Jones v. Harry et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re: motion to proceed IFP 2 .(See memo for complete details.) Signed by Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner on 8/10/15. (ki)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KENDALL JONES,
Plaintiff
v.
LAUREL HARRY, JENNIFER
DIGBY, JOHN WITZEL,
Defendants

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CIVIL NO. 1:15-CV-1442
(Chief Judge Conner)

MEMORANDUM
On July 27, 2015, plaintiff Kendall Jones (“Jones”), an inmate currently
confined at the State Correctional Institution in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, (“SCICamp Hill”), filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). At
the same time he filed the complaint, Jones filed a motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). An initial screening of the complaint has been conducted,
and for the reasons set forth below, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis will be
granted, and Jones will be directed to file a properly supported amended complaint.
I.

Screening Provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (April

26, 1996), authorizes a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against a governmental

employee or entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2),1 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.2 The Court is
required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). This initial screening is to be done as soon as
practicable and need not await service of process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
II.

Discussion
In order to state a viable § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead two essential

elements: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting
under color of state law, and (2) that said conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995); Shaw by Strain
1

Section 1915(e)(2) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been
paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal -(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
2

Section 1915A(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides:

(b) On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint-(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
2

v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1141-42 (3d Cir. 1990). “To establish liability for
deprivation of a constitutional right under § 1983, a party must show personal
involvement by each defendant.” Keys v. Carroll, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137930, *26
(M.D. Pa. 2012) (Caputo, J.), citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009)
(“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff
must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Santiago v. Warminster Twp.,
629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
The instant complaint names the following defendants: Laurel Harry,
Jennifer Digby, and John Witzel. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Jones alleges violations of his
Eighth Amendment rights. (Doc. 1). However, he fails to set forth any facts in
support of his claim, and fails to set forth any dates as to when these violations
allegedly occurred. Jones simply states that he was “mistreat[ed]”. (Id. at p. 3). He
fails to identify the individuals who allegedly mistreated him, and fails to allege any
personal involvement by the named defendants. If Jones seeks to obtain relief from
the individuals referenced in the complaint, he must allege additional facts showing
that all defendants were personally involved in the alleged violations of his rights.
See Cross v. Losinger, 2007 WL 954313, *1 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (Nealon, J.) (citing Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (“[E]ach named defendant must be shown, via the
complaint’s allegations, to have been personally involved in the events or
occurrences which underlie a claim.”); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison
Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976)).

3

While Jones will be granted an opportunity to file an amended complaint, he
is strictly cautioned that the allegations in the amended complaint “should be
specific as to time and place, and should identify the specific person or persons
responsible for the deprivation of his constitutional rights and what each individual
did that led to deprivation of his rights.” Williams v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 88367, *18 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676
(2009)). “It must be a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint
without reference to the complaint already filed.” Young v. Keohane, 809 F. Supp.
1185 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
III.

Conclusion
Given Jones’ pro se status, he will be afforded an opportunity to file an

amended complaint to sufficiently state a claim for relief. Failure to file a properly
supported amended complaint will result in dismissal of this action without further
notice of court.
An appropriate order will issue.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated:

August 10, 2015