Vaughn v. Franklin County Jail et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM re REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 of M.J. Schwab (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 6/14/17. (ma)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RICHARD ALVIN VAUGHN,
Petitioner
v.
FRANKLIN COUNTY JAIL, et al.,
Respondents
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: CASE NO. 1:16-CV-2488
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MEMORANDUM
I.
Introduction
Presently before the court is the report (Doc. 3) of Chief Magistrate Judge
Susan E. Schwab recommending dismissal of a Section 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (Doc. 1). The petition was filed on behalf of Petitioner Richard Alvin Vaughn
(“Vaughn”) by Joshua A. Monighan (“Monighan”), who claims to have power of attorney for
Vaughn. (Id. at 1, 14). The named respondents are the Franklin County Jail and the
Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania. (Id. at 1). Judge Schwab recommended
that the instant petition for habeas corpus be dismissed. (Doc. 3 at 10). For the following
reasons, the court agrees and will dismiss Vaughn’s petition.
II.
Background
On December 16, 2016, Monighan filed a “Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
for Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State Custody.” (Doc. 1). The petition was filed
on behalf of Vaughn, who Monighan claimed was “incommunicado” and in “solitary” with
“limited access/resources & information.” (Id. at 14). Monighan also claims that he has
“power of attorney” for Vaughn, but provided no evidence or documentation to support this
assertion. (Id. at 1, 14).
The habeas petition and attached declaration are difficult to decipher. It
appears that the habeas claim concerns both a 1999 state court conviction and judgment,
as well as a pending 2016 state court criminal case that has yet to go to trial. Judge
Schwab took judicial notice of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County docket
sheet for Vaughn and determined that the pending 2016 charges include corruption of
minors, unlawful contact with a minor, indecent assault of a person less than 16 years of
age, and criminal attempt of indecent assault of a person less than 16 years of age. (Doc.
3 at 2 (citing Commonwealth v. Vaughn, No. CP-28-CR-0001395-2016 (Ct. Com. Pl.
Franklin Cty. 2016))). Judge Schwab also noted that, at the time of her report, trial in the
2016 criminal matter was scheduled for the March 2017 trial term. (Id.)
Judge Schwab performed a thorough interpretation and analysis of the
habeas petition and its attachments. In her report, she determined that, while the petition
raised a number of disjointed and underdeveloped claims—claims that include issues
regarding the 2016 warrant, the assistant district attorney’s competency, Miranda
warnings, inadequate medical treatment, denial of access to the courts, improper waiver of
arraignment, insufficient law library access, unfair bail determinations, discrimination, and
Sixth Amendment counsel rights—Petitioner’s habeas claim primarily focused on the 2016
detention and asserted that Vaughn was wrongfully imprisoned. (Doc. 3 at 3-4).
Accordingly, because the 2016 criminal case was still in the pretrial stages,
Judge Schwab construed the § 2254 habeas petition as a petition for writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Id. at 5-6). She then recommended dismissing the
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§ 2241 petition due to failure to exhaust state remedies and lack of extraordinary
circumstances that would excuse the failure to exhaust. (Id. at 6-9).
Monighan, again acting on behalf of Vaughn, filed objections (Doc. 5) to the
report and recommendation, which are even more difficult to understand than the initial
habeas petition. Among the numerous objections listed, the substantive objections
Monighan seems to assert are that (1) Judge Schwab incorrectly ignored the independent
habeas claims raised regarding the 1999 conviction, (id. at 1, 5); (2) Monighan has a right
to file the instant habeas petition on Vaughn’s behalf not only because he has a power of
attorney for Vaughn, but also because he has “Taxpayer” standing, (id. at 5, 8); and (3)
Monighan should have the right to subpoena documents and video from Franklin County
in support of the instant petition, (id. at 4, 5, 11, 14).
III.
Standard of Review
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation,
the district court must review de novo the contested portions of the report. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C); M.D. Pa. Local Rule 72.3. Uncontested portions of the report are reviewed
for “clear error on the face of the record.” Clouser v. Johnson, 40 F. Supp. 3d 425, 430
(M.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting Cruz v. Chater, 990 F. Supp. 375, 375-78 (M.D. Pa. 1998)
(quoting 1983 Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b))).
IV.
Discussion
Regardless of what habeas claims Monighan is actually attempting to assert
on behalf of Vaughn, and regardless of whether the appropriate habeas procedural vehicle
is § 2254 or § 2241, the instant petition must be dismissed. It is plainly apparent from the
face of the petition that Monighan does not have standing to file a habeas petition on
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Vaughn’s behalf, and therefore this court lacks the power to entertain the petition or grant
habeas relief.
Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, “if it plainly appears from the petition and any
attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge
must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” Without requiring an
answer from the respondent, the court is “authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas
petition that appears legally insufficient on its face[.]” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849,
856 (1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4); Siers v. Ryan, 773 F.2d 37, 45 (3d Cir. 1985).
“Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified
by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2242. In order to file a habeas petition on another’s behalf, known as a “next friend”
habeas petition, one must establish the requisite Article III standing to do so. See
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 161-62 (1990). “Where standing is lacking, the
federal courts lack the power to grant habeas relief.” In re Zettlemoyer, 53 F.3d 24, 26 (3d
Cir. 1995) (citing Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 737 (1990)).
“‘[N]ext friend’ standing is by no means granted automatically to whomever
seeks to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163. Rather, the
next friend must provide an adequate justification for why the real party in interest cannot
appear on his own behalf to seek habeas relief. Id. Consequently, in order to
demonstrate standing and thus jurisdiction, the next friend bears the burden to “clearly
establish the propriety of his status.” Id. at 164; Zettlemoyer, 53 F.3d at 27.
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Here, Monighan has failed to carry his burden. He has not shown that
Vaughn—the real party in interest—cannot himself seek habeas relief, and therefore
Monighan has not “clearly establish[ed] the propriety of his status” as next friend.
Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164.
First, although the petition states that Monighan has power of attorney for
Vaughn, Monighan has not provided a copy of the power of attorney or any other
supporting proof of this claim. Even if Monighan were to provide documentary evidence
that he holds power of attorney for Vaughn, this fact in itself would be insufficient to
establish standing because, although “power of attorney may [confer] certain decisionmaking rights under state law,” it generally does not allow a person to litigate pro se on
behalf of another in federal court. In re Radogna, 331 F. App’x 962, 964 (3d Cir. 2009)
(nonprecedential) (citing Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664-65 (9th Cir.
2008)). Federal courts, including those in the Third Circuit, “have routinely adhered to the
general rule prohibiting pro se plaintiffs from pursuing claims on behalf of others in a
representative capacity.” Simon, 546 F.3d at 664-65 (collecting cases); see also LiggonRedding v. Willingboro Township, 351 F. App’x 674, 679 (3d Cir. 2009) (nonprecedential)
(finding that, even though wife had power of attorney for husband, she did not have
standing to bring a claim on his behalf in a representative capacity on a pro se basis).
More importantly, Monighan fails to establish the propriety of the next friend
habeas petition because he has not shown why Vaughn is unable to file a habeas petition
on his own behalf. While Monighan alleges that Vaughn is “incommunicado” and in
“solitary,” Judge Schwab noted that these allegations are belied by the docket sheet in the
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2016 criminal matter. 1 In that case, Vaughn has filed no less than five pro se motions,
including a motion for recusal, a motion for technical advanced communication, two
motions for electronic discovery, and another motion for discovery that includes multiple
requests for copies of other criminal case opinions. See Commonwealth v. Vaughn, No.
CP-28-CR-0001395-2016 (Ct. Com. Pl. Franklin Cty. 2016). Because Vaughn appears to
have access to the courts, it is decidedly unclear that he cannot file a habeas petition on
his own behalf. Consequently, Monighan has not carried his burden to show that he is
entitled to “next friend” status.
Finally, Monighan’s assertion that he has standing as a taxpayer is meritless.
Taxpayer standing—in cases where the taxpayer is not challenging the collection of a
specific tax assessment levied on him—is generally prohibited. Hein v. Freedom From
Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599, 602 (2007). The Supreme Court of the United
States has carved out a very narrow exception that allows taxpayer standing when
challenging a Congressional expenditure made pursuant to the Taxing and Spending
Clause of the United States Constitution that allegedly violates the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment. Id. at 602, 609-10. As this narrow exception is not implicated by
the instant habeas petition, taxpayer standing does not apply to Monighan.
V.
Conclusion
The court agrees with Judge Schwab that the instant petition for habeas
corpus must be dismissed. It is plainly apparent from the face of the petition that
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Judicial opinions and docket sheets are public records, of which this court may take judicial
notice. See Zedonis v. Lynch, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2017 WL 511234, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2017)
(Caldwell, J.) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192,
1197 (3d Cir. 1993) and Dean v. Copozza, No. CIV.A. 13-41, 2013 WL 1787804, at *1 (W.D. Pa.
Apr. 10, 2013) (“Pennsylvania’s Unified Judicial System provides online access to the docket sheet
for criminal cases, and this court may take judicial notice of those dockets.”)).
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Monighan cannot demonstrate that he is entitled to next friend status, and thus he lacks
standing to pursue a habeas claim on Vaughn’s behalf. As such, this court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition, nor can it grant habeas relief in the matter.
Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed. An appropriate order will issue.
/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge
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