Rotex Global, LLC v. Gerard Daniel Worldwide, Inc.

Filing 144

ORDER (memorandum filed previously as separate docket entry).Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on 10/11/2019. (ktt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROTEX GLOBAL, LLC

:
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
GERARD DANIEL WORLDWIDE, INC.:
:
Defendant.
:

CIV NO. 1:17-CV-2118
(Chief Judge Conner)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I.

Factual Background

We are overseeing on-going discovery disputes in this complex patent
litigation. As part of this process, we have emphasized for all counsel our view that
discovery in this case should be conducted in a symmetrical fashion, with the
greatest degree of transparency possible, consistent with legitimate concerns relating
to confidentiality of trade information. We also underscored for all counsel our view
that they should work cooperatively to tailor discovery to the needs of the case and
noted that clear communications between counsel are essential to achieve these
goals.
Notwithstanding our expression of these aspirational goals, the parties remain
embroiled in a discovery dispute relating to a motion to compel discovery filed by
1

the plaintiff, Rotex. (Doc. 107). In this motion to compel, Rotex seeks two forms of
relief. First, it asks that we direct Gerard Daniel Worldwide (GDW) to re-designate
customer lists, which it had previously identified under a stipulated protective order
as “Highly Confidential,” as merely “Confidential”. The effect of this re-designation
would be to allow Rotex’s counsel to share GDW’s customer lists with officials at
Rotex. Additionally, or in the alternative, Rotex argues that GDW has redacted the
identities of these customers from its “Highly Confidential” discovery disclosures.
Rotex contends that these redactions should be removed because the identity of the
GDW customers is an important element of proof in Rotex’s claims that GDW
infringed its patent and then used that infringed patent to market equipment to Rotex
customers. According to the plaintiff, the actual identity of the GDW customers is a
crucial component to showing the loss of sales suffered by Rotex since it would
demonstrate which former Rotex customers later purchased infringing goods from
GDW.
For its part, GDW has responded to the twofold argument advanced by Rotex
with a twofold rejoinder. First, GDW argues that Rotex is not entitled to compel it
to re-designate customer information as merely “Confidential” rather than “Highly
Confidential” since the parties’ stipulated protective order expressly allows for the
designation of customer information as “Highly Confidential.” In addition, citing
primarily to cases which have allowed the redaction of sensitive but irrelevant
2

information from documents, GDW contends that Rotex’s argument that the
identities of customers potentially lost by Rotex due to GDW’s alleged infringement
is relevant to its claims and loss calculations, “while superficially appealing, really
makes little sense,” since other factors may potentially also affect Rotex’s sales.
(Doc. 135, at 17).
With Rotex’s claims, and GDW’s rejoinders, framed in this manner, it is
apparent that this motion to compel in the first instance stems out of a dispute
between the parties regarding the meaning and interpretation of a stipulated
protective order entered into by the litigants in November of 2017. (Doc. 73). Such
stipulated protective orders are a commonplace feature of complex commercial
litigation where sophisticated parties are engaged in a dispute that may require the
disclosure of sensitive business information. The stipulated protective order is
designed to allow this discovery process to move forward in a fashion that allows
for the sharing of information while protecting client confidences. When this process
works correctly, it eliminates the need for discovery litigation. However, when—as
in this case—the process breaks down, the court is called upon to intervene.
Given the nature of this particular dispute, our consideration of the parties’
contentions begins with the language of their November 2017 stipulated protective
order. (Doc.73). That order, which provides a process for disclosing sensitive
commercial information, allows parties to designate information as either
3

“Confidential” or “Highly Confidential,” and defines these designations in the
following terms:
For purposes of this Protective Order, the term “Confidential” shall
mean any and all documents, materials, or information concerning the
products, projects, activities, intellectual property, marketing,
promotion, business, or financial affairs of any party to the Action
acquired in the course of the party’s respective work that such party
believes in good faith would qualify for a protective order if sought
from the Court. For purposes of this Protective Order, the term “Highly
Confidential” shall mean any and all Confidential Material that
qualifies as “Confidential” and further relates to financial information
about the party, future business plans, pending patent applications,
customer information, competitive information, product formulation
details, trade secret information, or proprietary computer source code.
(Id., ¶ 4).
The protective order then prescribes how “Confidential” and “Highly
Confidential” information may be disseminated and used by the parties in their
litigation. In this regard, the order provides the following with respect to the
disclosure of “Confidential Information”:
Confidential information shall be disclosed only to:
(a)

