Williams v. Pennsylvania State Education Association
Filing
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. Dft Pennsylvania State Education Associations Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7 ) is DENIED in its entirety.2. The case is STAYED pending the outcome of Ladley et al. v. Pennsylvania State Education Associ ation, No. CI-14-08552 (Jun. 30, 2015), in the Courtof Common Pleas of Lancaster County. 3. The parties shall alert the Court as to the resolution of the said Ladley case, and jointly file a copy of the county courts decision on the docket upon its entry. Signed by the Honorable John E. Jones, III on April 25, 2017. (kjn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES R. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
PENNSYLVANIA STATE
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
Defendant.
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1:16-cv-02529-JEJ
Hon. John E. Jones III
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
April 25, 2017
Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and failure to state a
claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 7). For the reasons that follow,
the Court denies the motion. The Court shall stay adjudication on the remainder of
the proceedings pending the outcome of Ladley et al. v. Pennsylvania State
Education Association, No. CI-14-08552 (Jun. 30, 2015), which is being litigated
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff James R. Williams (“Plaintiff” or “Williams”) is a public school
teacher at West Middlesex School District. (Doc. 1, ¶ 7). Defendant Pennsylvania
State Education Association (“Defendant” or “PSEA”) is a non-profit corporation
made up of professional and support professional employees of school and health
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entities. (Doc. 1, p. 1). PSEA is an “employee organization” as defined by 71 P.S.
§ 575. (Doc. 8, p. 1). Plaintiff is not a part of the PSEA, but is required to pay a
compulsory union fee known as a “fair share fee” by the collective bargaining
agreement governing his employment. (Doc. 9, p. 1).
In December 2015, Plaintiff filed an objection to the payment of the fair
share fee based on bona fide religious grounds pursuant to 71 P.S. § 575(e)(2).
(Doc. 1, ¶ 13). Subsection (h) of that same provision requires bona fide religious
objectors to pay the equivalent of a fair share fee to a “nonreligious charity agreed
upon by the nonmember and the exclusive representative.” 71 P.S. § 575(h).
Plaintiff indicated that he wanted his funds to go to Pennsylvania Foundation for
Life. (Doc. 1, ¶ 14). In February 2016, Defendant accepted Plaintiff’s religious
objection as bona fide, but rejected his selection of the Pennsylvania Foundation
for Life. (Doc. 1, ¶ 15). Defendant suggested other possible charities for Plaintiff
and asked Plaintiff to select one. (Doc. 8, p. 3). Plaintiff asked for clarification as
to why Defendant would not accept his selected charity. (Doc. 1, ¶ 17). Defendant
replied that it would not donate Plaintiff’s payment to the Pennsylvania Foundation
for Life because this charity would further his religious beliefs. (Doc. 1, ¶ 18).
Defendant again included a list of charities for Plaintiff to choose from, but
communications between the parties ceased after that. (Doc. 8, p. 3). In July 2016,
Defendant adopted additional procedures to resolve disputes regarding the
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selection of a charity. (Doc. 8, p. 3-4). These procedures include binding
arbitration. (Id.).
II.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed this action on December 22, 2016. (Doc. 1). The claim is
based on the application of the Pennsylvania Fair Share Fee Law, 71 P.S. § 575
(“§575”). Plaintiff claims that § 575 violates his rights under the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, the Equal Protection clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and due
process under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution, and brings his constitutional
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1, p. 1-2). Plaintiff also claims that the
binding arbitration agreement in § 575 violates his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
and finally, that Defendant has violated his rights under § 575 itself. (Id.).
Defendant filed the instant Motion to Abstain, Dismiss, or in the Alternative, to
Stay the proceedings on January 27, 2017. (Doc. 7). Plaintiff filed his brief in
opposition to the Defendant’s motion on February, 10, 2017. (Doc. 9). The time
for filing a reply has long passed. See Local Rule 7.7. The Motion is therefore
ripe for our review.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) contends that the complaint
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fails to assert a claim upon which relief can be granted. See FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6). In considering the motion, courts “accept all factual allegations as true,
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine
whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be
entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cnty. Of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).
