Wright v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole et al

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry).Signed by Honorable Yvette Kane on 7/27/17. (rw) Modified on 7/27/2017 (rw).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THEMIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EDWARD WRIGHT,
Petitioner
v.
PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF
PROBATION AND PAROLE, et al.,
Respondents

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No. 1:16-cv-2371
(Judge Kane)

MEMORANDUM
On November 29, 2016, Petitioner Edward Wright, an inmate at the State Correctional
Institution at Coal Township, Pennsylvania, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the decision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole
(“Parole Board”), to deny him parole. (Doc. No. 1.) Wright claims in his petition that the Parole
Board’s parole-release decisions denying him parole violate his substantive due process rights.
Id. In their response to the petition, Respondents maintain that denial of Wright’s petition is
appropriate, as his substantive due process challenge is meritless. (Doc. No. 6.) Upon
consideration of the fully briefed petition, for the reasons provided herein, the Court will deny
Wright’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
I.

BACKGROUND

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Wright is currently serving a three-to-ten-year sentence to be followed by a five-year
probationary sentence after pleading guilty to charges of statutory sexual assault, child
endangerment, and indecent exposure. (Doc. No. 6 at 3.)
Wright has been denied parole on four occasions beginning in 2013. (Doc. No. 6-1 at 9,
11, 13, 14, 16.) A combination of factors was invoked by the Parole Board to deny Wright
parole. Specifically, the Parole Board listed the following reasons for Wright’s first denial of
parole on April 30, 2013: (1) the need to participate in and complete additional institutional
programs; (2) a negative recommendation made by the Department of Corrections; and (3)
minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances of the offenses committed. (Id. at 9.) The
factors the Parole Board relied upon in denying Wright parole for a second time following his
November 15, 2013 parole hearing included: (1) the need to participate in and complete
additional institutional programs; (2) negative recommendation made by the Department of
Corrections; and (3) need to develop further insight into offender behavior. (Id. at 8.) Wright
was denied parole again following a parole hearing on May 19, 2014 for the following stated
reasons: (1) refusal to accept full responsibility for the offense(s) committed; (2) lack of remorse
for the offense(s) committed; and (3) failure to display insight into offending behavior. (Id. at
13.) Wright was denied parole for a third time after a scheduled hearing before the Parole Board
on April 29, 2015 on the grounds of: (1) failure to demonstrate motivation for success; (2)
minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances of the offense(s) committed; (3) refusal to
accept responsibility for the offense(s) committed; and (4) lack of remorse for the offense(s)
committed. (Id.)
Wright was most recently denied parole following his parole hearing held on April 25,
2016. (Id. at 16.) The reasons provided for this denial were: (1) failure to demonstrate
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motivation for success; (2) minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances of the offense(s)
committed; (3) refusal to accept responsibility for the offense(s) committed; and (4) lack of
remorse for the offense(s) committed. (Id.) Wright is scheduled to be reviewed for parole again
in April of 2018. (Id.) To date, his maximum incarceration date remains August 22, 2020. (Id.)
II.

DISCUSSION
Wright advances only one ground for relief in his petition: that the Parole Board’s

repeated parole denials amount to a violation of his right to substantive due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc No. 1.) Respondents argue that the petition should be denied
because there is no indication that the Parole Board abused its discretion by acting arbitrarily or
capriciously in denying Wright parole. (Doc. No. 6.)
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. It is well settled
that “there is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released
before the expiration of a valid sentence,” nor has the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania created
such a right. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); see
also Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1996) (recognizing the general principle that the
Pennsylvania parole statute does not create a liberty interest in the right to be paroled); Coady v.
Vaughn, 770 A.2d 287, 289 (Pa. 2001) (“It is undisputed that [an inmate] does not have a clear
legal right to the grant of parole, nor does the board have a corresponding duty to grant the
same.”).
“Since a discretionary decision of the Parole Board denying an inmate early parole does
not implicate any constitutionally [or state] protected liberty interest, the scope of federal judicial

