admissible is not entirely clear from Brown’s filings. Accordingly,
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consistent with caselaw governing the exercise of discretion in this field, this motion
in limine will be denied without prejudice to Brown seeking to admit specific
evidence as trial, provided that the plaintiff first makes a proffer of relevance
explaining how evidence of particular, dismissed matters is relevant to the sole
remaining claims in this lawsuit.
By adopting this course, we provide clear guidance to Ms. Brown that she
may not refer to claims that have been dismissed at trial without first explaining why
specific evidence is relevant and obtaining our approval. Following this path avoids
the concerns that justify motions in limine, excluding unfairly prejudicial, confusing,
cumulative or irrelevant evidence, Romano, 849 F.2d at 815, and “narrow[ing] the
evidentiary issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions.” Bradley,
913 F.2d at 1069 (citation omitted). Yet following this course does not absolutely
preclude Brown from presenting specific evidence if she can first demonstrate its
relevance through a narrowly tailored offer of proof.
An appropriate order follows.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: May 14, 2021

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAWN L. BROWN,

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Plaintiff,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, DEPT. OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 1:15-CV-918

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of May 2021, in accordance with the accompanying
Memorandum, upon consideration of the plaintiff’s motion in limine (Doc. 164),
which seeks to permit the plaintiff, who is now proceeding pro se, to refer to and
present evidence relating to claims that have previously been dismissed at the trial
of this case, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is DENIED without prejudice to Ms.
Brown making specific offers of proof as to the relevance of evidence relating to
previously dismissed claims during the course of the non-jury trial.

S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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