Gresh v. Huntingdon County et al

Filing 74

MEMORANDUM re Dfts' Mtns to Dismiss 14 , 43 , 45 and 47 (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner on 11/4/16. (ma)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DENNIS GRESH,
Plaintiff
v.
HUNTINGDON COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-1466
(Chief Judge Conner)

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Dennis Gresh (“Gresh”) filed the above-captioned action alleging
Fourth Amendment and due process claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state
law claims for civil conspiracy and tortious interference with a contractual
relationship. In the court‟s memorandum opinion (Doc. 89) and order (Doc. 39)
dated March 24, 2016, the court dismissed Gresh‟s first complaint without prejudice.
Gresh subsequently filed an amended complaint. (Doc. 40). Presently before the
court are three motions (Docs. 43, 45, 47) to dismiss filed by (1) Huntingdon County
(“the County”), Sheriff William G. Walters, Chief Deputy Mark Foor, Sergeant Jeff
Leonard, Deputy Dan McCartney, Deputy Tammy S. Foor, and Deputy Larry
Cressman (collectively, “the Huntingdon County defendants”); (2) the Huntingdon
County Agricultural Association (“Agricultural Association”); and (3) Bartlebaugh
Amusements, Inc. (“Bartlebaugh Amusements”). For the reasons that follow, the
court will grant defendants‟ motions in part and deny them in part.

I.

Factual Background & Procedural History
The material facts are set forth in the court‟s March 24, 2016 decision, Gresh

v. Huntingdon County, No. 1:15-CV-1466, 2016 WL 1162320, at *1-2 (M.D. Pa. March
24, 2016) (“Gresh I”), familiarity with which is presumed. The facts pertinent to this
matter are reiterated and elaborated as appropriate below.
Gresh filed the original complaint (Doc. 1) against the Huntingdon County
defendants, the Agricultural Association, and Bartlebaugh Amusements on July 29,
2015. Gresh asserted Fourth Amendment and procedural due process claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, IIED,
tortious interference with contract, and civil conspiracy against the Huntingdon
County defendants and the Huntingdon County Sheriff‟s Office (“Sheriff‟s Office”).
(Id.) Gresh also brought claims against the Agricultural Association and
Bartlebaugh Amusements alleging conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights.
(Id.)
Defendants filed three motions (Docs. 14, 23, 33) to dismiss Gresh‟s first
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The court decided these motions in Gresh I. First, the court
dismissed Gresh‟s Fourth Amendment and procedural due process claims against
the Sheriff‟s Office with prejudice. Id. at *4. The court subsequently dismissed
Gresh‟s Fourth Amendment and due process claims against the County without
prejudice because he failed to adequately plead a claim under Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). Gresh I, 2016 WL 1162320,
at *3-4. The court also dismissed, without prejudice, Gresh‟s procedural due
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process claim against the Huntingdon County defendants, Section 1983 conspiracy
claims against the Agricultural Association and Bartlebaugh Amusements, and
state law claims including intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious
interference with contract, and civil conspiracy against the Huntingdon County
defendants. Id. at *5-9. The court denied the individual Huntingdon County
defendants‟ motion to dismiss with respect to Gresh‟s Fourth Amendment unlawful
seizure claim and state law assault, battery, and false imprisonment claims. Id. at
*4, 7. The court specifically granted Gresh leave to amend to allow him the
opportunity to cure the complaint‟s deficiencies. Id.
Gresh filed an amended complaint (Doc. 40) on April 12, 2016. Gresh asserts
the same claims in his amended complaint as his original complaint. (Docs. 1, 40).
The Huntingdon County defendants, the Agricultural Association, and Bartlebaugh
Amusements filed motions (Docs. 43, 45, 47) to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
II.

Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the

dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cty. of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). In addition to reviewing the facts
contained in the complaint, the court may also consider “matters of public record,
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orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the record of the
case.” Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir.
1994); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196
(3d Cir. 1993).
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court must conduct a three-step
inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In
the first step, “the court must „tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to
state a claim.‟” Id. at 130 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next,
the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated; well-pleaded facts
must be accepted as true, while mere legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at
131; see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once
the court isolates the well-pleaded factual allegations, it must determine whether
they are sufficient to show a “plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (requiring plaintiffs to
allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level”). A claim
“has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Courts should grant leave to amend before dismissing a curable pleading in
civil rights actions. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc.,
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482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108
(3d Cir. 2002). Courts need not grant leave to amend sua sponte in dismissing noncivil rights claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fletcher-Harlee Corp., 482 F.3d at 251,
but leave is broadly encouraged “when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).
III.

Discussion
Defendants collectively aver that Gresh‟s amended complaint fails to cure the

deficiencies that the court identified in his original complaint. (Docs. 43, 45, 47).
Defendants accordingly assert that Gresh‟s amended complaint should be
dismissed with prejudice because the allegations contained therein, when taken as
true, do not establish plausible causes of action. (Docs. 43, 45, 47). Defendants
asseverate that Gresh‟s amended complaint adds no support to his allegata and that
the few amendments Gresh offers are speculative and derisory. (Docs. 43, 45, 47).
Gresh counters that his amendments allow the court to infer facts and relationships
that establish the plausibility of his claims. (Doc. 49 at 8; Doc. 50 at 9-14).
The court concludes that Gresh‟s has not sufficiently cured his complaint of
its defects. The scant material that Gresh added to his complaint provides no facts
that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
With respect to his claims against the Huntingdon County defendants, Gresh‟s
vague reference to the sheriff‟s “system of „private justice‟” in his amended
complaint does not establish a policy or custom for purposes of a Monell claim.
(Doc. 50 at 7-8). The amended complaint contains even fewer facts in support of the
civil conspiracy and tortious interference claims against the Huntingdon County
defendants. Gresh instead offers conjecture as to how the Huntingdon County
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defendants engaged in a conspiracy without offering any support for his assertions.
(Id. at 11-14).
Gresh similarly fails to buttress his claims against the Agricultural
Association and Bartlebaugh Amusements. Gresh avers that these defendants were
engaged in a conspiracy or sought to interfere in business relationships. (Doc. 49 at
8). To the extent Gresh alleges federal constitutional claims against the Agricultural
Association or Bartlebaugh Amusements, Gresh‟s allegations plainly fail under Rule
12(b)(6) because he asserts them against non-state actors. Plaintiffs “seeking to
hold an individual liable under § 1983 must establish that [he or she] was deprived
of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.” Kach v. Hose, 589
F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Benn v. Universal Health Sys., 371 F.3d 165, 16970 (3d Cir. 2004)). Gresh does not allege that Bartlebaugh Amusements and the
Agricultural Association are otherwise so associated with the state as to presume
that these defendants‟ actions “may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id.
at 648 (quoting Boyle v. Governor‟s Veterans Outreach & Assistance Ctr., 925 F.2d
71, 76 (3d Cir. 1991)). Gresh similarly submits no facts reinforcing his threadbare
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, yet repeats his demand for same.
The court is mindful that it should freely give leave to amend a complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108; see
also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). In this instance, the court has once
before dismissed Gresh‟s complaint. The court accordingly will dismiss the claims
discussed supra with prejudice. The court specifically notes, however, that in Gresh
I the court denied the Huntingdon County defendants‟ motion (Doc. 14) to dismiss
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with respect to Gresh‟s Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claim and his state law
claims for assault, battery, and false imprisonment. Gresh I, 2016 WL 1162320, at
*4-5, 7. The court declines to disturb its ruling in Gresh I and will deny the
Huntingdon County defendants‟ motion (Doc. 45) to dismiss with respect to these
claims.
IV.

Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, the court will grant in part and deny in part

defendants‟ motions (Docs. 43, 45, 47) to dismiss. An appropriate order shall issue.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated:

November 4, 2016