Edwards v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re: 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Gabriel Edwards. (See memo for complete details.) Signed by Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner on 12/21/16. (ki)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GABRIEL EDWARDS,
Petitioner
v.
ROBERT L. FARLEY, WARDEN,1
Respondent

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CIVIL NO. 1:15-CV-1116
(Chief Judge Conner)

MEMORANDUM
Presently before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed by petitioner Gabriel Edwards (“Edwards”), an inmate
formerly confined at the United States Penitentiary, in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania
(“USP-Lewisburg”). (Doc. 1). Edwards contends that his due process rights were
violated in the context of a disciplinary hearing held at USP-Lewisburg. The
petition is ripe for disposition and, for the reasons that follow, will be denied.
I.

Background
On February 13, 2015, while incarcerated at USP-Lewisburg, Edwards was

charged in incident report number 2682784 with conduct disruptive to the security
of the institution, in violation of Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) prohibited acts
code section 299, tampering with a locking device, in violation of code 208, engaging

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, the proper respondent in a habeas action is
“the person having custody of the person detained.” Therefore, the Clerk of Court
will be directed to substitute Robert L. Farley, Warden at the United States
Penitentiary, Big Sandy, in Inez, Kentucky, as the sole respondent in this action.
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in a group demonstration, in violation of code 212, and refusing to obey an order, in
violation of code 307. (Doc. 1-1 at 2; Doc. 6-2 at 11, Incident Report). The incident is
described as follows:
On February 13, 2015, at approximately 10:07 a.m., Inmate Edwards,
Gabriel #26282-018, had barricaded himself in B-115. This inmate was
unresponsive to staff directive to remove the covering of his window
and remove the objects placed in front of his food slot. This inmate
could not be observed or approached safely by staff, and refused all
staff directives. This inmate was one of 36 inmates involved in this
group demonstration that resulted in an emergency response to
contain the situation. This inmate was removed from his cell after
chemical agents and less lethal munitions were deployed into the cell.
(Doc. 6-2 at 11, Incident Report).
On March 24, 2015, Edwards appealed the disciplinary hearing officer’s
decision by filing Administrative Remedy Number 815112-R1 with the Regional
Office. (Doc. 6-2 at 36, Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval). On April 23,
2015, the Regional Office denied Administrative Remedy Number 815112-R1. (Id.)
On May 5, 2015, Edwards filed two appeals of Administrative Remedy
Number 815112-R1 to the BOP Central Office, designated as Administrative
Remedy Numbers 815112-A1 and A2. (Id.) On June 5, 2015, the BOP Central Office
rejected both appeals. (Id. at 36-37). Edwards was informed that he did not submit
the proper papers with his appeal. (Id.) The Central Office advised him to resubmit
his appeal in proper form within fifteen (15) days of the date of the rejection notice.
(Id.)
On May 11, 2015, Edwards refiled his appeal, designated as Administrative
Remedy Number 815112-A4. (Id. at 37). The Central Office accepted the appeal for
response. (Id.) The Central Office had forty days to respond, with the option to
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extend that time for an additional twenty days. (Doc. 6-2, Declaration of Jennifer
Knepper, BOP Attorney Advisor (“Knepper Decl.”), ¶ 8, citing 28 C.F.R. § 542.18).
On June 1, 2015, Edwards filed another appeal of the DHO hearing,
designated as Administrative Remedy Number 815112-A3. (Doc. 6-2 at 38,
Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval). On June 23, 2015, subsequent to
the filing of the instant petition, the Central Office rejected Administrative Remedy
Number 815112-A3 as untimely. (Id.) The Central Office advised Edwards to
resubmit his appeal within fifteen (15) days of the date of the rejection notice with
staff verification stating that the untimely filing was not his fault. (Id.) There is no
evidence that Edwards submitted any further appeals.
The instant petition was filed on or about June 3, 2015. (Doc. 1). In the
petition, Edwards claims that his due process rights were violated during the course
of the prison disciplinary hearing. (Id.) Edwards asserts that prison staff altered
the delivery date on the incident report, his requested staff representative was not
present at the hearing, the reporting officer’s description of the incident in the
incident report is embellished and misleading, the DHO was not impartial, and
BOP staff members used excessive force when they responded to the incident at
issue. (Id. at 1-5). For relief, Edwards requests that the court restore his good time
credits. (Id. at 5).

