Runion v. Equipment Transport, LLC
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re: 27 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Equipment Transport, LLC. (See memo for complete details.) Signed by Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner on 9/1/17. (ki)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EQUIPMENT TRANSPORT, LLC,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-2159
(Chief Judge Conner)
Plaintiff Bruce Runion (“Runion”) brings this action against his former
employer, defendant Equipment Transport, LLC (“Equipment Transport”),
alleging that Equipment Transport terminated him in retaliation for filing a
workers‟ compensation claim. Before the court is Equipment Transport‟s motion
(Doc. 27) for summary judgment. The court will grant Equipment Transport‟s
Factual Background & Procedural History1
Equipment Transport provides drilling and completion services to oil and gas
operators. (Doc. 27-2 ¶ 1). Equipment Transport hired Runion on May 6, 2014 as a
laborer to perform sundry tasks as assigned including, but not limited to, washing
and cleaning tanks and equipment used in the natural gas drilling industry. (Id. ¶¶
2-5). Runion served on a six-person labor crew under the supervision of Beverly
Miszler (“Miszler”). (Id. ¶¶ 6-7). As part of his employment application, Runion
executed various documents outlining his rights and duties under the Workers‟
Compensation Act, 77 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1 et seq. (Doc. 27-3; Runion
Dep. 84:13-85:6, Oct. 25, 2016 (“Runion Dep.”)).2
On September 30, 2014, Runion and fellow laborers were attempting to
suction byproduct out of a Newaltas machine into a waste truck. (Doc. 27-2 ¶ 14,
Pearson Dep. 10:5-11:2, Dec. 1, 2016 (“Pearson Dep.”)). Runion ingested byproduct
Local Rule 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 be supported “by a separate, short, and concise
statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving
party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56.1.
A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement
of material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving
party‟s statement and identifying genuine issues for trial. See id. Unless otherwise
noted, the factual background herein derives from the parties‟ Rule 56.1 statements
of material facts. (See Docs. 27-2, 33). To the extent the parties‟ statements are
undisputed or supported by uncontroverted record evidence, the court cites
directly to the statements of material facts.
Partial and full transcripts of Runion‟s deposition have been filed by the
parties at separate docket entries. Unless otherwise noted, the court will cite to this
deposition passim as “Runion Dep.” without docket entry citations. The court
employs this citation convention for deposition transcripts throughout this
when the hoses came apart and sprayed the laborers. (Pearson Dep. 11:2-7; Runion
Dep. 43:9-44:2). Runion informed Miszler, his immediate supervisor, that he was
going home to wash off the byproduct and then to the hospital to get “checked out.”
(Runion Dep. 44:3-6). Runion claims to have also informed Miszler that he was
“going to tell the hospital that it was going to be a workmen‟s comp. related
incident.” (Id. at 44:6-8). Runion vomited several times at home and then checked
into the Montrose Hospital emergency room. (Id. at 48:12-49:2).
Emergency room physician Dr. Hassan Khalil attended to Runion and took
bloodwork and induced vomiting. (Id. at 49:21-50:8). Runion does not recall
whether he told Dr. Khalil that his treatment would be a workers‟ compensation
claim. (Id. at 60:6-15). Runion testified that he did inform a hospital billing
administrator and a nurse regarding same and filled out paperwork related to his
injury and workers‟ compensation. (Id. at 58:24-60:5). Dr. Khalil cleared Runion to
return to work with instructions to schedule a follow-up appointment and to see a
toxicologist because the waste byproduct might contain radon or other harmful
substances. (Id. at 50:11-53:5; Pearson Dep. 18:12-20:7; Witbeck Dep. 26:1-29:13,
Nov. 21, 2016 (“Witbeck Dep.”)).
Safety supervisor Marc Vincent (“Vincent”) visited the work site on October
1, 2014 and spoke with Runion about the incident and his decision to seek medical
attention. (Runion Dep. 66:8-69:12). Vincent was purportedly upset that Runion
had “put [his injury-related medical expenses] through workmen‟s comp. at the
hospital.” (Id. at 69:13-17). On October 2, 2014, supervisor Bryan Witbeck
(“Witbeck”) visited the job site and Runion apprised him of the incident and that he
“put [his injury] under workmen‟s comp. to cover for the hospital bill.” (Id. at 72:224).
