Cochenaur et al v. Juniata Valley Bank et al

Filing 10

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The R & R (Doc. 9) is ADOPTED. 2. The Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) is GRANTED. 3. Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside Foreclosure and All Judgements (Doc. 7) is DENIED. 4. Plaintiffs' Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 5. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case. Signed by Honorable Robert D. Mariani on 8/7/17. (jam)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SCOTT GOCHENAUR, el al.

1:17-CV-743
(JUDGE MARIANI}

Plaintiffs,

v.
JUNIATA VALLEY BANK, et al.
Defendants.

ORDER

AND NOW, THIS--2Jy__ DAY OF AUGUST, 2017, upon consideration of
Magistrate Judge Carlson's Report and Recommendation (''R&R") (Doc. 9) for clear error or
manifest injustice, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The R&R (Doc. 9) is ADOPTED for the reasons set forth therein. 1
2. The Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Juniata Valley Bank, Pamela Parson, and
Marcie Barber (Doc. 4) is GRANTED.
3. Plaintiffs' "Motion to Set Aside Foreclosure and All Judgements" (Doc. 7) is
DENIED.
1 Although

the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's R&R in whole, we note that while the
Magistrate Judge refers to the Third Circuit's pre-Exxon "inextricably intertwined" formulation for
determining the applicability of Rooker-Feldman, even applying the formulation set forth by the Third Circuit
post-Exxon, this action would be barred by Rooker-Feldman principally for the same reasons discussed by
the Magistrate Judge. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 169 (3d
Cir. 2010) (The Third Circuit has "recognized that 'caution is now appropriate in relying on our preExxon formulation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,' which focused on whether the state and federal suits
were 'inextricably intertwined."')(quoting Gary v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 200 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008)).
Post-Exxon, it has been made clear that the federal court's task is "to identify those federal suits that
profess to complain of injury by a third party, but actually complain of injury 'produced by a state-court
judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by it."' Id. at 167 (quoting Hoblock v.
Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 2005)).

4. Plaintiffs' Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
5. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE the above-captioned action.

2