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II.

Discussion
A.

Exhaustion

Respondent argues that the petition should be denied based on Edwards’
failure to comply with the BOP’s administrative review process. (Doc. 6 at 7-9).
Despite the absence of a statutory exhaustion requirement attached to § 2241,
courts have consistently required a petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies
prior to bringing a habeas claim under § 2241. See Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627,
634 (3d Cir. 2000); Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir.
1996). Exhaustion is required “for three reasons: (1) allowing the appropriate
agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review;
(2) permitting agencies to grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources;
and (3) providing agencies the opportunity to correct their own errors fosters
administrative autonomy.” Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761-62 (citing Bradshaw v. Carlson,
682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981)). Nevertheless, exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not required where exhaustion would not promote these goals. See,
e.g., Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 171 (3d Cir. 1998) (exhaustion not required
where petitioner demonstrates futility); Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 205
(3d Cir. 1988) (exhaustion may be excused where it “would be futile, if the actions of
the agency clearly and unambiguously violate statutory or constitutional rights, or if
the administrative procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent
irreparable injury”); Carling v. Peters, 2000 WL 1022959, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 10,
2000) (exhaustion not required where delay would subject petitioner to “irreparable
injury”).
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In general, the BOP’s administrative review remedy program is a multi-tier
process that is available to inmates confined in institutions operated by the BOP for
review of an issue which relates to any aspect of their confinement. (Doc. 6-2,
Knepper Decl. ¶ 6, citing 28 C.F.R. § 542.10, et seq.). With respect to disciplinary
hearing decision appeals, a BOP inmate can initiate the first step of the
administrative review process by filing a direct written appeal to the BOP’s
Regional Director (thus bypassing the institutional level of review) within twenty
days after receiving the DHO’s written report. (Id.) If dissatisfied with the Regional
Director’s response, a Central Office Appeal may then be filed with the BOP’s Office
of General Counsel. (Id.) This is the inmate’s final available administrative appeal.
No administrative appeal is considered fully exhausted until a decision is reached
by the BOP’s Central Office. See Sharpe v. Costello, 2008 WL 2736782, at *3 (3d Cir.
2008).
In the instant matter, Edwards failed to exhaust the available administrative
remedies. Edwards filed his two initial administrative remedies with the Regional
Office. The appeals were denied. Edwards then filed appeals with the Central
Office. The Central Office rejected both appeals because they were submitted in
improper form. Edwards was given an opportunity to resubmit his appeals in
proper form.
On May 11, 2015, Edwards refiled his appeal, which the Central Office
accepted for review. (Id.) The Central Office had forty days to respond, with the
option to extend that time for an additional twenty (20) days. Edwards filed the
instant federal habeas petition before the response to his appeal was due.
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On June 1, 2015, Edwards filed another appeal of the DHO hearing. (Doc. 6-2
at 38, Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval). On June 23, 2015, subsequent
to the filing of the instant petition, the Central Office rejected the remedy as
untimely filed. (Id.) The Central Office advised Edwards to resubmit his appeal
within fifteen (15) days of the date of the rejection notice with staff verification
stating that the untimely filing was not his fault. (Id.) There is no evidence that
Edwards submitted any further appeals.
In response to this argument, Edwards claims that the BOP is attempting to
“mislead and manipulate” the court, and has altered their records submitted to the
court. (Doc. 7 at 2-3). Additionally, Edwards claims that the “issue of the
Administrative Remedy should be rendered moot” because the BOP Central Office
has since denied his appeal as untimely. (Id. at 3). Yet, Edwards filed his federal
habeas petition prior to the Central Office’s denial of his appeal. An administrative
remedy appeal is not fully and finally exhausted until it has been denied by the
BOP’s Central Office. Erring on the side of the petitioner, the court finds that
Edwards has alleged facts that potentially excuse exhaustion, and the court will
proceed to the merits.
B.