Equipment Transport assigned Runion exclusively to flow back containment
tank cleaning duties during the two weeks following the September 30, 2014
incident. (Id. at 76:1-5; Doc. 34-6). Runion experienced a significant decrease in
scheduled hours over that two week period. (Doc. 34-7). Equipment Transport
terminated Runion‟s employment on October 15, 2014. (Doc. 27-3, Ex. D, Decl. of
Beverly Miszler ¶¶ 12, 14, Jan. 16, 2017 (“Miszler Decl.”); Runion Dep. 32:2-5, 90:814). Equipment Transport listed the following reasons for Runion‟s termination:
failure to wear personal protective equipment; damaging company property; and
making terroristic threats against Equipment Transport employees and company
property.3 (Doc. 27-2 ¶ 24). Runion‟s past disciplinary history also included
insubordination, (Doc. 27-3, Ex. A, Tab G; Doc. 27-3, Ex. D, Tab A), and turning in a
timesheet containing sexual content. (Doc. 27-3, Ex. A, Decl. of Arthur Streeter ¶
18, Jan. 16, 2017; Doc. 27-3, Ex. A, Tab C).
Runion clarifies that the reprimand for failing to wear personal protective
equipment was due to his visor being tilted at an incorrect angle. (Runion Dep.
88:20-89:14). He denies damaging company property, specifically an eyewash
Runion denies this paragraph of Equipment Transport‟s Rule 56.1
statement and asserts that Equipment Transport terminated his employment in
retaliation for his expression of an intent to file a workers‟ compensation claim.
(Doc. 33 ¶ 24). Importantly, Runion does not deny the substance of this paragraph,
that Equipment Transport provided these reasons for his termination. Nor does
Runion cite to any contradictory evidence regarding same. The record evidence
supports the fact that these are the reasons provided by Equipment Transport,
regardless of whether they were the “real” reasons. (Doc. 27-3, Ex. A, Tab F & G;
Doc. 27-3, Ex. D, Tab A; Witbeck Dep. 33:5-20, 38:3-10).
station. (Id. at 89:15-22). He also denies making terroristic threats toward
Equipment Transport employees or company property. (Doc. 33 ¶¶ 17, 23, 24).
Runion does not recall being reprimanded for turning in a timesheet containing
sexual content. (Runion Dep. 87:15-88:16). Runion avers that the true reason
Equipment Transport decreased his hours, assigned him to tank cleaning duty, and
ultimately fired him was his decision to pursue workers‟ compensation. (Doc. 33 ¶¶
24, 29, 30). Equipment Transport maintains that the actions listed supra were
legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for Runion‟s termination. (Doc. 35 at 7-9).
Equipment Transport also points to an industry-wide slowdown as a factor.
(Doc. 27-2 ¶ 32). Equipment Transport closed the Hallstead, Pennsylvania plant
where Runion worked six months later in April 2015. (Id. ¶ 33).
Runion initiated the case by filing a complaint (Doc. 1) on November 11, 2015.
Therein, Runion asserts one common law claim: that Equipment Transport violated
the public policy of Pennsylvania by terminating Runion in retaliation for
exercising his rights under the Workers‟ Compensation Act. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 21-25).
Runion filed an amended complaint (Doc. 19) on March 1, 2016 with leave of court
(Doc. 18) for the purpose of clarifying the scope of his protected activity to include
expressing an intent to file for workers‟ compensation. Following a period of
discovery, Equipment Transport filed the instant motion (Doc. 27) for summary
judgment, together with supporting papers.4 The motion is fully briefed and ripe
Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that
do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact” and for which a jury trial
would be an empty and unnecessary formality. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The burden of
proof tasks the non-moving party to come forth with “affirmative evidence, beyond
the allegations of the pleadings,” in support of its right to relief. Pappas v. City of
Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). This evidence must be adequate, as a matter of law, to
sustain a judgment in favor of the non-moving party on the claims. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-57 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986). Only if this threshold is met may
the cause of action proceed. See Pappas, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
Pennsylvania law provides that employers may terminate employees “for any
or no reason” unless the employee is subject to an employment agreement. Shick v.
Shirey, 716 A.2d 1231, 1233 (Pa. 1998) (quoting Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d
174, 176 (Pa. 1974)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has carved out an
In addition to providing responses to each of Equipment Transport‟s
statements of fact, Runion‟s brief in opposition (Doc. 34) to Equipment Transport‟s
motion for summary judgment includes a section styled as “Counter Statement of
Facts.” Neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 nor Local Rule 56.1 authorizes
this filing, and Runion did not request leave of court therefor. The court will not
consider this portion of Runion‟s brief as same fails to conform to our procedural
exception to the at-will employment doctrine: employees may bring wrongful
termination claims when their termination “would violate a „clear mandate of public
policy.‟” McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 750 A.2d 283, 313 (Pa.