To resolve the motion, a court generally should consider only the allegations in the
complaint, as well as “any matters incorporated by reference or integral to the
claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items
appearing in the record of the case.” Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d
256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In general, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint
against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a
complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief, “in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (alteration
omitted)). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss need
not contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). To survive a
motion to dismiss, “a civil plaintiff must allege facts that ‘raise a right to relief
above the speculative level . . . .’” Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d
Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Accordingly, to satisfy the
plausibility standard, the complaint must indicate that the defendant’s liability is
more than “a sheer possibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Where a complaint
pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short
of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Under the two-pronged approach articulated in Twombly and later
formalized in Iqbal, a district court must first identify all factual allegations that
constitute nothing more than “legal conclusions” or “naked assertion[s].”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564, 557. Such allegations are “not entitled to the
assumption of truth” and must be disregarded for purposes of resolving a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Next, the district court must identify
“the ‘nub’ of the . . . complaint – the well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual
allegation[s].” Id. at 680. Taking these allegations as true, the district judge must
then determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. See id.
However, “a complaint may not be dismissed merely because it appears
unlikely that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the
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merits.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57). Rule 8
“‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,’ but instead
‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence of’ the necessary element.” Id. at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556).
IV.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues it is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983, and therefore
Plaintiff’s claims cannot be sustained. (Doc. 8, p. 6). Defendant also argues that
this court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this case pursuant to the
Pullman doctrine because this case presents issues of state law that may be soon
resolved in state court. See Ladley et al. v. Pennsylvania State Education
Association, No. CI-14-08552 (Jun. 30, 2015). Plaintiff responds by arguing that
Defendant PSEA is a state actor for purposes of § 1983 and that this court should
not abstain from hearing this case because of its “virtually unflagging” obligation
to hear cases where jurisdiction exists. (Doc. 9, pp. 5, 9).
The parties both acknowledge that this Court recently rendered a ruling in
Misja v. Pennsylvania State Education Association, No. 1:15-cv-1199 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 28, 2016) (Doc. 28), a case concerning virtually identical facts and legal
issues. In Misja, this Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and to
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abstain, and stayed the proceedings pending the outcome in Ladley. Misja, No.
1:15-cv-1199, Doc. 28.
The issues pending before this Court concerning the PSEA’s status as a state
actor, as well as the application of the Pullman Doctrine pending the Ladley
decision, mirror the Misja case almost identically. See Misja, No. 1:15-cv-1199,
Doc. 28, p. 12. Therefore, although we acknowledge Defendant’s disagreement
with our decision in Misja, we are not presented with any compelling reason to
depart from our holding in the Misja matter. We begin by first addressing the
claim that the PSEA is not a state actor.
A. The PSEA as a State Actor
As in the Misja case, Defendant PSEA argues that it is not a state actor and
does not act under color of state law, and therefore, Williams cannot assert § 1983
claims against it. See id. at p. 12. In order to show a prima facie violation of §
1983, a plaintiff must show that the wrongdoers acted under color of state law. 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The Third Circuit has said that “[t]he color of state law element is
a threshold issue; there is no liability under § 1983 for those not acting under color
of law.” Groman v. Twp. Of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995). The
Third Circuit has also instructed that “[w]here the actors are not state or municipal
officers, but are private individuals or associations, we still must address whether
their activity can nevertheless be deemed to be under color of law. The inquiry is
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fact-specific.” Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982)).
A plaintiff must demonstrate two things to prove the state action requirement.
First, “the conduct at issue must either be mandated by the state or must represent
the exercise of a state-created right or privilege. Second, the party who engaged in
the challenged conduct must be a person or entity that can ‘fairly be said to be a
state actor.’” White v. Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local
1300, 370 F.3d 346, 350 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
In Misja, we acknowledged that the analysis of whether an actor acts under
color of state law is a difficult one. Misja, No. 1:15-cv-1199, Doc. 28, p. 13. We
noted that the Supreme Court has not decided the issue of whether actions taken by
a union pursuant to an agency shop clause constitute state action, and that as a
result, a circuit split has developed regarding the issue.1 As we said in Misja, the
decisions leading to this split involved only private-sector unions, not public-sector
unions as we have here. See Kolinske v. Lubbers, 712 F. 2d 741 (D.C.Cir. 1983);
See Beck v. Communication Workers of America, 776 F. 2d 1187 (4th Cir. 1985).