Merits

The instant habeas petition fails on the merits. On February 13, 2015,
Edwards was served with incident report number 2682784, charging him with a
code 299 violation for conduct disruptive to the security of the institution, a code 208
violation for tampering with a locking device, a code 212 violation for engaging in a

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group demonstration, and a code 307 violation for refusing to obey an order. (Doc.
6-2 at 11, Incident Report).
On February 13, 2015 Lieutenant B. Shirk gave Edwards advanced written
notice of the charges against him. (Id. at 12). During the investigation of the
incident, Edwards was advised of his right to remain silent, and he indicated that he
understood his rights. (Id.) Edwards declined to comment on the charges, and
declined to identify any witnesses. (Id.) Based on the description of the incident
and Edwards’ failure to identify any witnesses, the investigator referred the matter
to the Unit Discipline Committee (“UDC”) for further action. (Id.)
On February 16, 2015, Edwards appeared before the UDC. (Id. at 11).
Edwards was advised of his rights and he acknowledged that he understood them.
Edwards stated, “I was denied my constitutional rights for not receiving our 8s.”
(Id.) Due to the reporting requirements, the UDC referred the incident to the DHO
with a recommendation that sanctions be imposed. (Id.)
A staff member informed Edwards of his rights at the DHO hearing and
provided him with a copy of the “Inmate Rights at Discipline Hearing” form. (Doc.
6-2 at 14, Inmate Rights at Discipline Hearing). Edwards was also provided with a
“Notice of Discipline Hearing before the Discipline Hearing Officer (DHO)” form.
(Doc. 6-2 at 13, Notice of Discipline Hearing before the Discipline Hearing Officer
(DHO)). Edwards refused to sign both forms, and elected not to call any witnesses.
(Id.) Edwards requested B. Tharp as a staff representative. (Id.)
On February 20, 2015, Edwards appeared for a hearing before DHO B.
Chambers. (Doc. 6-2 at 17, DHO Report). The DHO advised Edwards that his
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requested staff representative, Mr. Tharp, was out of the institution in training.
(Id.) The DHO gave Edwards the option of postponing the hearing until Mr. Tharp
was available, or obtaining another staff representative. (Id.) Edwards elected to
waive his right to a staff representative and proceed with the hearing. (Id.)
Edwards was unable to sign the waiver because his hands were in restraints behind
his back. (Id.)2 The DHO noted that a staff member was present and witnessed
Edwards’ waiver of his right to a staff representative. (Id.)
During the February 20, 2015 hearing, the DHO confirmed that Edwards
received advanced written notice of the charges on February 13, 2015, that he had
been advised of his rights before the DHO on February 16, 2015, that he waived his
right to a staff representative, and did not request to call any witnesses. (Id.) The
DHO again advised Edwards of his rights, Edwards indicated that he understood
them, and that he was ready to proceed with the hearing. (Id.) Edwards testified
that he did not dispute the accuracy of the description of the incident set forth in
incident report, but he denied committing any prohibited act. (Id.) Edwards made
the following statement regarding the charges, “my cellie … already took
responsibility for this incident during his hearing.” (Id.) He presented no
documents in support of his position. (Id.) Edwards’ cellmate at the time of the
incident appeared as a witness and testified as follows, “I already accepted
responsibility for committing this act at my own DHO hearing. He (Edwards) was
Viewed in its entirety, the record clearly reflects a knowing and voluntary
waiver. However, the court would be remiss if it did not express dismay over the
failure to temporarily implement alternative security measures to enable a simple
signature, e.g. frontal restraints.
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just standing at the back of the cell during the incident. He didn’t have anything to
do with it.” (Id.)
After consideration of the evidence, the DHO found that Edwards committed
the prohibited acts of interfering with security devices and engaging in a group
demonstration. (Id. at 18). The DHO explained his findings as follows:
The DHO finds that inmate Edwards committed the prohibited acts of
Interfering with Security Devices and Engaging in a Group
Demonstration, Codes 208 and 212. This finding is based on the
eyewitness written account of the reporting officer, which indicates on
02-13-2015 at approximately 10:07 a.m., inmate EDWARDS, Gabriel
#26283-018 had barricaded himself in B-115. Inmate Edwards was
unresponsive to staff directives to remove the covering from his cell
door window and move the objects placed in front of his food slot in his
cell door. Inmate Edwards could not be observed or approached safely
by staff and refused all staff orders. Inmate Edwards was one of 36
inmates involved in a group demonstration that resulted in an
emergency response to contain the situation. Inmate Edwards was
removed from his cell after chemical agents and less lethal munitions
were deployed into the cell.
The finding is further based upon the statement of inmate Edwards to
the UDC, as documented in Section 17 of the incident report. Inmate
Edwards stated, in reference to Section 11 of the incident report, “I
was denied my constitutional rights for not receiving BP-8’s (Informal
Resolution Attempt Forms).”
This finding is further based on the testimony of inmate Edwards, in
which he acknowledged that he is not disputing the accuracy [of]
Section 11 of the incident report in this case.
Inmate Edwards denied, however, committing any prohibited act in
this case. Inmate Edwards testified “my cellie (Roszkowski, #03679049) already took responsibility for this incident during his hearing.”
Edwards presented evidence in support of his defense in the form of
witness testimony from inmate ROSZKOWSKI, Arjusz, #03679-049,
who testified “I already accepted responsibility for committing this act
at my own DHO hearing. He (Edwards) was just standing at the back
of the cell during the incident. He didn’t have anything to do with it.”