2000) (quoting Geary, 319 A.2d at 180). The exception applies only when the
Pennsylvania legislature formulates a public policy or “a given policy is so obviously
for or against public health, safety, morals, or welfare that there is a virtual
unanimity of opinion in regard to it.” Weaver v. Harpster, 975 A.2d 555, 563 (Pa.
2009) (quoting Mamlin v. Genoe, 17 A.2d 407, 409 (Pa. 1941)).
Public Policy and Workers’ Compensation
A Pennsylvania employee may not be terminated for seeking workers‟
compensation benefits. Rothrock v. Rothrock Motor Sales, Inc., 883 A.2d 511, 51516 (Pa. 2005) (citing Shick, 716 A.2d at 1238). Unfortunately, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has not articulated the precise elements of such a retaliation claim.
Theriault v. Dollar General, 336 F. App‟x 172, 175 (3d Cir. 2009) (nonprecedential).
The Third Circuit predicts that, when presented with the opportunity, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court will apply the familiar Title VII framework to
Pennsylvania retaliation claims. Id.; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). District courts within the Third Circuit have likewise resolved that
federal retaliation standards apply to state law retaliation claims.5 See, e.g.,
Sharkey v. Fed. Exp. Corp., No. 98-CV-3351, 2001 WL 21500, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9,
2001); Landmesser v. United Air Lines, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 273, 277 (E.D. Pa. 2000);
Alderfer v. Nibco Inc., No. 98-6654, 1999 WL 956375, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 1999).
We agree with the ratio decidendi of this emerging consensus.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must prove that: (1)
he engaged in a protected activity; (2) his employer took an adverse employment
action against him; and (3) a causal nexus existed between his protected activity
and the adverse employment action. See id. at 174; see also Moore v. City of Phila.,
461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006). Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its decision. Moore, 461 F.3d at 342; see also Owens, 103 A.3d
at 863. If the employer proffers a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its decision,
the burden of persuasion returns to the plaintiff to prove that the proffered nonretaliatory rationale is pretextual and that the unlawful motive was the “but-for”
cause of the adverse action. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. __,
133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013); Moore, 461 F.3d at 342.
Both parties cite Owens v. Lehigh Valley Hospital, 103 A.3d 859 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2014), in their briefs. The trial court in Owens relied upon a federal
district court‟s predictive reasoning that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
apply the Title VII framework to a wrongful discharge claim. Id. at 861 (citing
Landmesser v. United Air Lines, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 273 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). On
appeal, the commonwealth court declined to endorse this predictive reasoning and
instead concluded that a case specific method of analysis was appropriate. Id. at
868-69. However, in light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court‟s continued silence
on the matter, this court will follow the clear trend of federal courts in the Third
Circuit. The parties do not dispute that this is the appropriate framework to be
applied to Plaintiff‟s claim. (See Doc. 28 at 11; Doc. 34 at 10).
Equipment Transport‟s termination of Runion‟s employment on October 15,
2014 constitutes an adverse employment action. LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty.
Ctr. Ass‟n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 (3d Cir. 2007). Equipment Transport does not dispute
this point. (See Doc. 28 at 12-16). Equipment Transport also does not challenge
whether there is a sufficient causal nexus between Runion‟s alleged exercise of his
rights under the Workers‟ Compensation Act and his termination. (See Doc. 28, 35).
Equipment Transport only disputes the first element of Runion‟s prima facie case:
whether he engaged in protected activity.
Prima Facie Retaliatory Discharge Claim
Equipment Transport claims Runion did not engage in protected activity
because he did not file a workers‟ compensation claim with either the Pennsylvania
Workers‟ Compensation Bureau or his employer. (Doc. 28 at 12-13). Equipment
Transport also argues Runion cannot sustain his retaliatory discharge action on the
ground that Equipment Transport had notice of his intent to file for workers‟
compensation. (Id. at 13). Pennsylvania courts have not explicitly extended the
public policy exception to at-will employees who merely express an intention to file
for workers‟ compensation. Equipment Transport views this as a bar to Runion‟s
retaliatory discharge claim. (Id. at 13).
Pennsylvania courts have provided limited guidance on the proper
application of this public policy exception to the at-will employment presumption,
stating only that it is an exceedingly narrow exception. See Shick v. Shirey, 716
A.2d 1231, 1238 (1998) (Flaherty, C.J., concurring); Owens, 103 A.3d at 862, 869;
McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Spec. Inc., 750 A.2d 283, 290 (Pa. 2000). District
courts in Pennsylvania have grappled with what conduct, short of actually filing a
workers‟ compensation claim, may be sufficient to constitute protected activity.