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The Third Circuit, along with the Second Circuit and D.C. Circuit, has concluded that when
unions negotiate and implement agency shop clauses, they are not acting under color of state
law. See White v. Communications Workers of America, 370 F. 3d 346 (3d Cir. 2004); see also
Price v. UAW, 927 F. 2d 88 (2d Cir. 1986); Kolinske v. Lubbers, 712 F. 2d 741 (D.C.Cir. 1983).
However, the Fourth and First Circuits have concluded that this same behavior does constitute
state action. See Beck v. Communication Workers of America, 776 F. 2d 1187 (4th Cir. 1985);
see also Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F. 2d 14 (1st Cir. 1971).
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Regarding public-sector unions, the Supreme Court has ruled on the merits
of § 1983 claims in Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct.
1066 (1986) and Knox v. Service Employees Int’l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct.
2277 (2012), but did so without addressing the issue of state action.
In Misja, we examined the Third Circuit’s approach to public-sector unions
and private-sector unions. Misja, No. 1:15-cv-1199, Doc. 28, pp. 14-15.
Regarding public-sector unions, the Third Circuit considered a § 1983 claim
brought against the PSEA in Otto v. Pennsylvania State Educ. Association-NEA,
330 F. 3d 125 (3d Cir. 2003). We noted that the Third Circuit passed on deciding
whether the PSEA was a state actor for purposes of § 1983, leading us to believe
the issue was not raised on appeal. Misja, No. 1:15-cv-1199, Doc. 28, p. 15. The
Court in White v. Communications Workers of America, 370 F. 3d 346 (3d Cir.
2004) found that implementation of agency shop clauses by private unions is not
state action, and did not comment on the validity of § 1983 cases in the context of
public-sector unions. White, 370 F. 3d at 347. Ultimately, we said that “[t]hough
we are tempted to extend the Third Circuit’s rationale in White to a public-sector
union as well, we find it imprudent to turn the tide against what is a clearly
established pattern, if not precedent, in favor of hearing § 1983 claims against
public-sector unions.” Misja, No. 1:15-cv-1199, Doc. 28, p. 18. We noted that the
authority to enforce the agency shop provision in the collective bargaining
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agreement is an agreement between the union and the state. Id. The union,
therefore, relies on the state to enforce the agreement and execute it, bringing the
action within the realm of state action governed by § 1983. Id.
We therefore do not stray from our ruling in Misja and reject the
Defendant’s argument that PSEA is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.
B. Abstention based on the Pullman Doctrine
Defendant PSEA also argues that this court should abstain, or in the
alternative, stay the proceedings, pursuant to the Pullman doctrine. (Doc. 8, p. 10).
As the Defendant recognizes, this identical argument was made and rejected in
Misja. We find no compelling reason to alter our reasoning or decision and will not
labor to analyze the Pullman issue again here. In short, despite the fact that the
elements of the Pullman doctrine are applicable, this Court takes notice of the
“virtually unflagging” obligation of the federal courts to adjudicate claims.
Planned Parenthood, 220 F. 3d at 149. We acknowledge that “[a]bstention is an
‘extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a
controversy properly before it’.” Id. We will therefore implement an “interim
step,” as we did in Misja, by instituting a stay of proceedings pending the
resolution in Ladley. Misja, No. 1:15-cv-1199, Doc. 28, p. 33.
C. Defendant’s Remaining Arguments for Dismissal
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Having acknowledged that implementation of a stay of proceedings is the
most appropriate step in this matter, we must still address Defendant’s remaining
arguments for dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has
failed to state a claim that PSEA violated § 575 and that Plaintiff’s claim based on
the binding arbitration clause must fail. We will address each in turn.
i. Mr. Williams’ alleged violation of Section 575
Defendant PSEA argues that Williams fails to state a claim that Defendant
PSEA violated § 575 by arguing that Williams violated § 575, not the PSEA.
(Doc. 8, p. 9). The language at issue is as follows:
When a challenge is made under subsection (e)(2), the objector shall provide
the exclusive representative with verification that the challenge is based on
bona fide religious grounds. If the exclusive representative accepts the
verification, the challenging nonmember shall pay the equivalent of the fair
share fee to a nonreligious charity agreed upon by the nonmember and the
exclusive representative.