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review of these decisions is necessarily quite limited.” Diehl-Armstrong v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. &
Parole, No. 13-2302, 2014 WL 1871509, at *5 (M.D. Pa. May 7, 2014). The role of a federal
court is confined to reviewing the substance of the state parole decision to determine whether the
Parole Board exercised its authority in an arbitrary and capricious, or constitutionally
impermissible manner. Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1980). Stated simply, the
court must evaluate whether the Parole Board abused its discretion. In order to show a violation
substantive due process, the petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) he was arbitrarily denied
parole on the basis of impermissible reasons such as race, religion, or political beliefs, and/or (2)
the Parole Board failed to apply appropriate, rational criteria in reaching its determination. Id. at
236; Bonsall v. Gillis, 372 F. Supp. 2d 805, 807 (M.D. Pa. 2005). “However, federal courts are
not authorized by the due process clause to second-guess parole boards and the requirements of
substantive due process are met if there is some basis for the challenged decision.” Coady v.
Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 487 (3d Cir. 2001). The “relevant level of arbitrariness required to find a
substantive due process violation involves not merely action that is unreasonable, but, rather,
something more egregious, which we have termed at times ‘conscience shocking’ or
‘deliberately indifferent.’” Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 247 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation
omitted).
Here, Wright has not established that his denial of parole amounted to an unreasonable
exercise of the Parole Board’s discretion. No argument is made by Wright that the Parole Board
based its decisions to deny him parole on arbitrary or impermissible criteria in violation of his
substantive due process rights. Rather, it is apparent from the arguments raised in Wright’s
petition that he merely disagrees with the criteria the Parole Board relied upon to deny him

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parole. However, this challenge to the Parole Board’s administrative decisions to deny Wright
parole release is unavailing. See 61 Pa. C.S. § 6137 (granting the Parole Board vast discretion to
refuse or deny parole). The record clearly reflects that the Parole Board based its parole
determinations from 2013 through 2016 on factors that it is statutorily required to consider in
accordance with 61 Pa. C.S. § 6135; see McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 277 (1973) (holding
that there is a “legitimate desire of the state legislature to afford state prison officials an adequate
opportunity to evaluate both an inmate's conduct and his rehabilitative progress before he is
eligible for parole”). Under 61 Pa. C.S. § 6135, the Parole Board must evaluate, among other
factors: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense, (2) any recommendations made by the
trial judge and prosecuting attorney, (3) the general character and background of the inmate, (4)
the notes of testimony of the sentencing hearing, if any, together with such additional
information regarding the nature and circumstances of the offense committed for which sentence
was imposed, and (5) the conduct of the person while in prison and his physical, mental and
behavioral condition and history and his complete criminal record.
Wright has not directed the Court to any factor relied upon by the Parole Board that could
be described as conscience shocking or deliberatively indifferent. The fact that the Parole Board
consistently relied on a combination of factors to deny Wright parole, alone, does not rise to the
level of conscience shocking behavior that could give rise to a substantive due process claim.
Ralston v. Dep't of Parole & Prob., No. 12-1844, 2015 WL 1542480, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 7,
2015) (citing Gordon v. Wenerowicz, No. 10–1257, 2011 WL 5509538, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 10,
2011)). Therefore, because Wright has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the Parole

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Board abused its discretion, the Court will deny the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
III.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A), unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate

of appealability (“COA”), an appeal may not be taken from a final order in a proceeding under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. A COA may issue only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by
demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his
constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). Because
reasonable jurists could not disagree with the resolution of this petition, there is no basis for the
issuance of a COA. Thus, the Court will decline to issue a certificate of appealability, as Wright
has failed to demonstrate “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
IV.

CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, Petitioner Edward Wright’s petition for a writ of

habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. No. 1), will be denied. An appropriate
Order follows.

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