Joyce v. Capital Area Transit et al

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry). Signed by Honorable Yvette Kane on 3/28/17. (rw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHELLE M. JOYCE,
Plaintiff
v.
CAPITAL AREA TRANSIT and
JIM CRAMER,
Defendants

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No. 1:16-cv-00758
(Judge Kane)

MEMORANDUM
Before the Court in the above-captioned action are three pending motions to dismiss.
(Doc. Nos. 3, 7, 12.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss filed by Plaintiff
Michelle M. Joyce (“Joyce”) will be deemed withdrawn, the motions to dismiss filed by
Defendants Capital Area Transit (“CAT”) and Jim Cramer (“Cramer”) will be granted in part,
and this action will be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County.
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background1

Joyce is an adult female residing in Hershey, Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 1-4 ¶ 1.) On the
evening of December 31, 2013, Joyce left work planning to take her regular bus – the Route 322
Hershey Hummelstown bus – home to Hershey. (Id. ¶ 11.) When her regular bus failed to
arrive, she decided to take the Number 7 bus to Middletown. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) Initially, the bus
was filled with passengers; however, the number of riders decreased as the bus approached the

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The following factual background is taken from Plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. No. 1-4.)
Plaintiff’s allegations are accepted as true for the purpose of the instant motion to dismiss. See
Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 417 (3d Cir. 1997)
(explaining that “[w]hen reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, [the court] must accept as true the
factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them”).
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stop at the Middletown Giant, where Joyce planned to exit. (Id. ¶¶ 17-19.) Joyce confirmed
with the driver of the bus that the bus was going to stop at the Middletown Giant. (Id. ¶ 20.)
The driver responded “yes, we will be alone at the Giant.” (Id. ¶ 21.) The last remaining
passengers exited the bus at stops before the Middletown Giant, leaving Joyce and the driver
alone on the bus. (Id. ¶ 23.)
When the bus reached the Middletown Giant, the driver drove the bus to the far left end
of the parking lot, and parked. (Id. ¶ 24.) As Joyce gathered her things to exit the bus, she heard
a loud “click” noise, rather than the sound of the doors being opened. (Id. ¶ 25.) The driver
locked the doors to the bus, trapping Joyce on the bus alone with him. (Id. ¶ 26.) The driver
blocked the door to the bus and stated, “OK, come on, you and I are going to get it on in the back
of the bus.” (Id. ¶ 27.) While saying this, the driver made sexual thrusting motions toward
Joyce. (Id. ¶ 28.) Joyce remarked “Are you kidding me?” (Id. ¶ 31.) The driver persisted,
responding “No, let’s go, right here in the back of the bus, just the two of us.” (Id. ¶ 32.) Joyce
refused his advances and demanded to be let off the bus. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34.) The driver blocked
Joyce’s exit, grabbed her, stating “come on, it’s New Year’s Eve,” and then attempted to kiss
her. (Id. ¶ 36.) Joyce, fearing that she would be physically harmed by the driver, pretended to
be willing to give him a kiss, so she could attempt to escape the bus. (Id. ¶¶ 37-38.) However,
the driver grabbed her arms tightly and pulled her against him and kissed her on the mouth. (Id.
¶¶ 39-40.) Joyce continued to struggle and eventually freed herself from the driver, ran towards
the door, and demanded to be let off the bus. (Id. ¶ 42.) The driver unlocked the doors, and
Joyce ran across the parking lot to a nearby pizza shop, where she reported the incident. (Id. ¶¶
43-44.)

