Rosa-Diaz v. Harry et al

Filing 89

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re: 77 MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by Gabriel Rosa-Diaz. IT IS ORDERED that the pltfs motion to compel, is GRANTED as follows: Within the next 30 days the dfts are ORDERED to produce any videos, reports or ot her complaints which reveal that inmate Eric Maple complained about the condition of the cell formerly occupied by Rosa-Diaz shortly after Rosa-Diaz vacated that cell in the spring and summer of 2017, along with any videos, reports or complaints which describe the condition of this cell in the spring or summer of 2017, that are in their possession, custody or control. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on September 18, 2019. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GABRIEL ROSA-DIAZ,

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Plaintiff,
v.
LAUREL HARRY, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 1:17-CV-2215
(Judge Rambo)

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

Statement of Facts and of the Case

This is a pro se state prisoner civil rights lawsuit. One of the surviving claims
in this case is an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim brought by
Rosa-Diaz who alleges that in March and April of 2017, while he was a state prisoner
housed at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) Camp Hill, he was housed in a cell
where “there were human feces inside the air conditioner and exhaust ventilations
[in his new cell]; . . . the plumbing for the hot water did not work and plaintiff did
not had [sic] access to hot water; . . . the exhaust air ventilation was broken and
inoperative and; . . . the cell smelled of urine and feces.” (Doc. 12-1, ¶ 36.)
With the issues in this litigation framed in this fashion, Rosa-Diaz has filed a
second motion to compel production of certain information from the defendants.
(Doc. 77.) In this motion, Rosa-Diaz follows up on prior requests for production of
videos or documents relating to a June 2017 incident involving another inmate, Eric
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Maple, who allegedly refused at that time to enter the cell formerly occupied by
Rosa-Diaz because of the lingering presence of human waste in the cell.
We previously found on December 4, 2018, that this information relating to
other complaints about the conditions in this cell, made shortly after Rosa-Diaz
vacated the cell, was potentially relevant to the issues raised in this lawsuit.
Accordingly, we entered an order directing the defendants to notify Rosa-Diaz if any
prison records or videos reveal that inmate Eric Maple complained about the
condition of the cell formerly occupied by Rosa-Diaz shortly after Rosa-Diaz
vacated that cell in the spring and summer of 2017. (Doc. 49.) Inmate Maple was
later deposed and apparently corroborated the fact that he refused to enter the cell
vacated by Rosa-Diaz because it was fouled by human waste. Thus, Maple has
provided relevant information that corroborated Rosa-Diaz’s claims regarding the
condition of this cell.
It was against this backdrop that Rosa-Diaz filed in instant motion to compel,
seeking discovery of prison videos or grievances involving inmate Maple which
would further corroborate Maple’s statements concerning his complaints regarding
the condition of this cell in June of 2017. (Doc. 77.) The defendants have responded
to this motion by arguing that Maple’s testimony confirming his complaints
regarding the condition of the cell fulfilled their discovery obligations under our
December 2018 order. While we understand the defendants’ potential confusion in

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this regard, for the reasons set forth below we believe that Rosa-Diaz is entitled to
the additional information he seeks. Therefore, this motion to compel will be
granted.
II.

Discussion

Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery
dispute. At the outset, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
motions to compel discovery, and provides that:
(a) Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery
(1) In General. On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a
party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
The general scope of discovery is defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(1) in the following terms:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that
is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the
needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake
in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access
to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense
of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information
within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to
be discoverable.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Issues relating to the scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 rest in the
sound discretion of the court. Wisniewski v. Johns–Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90
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(3d Cir. 1987). Thus, a court's decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and
whether to compel disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a
showing of an abuse of discretion. Marroquin–Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129,
134 (3d Cir. 1983). See Wertz v. GEA Heat Exchangers Inc., No. 1:14-CV-1991,
2015 WL 8959408, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2015). This broad discretion extends to
discovery rulings by magistrate judges. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and
Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, when
assessing discovery disputes we are enjoined that:
“Discovery need not be perfect, but discovery must be fair.”
Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int'l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 333 (E.D. Pa.
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2012) (Baylson, J.). “The responses sought must comport with the
traditional notions of relevancy and must not impose an undue burden
on the responding party.” Hicks v. Arthur, 159 F.R.D. 468, 470 (E.D.
Pa. 1995). “[T]he scope of [ ] discovery is not without limits.” Kresefky
v. Panasonic Commc'ns & Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J. 1996).
As such, “[d]iscovery should be tailored to the issues involved in the
particular case.” Id.
Fassett v. Sears Holdings Corp., 319 F.R.D. 143, 149 (M.D. Pa. 2017).
Further, in making these judgments:
To determine the scope of discoverable information under Rule
26(b)(1), the Court looks initially to the pleadings.” Trask v. Olin Corp.,
298 F.R.D. 244, 263 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (Fischer, J.). In ascertaining
which materials are discoverable and which are not, a district court
must further distinguish between requests that “appear[ ] reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,” Bell v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 270 F.R.D. 186, 191 (D.N.J. 2010), and
demands that are “overly broad and unduly burdensome.” Miller v.
Hygrade Food Products Corp., 89 F.Supp.2d 643, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
Id.
A party moving to compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving the
relevance of the requested information. Morrison v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 203
F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D.Pa. 2001). Once that initial burden is met, “the party resisting
the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance by demonstrating that
the requested discovery (1) does not come within the broad scope of relevance as
defined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the
potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption
in favor of broad disclosure.” In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 261 F.R.D. 570,
573 (D.Kan. 2009).
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With respect to Rosa-Diaz’s conditions of confinement claim, a pivotal issue
in this litigation is the condition of the cell vacated by the plaintiff in the Spring of
2017. We have already concluded that evidence provided by another inmate, Eric
Maple, who staff attempted to place in that cell in June of 2017, was potentially
relevant to this issue. Moreover, the parties apparently concede that Maple
confirmed that the cell was fouled with human waste and he objected to entering the
cell because of its condition. While this evidence is relevant, Maple’s testimony,
standing alone, does not in our view fully discharge the defendants’ discovery
obligations on this score.
As we noted in December of 2018 when we granted Rosa-Diaz’s prior motion
to compel:
Rosa-Diaz is not seeking the video as much as he is searching for
corroboration that his former cell was fouled with human waste.
Contemporaneous complaints that this cell had been fouled by human
waste would have some relevance to the issues presented in this lawsuit.
Therefore, to the extent that videos or other evidence in the defendants’
possession, custody or control reflects that inmate Maple complained
about the condition of the cell formerly occupied by Rosa-Diaz shortly
after Rosa-Diaz vacated that cell in the spring and summer of 2017 the
defendants will be directed to notify Rosa-Diaz of the existence of those
complaints.
(Doc. 49 at 9.)
Implicit in our December 2018 ruling was our finding that evidence of these
complaints by inmate Maple would be relevant because it would tend to confirm the
condition of the cell at about the time of the events which form the basis for Rosa6

Diaz’s conditions of confinement claim. While our prior admonition that “the
defendants . . . be directed to notify Rosa-Diaz of the existence of those complaints,”
may have been ambiguous, confused the defense, and led the defendants to believe
that Maple’s testimony, standing alone, fully discharged their discovery obligations,
we believe that those discovery obligations are more extensive and call for the
production of evidence confirming and corroborating Maple’s testimony concerning
his complaint regarding the condition of the cell. We reach this conclusion because
we find at a minimum that this evidence may constitute a prior consistent statement
by Maple, further confirming and corroborating his testimony that he made
contemporaneous complaints regarding this condition of this cell shortly after RosaDiaz was removed from the cell. As a prior consistent statement, these reports and
videos would arguably be relevant and admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
Therefore, we now clarify our prior ruling. Finding that this evidence is
potentially relevant and therefore discoverable, IT IS ORDERED that the defendants
produce any videos, reports or other complaints describing the condition of this cell
in their possession, custody or control within the next 30 days.
An appropriate order follows.

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III.

Order

AND NOW this 18th day of September 2019, in accordance with the
accompanying Memorandum Opinion, IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion
to compel, (Doc. 77) is GRANTED as follows: Within the next 30 days the
defendants are ORDERED to produce any videos, reports or other complaints which
reveal that inmate Eric Maple complained about the condition of the cell formerly
occupied by Rosa-Diaz shortly after Rosa-Diaz vacated that cell in the spring and
summer of 2017, along with any videos, reports or complaints which describe the
condition of this cell in the spring or summer of 2017, that are in their possession,
custody or control.

S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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