Remlinger v. Lebanon County et al

Filing 66

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 44 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Van Duzen, Davis, Kyle Fink, Arlene, Trudy, Scott Hocker, Tony Haus, 27 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Warden Robert J. Karnes, Lebanon County, 59 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 44 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Van Duzen, Davis, Kyle Fink, Arlene, Trudy, Scott Hocker, Tony Haus, 27 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Warden Robert J. Karnes. Signed by Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson on 6/11/2020. (ve)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ATHENA REMLINGER,
Plaintiff,
v.
LEBANON COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.

: Civil No. 1:18-CV-00984
:
:
:
: Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
:
:
:
:
: Magistrate Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
MEMORANDUM

This is a prisoner civil rights case arising from the alleged use of restraints
and solitary confinement during the Plaintiff’s pregnancy and delivery. The case is
presently before the court on a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Lebanon
County and Robert J. Karnes (“Karnes”); a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants
Tony Haus (“Haus”), Stephen Davis (“Davis”), Scott Hocker (“Hocker”), Kyle
Fink (“Fink”), Edward Van Duzen (“Van Duzen”), Arlene McHale (“McHale”),
and Trudy Seyfert (“Seyfert”) (collectively referred to as “moving corrections
Defendants”); a report and recommendation issued by United States Magistrate
Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr. addressing the motions; and objections to the report
and recommendation filed by the moving corrections Defendants. For the reasons
that follow, the report and recommendation is adopted in its entirety, the motion to
dismiss filed by Lebanon County and Karnes is denied, and the motion to dismiss
filed by the moving corrections Defendants is granted in part and denied in part.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Athena Remlinger (“Remlinger”) initiated this case by filing a
complaint on May 9, 2018. (Doc. 1.) On March 5, 2019, United States District
Judge Yvette Kane adopted Judge Saporito’s report and recommendation and
dismissed the complaint in part, after which Remlinger filed an amended
complaint. (Docs. 21–22, 24.)
According to the allegations in the amended complaint, Remlinger was
incarcerated in the Lebanon County Correctional Facility (“LCCF”) from April 6,
2017 to January 24, 2018. (Doc. 24 ¶ 19.) Immediately upon her arrival at LCCF,
Remlinger was placed in solitary confinement because she was detoxing from
heroin. (Id. ¶¶ 25–26.) Shortly thereafter, she learned that she was pregnant. (Id.
¶ 23.) Nevertheless, her solitary confinement continued even after staff at the
prison learned that she was pregnant. (Id. ¶ 28.) She was then released from
solitary confinement thirty days after she had arrived at LCCF. (Id. ¶ 30.)
On June 1, 2017, Remlinger was placed in a medical isolation cell, where
she remained confined until approximately July 15, 2017. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 33.) While
in the medical isolation cell, Remlinger was subjected to solitary confinement for a
period of twenty-three hours a day. (Id. ¶ 34.) She submitted multiple requests to
be removed from the medical isolation cell, which were ignored by prison staff.
(Id. ¶ 41.)
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In October 2017, Remlinger learned through her public defender that the
prison planned to induce her labor prior to her due date. (Id. ¶ 56.) Before this,
Remlinger had not been informed that the prison planned to induce her labor, and
she had not consented to such a procedure. (Id. ¶¶ 57–58.)
Remlinger was transported to Hershey Medical Center on October 17, 2017,
so that her labor could be induced. (Id. ¶ 60.) Upon arriving at the hospital, her
left leg was shackled to the guardrail of her hospital bed in accordance with LCCF
policy. (Id. ¶ 62.) Remlinger was removed from these shackles for approximately
an hour and a half after the labor induction drugs were first administered so that
she could sit in a rocking chair. (Id. ¶ 63.) While sitting, she was shackled to the
chair. (Id. ¶ 64.) She was then returned to the bed, where she was again shackled.
(Id. ¶ 65.) Remlinger ended up being shackled for four and a half hours during her
labor. (Id. ¶ 66.)
The shackles were removed when medical staff determined that they were
preventing delivery and causing difficulties in finding the baby’s heartbeat. (Id. ¶
70.) At that point, medical staff had to conduct an emergency caesarean section
due to excessive bleeding. (Id. ¶ 71.) Remlinger’s son was unresponsive at birth
and could not be revived for several minutes. (Id. ¶ 72.) Remlinger was reshackled to her bed after her emergency C-section. (Id. ¶ 74.) She then remained

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shackled to her bed for the five days she spent in the hospital following the
delivery. (Id. ¶ 75.)
Based on those alleged facts, Remlinger raises four counts for relief. In
Count I, she asserts that the decision to induce labor two weeks prior to her due
date constituted deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation of her
right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 88–89.)
Count I is brought against Defendants Lebanon County and Karnes. (Id.) In
Count II, Remlinger asserts that the use of shackles during labor and delivery and
during her postpartum period violated her right to substantive due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 90–92.) This count is brought against
Defendants Lebanon County, Karnes, Davis, Hocker, Van Duzen, Fink, Cheyenne
Gettle (“Gettle”), Amber Schwartz (“Schwartz”), Crystal Herr (“Herr”), and
Michelle Williams (“Williams”). (Id.) In Count III, Remlinger asserts that the use
of solitary confinement during her pregnancy violated her right to substantive due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 93–95.) This count is brought
against Defendants Lebanon County, Karnes, Haus, McHale, and Seyfert. (Id.) In
Count IV, Remlinger asserts that the use of solitary confinement and shackles
constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) under Pennsylvania
law. (Id. ¶¶ 96–98.) This count is brought against all individual defendants. (Id.)

