Rosa-Diaz v. Harry et al

Filing 133

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 131 MOTION for Recusal filed by Gabriel Rosa-Diaz. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on August 11, 2020. (kjn)

Case 1:17-cv-02215-SHR-MCC Document 133 Filed 08/11/20 Page 1 of 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GABRIEL ROSA-DIAZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
LAUREL HARRY, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 1:17-CV-2215
(Judge Rambo)

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM ORDER
THE BACKGROUND OF THIS CASE IS AS FOLLOWS:
This is a pro se state prisoner civil rights lawsuit. One of the surviving claims
in this case is an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim brought by
Rosa-Diaz who alleges that in March and April of 2017, while he was a state prisoner
housed at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) Camp Hill, he was housed in a cell
where “there were human feces inside the air conditioner and exhaust ventilations
[in his new cell]; . . . the plumbing for the hot water did not work and plaintiff did
not had [sic] access to hot water; . . . the exhaust air ventilation was broken and
inoperative and; . . . the cell smelled of urine and feces.” (Doc. 12-1, ¶ 36.)
With the issues in this litigation framed in this fashion, Rosa-Diaz filed a
motion which seemed to seek a copy of the deposition testimony of an inmate
witness Eric Maple. (Doc. 120). Rosa-Diaz filed this motion on April 24, 2020, but
the motion was first referred to us on August 10, 2020. Upon learning of the motion

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on August 10, we acted in a prompt and favorable fashion, granting the motion in
part the following day, August 11, 2020. Nonetheless, imputing some bias on our
part from the perceived delay in ruling upon this motion, Rosa-Diaz has filed a
motion seeking our recusal. For the reasons set forth below, this motion is DENIED.
The legal standards which govern recusal requests were aptly summarized in
Conklin v. Warrington Township, 476 F.Supp.2d 458 (M.D. Pa. 2007). In terms that
are equally applicable here, the court explained that:
The disqualification standard is set forth in 28 U.S.C. ' 455, which
provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. . . .
Id.
Pursuant to the above quoted language, the court must consider whether
its rulings and statements objectively produce the appearance of bias
against [the plaitniff]. As explained by the Supreme Court, these
provisions “require . . . ‘bias and prejudice’ . . . to be evaluated on an
objective basis, so that what matters is not the reality of bias or
prejudice but its appearance.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
548, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). This objective standard
requires recusal when a “reasonable man knowing all the circumstances
would harbor doubts concerning the judge's impartiality.” Edelstein v.
Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir.1987) (citing United States v.
Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir.1983)); see also In re Antar, 71
F.3d 97, 101 (3d Cir.1995). If the record presents a close question, the
court must resolve the issue in favor of disqualification. Nichols v.
Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 352 (10th Cir.1995).

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Id. at 462-3.
It is clear, however, that a party=s disappointment with what the party
anticipates may be the court’s rulings cannot form the basis for recusal. As we have
observed:
The Third Circuit has repeatedly observed that “a party's displeasure
with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal.”
Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278
(3d Cir.2000) (citing In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 728 (3d Cir.1999)
and Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1356 (3d
Cir.1990)). Subsections 455(a) and (b)(1) require the source of bias to
be extrajudicial, that is stemming from a source outside of the
proceeding, or of such an intensity as to make a fair trial impossible.
Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253 (3d Cir.1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 915, 116 S.Ct. 303, 133 L.Ed.2d 208 (1995). As stated
by the Supreme Court:
[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts
introduced or events occurring in the course of the current
proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a
basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a
deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair
judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the
course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even
hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do
not support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so
if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial
source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high
degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair
judgment impossible. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S.Ct.
1147 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 463.

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Judged against these benchmarks, Rosa-Diaz’s recusal motion fails as a matter
of law. First, the plaintiff errs in imputing some bias on our part from the delay in
ruling upon his motion. That delay was a simple function of a belated notification of
the pending motion. Moreover, once we learned of this pending motion, we acted
with alacrity, granting the motion in part the day after it was referred to us. Thus,
nothing in our handling of this case exhibits the type of extra-judicial bias which is
necessary for recusal. Accordingly, we conclude our legal analysis of this recusal
motion by observing that “a judge ‘has as strong a duty to sit when there is no
legitimate reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the law and facts require.’ ”
Conklin, 476 F. Supp. 2d at 463. Guided by this basic truth, Rosa-Diaz’s recusal
motion must be denied. See Fouad v. Milton Hershey Sch. & Tr., No. 1:19-CV-253,
2020 WL 1467251, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2020).
AND NOW, this 11th day of August 2020, IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff’s
motion to recuse (Doc. 131) is DENIED.

S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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