No more than two employees, officers, or board members of each party,
to be designated as such by each party in writing prior to disclosure;

(b)

This Court and any court to which an appeal might lie, including court
personnel and trial jurors;

(c)

Outside litigation counsel of record for the non-designating parties,
together with their respective associate attorneys and office personnel
employed or engaged in the preparation for, or aiding in the trial of, the
Action;
4

(d)

Outside vendors who perform microfiching, photocopying, computer
classification, or similar clerical functions, but only for so long as and
to the extent necessary to perform those services;

(e)

Court reporters and other persons engaged in preparing transcripts of
testimony of hearings in the Action;

(f)

Outside experts and/or advisors consulted by counsel in connection
with the Action, whether or not retained to testify at trial, except that,
absent written consent from the Designating Party, no party shall
disclose Confidential Material to any expert or advisor, or to such
person’s support personnel, if such person currently or at any time in
the past has been an employee, contractor, or customer of any of the
parties;

(g)

Jury selection consultants, and participants in any mock trial or similar
simulation, employed for purposes of trial preparation in this matter but
only for so long as and to the extent necessary to perform those services;

(h)

Witnesses at any deposition in the Action, subject to the provisions of
paragraphs 11, 12, and 13 of this Protective Order to the extent that the
witness is reflected on the face of the document, or is reasonably
believed by counsel to be, a writer or a recipient of the document; and

(i)

Any other persons to whom the Designating Party agrees in writing.

(Id., ¶ 6).
As might be expected, the stipulated protective order then affords a heightened
level of protection to information designated as “Highly Confidential,” stating that:
In the event that a party designates information as Highly Confidential,
the information shall be treated the same as and shall be subject to the
same procedures as set forth in this Protective Order for information
designated Confidential, except that such information shall be disclosed
only to persons identified in subparagraphs b-h of Paragraph 6 above.
(Id., ¶ 8).
5

While cast in a somewhat oblique fashion, what this provision of the
protective order does by indirection is twofold: First, it allows litigating counsel and
outside experts access to “Highly Confidential” but relevant information so that they
may use that information to advance claims or prepare defenses. In addition, though,
this provision of the order ensures that “Highly Confidential” data will not be shared
with representatives of the opposing party, who might otherwise be tempted to
utilize this information to gain some unfair competitive commercial advantage over
a business rival.
The protective order then provides a mechanism for parties to challenge
designations of data as either “Confidential” or “Highly Confidential,” stating that:
If any documents, information, or testimony are designated as
Confidential or Highly Confidential, but are not believed in good faith
to be Confidential or Highly Confidential by any Receiving Party, that
party shall notify the Designating Party, in writing, and request a release
of confidentiality. If such a release is not forthcoming within five (5)
days, the objecting party may apply to the Court for an order requiring
the release of confidentiality. On any motion to the Court regarding a
claim of confidentiality, the party seeking to assert confidentiality shall
have the burden of proof.
(Id., ¶ 15).
While the protective order provides these procedures for the sharing of
“Confidential” and “Highly Confidential” information, the stipulated order does not
appear to provide any redaction guidelines for use by the parties.

6

Guided by the terms of this protective order, we turn to a consideration of this
instant motion to compel. For the reasons set forth below, this motion will be
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: First, to the extent that Rotex
seeks to have highly confidential customer information of GDW re-designated as
confidential, the motion is DENIED, since the highly confidential designation made
by GDW is proper under the protective order and is fully justified in order to avoid
direct disclosure of customer information to corporate representatives of Rotex.
However, to the extent that Rotex’s motion seeks the release of this customer
information in a highly confidential manner but without redaction, the motion is
GRANTED since the customer information is relevant to Rotex’s calculation of its
potential losses, and the highly confidential designation of this information, which
we have sustained, adequately protects this data from improper disclosure to
representatives of the opposing party who might gain some unfair competitive
commercial advantage through a direct disclosure of this data.
II.

