Millhouse v. Samuals et al

Filing 50

MEMORANDUM ORDER - Upon consideration of the pending motion to compel discovery (Doc. 31 ),IT IS ORDERED that this motion is DENIED and further discovery is STAYED pending resolution of the outstanding motion to dismiss filed by the defendants. IT I S FURTHER ORDERED that the pltfs motions to compel a response to the request for preliminary injunction (Docs. 26 and 28 ) are GRANTED, and dfts shall respond to the motion for preliminary injunction on or before April 29, 2016. The movant may then file a reply brief on or before May 13, 2016. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on April 15, 2016. (kjn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KAREEM MILLHOUSE,
Plaintiff,
v.

CHARLES SAMUELS, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL NO. 1:15-CV-1644
(Judge Rambo)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM ORDER
THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:
This is a pro se prisoner civil rights lawsuit. The plaintiff, Kareem Millhouse,
has filed a motion to compel discovery (Doc. 31), and two motions to compel a
response to a motion for preliminary injunction. (Docs. 26 and 28.) These motions
were filed by Millhouse before any attorney had entered an appearance for the
defendants. Counsel has now entered an appearance and moved to dismiss this
complaint.
Given this background the motion to compel discovery, (Doc. 31) will be
denied and discovery will be stayed pending resolution of the motion to dismiss. The
motions to compel a response to the request for preliminary injunction (Docs. 26 and
28) will be granted.

Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of these motions. At the
outset, with respect to Millhouse’s motion to compel discovery, rulingsregarding the
proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which discovery may be compelled, are
matters consigned to the court’s discretion and judgment. Thus, it has long been held
that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are “committed to the sound discretion of
the district court.” DiGregorio v. First Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir.
1974). Similarly, issues relating to the scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26
also rest in the sound discretion of the Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus, a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of
discovery, and whether to compel disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed
only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699
F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by
United States Magistrate Judges on discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys.
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Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
We also note that our broad discretion over discovery matters extends to
decisions under Rule 26(c) relating to the issuance of protective orders limiting and
regulating the timing of discovery. Indeed, it is undisputed that: “ ‘[t]he grant and
nature of [a protective order] is singularly within the discretion of the district court
and may be reversed only on a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’ Galella v.
Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d Cir.1973) (citation omitted).” Dove v. Atlantic
Capital Corp., 963 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1992). This discretion is guided, however, by
certain basic principles. One of these cardinal principles, governing the exercise of
discretion in this field, is that the district court may properly defer or delay discovery
while it considers a potentially dispositive pretrial motion, provided the district court
concludes that the pretrial motion does not, on its face, appear groundless. See, e.g.,
James v. York County Police Dep’t, 160 F.App’x 126, 136 (3d Cir. 2005); Nolan v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 973 F.2d 843,849 (10th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. New York Univ.
Sch. of Ed., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Briefly deferring discovery in such
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a case, while the court determines the threshold issue of whether a complaint has
sufficient merit to go forward, recognizes a simple, fundamental truth: Parties who
file motions which may present potentially meritorious and complete legal defenses
to civil actions should not be put to the time, expense and burden of factual discovery
until after these claimed legal defenses are addressed by the court. In such instances,
it is clearly established that:
“[A] stay of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a potentially
dispositive motion where the motion ‘appear[s] to have substantial
grounds' or, stated another way, ‘do[es] not appear to be without
foundation in law.’ ” In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust
Litigation, 2002 WL 88278, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (quoting
Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp., 137 F.R.D. 209, 209-10
(S.D.N.Y.1991)) ( citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 203
F.R.D. 92, 2001 WL 396422, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2001); AntiMonopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1996 WL 101277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
March 7, 1996)).
Johnson v. New York Univ. School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Guided by these legal tenets we conclude that further discovery should be
briefly stayed at this time until after the court resolves the pending motion to dismiss.
We reach this conclusion in accordance with settled case law, finding that: “[A] stay
of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a potentially dispositive motion
where the motion ‘appear[s] to have substantial grounds' or, stated another way,
‘do[es] not appear to be without foundation in law.’” Johnson v. New York Univ.

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School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
We agree, however, that the defendants should now respond to Millhouse’s
motion for preliminary injunction and will direct a response to that motion.
An appropriate order follows:
Order
Upon consideration of the pending motion to compel discovery (Doc. 31),IT
IS ORDERED that this motion is DENIED and further discovery is STAYED
pending resolution of the outstanding motion to dismiss filed by the defendants. IT
IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motions to compel a response to the
request for preliminary injunction (Docs. 26 and 28) are GRANTED, and defendants
shall respond to the motion for preliminary injunction on or before April 29, 2016.
The movant may then file a reply brief on or before May 13, 2016.
So ordered this 15th day of April, 2016.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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