Jewish Association on Aging/Charles Morris Nursing & Rehabilitation Center v. Dallas

Filing 43

MEMORANDUM re pltf's MOTION for Reconsideration 41 (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 9/16/16. (ma)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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THEODORE DALLAS, In his official :
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capacity as the Secretary of the
Pennsylvania Department of Human :
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Services,
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Defendant.
JEWISH ASSOCIATION ON
AGING/CHARLES MORRIS
NURSING & REHABILITATION
CENTER, as assignee and/or
authorized representative of Lee Read
and Eugene Schreiber,

Civ. No. 1:15-CV-1809

Judge Sylvia H. Rambo

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint on September 17,
2015. (Doc. 1.) The complaint was not served upon Defendant, however, until
March 11, 2016. (Doc. 23.) On July 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for entry of
default judgment (Doc. 24), but was instructed by the court to first file a motion for
entry of default (Doc. 25). Plaintiff filed two motions for entry of default, one on
August 2, 2016 and the second on August 12, 2016. (Docs. 26 & 27.) On August
12, 2016, Plaintiff also filed a motion for entry of default judgment (Doc. 28), and
the court granted Plaintiff’s motions and entered default judgment on August 15,
2016 (Doc. 30).

On August 19, 2016, Defendant filed a motion for relief from the default
judgment, asserting that the lead attorney at the Pennsylvania Department of
Human Services (“DHS”) took a leave of absence due to family medical issues
shortly after the complaint was served, causing it to be overlooked and not
reassigned to a different attorney, and that DHS never received Plaintiff’s motions
for default as they were mailed to a post office box rather than the DHS office.
(See Doc. 31.) A telephonic hearing regarding Defendant’s motion was held on
August 24, 2016, and the court issued a memorandum and order on August 25,
2016 (Docs. 39 & 40) finding that the relevant factors favored setting aside the
entry of default and ordering that it indeed be set aside so that the case could
proceed on its merits.

Presently before the court is Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration of the court’s decision to set aside default. (Doc. 41.)
I.

Legal Standard
Motions for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)

serve primarily to correct manifest errors of law or fact in a prior decision of the
court. See United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003). Under Rule
59(e), “a judgment may be altered or amended if the party seeking reconsideration
establishes at least one of the following grounds: (1) an intervening change in the
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when
the court granted the motion for summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a
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clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Cafe ex
rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing N. River
Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). Motions
for reconsideration may also be appropriate in instances “where, for example, the
Court has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the
adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of
reasoning but of apprehension.” Reaves v. Pa. State Police, Civ. No. 09-cv-2549,
2014 WL 486741, *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2014) (quoting Rohrbach v. AT&T Nassau
Metals Corp., 902 F. Supp. 523, 527 (M.D. Pa. 1995)).

“‘A motion for

reconsideration is not to be used as a means to reargue matters already argued and
disposed of or as an attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement between the Court
and the litigant.’” Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F. Supp. 2d 588, 606 (M.D.
Pa. 2002) (quoting Abu-Jamal v. Horn, Civ. No. 99-cv-5089, 2001 WL 1609761,
*9 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2001)). “Likewise, reconsideration motions may not be used
to raise new arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the
entry of judgment.” Hill v. Tammac Corp., Civ. No. , 2006 WL 529044, *2 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 3, 2006) (citing McDowell Oil Serv., Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co.,
817 F. Supp. 538, 541 (M.D. Pa. 1993)). Reconsideration of a judgment is an
extraordinary remedy, and courts should grant such motions sparingly. D’Angio v.

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Borough of Nescopeck, 56 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (citing NL Indus.,
Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996)).
II.

Discussion
In its motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff does not cite to any change in

intervening law or new evidence since the court’s decision to set aside default, nor
does Plaintiff point to any mistake of fact or error of law that the court may have
made. Rather, Plaintiff simply states that the court should reconsider its decision
based on Defendant’s failure to timely respond to the summons and the fact that
Defendant had two opportunities to timely file a responsive pleading in this matter.
(See Doc. 41, ¶¶ 5 & 7.)
These are the very same arguments that Plaintiff previously made during the
telephonic hearing regarding Defendant’s motion to set aside default, which the
court rejected in its prior memorandum by finding “that Defendant’s delay in
responding to this litigation has not caused any prejudice to Plaintiff, Defendant
has put forward a meritorious defense, and Defendant did not engage in any
culpable conduct.” Jewish Assoc. on Aging/Charles Morris Nursing & Rehab. Ctr.
v. Dallas, Civ. No. 15-cv-1809, 2016 WL 4479317, *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2016).
As the court held, “[t]hese findings, coupled with the court’s preference for
resolving disputes upon their merits rather than procedural technicalities, compels
the court to set aside the entries of default and default judgment.” Id. Plaintiff’s
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motion is simply an attempt to reargue its previous points, which is not a basis for
the court to reconsider its decision. See Ogden, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 606.
III.

Conclusion
Based on the court’s prior reasoning for setting aside the default judgment

and Plaintiff’s failure to propound any proper basis for the court to reconsider its
decision, the motion for reconsideration will be denied.
An appropriate order will issue.

s/Sylvia H. Rambo
SYLVIA H. RAMBO
United States District Judge
Dated: September 16, 2016

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