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The DHO gives the greater weight of the evidence in this case to the
eyewitness written account of the reporting officer, as well as the
statement or inmate Edwards to the UDC, as documented in Section
17 of the incident report in which he stated, in reference to Section 11
of the incident report, “I was denied my constitutional rights for not
receiving BP-8’s (Informal Resolution Attempt Forms).” This evidence
indicates on 02-13-2015 at approximately 10:07 a.m., inmate
EDWARDS, Gabriel #26283-018 had barricaded himself in B-115.
Inmate Edwards was unresponsive to staff directives to remove the
covering from his cell door window and move the objects placed in
front of his food slot in his cell door. Inmate Edwards could not be
observed or approached safely by staff and refused all staff orders.
Inmate Edwards was one of 36 inmate involved in a group
demonstration that resulted in an emergency response to contain the
situation. Inmate Edwards was removed from his cell after chemical
agents and less lethal munitions were deployed into the cell.
The DHO has considered as evidence in this case the testimony of
inmate Edwards, in which he denied committing any prohibited act in
this case, as well as the testimony of his cellmate at the time of the
incident, inmate Roszkowski, #03679-049, who attempted to accept
responsibility for Edwards’ actions inside of the barricaded cell during
the incident. The DHO considers this evidence to be less credible,
thereby giving it lesser weight than that to which the greater weight is
given in this case, for the following reasons. First, neither Inmate
Edwards nor Roszkowski disputes cell B-115 was barricaded during
the incident, and that neither inmate responded to staff directives to
remove the cell door window covering and the barricade material from
the cell door, and to submit to hand restraints. Given these facts,
inmate Edwards must be held accountable for his actions as an
individual inside the cell, despite inmate Roszkowski’s attempt to
claim sole responsibility for participation in the incident in this case.
Despite Roszkowski’s testimony “I already accepted responsibility for
committing this act at my own DHO hearing. He (Edwards) was just
standing at the back of the cell during the incident. He didn’t have
anything to do with it”, there was absolutely no evidence presented
during the hearing leading to a conclusion that Edwards was in any
way physically compelled to participate in the incident. Further, there
was no evidence presented indicating Edwards was threatened in any
way, thereby leading to a conclusion he may have been coerced into
being unresponsive to staff directives to remove the covering from his
cell door window and move the objects placed in front of his food slot
in the cell door. Moreover, the DHO notes Edwards’ statement to the
UDC “I was denied my constitutional rights for not receiving BP-8’s
(Informal Resolution Attempt Forms)”, and considers this statement
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compelling evidence Edwards was, in fact, a willing participant in the
incident, as the statement was clearly made in an attempt to justify or
rationalize his actions during the incident. If Edwards had in fact not
been involved in the incident as he alleges, he would have had no
reason to make such a statement. The evidence, therefore, when
considered in its entirety, supports a finding Edwards made a
conscious choice to participate in the incident, and therefore must be
held accountable for his actions as an individual inside cell B-115
during the incident.
The greater weight of the evidence in this case, therefore, supports the
finding inmate Edwards committed the prohibited acts of Interfering
with Security Devices and Engaging in a Group Demonstration, Codes
208 and 212.
(Id.)
As such, the DHO sanctioned Edwards with a total of fifty-four (54) days
disallowance of good conduct time, sixty (60) days in disciplinary segregation, and
two hundred forty (240) days loss of commissary, telephone, and visiting privileges.
(Id. at 19-20). The DHO noted that the acts of interfering with security devices and
engaging in a group demonstration inherently jeopardize the security and good
order of the institution. (Id.) Therefore, the sanctions imposed were intended to
punish Edwards and to deter future misconduct. (Id.) Edwards was advised of his
appeal rights at the conclusion of the hearing. (Id. at 20).
Edwards’ sanctions included the loss of good conduct time, therefore he has
identified a liberty interest in this matter. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides: “No person shall . . .
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.
amend. V. Federal inmates possess a liberty interest in good conduct time. See