Several federal courts have predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will
determine that injured employees who have expressed their intent to pursue
workers‟ compensation claims to their employers will fall within the ambit of
“protected activity.” See, e.g., Smith v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., No. 10-1417,
2011 WL 4346340, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2011); Worthington v. Chester Downs &
Marina, LLC, No. 17-1360, 2017 WL 3457031, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2017); KofaLloyd v. Brookside Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, No. 14-00668, 2014 WL 1159677,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2014).
The reasoning in Smith is particularly persuasive. The court in Smith held
that a plaintiff must (1) report the work-related injury and (2) express the “intent to
file” a workers‟ compensation claim to the employer in order to trigger the
protection of the public policy exception. Smith, 2011 WL 4346340, at *6. An
employer‟s knowledge of a work-related injury alone is insufficient to establish the
plaintiff engaged in protected activity. Id. The court furnished this two-step rule to
further the purpose of the public policy exception. Id. This ensures employees
seeking workers‟ compensation have “the opportunity to complete the
administrative task” and prevents employers from escaping their obligations under
the Workers‟ Compensation Act. Id. We will follow the lead of our sister courts in
the Third Circuit and apply the test laid out in Smith.
Ample evidence supports that Runion suffered a workplace injury. Runion
swallowed waste material not intended for ingestion while working to clear a line
from a Newaltas machine. (Doc. 27-3, Ex. A, Tab D & E). Runion vomited at home
several times and sought medical attention at Montrose Hospital emergency room.
(Runion Dep. 48:12-49:6; Doc. 27-3, Ex. A, Tab E). Multiple employees were aware
that Equipment Transport was testing this waste product for radon or other forms
of radiation. (Witbeck Dep. 26:1-29:13; Runion Dep. 55:6-56:18; Pearson Dep. 18:1220:7). At least two Equipment Transport supervisors reacted strongly to the
incident report, with the truck supervisor stating that “it was some pretty nasty
stuff that [Runion] had . . . in his mouth.” (Witbeck Dep. 17:2-18:14, 24:3-13). The
doctor treating Runion took bloodwork and induced vomiting. (Runion Dep. 50:68). Surveying the record in the light most favorable to Runion, there is sufficient
evidence to establish Runion suffered a workplace injury.
Filed or Intended to File for Workers’ Compensation
Equipment Transport asserts that Runion did not engage in protected
activity because he did not actually file a workers‟ compensation claim. (Doc. 28 at
14). Indeed, the record is devoid of evidence that Runion filed any claim with the
Workers‟ Compensation Bureau, Equipment Transport, or other appropriate
authority. (Doc. 27-3, Ex. G at 7).
Equipment Transport further asserts that Runion did not notify Equipment
Transport of his intention to file a claim for workers‟ compensation. (Doc. 28 at 14).
Equipment Transport argues that Runion‟s sole evidence to the contrary is his
“conclusory, self-serving” deposition testimony which is insufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact. (Id.) The court agrees. Generally, self-serving
affidavits and deposition testimony are alone insufficient to withstand a motion for
summary judgment when “impeached by a well-supported showing to the
contrary.” Gonzalez v. Sec‟y of Dep‟t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 263-64 (3d
Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. 717 S. Woodward St., 2 F.3d 529, 533 (3d Cir.
1993)); Irving v. Chester Water Auth., 439 F. App‟x 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2011)
(nonprecedential). Runion relies solely on his own deposition testimony in
opposing Equipment Transport‟s motion. The issue is not whether the testimony is
self-serving, but whether Runion‟s testimony is sufficient for a rational factfinder to
credit it when juxtaposed with the other, contrary record evidence. See Johnson v.
MetLife Bank, N.A., 883 F. Supp. 2d 542, 549 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
Runion avers that he expressed his intent to file a worker‟s compensation
claim to six individuals: Dr. Hassan Khalil, an unnamed Montrose Hospital nurse,
an unnamed Montrose Hospital billing administrator, his labor crew supervisor
(Miszler), Miszler‟s supervisor (Witbeck), and another Equipment Transport
supervisor (Vincent). (Runion Dep. 44:4-46:23, 49:21-50:8, 60:6-15, 69:13-22, 70:9-21,
Runion initially testified that he may have mentioned to Dr. Khalil in the
Montrose Hospital emergency room that his treatment would be a workers‟
compensation claim, but later admitted he did not specifically recall. (Id. at 49:2150:8; 60:6-15). Runion testified that he advised both the hospital billing
administrator and the nurse who cared for him of his intent to file for workers‟
compensation. (Id. at 58:24-60:5). Runion recollects completing paperwork with
these hospital employees, but he is unable to provide any documentation to support
his recollections or to show he initiated the process of filing a workers‟
compensation claim at the hospital. (Id.) Assuming this testimony to be true, none
of the hospital representatives is an employee of Equipment Transport, and Runion
adduces no evidence to suggest that anyone informed Equipment Transport of
Runion‟s intent to file a claim.
