Collie v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P.
Filing
66
ORDER granting Wal-Mart's MIL 44 to limit evidence re: Collie's medical expensees. (See order for complete details.) Signed by Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner on 5/24/17. (ki)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KATHLEEN ANN COLLIE,
Plaintiff
v.
WAL-MART STORES EAST, L.P.,
Defendant
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16-CV-227
(Chief Judge Conner)
ORDER
AND NOW, this 24th day of May, 2017, upon consideration of the motion
(Doc. 44) in limine by defendant Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. (“Wal-Mart”), seeking to
limit the medical expenses that plaintiff Kathleen Ann Collie (“Collie”) may claim at
trial pursuant to Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Medical Center, 765 A.2d 786 (Pa.
2001) (“Moorhead II”), abrogated on other grounds by Northbrook Life Ins. Co. v.
Commonwealth, 949 A.2d 333 (Pa. 2008), and requesting that the court limit the
evidence Collie may present at trial with respect to her medical expenses, (Doc. 61
at 1-2), because Collie’s health insurers have satisfied the majority of her medical
expenses at a discount price, (Doc. 45 at 1-3), and further upon consideration of
Collie’s response, contending that Wal-Mart’s instant motion is an untimely attempt
to invoke a setoff, (Doc. 54 at 4-5), which, according to Collie, Wal-Mart must have
pled in its answer as an affirmative defense, (id.); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1), but
the court noting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Moorhead II clearly
limited the amount of medical expenses a plaintiff may seek at trial to those
expenses that the plaintiff paid instead of the amount that the plaintiff was billed,1
see Moorhead II at 164-65, and that to hold otherwise would provide plaintiffs with a
windfall in violation of the “fundamental tenets of just compensation,” id. at 163, it
is hereby ORDERED that:
1.
Wal-Mart’s motion (Doc. 44) in limine to limit evidence concerning
Collie’s medical expenses is GRANTED.
2.
At trial, Collie may only submit evidence concerning medical
expenses that she actually paid, not the total amount her health
providers billed.
/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania
1
In its holding, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explicitly declined to adopt
the setoff calculus that the Pennsylvania Superior Court utilized in its analysis.
Moorhead II, 765 A.2d at 164-65 & n.4, aff’g on other grounds Moorhead v. Crozer
Chester Med Ctr. v. Crozer, 705 A.2d 452, 454-56 (Pa. Super. 1997). Consequently,
we need not consider whether a claim for setoff constitutes an affirmative defense
which must be pled in a responsive pleading.
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