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Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-57 (1974); Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1399
(3d Cir. 1991).
In Wolff, the Supreme Court set forth the following minimum procedural due
process rights to be afforded to a prisoner accused of misconduct in prison which
may result in the loss of good time credit: (1) the right to appear before an impartial
decision-making body; (2) twenty-four hour advance written notice of the
disciplinary charges; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary
evidence in his defense when it is consistent with institutional safety and
correctional goals; (4) assistance from an inmate representative if the charged
inmate is illiterate or complex issues are involved; and (5) a written decision by the
fact finder of the evidence relied upon and the rationale behind the disciplinary
action. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67. The Supreme Court has held that the standard of
review with regard to the sufficiency of the evidence is whether there is “any
evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the
disciplinary board.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985); see also
Griffin v. Spratt, 969 F.2d 16, 19 (3d Cir. 1992). If there is “some evidence” to
support the decision of the hearing examiner, the court must reject any evidentiary
challenges by the plaintiff. Hill, 472 U.S. at 457.
The Bureau of Prisons’ inmate disciplinary procedures are codified at 28
C.F.R. § 541, et seq., and entitled: Inmate Discipline and Special Housing Units.
These procedures are intended to meet or exceed the due process requirements
prescribed by the Supreme Court. See Von Kahl v. Brennan, 855 F. Supp. 1413,
1418 (M.D. Pa. 1994). Pursuant to these regulations, staff shall prepare an incident
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report when there is reasonable belief that a violation of BOP regulations has been
committed by an inmate and the staff considers informal resolution of the incident
inappropriate or unsuccessful. 28 C.F.R. § 541.5. The incident is then referred to
the UDC for an initial hearing pursuant to § 541.7. The UDC “will ordinarily review
the incident report within five work days after it is issued, not counting the day it
was issued, weekends, and holidays.” 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(c). This period may be
extended if the incident is being investigated for possible criminal prosecution. 28
C.F.R. § 541.4(c). If the UDC finds that a prisoner has committed a prohibited act, it
may impose minor sanctions. 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(f). If the alleged violation is serious
and warrants consideration for more than minor sanctions, or involves a prohibited
act listed in the greatest severity category, the UDC must refer the matter to a
disciplinary hearing officer for a hearing. 28 C.F.R. §§ 541.7(a), (g). The inmate will
receive written notice of the charge(s) against him at least twenty-four hours before
the DHO’s hearing, however the inmate may waive this requirement. 28 C.F.R. §
541.8(c). The inmate is entitled to have a staff representative, appear at the hearing,
make a statement, present documentary evidence, and present witnesses. 28 C.F.R.
§§ 541.8(d), (e), (f). Following the hearing, the inmate will receive a written copy of
the DHO’s decision. 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(h).
In the present matter, it is clear that Edwards was afforded all of the required
procedural rights set forth in Wolff. He received timely notice of the incident
report. He was properly informed of his rights before the hearing, as well as given
the opportunity to make his own statement, present documentary evidence, have a
staff representative, and to present witnesses on his behalf. The DHO advised
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Edwards that his requested staff representative was unavailable, and Edwards
chose to waive his right to a staff representative and proceed with the hearing.
Edwards initially declined to call any witnesses, however his cellmate ultimately
testified at the hearing. Edwards presented no further evidence in support of his
position. At the conclusion of the hearing, Edwards received a written decision
setting forth the evidence relied upon by the DHO and the rationale behind the
decision. Edwards was also notified of his right to appeal.
Since Edwards was afforded all of his procedural rights, the only remaining
issue is whether there was sufficient evidence to support the decision by the DHO.
The record unequivocally reveals the existence of sufficient evidence to conclude
that Edwards was guilty of the charges. The DHO relied upon the eyewitness
account of the reporting officer, Edwards’ statement to the UDC, and his admission
that the description of the incident in the incident report was true. (Id.) The DHO
afforded less weight to Edwards’ self-serving denial of the prohibited acts charged,
and his cellmate’s attempt to accept responsibility for the incident. Based upon this
evidence as relied upon by the DHO, the court finds that Edwards’ due process
rights were not violated by the determination of the DHO.
Finally, the court finds that all sanctions imposed by the DHO were within
the limits of 28 C.F.R. § 541, et seq. Edwards was found guilty of two 200-level, high
severity prohibited acts. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 541.3, the following are the
sanctions available for 200-level offenses:

