Walker v. Ebbert et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM re MOTION to Dismiss 20 (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 9/18/17. (ma)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THEMIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CEDRIC TYRONE WALKER,
Plaintiff
vs.
WARDEN DAVID J. EBBERT,
et al.,
Defendants
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No. 1:16-CV-02387
(Judge Rambo)
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court for disposition is Defendants’ motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s amended complaint. (Doc. No. 20.) For the reasons set forth below,
Defendants’ motion will be granted.
I.
Background
On December 1, 2017, pro se Plaintiff Cedric Tyrone Walker, an inmate
formerly housed in the Special Management Unit at the United States Penitentiary
in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (“USP-Lewisburg”), filed this civil rights action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Doc. No. 1.) Named as Defendants were eight
Federal Bureau of Prisons’ employees: Warden David J. Ebbert, Lieutenant Jason
Seeba, and Correctional Officers C. Hughs, M. Hess, J. Klose, B Melek, B.
Mottern, and A. Simmons. (Id.) Plaintiff alleged that his Eighth Amendment
rights were violated when he was placed in restraints on May 1, 2015 through May
10, 2015. (Id.) He alleged that the restraints were so tight that they cut off his
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circulation and caused wounds on his wrists, for which he was denied medical
care. (Id.) He also claimed that he was denied food, water, and use of the
bathroom. (Id.)
On January 30, 2017, Plaintiff filed an amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 10).
In the amended complaint, Plaintiff identifies only four Federal Bureau of Prisons’
employees: Warden David J. Ebbert, retired BOP Director Charles E. Samuels,
Regional Physician Dr. Kevin Pigos, and Senior Officer Adam Simmonds. (Id.)
Plaintiff’s amended complaint re-alleges the Eighth Amendment claim but adds
claims that staff falsified incident reports against him while he was in restraints and
that he was denied due process during his disciplinary proceedings. (Id.)
On May 2, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 20) and a
brief in support. (Doc. No. 21.) On June 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed a brief in
opposition (Doc. No. 25), arguing that the Court should grant a default judgment in
his favor for Defendants’ failure to answer his amended complaint. On July 5,
2017, Plaintiff filed a document that was docketed as a memorandum of law (Doc.
No. 34), in which he argues that his complaint states a claim under the Eighth
Amendment because he suffers significant and recurrent pain from headaches.
(Id.)1
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Although Plaintiff provides the instant civil docket number for this case on this memorandum
of law, the Court can discern no relevancy of this document to the instant case.
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II.
Legal Standard
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must
accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences
that can be drawn from them, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). The
Court’s inquiry is guided by the standards of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Under Twombly and
Iqbal, pleading requirements have shifted to a “more heightened form of pleading.”
See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). To prevent
dismissal, all civil complaints must set out “sufficient factual matter” to show that
the claim is facially plausible. Id. The plausibility standard requires more than a
mere possibility that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. As the
Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Accordingly, to determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly
and Iqbal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has identified
the following steps a district court must take when determining the sufficiency of a
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6): (1) identify the elements a plaintiff must plead to
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state a claim; (2) identify any conclusory allegations contained in the complaint
“not entitled” to the assumption of truth; and (3) determine whether any “wellpleaded factual allegations” contained in the complaint “plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.” See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d
Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a
court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters
of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s
claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230
(3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc.,
998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). A court may also consider “any ‘matters
incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice,
matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case.’”
Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 5B
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 (3d
Ed. 2004)).
In conducting its review of a complaint, the court must be mindful that a
document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to
“less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be
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dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972).
III.
Discussion
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be dismissed for
failure to allege sufficient personal involvement on the part of any of the
Defendants and that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars Plaintiff’s due
process claims.
A. Personal Involvement of Defendants
Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to allege any personal involvement
with respect to any of the four Defendants named in the amended complaint, and as
such, the amended complaint should be dismissed. Defendants also point out that
the only Defendant named in the body of the amended complaint is Warden
Ebbert.2 However, Defendants argue that to the extent the amended complaint
alleges liability against Warden Ebbert, former Director Samules, or Dr. Pigos by
virtue of their supervisory positions, these claims are barred by the doctrine of
respondeat superior.
2
The Court’s review of the amended complaint reveals that one paragraph also mentions M.
Hess. (Doc. No. 10 at 7, ¶ 12(1)). However, M. Hess is neither named in the caption of the
amended complaint nor in the subsection of the amended complaint labeled “Defendants.” (Id.
at 2, 3.)