On the day of the incident, Runion informed Miszler, his direct supervisor,
that he was going to go to the hospital to “get checked out” and he “was going to tell
the hospital that it was going to be a workers‟ comp. related incident.” (Id. at 44:39). Runion testified at his deposition that he also informed safety supervisor
Vincent, in a one-on-one conversation at the job site, of his hospital visit and that he
“put it through workmen‟s comp. at the hospital.” (Id. at 69:13-22, 70:9-21). Runion
also testified that when Witbeck visited the job site after the incident, Runion
apprised Witbeck of the incident, the hospital visit, and that he “put it under
workmen‟s comp.” (Id. at 72:12-73:12). Other individuals were present for the
conversations with Miszler and Witbeck including fellow laborers Nathan Pearson,
Dave Husney, and Cody, and a Newaltas representative. (Id. at 44:4-46:23, 72:1273:12).
The remainder of the record wholly refutes Runion‟s version of events.
Witbeck testified that Runion never expressed to him a desire to file a workers‟
compensation claim. (Witbeck Dep. 18:24-19:1). He did not know whether Runion
had expressed such a desire to anyone else at Equipment Transport. (Id. at 19:213
20:19). Pearson, who left Equipment Transport shortly after Runion did, testified
that he did not know if Runion informed anyone of his intent to file a workers‟
compensation claim. (Pearson Dep. 13:15-17). Miszler submitted a sworn
declaration stating that she was unaware of Runion‟s intent to file a workers‟
compensation claim or whether any such filing might have occurred. (Miszler Decl.
¶ 10). Inexplicably, Runion elected not to depose witnesses to the alleged
statements he made to Equipment Transport supervisors about his intent to file a
workers‟ compensation claim. Runion did not depose his direct supervisor Miszler,
safety supervisor Vincent, or fellow laborers Cody and Dave Husney. Runion
provides no documentation of communications with Equipment Transport or its
employees regarding a desire to file workers‟ compensation claim in response to its
interrogatories. (Doc. 27-3, Ex. H at 4). Nor does Runion provide any documentary
evidence of an attempted or actual filing of a workers‟ compensation claim at the
hospital or with the Workers‟ Compensation Bureau, which might have been shared
with Equipment Transport.
Despite the full benefit of discovery, Runion offers no support beyond his
own deposition testimony to corroborate his claim that Equipment Transport was
on notice of his intent to file a workers‟ compensation claim. (Doc. 35 at 3).
Runion‟s self-serving deposition testimony, when juxtaposed against the rest of the
record, is insufficient to meet his burden of “point[ing] to some evidence in the
record that creates a genuine issue of material fact.” Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v.
Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006); Irving, 439 F. App‟x at 127. Moreover,
“arguments made in briefs „are not evidence and cannot by themselves create a
factual dispute sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.‟” Eastman v.
Lackawanna Cty., 95 F. Supp. 3d 773, 783 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Jersey Cent.
Power & Light Co. v. Lacey Twp., 772 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (3d Cir. 1985)). Runion‟s
allegata of expressed intent to file a workers‟ compensation claim may have been
sufficient to satisfy his pleading burden, but litigation discovery has resulted in a
dearth of probata in the Rule 56 record. Thus, the court concludes that Runion has
not demonstrated that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether
he notified his employer of his intent to pursue workers‟ compensation benefits.
The court will grant Equipment Transport‟s motion for summary judgment on
Runion‟s retaliatory discharge claim for want of record evidence of protected
The court will grant Equipment Transport, LLC‟s motion (Doc. 27) for
summary judgment. An appropriate order shall issue.
/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania
September 1, 2017
Runion seeks spoliation sanctions, including but not limited to an adverse
inference, against Equipment Transport as a result of Equipment Transport‟s
failure to preserve the tape recording of Runion‟s alleged terroristic threats against
Equipment Transport employees and property. (Doc. 34 at 15-16). Because the
court does not reach the issue of whether or not Equipment Transport has a
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating Runion‟s employment, it is
unnecessary to address Runion‟s request for spoliation sanctions.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?