Discussion
A. Guiding Legal Principles

The resolution of this discovery dispute is guided by familiar legal principles.
At the outset, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions to
compel discovery, and provides that:
(a) Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery
7

(1) In General. On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a
party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
The scope of what type of discovery may be compelled under Rule 37 is
defined, in turn, by Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides that:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as
follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at
stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative
access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of
the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense
of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information
within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be
discoverable.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
Acommitted to the sound discretion of the district court.@ DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the
scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the
Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987).
Therefore, a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery will be disturbed
8

only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699
F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). Likewise, discovery sanction decisions rest in the
sound discretion of the court. Grider v. Keystone Health Plan Cent., Inc., 580 F.3d
119, 134 (3d Cir. 2009). This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United
States Magistrate Judges on discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , Acourts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.@ Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling Ais entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.@ Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and
Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
When presented with claims that discovery disclosures may reveal
confidential trade secret information, it is also well-settled that:
[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly recognize that this
type of trade information may be protected from disclosure and
specifically authorize courts to enter orders “requiring that a trade
secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial
9

information not be revealed....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(1)(G). The
paradigm for assessing requests for compelled disclosure of trade secret
information involves a straightforward assessment of the competing
interests of the parties. In this setting:
The courts have developed a balancing test for discovery
of information that one party claims would result in undue
harassment, oppression, or embarrassment. This test
requires the trial judge to weigh the interests of both
parties in deciding whether or not to protect the
information. A three pronged test has developed in regards
to trade secrets. For a protective order to be granted, a
party must show that the information is confidential and
that the disclosure would be harmful. The burden then
shifts to the party seeking disclosure to show that the
information sought is relevant and necessary at this point
in the litigation. Centurion Industries, Inc. v. Warren
Steurer and Associates, 665 F.2d 323 (10th Cir.1981);
Empire of Carolina v. Mackle, 108 F.R.D. 323
(S.D.Fla.1985).
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Phosphate Engineering and
Const. Co., Inc., 153 F.R.D. 686, 688 (M.D. Fla. 1994). See also
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 206 F.R.D.
525, 528 (D. Del. 2002).
RyCon Specialty Foods, Inc. v. Wellshire Farms, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-2092, 2011 WL
1342998, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No.
1:09-CV-2092, 2011 WL 1988016 (M.D. Pa. May 23, 2011). The law also prescribes
the applicable burdens of proof and persuasion for those who seek to prevent the
disclosure of otherwise relevant evidence on commercial confidentiality grounds. In
this regard:
Under Rule 26(c)(7), a protective order may issue to protect trade
secrets or other confidential research, development, or commercial
10

information. Smith v. Bic Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 1989). The
party seeking protection has the burden of showing that it is entitled to
the protection sought. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n.16,
101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981). Establishing that a particular
document is a trade secret requires specific showings, and the party
seeking to shield potentially responsive information from disclosure as
a trade secret faces a high burden. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v.
Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 109-110 (3d Cir. 2010). “Good cause is
established on a showing that disclosure will work a clearly defined and
serious injury to the party seeking [to prevent] disclosure. The injury
must be shown with specificity.” Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733
F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984). “Broad allegations of harm,
unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning” will not
establish good cause. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108,
1121 (3d Cir. 1986).
Jeddo Coal Co. v. Rio Tinto Procurement (Singapore) PTD Ltd., No. 3:16-CV-621,
2018 WL 1635153, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2018).
Further, we may authorize disclosure pursuant to an attorneys’ eyes only
protective order. Such limited disclosure may be particularly appropriate where the
information sought is relevant, but it is alleged that wholesale disclosure to a
competitor might result in unfair harm. As one court has observed:
“In general, courts utilize ‘attorneys' eyes only’ protective orders when
especially sensitive information is at issue or the information is to be
provided to a competitor.” Westbrook v. Charlie Sciara & Son Produce
Co., Inc., No. 07–2657, 2008 WL 839745, at *4 (W.D.Tenn. Mar.27,
2008) (citing cases). See also Arvco Container Corp. v. Weyerhaeuser
Co., No. 1:08–CV–548, 2009 WL 311125, at *5 (W.D.Mich. Feb.9,
2009) (“To be sure, courts in many circumstances have found that a
specific showing of competitive harm justifies a restriction of
confidential or trade secret information to ‘attorney's eyes only.’ ”). The
party moving for the restrictive AEO designation must detail the
alleged harm it is likely to suffer absent the requested protection “with
a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from
11

stereotyped and conclusory statements.” Nemir v. Mitsubishi Motors,
Corp., 381 F.3d 540, 550 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v.
Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n. 16, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693
(1981)). In determining whether good cause exists for an AEO
designation, courts must balance “the difficulties imposed upon
plaintiff against the need to protect information from abuse by
competitors.” Arvco Container, 2009 WL 311125, at *6.
U.S. ex rel. Daugherty v. Bostwick Labs., No. 1:08-CV-354, 2013 WL 3270355, at
*2 (S.D. Ohio June 26, 2013).
Finally, in a case such as this where we are called upon to interpret and apply
a stipulated protective order that reflected the considered mutual judgment of
counsel regarding how best to protect and use sensitive information, we are enjoined
to treat the stipulated protective order as a contract and:
[L]ook to the plain language of the Protective Order to determine its
meaning [since] “Pennsylvania follows the plain meaning rule of
contract interpretation, such that when a written contract is clear and
unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its contents alone.”
Sloan & Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 653 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir.
2011) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “The court must
interpret the contract in a manner that gives reasonable meaning to all
of its provisions and gives effect to all provisions of the contract.”
Grove v. Johnson Controls, Inc., Civil No. 1:12–CV–02622, 2016
WL1271328, at *15 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2016) (slip copy). “Contract
provisions are to be interpreted so as to give each provision meaning,
rather than rendering some provisions superfluous.” Carter v. Exxon
Co. USA, a Div. of Exxon Corp., 177 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 1999).
Scranton Prod., Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 419, 442
(M.D. Pa. 2016). Yet, while we use the plain language of the stipulated protective
order as our initial guidepost in resolving discovery disputes governed by some
12

stipulated order, in specific limited circumstances we may go beyond the terms of
that order, provided the party seeking a deviation from the terms of the protective
order makes an exacting showing of a need to depart from the parties’ prior
agreement. Simply put:
Although courts have discretionary authority to modify a stipulated
protective order, the burden of demonstrating that an agreed protective
order should be modified is on the moving party. Omega Homes, Inc.
v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 656 F.Supp. 393, 403 (W.D. Va. 1987);
Zenith Radio v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F.Supp. 866, 894
(E.D. Pa. 1981) . . .. [I]f a dispute arises as to the confidentiality of
materials bearing such a designation, the party asserting confidentiality
has the burden of proving that the material in question are within the
scope of protection afforded by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Rexene Prod. Co., 158 F.R.D. 43, 46 (D. Del. 1994).
B. This Motion to Compel Will be Granted in Part and Denied in
Part.
Guided by these legal tenets, we turn to the instant motion. As we have noted,
in this motion to compel, Rotex seeks two forms of relief. First, Rotex invites us to
direct GDW to re-designate its customer information as simply “Confidential” rather
than “Highly Confidential.” This re-designation, if ordered by the court, would allow
Rotex officials to gain direct access to the customer lists of its competitor GDW.
We will decline this invitation and deny this aspect of Rotex’s motion.
Treating the stipulated protective order as a contract, Scranton Prod., Inc. v. Bobrick
Washroom Equip., Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 419, 442 (M.D. Pa. 2016), and applying
familiar principles of contract interpretation, we conclude that Rotex is not entitled
13

to this relief under the plain language of the protective order agreed to by these
parties, which clearly states that:
For purposes of this Protective Order, the term “Highly Confidential”
shall mean any and all Confidential Material that qualifies as
“Confidential” and further relates to financial information about the
party, future business plans, pending patent applications, customer
information, competitive information, product formulation details,
trade secret information, or proprietary computer source code.
(Doc. 73, ¶ 4) (emphasis added).
This definition of “Highly Confidential” information by its terms embraces
customer information like that designated highly confidential by GDW. Therefore,
a straightforward interpretation of the order indicates that this information has been
properly designated as “Highly Confidential,” and there is no basis under the
protective order itself for a re-designation of this data. Moreover, Rotex has not
pleaded or proven any exceptional circumstances which would justify a modification
of this protective order to release this otherwise highly confidential information. See
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Rexene Prod. Co., 158 F.R.D. 43, 46 (D. Del. 1994). On
the other hand, GDW persuasively argues that providing these customer lists directly
to representatives of its competitor, Rotex, could result in competitive harm to
GDW, the very evil which a “Highly Confidential” designation is designed to avoid.
See U.S. ex rel. Daugherty v. Bostwick Labs., No. 1:08-CV-354, 2013 WL 3270355,
at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 26, 2013).

