K.E. v. Dover Area School District et al

Filing 130

ORDER DENYING Dover's MIL 103 . (See order for complete details.) Signed by Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner on 4/17/18. (ki)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
K.E.,
Plaintiff
v.
DOVER AREA SCHOOL
DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-1634
(Chief Judge Conner)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of April, 2018, upon consideration of the motion
(Doc. 103) in limine by defendant Dover Area School District (“Dover”) seeking, on
relevance grounds, to preclude plaintiff K.E. from referencing at trial in the abovecaptioned action evidence or allegations of sexual abuse by defendant Matthew
Puterbaugh (“Puterbaugh”), a former teacher, which did not occur on Dover’s
property or at a school district event, as well as evidence or allegations of abuse
which occurred after K.E. matriculated from Dover’s intermediate school to its high
school and was no longer Puterbaugh’s student, and the motion having been fully
briefed, (Docs. 104, 110, 114), and the court noting that relevant evidence is that
which has a tendency to make a fact of consequence “more or less probable than
it would be without the evidence,” FED. R. EVID. 401, 402, and that, to establish
Dover’s liability for failure to train its employees to detect or report signs of sexual
abuse of students, K.E. must show, inter alia, an underlying constitutional violation
committed “under color of” state law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the court further noting
that Dover identifies several cases establishing that a public school teacher’s private

acts cannot be considered state action for purposes of Section 1983 and Monell
liability, (see Doc. 104 at 5-10 (collecting cases)), in support of its assertion that, if
Puterbaugh’s abuse of K.E. did not occur under color of state law, there can be no
state action and thus no municipal liability, (id. at 5), but the court observing that
the cases cited by Dover are distinguishable in that each concerned isolated and
exclusively private instances of sexual abuse by a public school teacher,1 in marked
contrast to K.E.’s allegations sub judice, viz.: that Puterbaugh began his abuse of
K.E. in the context of a student-teacher relationship and on school property, that
the abuse continued to occur on school property for an extended period of time,
that the abuse eventually occurred both on and off of school property before moving
primarily off school property when K.E. matriculated to the district’s high school
and was no longer in Puterbaugh’s class, and that Dover’s administrators were
made aware of both the on-campus and the off-campus abuse while K.E. was a
student at the intermediate school and again thereafter when she was a student at
the high school, (see Doc. 92 at 2-6), and the court further observing that, as to the
question of damages, a reasonable trier of fact could determine that the continued
abuse and any injury flowing therefrom was a proximate result of Dover’s alleged
failure to respond to an initial report of abuse which, if K.E.’s narrative is credited,

1

See D.T. by M.T. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176, 1192 (10th Cir.
1990) (no state action where abuse occurred during fundraising trip for basketball
camp unaffiliated with the school during summer break); Becerra v. Asher, 105 F.3d
1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1997) (no state action where abuse occurred in student’s home
more than five months after student withdrew from the school and student-teacher
relationship ended).
2

indisputably occurred under color of state law, and the court thus concluding that
the evidence is relevant and shall be admissible at trial, it is hereby ORDERED that
Dover’s motion (Doc. 103) in limine is DENIED.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania