Rinadli v. John Doe #1 et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM re Complaint 1 filed by Michael Rinadli (Order to follow as separate docket entry) Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 8/8/17. (ma)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL RINALDI,
Plaintiff
vs.
JOHN DOE #1 et al.,
Defendants

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No. 1:17-CV-01090
(Judge Rambo)

MEMORANDUM
I.

Background
Plaintiff, Michael Rinaldi, an inmate currently confined at the United States

Penitentiary Canaan in Waymart, Pennsylvania (“USP-Canaan”), filed this civil
action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) on June 21, 2017. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff names
the following individuals as Defendants: (1) John Doe #1, the director of the
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) responsible for implementing and maintaining program
statements; (2) J. Baltazar, Warden of USP-Canaan; and (3) John Doe #2, a
correctional officer who is directly responsible for the supervision of Plaintiff
while Plaintiff performs his job detail. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he was forced to
perform manual labor which consisted of sweeping and mopping floors, cleaning
and painting walls and emptying trash cans, even though he did not want to

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perform such work. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks general and punitive damages in the
amount of twenty five thousand dollars. (Id.)
Plaintiff has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and authorization to
have funds deducted from his prison trust fund account to pay the filing fee in
installments. (Doc. Nos. 5,6.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion
to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted but his complaint will be dismissed as
frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in
accordance with the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2).
II.

Standard of Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated, prior to service of process,

to screen a civil complaint in which a prisoner is seeking redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 230 F. App’x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007). The
Court must dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454,
471 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The Court has a similar obligation with respect to actions
brought in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (The Court is statutorily
required to screen and dismiss a complaint if the Court determines that it is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or
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seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief). An
action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on
an “indisputably meritless legal theory.” Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th
Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
III.

Discussion

Plaintiff’s lone allegation in the instant complaint is that he was forced to
perform manual labor which consisted of sweeping and mopping floors, cleaning
and painting walls and emptying trash cans, even though he did not want to
perform such work. (Doc. No. 1.) This claim has no merit. “There is no federally
protected right of a … prisoner not to work while imprisoned after conviction.”
Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1963); see, e.g., Aceves v. Jeffers, 196
F. App’x 196 (10th Cir. 2006); Franklin v. Johns, No. 5:08-HC-2140, 2008 WL
8162541, at *1–2 (E.D. N.C. Oct. 6, 2008); Moody v. Baker, 857 F.2d 256, 257–58
(5th Cir. 1988) (work is a typical condition of confinement); Ali v. Johnson, 259
F.3d 317, 318 (5th Cir.2001) (forcing a prisoner to work does not amount to
involuntary servitude). “A work assignment alone does not rise to a constitutional
violation.” Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 194 (5th Cir.1993) (affirming
dismissal of inmate's claim because “prisoners can be required to work, in the
absence of deliberate indifference toward their physical condition.”).
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To the extent Plaintiff is alleging an Eighth Amendment violation of cruel
and unusual punishment, the Eighth Amendment only protects inmates from work
programs if the work is medically prohibited, caused great physical hardship, or is
a threat to life or health. See Valderas v. Johnson, 250 F.3d 739 (5th Cir. 2001)
(unpublished) (citing Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993)
(Eighth Amendment claim wholly without merit because plaintiff failed to make
any allegation that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his physical
condition in assigning his work detail); Woodall v. Patilla, 581 F. Supp. 1066,
1077 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 687 (E.D. Ark. 1965);
Franklin, 2008 WL 8162541, at *1–2. This, however, is not Plaintiff’s claim. To
be sure, Plaintiff makes no assertion of physical hardship, injury or deliberate
indifference. Plaintiff merely takes issue with working.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff believes that his work assignment violates
some due process right, he has failed to state a claim. The Due Process Clause
does not protect every change in conditions of confinement that may have an
adverse effect on a prisoner. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). Due
process concerns are implicated and judicial review is required only when a
disciplinary sanction “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. Courts have held that
punishment in the form of extra work duty does not impose “atypical and
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significant hardship” on a prisoner that would implicate due process concerns. See,
e.g., Hayes v. Quarterman, No. H–08–2501, 2009 WL 2044652, at *2 (5th Cir.
July 7, 2009) (holding that extra work duty does not implicate due process
protections). Finally, as set forth above, work is a typical condition of
confinement, Moody, 857 F.2d at 257–58, and forcing a prisoner to work does not
amount to involuntary servitude. Ali, 259 F.3d at 318. Accordingly, Plaintiff has
failed to set forth a cognizable claim.
The Court is mindful that in civil cases pro se plaintiffs often should be
afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in
its entirety unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). However, in this case,
the Court can envision no scenario in which an amended complaint would entitle
Plaintiff to relief, given that Plaintiff’s cause of action is legally frivolous.
Accordingly, Plaintiff will not be granted leave to file an amended complaint and
the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.

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IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed with
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
(b)(1) as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
An appropriate Order follows.

s/Sylvia H. Rambo
SYLVIA H. RAMBO
United States District Judge
Dated: August 8, 2017

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