Eberhardinger v. City of York et al

Filing 141

ORDER granting pltf's MIL 99 - Defts PRECLUDED from discussing or referring to Foster's 2015 conviction for aggravated assault resulting from his plea of nolo contendre - Defts further PRECLUDED from making or eliciting statements that indicate Foster's guilt as to this offense or that reference related factual allegations or proffers from his 2015 plea & sentencing. (See order for complete details.) Signed by Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner on 9/26/19. (ki)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERIKA EBERHARDINGER,
Plaintiff
v.
CITY OF YORK, et al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16-CV-2481
(Chief Judge Conner)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 26th day of September, 2019, upon consideration of plaintiff’s
motion (Doc. 99) in limine, wherein plaintiff seeks exclusion of “any and all
statements or insinuations of Matthew Foster’s guilt as to aggravated assault,” and
the court noting that defendant Matthew Foster (“Foster”) pled nolo contendere or
“no contest” to the charge of aggravated assault—18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a)(4)—
stemming from the car-chase incident underlying this case, (see Doc. 58-6 at 128),
which statute provides that a person is guilty of aggravated assault if he “attempts
to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly
weapon,” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a)(4), 1 and the court noting that when Foster
entered his nolo contendere plea to aggravated assault, he repeatedly explained that,

1

Defendants assert that Foster’s aggravated assault was “upon Officer
Smith,” and they reference 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a)(6) (dealing with assault of
an officer by physical menace resulting in “fear of imminent serious bodily injury”),
when discussing Foster’s conviction. (See Doc. 124 at 1, 3). The problem with these
assertions is twofold: first, Foster’s conviction was under Section 2702(a)(4), which
is recited supra; second, there are no facts of record about this offense because
Foster pled no contest and the sentencing judge based her acceptance of that plea
on the Commonwealth’s proffer, which itself derived entirely from the accounts of
officers involved in the incident. (See Doc. 58-6 at 144, 146). The accuracy of those
accounts, of course, is a matter of genuine dispute in this case.

due to drug and alcohol ingestion and a head injury sustained from backing into a
telephone pole, he does not “remember anything” that occurred after hitting the
pole, (see Doc. 58-6 at 139, 143, 144, 146), which lack of memory precipitated Foster’s
plea of no contest, (see id.), and the court noting that although a plea of nolo
contendere results in a conviction, it “is not an admission of guilt and thus the fact
that a defendant made such a plea cannot be used to demonstrate that he was guilty
of the crime in question,” United States v. Adedoyin, 369 F.3d 337, 343-44 (3d Cir.
2004), and that “a nolo plea does not admit underlying facts or guilt,” Sharif
v. Picone, 740 F.3d 263, 270 (3d Cir. 2014), and it appearing that defendants posit
that Foster’s “conduct . . . will be a central factor at trial and his credibility will be
crucial in this case,” (Doc. 124 at 3), but the court observing that, because Foster did
not admit underlying facts or guilt, his nolo plea would be irrelevant to assessing his
credibility or establishing his conduct on the night in question, 2 see Sharif, 740 F.3d

2

We are cognizant that in our September 18, 2018 memorandum we
indicated that evidence of Foster’s convictions “is relevant” to the excessive force
claim but not determinative. See Eberhardinger v. City of York, 341 F. Supp. 3d
420, 432 n.5 (M.D. Pa. 2018), aff’d, __ F. App’x __, 2019 WL 3544021 (3d Cir. Aug. 5,
2019). However, this cursory footnote encompassed all of Foster’s convictions,
many of which were the result of guilty pleas, not just the aggravated assault
charge. Moreover, because we rejected defendants’ argument at the Rule 56 stage
insofar as Foster’s convictions would not be dispositive on the excessive force claim,
there was no need to isolate and scrutinize the aggravated assault conviction. After
undertaking a more fulsome examination, we find little, if any, relevance of this
nolo-plea conviction. It is clear that Foster pled no contest because he could not
remember what happened after hitting the telephone pole and injuring his head.
Nothing from this nolo plea will make any material fact in the instant case “more or
less probable,” see FED. R. EVID. 401, because no facts related to aggravated assault
were admitted. See Sharif, 740 F.3d at 270. Even if the nolo plea were relevant, it
would fail the Rule 403 balancing test because any negligible probative value would
be substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice and juror confusion. See
FED. R. EVID. 403.
2

at 270, and the court finding that none of the cases on which defendants rely are
applicable to the matter sub judice because those cases did not involve convictions
resulting from nolo contendere pleas, (see Doc. 124 at 4-5 (citations omitted)), it is
hereby ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 99) in limine is GRANTED.

2.

Defendants are PRECLUDED from discussing or referring to Foster’s
2015 conviction for aggravated assault resulting from his plea of nolo
contendere. Defendants are further PRECLUDED from making or
eliciting statements that indicate Foster’s guilt as to this offense or that
reference related factual allegations or proffers from his 2015 plea and
sentencing.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania