ROBERTS v. PA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM re Complaint 3 (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 8/17/16. (ma)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DWAYNE ROBERTS,
Plaintiff
vs.
PA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL NO. 1:CV-15-2456
(Judge Caldwell)

MEMORANDUM
I.

Introduction
The pro se plaintiff, Dwayne Roberts, an inmate at the state correctional

institution in Rockview, Pennsylvania, filed this civil-rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983.1 Plaintiff asserts a claim under the Eighth Amendment against several medical
professionals employed by the private corporation that provides health care to SCIRockview inmates and the “grievance coordinator” at SCI-Rockview.2
This case is now before the court for a preliminary review pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), we will dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, principally because Plaintiff has

1

2

Roberts’ action was transferred to this court from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Defendants are identified as Dr. Doll, Physician Assistant (PA) Julie Coltie, PA Christy
Doe and PA Beth Doe. Plaintiff also named Ted Williams, whom is identified as the institution’s
grievance officer. (Doc. 1-1, Compl.)

failed to make allegations that would support an essential element of his Eighth
Amendment claims, deliberate indifference to his medical needs.

II.

Standard of Review
When a litigant seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, without the prepayment

of fees, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 requires the court to screen the complaint. Likewise, when a
prisoner seeks redress from a government defendant in a civil action, whether proceeding
in forma pauperis or not, the court must screen the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915(A) give the court the authority to dismiss a
complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(I) - (iii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) - (2).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact. See
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003)(citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
327-28, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1832-33, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989)). In deciding whether the
complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, the court employs the
standard used to analyze motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). Under Rule 12(b)(6), we must “accept all
factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be
entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). The court may also rely
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on exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick,
502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
Finally, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by attorneys and are to be liberally construed. See Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); Giles v. Kearney, 571
F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009). Pro se litigants are to be granted leave to file a curative
amended complaint even when a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, unless such an
amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Philips, 515 F.3d at 245-46 (citing Alston v.
Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)). However, a complaint that sets forth facts which
affirmatively demonstrate that the plaintiff has no right to recover is properly dismissed
without leave to amend. Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir.
2002).

III.

Background.
According to the Complaint, it is recorded in Roberts’ medical chart that he is

allergic to the drug Bactrim. On October 14, 2014 Dr. Doll ordered Bactrim for Roberts to
replace his intravenous antibiotics. (Doc. 1-1, ECF p. 3 and p. 10). Both PA Coltie and PA
Beth “Doe” were parties involved in administering the Bactrim to him. Roberts was to be
seen by Dr. Doll on October 21, 2014, but he failed to appear for the appointment. (Id.,
ECF p. 10). He was seen the following day “and there were no issues noted while taking
the Bactrim.” (Id.)

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On October 23, 2014, Roberts was seen by nursing staff for a rash on his
upper arms. He was seen the following day by a physician assistant for a possible drug
reaction. It was noted that he had hives and facial swelling. (Id.) At that time, his
medication was switched to Clindamycin and he received an injection of Benadryl, and
capsules by mouth as needed. (Id., ECF p. 10). Roberts alleges he also had a speech
impairment at the time. (Id., ECF p. 4).
Dr. Lightbourn (non-defendant) saw Roberts on October 26, 2014, concerning
continued complaints related to a reaction. He was then admitted to the infirmary and
given steroids. When Dr. Doll saw him later that day, noting no improvement, she ordered
him be taken to the local hospital concerning a possible medication reaction. (Id., ECF p.
10). Following his return from the hospital he was seen by Dr. Doll on October 30, 2014;
November 6, 2014; and November 20, 2014. (Id.) Roberts had no major complaints other
than itching at those visits. (Id.) On December 9, 2014, W. Ted Williams, who identifies
himself as the Corrections Health Care Administrator, denied Roberts’ grievance. (Id.)
Defendants are sued in their individual and official capacities. Roberts seeks
monetary relief. He calls the medical defendants’ behavior “neglegent (sic) and
unprofessional.” (Id., ECF p. 10).

IV. Discussion.
It is well established that “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs . . . Personal involvement may be shown
through allegations of personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode v.
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Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988). See also Sutton v. Rasheed, 323
F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 2003)(citing Rode). Liability may not be imposed under § 1983 on
the traditional standards of respondeat superior. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08. Moreover,
“supervisory personnel are only liable for the § 1983 violations of their subordinates if they
knew of, participated in or acquiesced in such conduct.” Capone v. Marinelli, 868 F.2d 102,
106 n.7 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1082
(3d Cir. 1976)). A doctor under contract to a state to provide medical services to prisoners
is considered to be acting under color of state law, West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54, 108
S.Ct. 2250, 2258, 101 L.Ed.2d 40, 53 (1988), and the principles just mentioned apply in
that context as well. Hetzel v. Swartz, 909 F. Supp. 261, 264 (M.D. Pa. 1995).3
In order to establish an Eighth Amendment medical claim, a plaintiff must
show “(i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate
deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden Cty. Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d
575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). See also Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
A prison official acts with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious
medical needs when he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that
a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v.
3

However, it is unsettled whether a doctor who works for a private medical facility can
nonetheless be considered a state actor for having treated a prisoner. Compare Conner v.
Donnelly, 42 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 1994)(considered state actor) with Nunez v. Horn, 72 F. Supp. 2d
24 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)(not a state actor). See also Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.2d 211 (6th Cir.
1996)(doctor who examined state employee only once was not a state actor by virtue of having
performed that examination).