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A.

Recommend parole date rescission or retardation.

B.

Forfeit and/or withhold earned statutory good time or non-vested good
conduct time up to 50% or up to 60 days, whichever is less, and/or
terminate or disallow extra good time (an extra good time or good
conduct time sanction may not be suspended).

B.1

Disallow ordinarily between 25% and 50% (14-27 days) of good conduct
time credit available for year (a good conduct time sanction may not be
suspended).

C.

Disciplinary segregation (up to 6 months).

D.

Make monetary restitution.

E.

Monetary fine.

F.

Loss of privileges (e.g., visiting, telephone, commissary, movies,
recreation).

G.

Change housing (quarters).

H.

Remove from program and/or group activity.

I.

Loss of job.

J.

Impound inmate’s personal property.

K.

Confiscate contraband.

L.

Restrict to quarters.

M.

Extra duty.

28 C.F.R. § 541.3 (Table 1). Thus, the sanctions imposed by the DHO in this
instance were consistent with the severity level of the prohibited act and within the

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maximum available to the DHO. Accordingly, the petition will be denied as to
incident report number 2682784.3
III.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the petition for writ of habeas corpus will be denied.

An appropriate order shall issue.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated:

December 21, 2016

To the extent that Edwards attempts to allege an excessive force claim, this
claim is not cognizable in a habeas corpus action. (Doc. 1 at 2-3). A habeas petition
may be brought by a prisoner who seeks to challenge either the fact or duration of
his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973); Tedford v. Hepting,
990 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. 1993). When seeking to impose liability due to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, the appropriate remedy is a civil rights action. See Leamer v. Fauver, 288
F.3d 532, 540 (3d Cir. 2001). “Habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available
federal remedy.” See Linnen v. Armainis, 991 F.2d 1102, 1109 (3d Cir. 1993).
3