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A review of the amended complaint confirms that other than being named in
the caption, there exist no factual averments relating to the Defendants in the body
of the amended complaint. Indeed, other than one conclusory averment made
against Defendant Ebbert that he was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious
medical needs, and one conclusory averment made against M. Hess that his use of
excessive force violated Plaintiff’s rights, the body of the complaint does not
mention any other Defendant. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to identify the particular
conduct of each Defendant that is alleged to have violated Plaintiff’s rights. For
instance, Plaintiff does not provide any basis regarding how David Ebbert was
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs or how or when M.
Hess used excessive force. This style of pleading is patently inadequate since it
fails to allege facts that give rise to a plausible claim for relief. Hudson v. City of
McKeesport, 244 F. App’x 519 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of defendant
who was only named in caption of case.).
To the extent Plaintiff alleges liability against these Defendants by virtue of
their supervisory positions, it is well settled that “[c]ivil rights claims cannot be
premised on a theory of respondeat superior. Rather, each named defendant must
be shown, via the complaint’s allegations, to have been personally involved in the
events or occurrences which underlie a claim.” Millbrook v. United States, 8
F.Supp. 3d 601, 614 (M.D. Pa. 2014). Indeed, “[a] defendant in a civil rights
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action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. . . . [P]ersonal
involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and
acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity.” Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (addressing § 1983 claim);
Millbrook, 8 F.Supp. 3d at 614 (quoting Rode in the Bivens context).
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s amended complaint is bereft of any
allegations identifying how any of the Defendants were personally involved in the
alleged constitutional deprivations. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss
will be granted.
B. Due Process Claims
Plaintiff alleges that a number of falsified incident reports were issued to
him and that his due process rights were violated during the subsequent
disciplinary hearings. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s due process claim for
money damages calls into question the validity of a disciplinary action which is
barred by Heck. The Court agrees. Plaintiff’s final claim will be dismissed
pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) and Edwards v. Balisok, 520
U.S. 641 (1997). In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court ruled that a
constitutional cause of action for damages does not accrue “for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions
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whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” until the
plaintiff proves that the “conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to
make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87.
In Edwards v. Balisok, the Supreme Court extended the rationale in Heck to
disciplinary proceedings, holding that the expungement of the inmate disciplinary
proceeding would imply the invalidity of the underlying disciplinary action: “[t]he
principal procedural defect complained of by the respondent would, if established,
necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time credits.”
Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646. Accordingly, an inmate may not bring a civil rights
action for damages related to an inmate disciplinary proceeding without first
challenging and overturning, via appropriate proceedings, the disciplinary hearing
in question. Id. at 646-47.
Thus, under Heck and its progeny, Plaintiff’s claim fails, as Plaintiff has not
alleged facts demonstrating that the DHO’s decision regarding the misconduct was
invalidated on administrative appeal or through issuance of a writ of habeas
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corpus.3 Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted and the due
process claim will be dismissed with prejudice.
IV.
Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal
for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment,
unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). This instruction applies equally to pro se
plaintiffs and those represented by counsel. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235
(3d Cir. 2004). “A district court has ‘substantial leeway in deciding whether to
grant leave to amend.’” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Products Liab.
Litig., 564 F. App’x 672 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360,
373 (3d Cir. 2000)).
While Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint as a matter of course, this is
the first time Plaintiff’s claims have been tested by an adverse party and found
lacking. As to Plaintiff’s due process claims involving the disciplinary
proceedings, the Court finds that any amendment would be futile given the clear
Heck bar. Accordingly, Plaintiff will not be permitted to amend this claim.
However, with regard to his Eighth Amendment claims, it is neither clear that
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The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff raised the very same due process claims before this
Court in a habeas petition in Walker v. Ebbert, 1:16-cv-330, that this Court denied. See Walker
v. Ebbert, 1:16-cv-330, Docket Nos. 37and 38.
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amendment would be futile, nor is there any basis to believe it would be
inequitable. Accordingly, Plaintiff will be granted leave to file a second amended
complaint as to his Eighth Amendment claims.
V.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted.
Plaintiff will be granted leave to file a second amended complaint but only as to his
Eighth Amendment claims. An appropriate order follows.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
SYLVIA H. RAMBO
United States District Judge
Dated: September 18, 2017
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