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Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994). Thus, a complaint that a
physician or a medical department “has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical
condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth
Amendment . . .” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251
(1976).
Accordingly, a “medical decision not to order an X-ray, or like measures, does
not represent cruel and unusual punishment. At most it is medical malpractice.” Id., 429
U.S. at 107, 97 S.Ct. at 293. “[A]s long as a physician exercises professional judgment his
behavior will not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Brown v. Borough of
Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990). In sum, negligence, unsuccessful
medical treatment, or medical malpractice do not give rise to a § 1983 cause of action, and
an inmate's disagreement with medical treatment is insufficient to establish deliberate
indifference. See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993).

A.

Claims Against CHCA Williams
It appears Roberts misidentified this defendant as the “grievance officer” at

SCI-Rockview because Williams responded to his grievance concerning his medical care.
However, the grievance response, which is attached to the Complaint (see Doc. 1-1, ECF
p. 10), clearly identifies Williams as the institution’s Corrections Health Care Administrator.
Williams is not a physician. Williams is not alleged to have personally participated in any
aspect of Roberts’ medical care. He is named simply because of Roberts’ dissatisfaction
with Williams’ response and failure to properly investigate his claims. Hence, Roberts fails
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to state a claim against Williams. See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993)
(prison personnel who are not physicians cannot be considered deliberately indifferent for
failing to respond to an inmate’s medical needs when the inmate is already receiving
treatment from the prison’s medical staff); Rode, supra (no civil rights claim can be made
against a defendant who lacks personal involvement). Williams sole involvement was not
to thoroughly investigate Roberts’ claims of the medical defendants “negligence and
unprofessional conduct.” Accordingly, Roberts fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted against Williams.

B.

Dr. Doll and the Physician Assistants
Roberts claims Dr. Doll and the various identified, and unidentified, physician

assistants, who prescribed and dispensed Bactrim to him are employed by the contract
health-care provider at SCI-Rockview. While Roberts believes the defendants mishandled
his care, knowing he was allergic to Bactrim, this allegation does not rise to the level of a
claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
Here Roberts supplies documents that suggest Dr. Doll, aware of his allergy
to Bactrim was concerned with possible soft tissue infection for an unknown pre-existing
medical condition when she ordered Bactrim to replace his intravenous antibiotics on
October 14, 2014. After receiving two doses without any reaction, Dr. Doll ordered the
medication continued and the drug removed from Roberts’ known list of allergies. Seven
days after his initial dose, Roberts failed to appear at his next scheduled medical
appointment but was seen the following day by a nurse who noted no issues with the
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Bactrim. (Doc. 1-1, ECF p. 10). The following day, a physician assistant examined him,
and noting a possible drug allergy, discontinued the Bactrim. He was given a Benadryl
injection and capsules as needed. Two days later when still uncomfortable Roberts was
admitted to the infirmary by a non-defendant physician and given steroids. Dr. Doll saw
him later that day and ordered his transport to the local hospital for possible drug allergy.
Based on these events, Dr. Doll exercised her professional medical judgment
when ordering Bactrim for Roberts. She proceeded cautiously when initially prescribing the
medication and followed Roberts for a possible reaction. After no signs of a drug reaction
were noted, she continued to prescribe Bactrim for Plaintiff’s underlying condition. Clearly,
she did not ignore the risk of a possible drug reaction when choosing this course of
treatment for Roberts. The physicians assistants, following Dr. Doll’s orders, dispensed the
Bactrim to Roberts. Once alerted to a possible drug allergic reaction more than a week
after his initial dose, the documents attached to the Complaint demonstrate medical staff,
including Dr. Doll, acted to reduce the likelihood of harm to Roberts by discontinuing the
medication and administering Benadryl. When this did not resolve his complaints, he was
admitted to the infirmary, given steroids, and ultimately sent to the local hospital for further
treatment. At best, Roberts claims are of medical negligence against these defendants;
however, claims of medical negligence are not actionable under the Eighth Amendment.
See Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d at 67. Accordingly, Roberts’ Eighth Amendment claims
against the medical defendants will be dismissed.

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V.

Conclusion
We will dismiss the complaint. Normally, we would grant leave to amend if it

was possible for Plaintiff to cure the deficiencies in his pleading. See Alston v. Parker, 363
F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). However, given the detail Plaintiff has already supplied in his
complaint, amendment would be futile, id., and hence will not be allowed.
We will issue an appropriate order.

/s/William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge

Date: August 17, 2016

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