Medley v. United States of America
Filing
62
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - For the foregoing reasons, the pltfs motion to compel (Doc. 59 .) is DENIED. Further, the Govts motion for extension of time, (Doc. 60 .), is GRANTED, as follows: Close of Discovery: January 4, 2017. Dispositive Motions and Supporting Briefs Due: January 4, 2017. Consent to Proceed Before U.S. Magistrate Judge: January 4, 2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on November 29, 2016. (kjn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LOUIS MEDLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Defendant.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
CIVIL NO. 1:15-CV-1261
(Judge Caldwell)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
Statement of Facts and of the Case
This is a pro se civil rights action brought by Louis Medley, a federal inmate,
through the filing of a complaint on June 29, 2015. (Doc. 1.) Liberally construed,
in his complaint Medley alleges that prison officials negligently failed to follow their
own protocol for screening inmates for tuberculous and placed a tubercular inmate
in Medley’s prison housing unit, exposing him to tuberculous, which he contracted
in a latent form. (Id., ¶ 12.)
This case now comes before us for resolution of a discovery dispute and motion
to compel filed by the plaintiff. (Docs. 59 and 61.) In these pleadings, Medley
objects to the United States’ response to several of his discovery requests. These
discovery requests sought memoranda and other documents relating to a prison
housing unit lockdown which Medley alleges followed the discovery in October or
November of 2013 that there was a tubercular inmate housed at U.S.P. Canaan. The
government has responded to these discovery demands by stating that no such records
exist. Medley also seeks the entire medical file of the inmate who was allegedly
infected with tuberculous. The government objects to this disclosure on privacy
grounds.
Upon consideration, Medley’s request to compel production of this information
will be denied.
II.
Discussion
Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery
dispute. At the outset, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
motions to compel discovery, and provides that:
(a) Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery
(1) In General. On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a
party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
The scope of what type of discovery may be compelled under Rule 37 is
defined, in turn, by Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P.,
Rule 26(b)(1), which provides that:
2
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as
follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake
in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to
relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within
this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be
discoverable.
Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 26(b)(1).
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
“committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the
scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the
court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987).
Therefore, a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to
compel disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of
an abuse of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir.
1983). This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate
Judges on discovery matters. In this regard:
3
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and
Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, at the
outset, it is clear that Rule 26's broad definition of that which can be obtained through
discovery reaches nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense. Therefore, valid claims of relevance and privilege still cabin and restrict the
court’s discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the scope of discovery
permitted by Rule 26 embraces all relevant information a concept which is not
confined to admissible evidence but is also defined in the following terms:
“Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be
4
discoverable.” Rather, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.”
A party moving to compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving the
relevance of the requested information. Morrison v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 203
F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D.Pa. 2001). Once that initial burden is met, “the party resisting
the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance by demonstrating that
the requested discovery (1) does not come within the broad scope of relevance as
defined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the
potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in
favor of broad disclosure.” In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 261 F.R.D. 570, 573
(D.Kan. 2009). Likewise, “[i]n deciding whether a federal privilege against discovery
exists, plaintiffs as the objecting party have the burden of establishing the privilege.”
Bayges v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 144 F.R.D. 269, 271 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
Indeed, because the assertion of a claim of privilege “may result in the withholding
of relevant information and so may obstruct the search for truth,” In re Chevron
Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 164 (3d Cir. 2011), it is well-established that, “ ‘The burden of
proving that the . . . privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege.’
United States v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978).” Matter of Grand Jury
Empanelled February 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 1979).
5
One other immutable rule defines the court’s discretion when ruling on motions
to compel discovery. It is clear that the court cannot compel the production of things
that do not exist. Nor can the court compel the creation of evidence by parties who
attest that they do not possess the materials sought by an adversary in litigation. See,
e.g., AFSCME District Council 47 Health and Welfare Fund v. Ortho-McNeilJanssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08-5904, 2010 WL 5186088 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 21,
2010); Knauss v. Shannon, No. 08-1698, 2009 WL 975251 (M.D.Pa. April 9, 2009).
With these legal guideposts in mind, we turn to consideration of Medley’s various
discovery requests.
At the outset, in this case the defendant has responded to a number of the
plaintiff’s requests by asserting that it possesses no records that are responsive to
these requests. As we have noted, this Court cannot compel the production of things
that do not exist. Nor can the Court compel the creation of evidence by parties who
attest that they do not possess the materials sought by an adversary in litigation. See,
e.g., AFSCME District Council 47 Health and Welfare Fund v. Ortho-McNeilJanssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08-5904, 2010 WL 5186088 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 21,
2010); Knauss v. Shannon, No. 08-1698, 2009 WL 975251 (M.D.Pa. April 9, 2009).
Therefore, the defendant’s assertion that it does not possess any responsive records
that meet the description of the records sought by Medley compels us to deny these
6
specific requests. While we deny these particular requests, we note that the parties
have an on-going responsibility to supplement their discovery disclosures. Rule 26
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes this obligation on all parties. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e). Thus, while we deny these requests at this time in light of the
defendant’s response, all parties are directed to continue to comply with the
provisions of Rule 26(e) and make prompt disclosure of any additional relevant,
responsive materials which they may encounter in the course of this litigation.
As for Medley’s request for the production of the entire medical file of another
prisoner, the inmate who allegedly was the tuberculous carrier in this case, we find
that this request is overly broad in that third party inmates possess an undeniable
privacy interest in their own medical information. See Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309
(3d Cir. 2001). Given this undisputed privacy interest, any request for wholesale
disclosure of the inmate’s medical files will be denied.1
III.
Order
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s motion to compel (Doc. 59.) is
DENIED. Further, the Government’s motion for extension of time, (Doc. 60.), is
We deny this request without prejudice to Medley endeavoring to make
more narrowly tailored requests for information concerning matters relevant to his
claims such as requests for information pre-dating the placement of this prisoner in
Medley’s cell block regarding diagnosis, or treatment for tuberculous.
1
7
GRANTED, as follows:
Close of Discovery:
January 4, 2017
Dispositive Motions and Supporting Briefs Due:
January 4, 2017
Consent to Proceed Before U.S. Magistrate Judge: January 4, 2017
So ordered this 29th day of November 2016.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?