71 P.S. § 575(h). The parties each argue that the other violated the phrase “agreed
upon,” the same language that, in Misja, we determined was vague. Misja, No.
1:15-cv-1199, Doc. 28, p. 30. In his complaint, Plaintiff argues that the PSEA
violates the language of this statute, which calls for agreement, by creating a policy
of mandatory arbitration and a provision allowing the PSEA to send Plaintiff’s
funds to a charity other than that of his choice. (Compl. ¶ 67). Defendant argues
that Plaintiff Williams violated the plain language of the statute himself by
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refusing to “agree” to one of the charities it suggested, and bringing this lawsuit.
(Doc. 8, p. 10).
As discussed in Misja, this court believes § 575 is written in a way that
invites the type of debate presented in this case. It is true that the plain meaning of
the word “agree” implies that both parties must cooperate to some degree. It also
implies that neither Plaintiff nor Defendant can force the other to submit. The
word “agree” connotes mutual understanding and voluntariness. However, the
plain meaning of “agree” does little to help either Plaintiff or Defendant in this
case. By failing to come to an agreement, both parties may have violated § 575.
However, finding that both parties simultaneously violated the provision
does nothing to relieve the current stalemate. To avoid this absurd result, the
phrase “agreed upon” must have additional meaning attached to it to make it clear
when a party has done enough to “agree.” As of now, we cannot say that
Defendant has sufficiently satisfied the provision simply because it provided a list
of potential charities. Nor are we prepared to say that Plaintiff fails to state a claim
because he exercised his rights by filing this lawsuit. We are not finding that
Defendant violated § 575, but rather that Plaintiff has pled sufficiently to survive a
motion to dismiss. The ambiguity of the phrase “agreed upon” in § 575, and the
lack of clarity as to how parties in a situation such as this are to agree, illustrate
why it is necessary to stay this case pending the outcome of Ladley.
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ii. PSEA’s Agreement not to Force Mr. Williams to Arbitrate
Lastly, Plaintiff claims that the arbitration provision of PSEA’s procedures
violates his rights to access the courts under § 1983. (Doc. 1, ¶ 27). Defendant
argues that this claim must fail because PSEA agreed not to subject him to binding
arbitration, as required by § 575(g). (Doc. 8, p. 8). However, this argument
triggers two critical issues. First, as Plaintiff pointed out in his brief, the Third
Circuit has already held this particular provision of § 575(g) to be unconstitutional
as applied. See Hohe v. Casey, 956 F.2d 399, 409 (3d Cir. 1992). As the basis for
its reasoning, the Third Circuit cited Pasty v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457
U.S. 496, 516 (1982), saying that “exhaustion of state remedies should not be
required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983.” Id. Clearly,
Defendant could not enforce the arbitration provision, as it is effectively
unenforceable.
Second, the Supreme Court has long recognized that “A defendant's
voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct ordinarily does not suffice to
moot a case.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 174 (2000). In other words, when a defendant is accused of wrongdoing,
it cannot simply cease to engage in that activity and then claim that the case is
moot because there is no more ongoing harm. Id. For this reason, we find
Defendant’s argument for dismissal based on its agreement not to force Williams
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to arbitrate unpersuasive. Because the PSEA procedures still include the
unconstitutional arbitration agreement, Plaintiff has a valid claim.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth, we shall deny the Defendant PSEA’s Motion to
Dismiss. We shall stay any further adjudication of this matter pending the
resolution of the state court proceedings in Ladley et al. v. Pennsylvania State
Education Association, No. CI-14-08552 (Jun. 30, 2015).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendant Pennsylvania State Education Association’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 7) is DENIED in its entirety.
2. The case is STAYED pending the outcome of Ladley et al. v. Pennsylvania
State Education Association, No. CI-14-08552 (Jun. 30, 2015), in the Court
of Common Pleas of Lancaster County.
3. The parties shall alert the Court as to the resolution of the said Ladley case,
and jointly file a copy of the county court’s decision on the docket upon its
entry.
s/ John E. Jones III
John E. Jones III
United States District Judge
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