Millhouse v. Samuals et al

Filing 47

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 40 MOTION for Default Judgment as to filed by Kareem Hassan Milhouse, 33 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Kareem Hassan Milhouse, 35 MOTION to Alter Judgment filed by Kareem Hassan Milhouse. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on April 8, 2016. (kjn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KAREEM MILLHOUSE,
Plaintiff,
v.

CHARLES SAMUELS, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL NO. 1:15-CV-1644
(Judge Rambo)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM ORDER
THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:
The plaintiff, Kareem Millhouse, is a federal prisoner housed at the Special
Management Unit of the United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg. On August 25, 2015,
Millhouse filed a pro se complaint with this court. (Doc. 1.) Liberally construed, this
complaint lodged both general and specific claims that officials at the Lewisburg
Penitentiary were violating Millhouse’ rights under the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiff
has now filed a series of motions in the nature of motions for entry of default
judgment. (Docs. 33, 35, and 40.) For the reasons set forth below, these motions are
DENIED.
Default judgments are governed by Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and a default judgment may only be entered when the party against whom

the default judgment is sought “has failed to plead or otherwise respond.” Rule 55(a),
F.R.Civ.P. Here the defendants have now responded to the complaint by filing a
motion to dismiss that complaint (Doc. 46.) Therefore Millhouse is not entitled to the
entry of a default judgment.
Furthermore, in ruling upon requests relating to default judgments it is wellsettled that these decisions are:
[L]eft primarily to the discretion of the district court. Tozer v. Charles A.
Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 244 (3d Cir.1951). We recognize,
however, that this court does not favor entry of defaults or default
judgments. We require doubtful cases to be resolved in favor of the
party moving to [deny or] set aside the default judgment “so that cases
may be decided on their merits.” Id. at 245. See also Gross v. Stereo
Component Systems, Inc., 700 F.2d 120, 122 (3d Cir.1983); Feliciano v.
Reliant Tooling Company, Ltd., 691 F.2d 653, 656 (3d Cir.1982);
Farnese v. Bagnasco, 687 F.2d 761, 764 (3d Cir.1982). Nevertheless, we
do not [deny or] set aside the entry of default and default judgment
unless we determine that the district court abused its discretion. We
require the district court to consider the following factors in exercising
its discretion . . . : (1) whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced; (2)
whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; (3) whether the default
was the result of the defendant's culpable conduct. Gross v. Stereo
Component Systems, Inc., 700 F.2d at 122; Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling
Company, Ltd., 691 F.2d at 656; Farnese v. Bagnasco, 687 F.2d at 764.
United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d 192, 194-95 (3d
Cir. 1984)
In this case, we find that all of these discretionary factors favor denial of entry
of default judgment against these defendants at this time. At the outset, allowing this
matter to be resolved on its merits is a cardinal guiding principle in our legal system,

and one which causes courts to view default judgments with disfavor. This principle
applies with particular force here, since the plaintiff’s entitlement to judgment on the
merits is unclear. Furthermore, the plaintiff is not unfairly prejudiced by denying a
default judgment at this early stage of the litigation. However, entry of default would
be highly prejudicial to the defendants.
Accordingly, the plaintiff is not entitled to the entry of a default judgment
against these defendants, the various motions for entry of default judgment, (Docs. 33,
35 and 40) are DENIED.

S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
April 8, 2016