Joyce subsequently took her regular bus to work on January 2, 2014, and told the

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driver of her regular bus, who she knew as “Corey,” about the incident that occurred on
December 31. (Id. ¶¶ 48-50.) Corey convinced her to go with him to the General Manager of
the CAT office as soon as he completed the route. (Id. ¶ 51.) Joyce reported the incident to the
General Manager of CAT. (Id. ¶ 52.) The individuals at CAT identified the driver based on the
description provided by Joyce, but did not provide his name to her. (Id. ¶ 53.) He was described
as a “floater” driver. (Id. ¶ 54.) Joyce’s regular driver told her “that the driver who assaulted
Joyce had previously solicited [a relative of his] for sex after acquiring her number under false
pretenses.” (Id. ¶ 55.) Joyce alleges that the driver responsible for the incident was a former
firefighter in the City of Harrisburg and had a history of similar misconduct prior to being hired
by CAT. (Id. ¶ 56.) Joyce alleges that CAT was aware of other incidents of misconduct by the
driver prior to December 31, 2013. (Id. ¶ 57.)
On or about January 3, 2014, CAT Operations Manager Brad Flickinger sent Joyce a
letter of apology from CAT regarding the incident. (Id. ¶ 58.) Flickinger indicated that he had
seen video and heard audio of the incident and that the driver had been immediately terminated.
(Id. ¶ 59.) On behalf of CAT, Flickinger gave Joyce several months’ worth of bus passes and
admitted that “it in no way compensates [her] for what [she] went through.” (Id. ¶ 60.) As a
result of this incident, Joyce alleges that she has developed severe general anxiety in public, and
particularly in any enclosed space, which is exacerbated if older men are present. (Id. ¶ 65.)
Joyce also has exhibited symptoms of severe anxiety including loss of sense of smell, ringing in
her ears, migraines, panic attacks, shortness of breath, nausea and a nervous cough. (Id. ¶ 66.)
Joyce has lost significant time from work as a result of her anxiety and depression, which have
required ongoing treatment, including prescription medication and ongoing therapy. (Id. ¶¶ 67-

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68.) Joyce alleges that a criminal investigation into the incident was initiated; however, she is
not aware of the status of the investigation. (Id. ¶ 70.)
B.

Procedural Background

On December 31, 2015, Joyce commenced this action by filing a complaint in the Court
of Common Pleas of Dauphin County against CAT and Cramer, whom Joyce identified as the
driver of the Number 7 CAT bus on December 31, 2013. (Doc. No. 6 at 3.) Joyce’s complaint
asserts six counts for relief, including five state law tort claims and one claim under federal law.
The first three counts are asserted solely against Cramer: (1) false imprisonment; (2) assault and
battery; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at 11-14.) Counts 4 and 5 are
asserted against CAT – Count 4 asserts negligence and gross negligence, and Count 5 asserts a
“respondeat superior” claim. (Id. at 14-18.) Finally, Count 6 asserts a 42 U.S.C. “§1983 action
against CAT and John Doe.” (Id. at 18-20.)
Subsequent to the filing of her complaint in state court, Joyce filed praecipes to reinstate
the complaint on January 29, 2016, February 29, 2016, and March 30, 2016. (Id. at 22-24.) The
January 29 praecipe to reinstate the complaint represented that “[e]fforts to secure acceptance by
CAT and a reliable address for Mr. Cramer are ongoing.” (Id. at 22.) Further, the praecipes to
reinstate the complaint filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County on February 29
and March 30 stated that “[s]ervice of defendants by the Sheriff at the best known addresses is
being processed on this date.” (Id. at 23-24.) The complaint was ultimately served on
Defendant CAT on April 5, 2016, (id. at 77), and on Defendant Cramer on April 12, 2016 (id. at
78). CAT filed preliminary objections to the complaint on April 25, 2016, and amended
preliminary objections to the complaint on May 4, 2016. (Doc. No. 6 at 25, Doc. No. 10 at 2.)

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CAT also filed a praecipe to file a certificate of incorporation with attached articles of
incorporation on May 4, 2016. (Doc. No. 10 at 83.) CAT filed a notice of removal with this
Court on the same day. (Doc. No. 1.)
On May 11, 2016, CAT filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) on the grounds of insufficient process, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(5) on the grounds of insufficient service of process, and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 3.) On May 13, 2016, Defendant
Cramer filed his motion to dismiss on the same grounds. (Doc. No. 7.) CAT filed a brief in
support of its motion to dismiss on May 25, 2016, (Doc. No. 9), and Cramer filed a brief in
support of his motion on May 27, 2016, (Doc. No. 11). On June 15, 2016, Joyce filed a
document entitled “Motion to Dismiss Filed by Plaintiff Joyce.” (Doc. No. 12.) Upon Joyce’s
failure to file a brief in opposition to Defendants’ motions to dismiss, the Court issued an Order
on June 17, 2016 directing Joyce to show cause within ten days why Defendants’ motions to
dismiss should not be granted as unopposed. (Doc. No. 13.) On June 27, 2016, Joyce filed a
brief in opposition to Defendants’ motions to dismiss. (Doc. No. 14.) On July 11, 2016,
Defendant CAT filed its reply brief in further support of its motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 15.)
Having been fully briefed, this matter is now ripe for disposition.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency

of the complaint’s factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint
must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon

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which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). Generally, a court considering a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must determine whether the complaint
contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s rulings in Twombly and Iqbal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit requires district courts to engage in a two-part analysis
when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion: (1) first, a court should separate the factual and legal
elements of a claim, accepted well-pleaded factual matter and disregarding legal conclusion; (2)
second, a court should determine whether the remaining well-pled facts sufficiently demonstrate
that a plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Facial plausibility exists when the
plaintiff pleads factual content “that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations
omitted).
In conducting its analysis, a court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the
complaint as true for purposes of determining whether the complaint states a plausible claim for
relief, and must view the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Phillips
v. Cnty of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). The court’s determination on a Rule
12(b)(6) review is not whether the non-moving party “will ultimately prevail,” but whether that
party is “entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” United States ex rel. Wilkins v.
United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 259, 302 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). The

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court’s analysis is a context-specific task requiring the court “to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663-64.
In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a court must
consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well
as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these
documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). A court may also
consider “any ‘matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to
judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case.’”
Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 5B Charles A.
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004)).
III.

DISCUSSION
A.

Defendants’ motions to dismiss

In their motions to dismiss and supporting briefs, Defendants CAT and Cramer assert
several grounds upon which they maintain Joyce’s claims should be dismissed, including
arguments regarding Joyce’s efforts to serve the complaint and the effect of those efforts on the
tolling of the statute of limitations governing her claims, and immunity under the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Municipal Authorities Act. However, the Court declines to
address the majority of those arguments, as it finds that Joyce’s complaint fails to assert a
cognizable federal claim.
Joyce’s complaint attempts to assert a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides
citizens a means to redress violations of federal law committed by state officials. See 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983. Her assertion of a Section 1983 claim provides the sole basis for Defendant CAT’s
removal of this action from state to federal court. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Id. “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but merely a method to vindicate
violations of federal law committed by state actors.” Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp.2d
311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). To
state a claim under this section, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the conduct complained of was
committed by persons acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct violated a right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Harvey v.
Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988)).
Count 6 of Joyce’s complaint alleges the following:
The wrongful conduct involved false imprisonment i[n] violation of the
Constitutional rights of Joyce. CAT and Jim Cramer/John Doe were acting
under color of state law as a public common carrier and bus driver for a
public common carrier. Cramer acted intentionally and with deliberate
indifference to Joyce’s rights to be free from wrongful detention and to be
free from assault and battery while in such detention. The acts and omissions
of CAT management as described above demonstrate deliberate indifference
and callous indifference for known and foreseeable risk[s] of the very wrongful
conduct to which Joyce was subjected. The conduct of Jim Cramer was committed
willfully, knowingly, maliciously, intentionally, and recklessly. CAT performed its
supervisory duties in an intentionally or grossly negligent manner with callous
indifference to the life safety and welfare of CAT riders including Plaintiff.
(Doc. No. 1-4 ¶¶ 113-118.)
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As noted above, a claim brought under Section 1983 requires the assertion of a violation
of a Constitutional right. See Harvey, 421 F.3d at 189. The only “right” that the allegations
above can be fairly construed to assert is a right to be free from “false imprisonment” or
“wrongful detention” by CAT or one of its drivers. However, the Third Circuit has recognized a
Section 1983 claim for false imprisonment only in the context of unlawful arrests or detentions
by law enforcement. In Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995), the
Third Circuit stated that “[a] false imprisonment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is based on the
Fourteenth Amendment protection against deprivations of liberty without due process of law . . .
. where the police lack probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee has a claim under § 1983
for false imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest. A false imprisonment claim
under § 1983 which is based on an arrest made without probable cause is grounded in the Fourth
Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable seizures.” Id. (citations omitted).
Joyce does not cite to, nor has this Court found, any authority in this Circuit recognizing
a Section 1983 claim for false imprisonment outside of the law enforcement context. See
Buonadonna, et al. v. Se. Delco Sch. Dist., et al., No. 14-02708, 2015 WL 2365629, at *3-*4
(E.D. Pa. May 18, 2015) (finding that a Section 1983 claim for false imprisonment asserted by
students riding on a school bus failed as a matter of law, as no such claim exists outside of the
law enforcement context). In Buonadonna et al. v. Se. Delco Sch. Dist., et al., the court cited the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979), where
the Court cautioned against conflating constitutional law and tort law, stating that “Section 1983
imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties
of care arising out of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought in state court

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under traditional tort-law principles.” Baker, 443 U.S. at 146. Here, just as in Buonadonna,
while Joyce may be able to state a common law tort claim for false imprisonment, she has not
alleged a deprivation of a Constitutional right, and thus, she has no cognizable claim under
Section 1983. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss with prejudice Count 6 of Joyce’s complaint.
As noted above, the remaining counts of Joyce’s complaint consist of state tort law
claims brought against Defendants Cramer and CAT. Joyce asserts three intentional tort claims
against Cramer (false imprisonment, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress), and claims of negligence and what appears to be a vicarious liability claim against
CAT. In the absence of a cognizable federal claim, this Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, and instead, will remand them back to the
Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, the forum that is best suited to address Joyce’s state
law claims and Defendants’ arguments regarding Joyce’s failure to properly effect service under
state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“[D]istrict courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim . . . . [when] the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.”); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cahill, 484 U.S. 343, 349, 357 (1988)
(holding that a district court “has discretion to remand to state court a removed case involving
pendent claims upon a proper determination that retaining jurisdiction over the case would be
inappropriate,” such as “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early
stages and only state-law claims remain”).
B.

Joyce’s “Motion to Dismiss”

The “Motion to Dismiss Filed by Plaintiff Joyce” states that it seeks to dismiss “the
added grounds for Preliminary Objections in the Amended Preliminary Objections and Motion to

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Dismiss which were untimely and improper in the State Court, and reasserted here related to
alleged insufficient process and/or insufficient service of process, and the Motion to Dismiss of
Cramer which was untimely and barred under state procedure before the removal to this Court.”
(Doc. No. 12 at 1.) Although it is difficult to discern exactly what Joyce refers to in this
statement, the Court construes this filing as attacking Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss
and supporting briefs that advance arguments relating to the improper nature of service of the
complaint, as untimely. (See Doc. Nos. 3, 7, 9, 11.)
However, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of this Court,
an argument opposing a ground upon which a motion to dismiss is based is properly made in a
brief in opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss, not by way of filing a “motion to dismiss”
a particular argument made by a defendant. See Local Rule 7.6 (“Any party opposing any
motion . . . shall file a brief in opposition”). Accordingly, as Joyce’s “motion to dismiss” is not
responsive to any pleading, and merely seeks to oppose arguments made in the motions and
briefs of the Defendants, it is not properly before this Court, and the Court can disregard the
motion. See Sfakianos v. Shelby Cnty. Gov’t, No. 08-2172, 2010 WL 4791680, at *2 (W.D.
Tenn. Aug. 2, 2010) (recognizing that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) only provides the
means for striking pleadings, and therefore excluding from its consideration any documents not
properly before the court); Lombard v. MCI Telecom. Corp., et al., 13 F. Supp. 2d 621, 625
(N.D. Ohio 1998) (same). Furthermore, even assuming that the motion to dismiss filed by Joyce
was properly before this Court, Joyce failed to file a brief in support of the motion to dismiss in
accordance with Local Rule 7.5. Accordingly, Joyce’s motion to dismiss will be deemed
withdrawn. See Local Rule 7.5 (“Within fourteen (14) days after the filing of any motion, the

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party filing the motion shall file a brief in support of this motion. . . . If a supporting brief is not
filed within the time provided in this rule the motion shall be deemed to be withdrawn.”).
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, The Court will deem Joyce’s “Motion to Dismiss”

withdrawn, grant in part Defendant CAT’s motion to dismiss as to Count 6, and grant in part
Defendant Cramer’s motion to dismiss as to Count 6. Further, the Court will decline to exercise
jurisdiction over Joyce’s pendent state law claims and will remand this case to the Dauphin
County Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings. An Order consistent with this
Memorandum follows.

s/ Yvette Kane
Yvette Kane, District Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania

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