14

However, to the extent that Rotex’s motion concedes the “Highly
Confidential” status of this customer information but requests that GDW be required
to release this customer data in an unredacted form, the motion will be granted.
At the outset, we note that the parties’ stipulated protective order does not
appear to prescribe a process for document redaction. Therefore, this aspect of
Rotex’s motion does not appear to be controlled by the plain language of the
protective order. Instead, as to this component of Rotex’s motion to compel, we are
guided by the principles of relevance which control discovery generally. Those
guiding principles tell us that:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that
is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs
of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the
action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant
information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of
discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
In terms of the relevance of this information, Rotex proffers that the identity
of the GDW customers is an important element of proof in Rotex’s claims that GDW
infringed its patent and then used that infringed patent to market equipment to Rotex
customers, since this information would demonstrate which former Rotex customers
later purchased infringing goods from GDW and would reveal the overlap between
the two firm’s potential customer bases in these allegedly infringing goods. For its
15

part, GDW disputes Rotex’s claims and asserts that this proffer of relevance, “while
superficially appealing,” is flawed since other factors may potentially also affect
Rotex’s sales. (Doc. 135, at 17).
At the risk of seeming to be superficial, we find that Rotex’s proffer of
relevance is more than superficially appealing. It is entirely persuasive when judged
against the discovery standards prescribed by Rule 26, which authorize disclosure
of “matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the
needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Additionally, under Rule 401 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence:
Evidence is relevant if:
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it
would be without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.
Fed. R. Evid. 401.
Here, the customer information sought by Rotex is clearly relevant to any
damages calculation since it would provide a basis for determining whether and to
what extent GDW sold allegedly infringing articles to former or current customers
of Rotex. Thus, depending upon an analysis of this information, GDW’s customer
information would have a tendency to make a fact of consequence in this litigation—
Rotex’s proof of lost sales due to GDW’s marketing of allegedly infringing
articles—either more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Further,
16

GDW’s objection to the release of this information based upon its assertion that other
factors may have also affected Rotex’s sales is unavailing. This argument confuses
the concepts of relevant and conclusive evidence. In order to be discoverable, this
information need only be relevant; that is, it only needs to have the tendency to make
a fact more or less likely than it would have been without the evidence. This
information does not have to be conclusive, however. Therefore, the fact that GDW
argues that other factors could also affect Rotex’s sales does not rob this evidence
of potential relevance.
Finally, we note that we have considered the collateral harm which could flow
to GDW as a result of the disclosure of this information in an unredacted form but
note that the highly confidential designation of this information, which we have
sustained, adequately protects this data from disclosure to representatives of Rotex,
who might gain some unfair competitive commercial advantage through a direct
disclosure of this data. Therefore, we conclude that the restrictions that were
carefully crafted by the parties in their stipulated protective order sufficiently
address GDW’s concerns regarding potential misuse of this otherwise relevant data.
Having reached these conclusions, we will deny Rotex’s request to redesignate this data, but grant their request to have this customer information released
as “Highly Confidential” data but in an unredacted form.
An appropriate order follows.
17

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROTEX GLOBAL, LLC

:
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
GERARD DANIEL WORLDWIDE, INC.:
:
Defendant.
:

CIV NO. 1:17-CV-2118
(Chief Judge Conner)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

ORDER

In accordance with the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, IT IS
ORDERED that Rotex’s Motion to Compel, (Doc.107), is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part as follows:
First, to the extent that Rotex seeks to have highly confidential customer
information of GDW re-designated as confidential, the motion is DENIED since the
designation made by GDW is proper under the protective order and is fully justified
in order to avoid direct disclosure of customer information to corporate
representatives of Rotex.
Second, to the extent that Rotex’s motion seeks the release of this customer
information in a highly confidential manner but without redaction the motion is
GRANTED since the customer information is relevant to Rotex’s calculation of its
18

potential losses, and the highly confidential designation of this information, which
we have sustained, adequately protects this data from representatives of the opposing
party, who might gain some unfair competitive commercial advantage through a
direct disclosure of this data.
So ordered this 11th day of October 2019.
/s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

19