Quiles v. Pike County (PA) et al

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry). Signed by Honorable Yvette Kane on 2/4/16. (sc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EDWIN D. QUILES,
Plaintiff
vs.
PIKE COUNTY (PA), et al.,
et al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL NO. 1:15-CV-01171

(Judge Kane)

MEMORANDUM
Background
On June 15, 2015, Plaintiff Edwin D. Quiles, while
incarcerated at the Pike County Correctional Facility, Lords
Valley, Pennsylvania,1 filed a 7-page typewritten complaint
against (1) Pike County; (2) Craig Lowe, the Warden of Pike County
Correctional Facility; and (3) John Frawley, a corrections officer
employed at the Pike County Correctional Facility with the rank of
sergeant. Doc. 1.
Quiles contends that he is bringing his action pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1977).2 Id., ¶ 3. In

1. Quiles is presently incarcerated at the State Correctional
Institution-Somerset, Somerset, Pennsylvania.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 states as follows: “The district court shall
have original jurisdiction of all actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
Bivens stands for the proposition that "a citizen suffering
a compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interest
(continued...)

the complaint, Quiles alleges that his rights under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated by the
defendants. Id. Specifically, he claims that on February 16, 2015,
he deposited in the inmate mail system at Pike County Correctional
Facility a legal brief addressed to the Pike County Court of
Common Pleas.3 Id., ¶¶ 4-8. Quiles further alleges that the mail
from Pike County Correctional Facility “was to go out on February
17, 2015, and that on February 19, 2015, he was called to the
administration office of Pike County Correctional Facility and
confronted by Sergeant Frawley about the item he placed in the
inmate mail system on February 16th addressed to the Court of
Common Pleas. Id.

Quiles contends that Sergeant Frawley opened

the legal mail, reviewed the documents, and then discarded them in
the trash. Id.

Quiles does not allege that the destruction of the

“legal brief” by Sergeant Frawley affected any legal action
pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County. Id.

Quiles

2. (...continued)
could invoke the general federal question jurisdiction of the
district court to obtain an award of monetary damages against the
responsible federal official." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
504 (1978). The defendants named in this action are not federal
officials and the action will be construed as one filed pursuant
to § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972)(pleadings by pro se prisoners are to be construed
liberally).
3. In the complaint Quiles states that it was “addressd to the
Milford County Court.” However, the borough of Milford is the
county seat of Pike County and where the Court of Common Pleas is
located.
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then alleges, without specifying a date, that Sergeant Frawley
interfered with a mailing “addressed to media.” Id.
There are no allegations in the complaint directed
specifically at Warden Lowe other than a conclusory claim that
Warden Lowe conspired with Sergeant Frawley, nor is there any
allegation regarding the existence of a custom or policy of the
Pike County Correctional Facility of opening legal mail of inmates
or prohibiting inmates to mail letters to the media, including
newspapers. Id.

As relief, Quiles requests that the court issue a

declaratory judgment stating that Defendants violated his rights
and awarding him compensatory and punitive damages. Id., ¶¶ A
through D (Relief Requested).
On June 16, 2015, this court sent to Quiles a copy of
its Standing Practice Order, advising him of his responsibilities
under the Local Rules of Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. Doc. 4.

On August 28, 2015, an order was issued

granting Quiles in forma pauperis status and requesting that
Defendants waive service of the complaint. Doc. 11.

On September

14, 2015, Defendants waived service and on September 24, 2015,
filed an answer to the complaint in which they also raised the
following affirmative defenses: (1) the complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted; (2) Quiles failed to
exhaust available administrative remedies through the Pike County
Correctional Facility’s grievance procedure; and (3) Quiles fails

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to set forth the requisite elements for supervisory or municipal
liability.4 Docs. 15 & 16.
On September 30, 2015, Quiles filed a motion for
appointment of counsel. Doc. 17.

By order of October 16, 2015,

the court denied that motion. Doc. 19.

Furthermore, in light of

the Defendants’ affirmative defenses the court directed Quiles to
show cause in writing within 21 days why his complaint should not
be dismissed for the reasons set forth in the Defendants’
affirmative defenses, including that his complaint fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted. Quiles was advised that
the document showing cause should conform to the requirements of
the Local Rules relating to the submission of briefs and that
failure to do so would result in his complaint being dismissed for
failure to prosecute and abide by a court order.

Quiles’s brief

was due on November 9, 2015, allowing him three extra days for
mailing.
When a plaintiff fails to prosecute or comply with a
court order, the court may dismiss the action pursuant to Rule
41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629 (1962).

Link v. Wabash

In Link, the Supreme

Court stated:

4. In the answer Defendants aver, inter alia, that the “legal
brief” mailing was returned to the Pike County Correctional
Facility by the United States Postal Service “because the
envelope Quiles mailed weighed more than 13 ounces, had 11 stamps
on it, and the U.S.P.S. considered the mailing to present a
security risk.” Doc. 16, ¶4.
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The authority of a federal trial
court to dismiss a plaintiff's
action with prejudice because of
his failure to prosecute cannot
seriously be doubted. The power
to invoke this sanction is
necessary in order to prevent
undue delays in the disposition
of pending cases and to avoid
congestion in the calendars of
the District Courts. The power
is of ancient origin, having its
roots in judgments of nonsuit and
non prosequitur entered at common
law . . . . It has been
expressly recognized in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) . .
. .
Id. at 629-30.

The Court of Appeals for this circuit held in

Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991), that a
district court should not dismiss a former prisoner’s civil rights
complaint for failure to comply with a local rule requiring a
response to a dispositive motion without examining the merits of
the complaint.

However, the Court of Appeals did not vitiate the

Supreme Court's decision in Link, Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure or the inherent power of the district court to
impose the sanction of dismissal for failing to comply with a
court order.

Instead, the Court of Appeals specifically stated:
In reaching our result, we do not
suggest that the district court
may never rely on the local rule
to treat a motion to dismiss as
unopposed and subject to
dismissal without a merits
analysis. There may be some
cases where failure of a party to
oppose a motion will indicate
that the motion is in fact not
opposed, particularly if the
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party is represented by an
attorney and in that situation
the rule may be appropriately
invoked. Nor do we suggest that
if a party fails to comply with
the rule after a specific
direction to comply from the
court, the rule cannot be
invoked.
Id. at 30 (emphasis added); see also Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d
1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Poulis did not provide a magic formula
whereby the decision to dismiss or not to dismiss a plaintiff's
complaint becomes a mechanical calculation . . . [N]ot all of the
Poulis factors5 need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.
Instead, the decision must be made in the context of the district
court's extended contact with the litigant.

Ultimately, the

decision to dismiss constitutes an exercise of the district court
judge's discretion and must be given great deference by [the Court
of Appeals].").
Though the deadline for filing a response to this
court’s show cause order has long passed, Quiles has neither filed
a brief nor requested an extension of time in which to do so.

At

this point, it appears that Quiles has wilfully declined to file a
5. The Court of Appeals in Poulis v. State Farm Fire and
Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984) identified six factors
that are appropriate to consider before dismissing a case for the
plaintiff's late filing of a pretrial statement. The six factors
are: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2)
the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet
scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of
dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or attorney
was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions
other than dismissal which entails an analysis of alternative
sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.
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brief.

The Court finds that the dilatoriness of Quiles outweighs

any of the other considerations set forth in Poulis.

The court

will, pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, dismiss Quiles’s complaint both for failure to
prosecute and for failure to comply with a court order.
An appropriate order will be entered.

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