Ash v. Lawton et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM re dfts' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 21 (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 9/7/17. (ma)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM A ASH,
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Plaintiff
v.
ROBERT LAWTON, et al.,
Defendants
CIVIL NO. 1:CV-16-0148
(Judge Caldwell)
MEMORANDUM
I.
Introduction
The pro se plaintiff, William Ash, has filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
alleging that his detention for about two weeks at the Luzerne County Prison after he
was granted bail violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Presently
before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint on the basis of the
statute of limitations. (ECF No. 21).
For the reasons that follow Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted
and the Complaint dismissed.
II.
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a
complaint “for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the district court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under
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any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff is entitled to relief.” Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cty. of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). While a complaint need only contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and detailed factual
allegations are not required, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct.
1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974. “The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556,
127 S.Ct. at 1965). Formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action will not
suffice. See Id. “[L]abels and conclusions” are not enough, and a court is “not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1965.
With this standard in mind, the following is the background to this litigation,
as Plaintiff alleges it.
III.
Background
On December 11, 2013, William Ash was picked up on an active bench
warrant, issued after he failed to appear at a court ordered pre-trial hearing. (ECF No.
1, Compl.) Following a December 18, 2013, bail hearing, the Honorable William H.
Amesbury of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas set Ash’s bail at $25,000
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unsecured. (Id., p. 6). The following day, Ash wrote to Mark Rockovich, the Captain of
Records, asking why he was still being held. He received no response. (Id., p. 3 and p.
7). On December 22, 2013, still incarcerated, he wrote to Deputy Warden James
Larson asking why he was still being held. (Id., p. 3 and p. 8). On December 28, 2013,
he was called down to “the Lieutenant’s office” to learn that his daughter had been in a
car accident. When he asked the Lieutenant about his release, she responded that he
was being held on $25,000 bail. (Id., p. 4). The next day Ash filed a grievance
concerning his release. (Id., p. 4 and p. 9). He was released on January 2, 2014,
without receiving a response to his grievance. (Id., p. 4). Under the prison mailbox rule,
see Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands, 705 F.3d 80, 84 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013),
this lawsuit is considered filed on January 21, 2016.
IV.
Discussion
There is no specific statute of limitations for actions filed pursuant to 42
U.S.C § 1983. Pearson v. Sec’y Dept. of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 602 (3d Cir. 2015).
Rather, the United States Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitations for
personal injury actions in the state where the cause of action arose is to be employed.
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 1094, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007); see
also Estate of Lagano v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 769 F.3d 850, 859 - 60 (3d
Cir. 2014). As Pennsylvania has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury
actions, the statute of limitations applicable to claims brought under § 1983 in
Pennsylvania is two years, subject to any state law tolling provisions which are not
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inconsistent with federal law. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5524(7) (2014); Kach v.
Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009); Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 368–69 (3d Cir.
2000).
The date when a § 1983 cause of action accrues is determined by federal
law. Under federal law, a civil rights cause of action accrues and the statute of
limitations begins to run “ ‘when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury
upon which [his] action is based.’ ” Kach, 589 F.3d at 634 (quoted cases omitted)
(brackets added). A “cause of action accrues even though the full extent of the injury is
not then known or predictable … Were it otherwise, the statute would begin to run only
after a plaintiff became satisfied that he had been harmed enough, placing the
supposed statute of repose in the sole hands of the party seeking relief.” Wallace, 549
U.S. at 392, 127 S.Ct. at 1097 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Section 1983’s statute of limitations is subject to tolling. First, the statute
is tolled while an inmate plaintiff exhausts his administrative remedies. See Pearson,
775 F.3d at 603 (“[T]he PLRA is a statutory prohibition that tolls Pennsylvania’s statute
of limitations while a prisoner exhausts administrative remedies.”) Second, the statute
of limitations may be equitably tolled when the plaintiff has been prevented from filing in
a timely manner due to sufficiently inequitable circumstances.1 See Cunningham v.
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“[T]o benefit from the equitable tolling doctrine, plaintiffs have the burden of proving
three necessary elements: (1) that the defendant actively misled the plaintiff; (2) which
prevented the plaintiff from recognizing the validity of her claim within the limitations period; and
(3) where the plaintiff's ignorance is not attributable to her lack of reasonable due diligence in
attempting to uncover the relevant facts.” Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Grp., Inc., 460 F.3d 494, 509
(3d Cir. 2006). “[T]here are few facts which diligence cannot discover, but there must be
some reason to awaken inquiry and direct diligence in the channel in which it would be
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M&T Bank Corp., 814 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Santos ex rel. Beato v. United
States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2007)). Finally, “[t]he ‘discovery rule’ tolls the
limitations period where the injured party is unable to know that he is injured and to
know what caused the injury, despite the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Brown v.
Buck, 614 F. App’x 590, 593 (3d Cir. 2015) (nonprecedential).
Here, there is no dispute that Ash believed that he was “being held against
his will” after he was granted unsecured bail on December 18, 2013, but was not
released the following day, or the following week. He asked staff for help, filed a
request slip, and a grievance concerning the situation without a satisfactory response.
He was ultimately released on January 2, 2014. Yet he did not file this action until
January 21, 2016. (ECF No. 1, Compl.) Clearly, Ash was aware of his injury as of
December 19, 2013, the date he knew he was still being held even though bail had
been granted. Thus he had until December 19, 2015, to file his action. While he argues
that he was unaware that he could bring his action prior to his March 12, 2015,
sentencing date, this mistake is not a basis to toll the statute of limitations. Ash also
suggests that Defendants committed fraud and misled him as to his ability to file this
action by their failure to respond to his requests and grievance prior to his January 2,
2014, release. (ECF No. 25, p. 2). The Court does not agree.
Ash presents no facts to suggest that Defendants attempted to “cover up”
their failure to release him following his receipt of unsecured bail. At best, Ash could
successful. This is what is meant by reasonable diligence.” Debiec v. Cabot Corp., 352 F.3d
117, 129 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).
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argue that his statute of limitations was tolled while he awaited a response to his
grievance prior to his January 2, 2014, release. Such an argument would only extend
his limitation period until January 2, 2016. Even under this calculation, his Complaint is
untimely filed.
V.
Conclusion
“[I]f a complaint is vulnerable to [Rule] 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court
must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or
futile.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008). In this instance,
the court believes that any amendment to Ash’s claims against the Defendants would
be futile given the applicable statute of limitations.
We will issue an appropriate order.
/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge
Date: September 7, 2017
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