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For relief, Remlinger seeks compensatory and punitive damages and attorney’s
fees. (Id. at 18–19.)
Defendants Lebanon County and Karnes moved to dismiss Counts III and IV
of the amended complaint on May 2, 2019. (Doc. 27.) Defendants Williams, Herr,
Schwartz, and Gettle filed answers to the amended complaint on June 21, 2019.
(Docs. 39–42.) The moving corrections Defendants then moved to dismiss Counts
II, III, and IV of the amended complaint on July 1, 2019, arguing that the claims
should be dismissed on their merits and that they are entitled to qualified
immunity. (Doc. 44.) The case was then reassigned to the undersigned to act as
the presiding judge on November 20, 2019.
Judge Saporito issued a report and recommendation addressing the motions
to dismiss on March 27, 2020. (Doc. 59.) Judge Saporito recommends (1) that all
official capacity claims against the individual defendants be dismissed as
duplicative of the claims against Lebanon County, id. at 15–16; (2) that
Remlinger’s claim for punitive damages against Lebanon County be dismissed
with prejudice since it was previously dismissed by Judge Kane, id. at 16–17; (3)
that the motions to dismiss be denied as to Remlinger’s shackling claim in Count
II, id. at 17–26; (4) that the moving corrections Defendants’ motion to dismiss
Count II on qualified immunity grounds be denied, id. at 26–27; (5) that Count III
be dismissed as to the individual defendants on the basis of qualified immunity
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because the right of pregnant inmates to be free from solitary confinement was not
clearly established at the time of Remlinger’s solitary confinement, id. at 27–34;
(6) that the motion to dismiss Remlinger’s IIED claim be granted insofar as the
claim is based on her being shackled prior to labor and delivery and being placed
in solitary confinement, id. at 34–38; and (7) that the IIED claim be allowed to
proceed to the extent that it is based on the use of shackles during Remlinger’s
labor, delivery, and post-partum recovery, id. at 36–38.
The moving corrections Defendants objected to the report and
recommendation on April 10, 2020. (Doc. 60.) The moving corrections
Defendants argue that the report and recommendation errs by finding that
Defendants Haus, Davis, Hocker, Fink, and Van Duzen are not entitled to qualified
immunity as to Remlinger’s shackling claim, that the report and recommendation
errs by finding that those defendants are not entitled to state law immunity as to
Remlinger’s IIED claim, and that the report and recommendation errs by not
dismissing the IIED claim for failure to state a claim. (Docs. 60–61.) The moving
corrections defendants additionally argue that Defendants Seyfert and McHale
should be dismissed from the case because the report and recommendation
recommends dismissing all claims against them. (Doc. 61 at 26–27.)
Remlinger filed a response to the moving corrections Defendants’ objections
on April 24, 2020, and the moving corrections Defendants then filed a reply brief
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on May 22, 2020, after the court had extended the time to reply. (Docs. 62, 65.)
Because briefing on the objections has now concluded, the report and
recommendation is ripe for the court’s review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the
district court is required to conduct a de novo review of the contested portions of
the report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3);
Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1106 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989). The district court may
accept, reject, or modify the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in
whole or in part. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court may also receive
further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with further
instructions. Id. “Although the standard is de novo, the extent of review is
committed to the sound discretion of the district judge, and the court may rely on
the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper.”
Weidman v. Colvin, 164 F. Supp. 3d 650, 653 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (citing Rieder v.
Apfel, 115 F. Supp. 2d 496, 499 (M.D. Pa. 2000)).
De novo review is not required for portions of a report and recommendation
to which no objections have been raised. Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc.,
702 F. Supp. 2d 465, 469 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140,
149 (1985)). Instead, the court is only required to “satisfy itself that there is no
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clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Id.
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition).
MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Conclusory allegations of liability are insufficient” to
survive a motion to dismiss. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir.
2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79). To determine whether a complaint
survives a motion to dismiss, a court identifies “the elements a plaintiff must plead
to state a claim for relief,” disregards the allegations “that are no more than
conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and determines
whether the remaining factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012).
DISCUSSION
At the outset, the court will address the recommendations that all official
capacity claims against the individual defendants be dismissed as duplicative of the
claims against Lebanon County, that Remlinger’s claim for punitive damages
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against Lebanon County be dismissed with prejudice, that Count III be dismissed
as to the individual defendants on the basis of qualified immunity, and that
Remlinger’s IIED claim be granted to the extent it is based on the use of solitary
confinement and the use of shackles prior to labor and delivery. Because no party
has objected to these recommendations, the court reviews them only for clear error.
Univac Dental, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 469. Finding none, the court will adopt those
portions of the report and recommendation. The court therefore turns its attention
to the moving corrections Defendants’ objections. (See Docs. 60–61.)
The moving corrections Defendants first argue that the report and
recommendation errs by finding that they are not entitled to qualified immunity as
to Remlinger’s shackling claim. (Doc. 61 at 9–19.) In the relevant portion of the
report and recommendation, Judge Saporito concludes that Defendants are not
entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of litigation because the factual record
must be developed to determine whether qualified immunity applies. (Doc. 59 at
26.) The moving corrections Defendants argue that this conclusion is erroneous
because Supreme Court precedent suggests that issues of qualified immunity
should be resolved at the earliest possible time. (Doc. 61 at 17.) Defendants also
argue that no development of the record is necessary and that they are entitled to
qualified immunity because the right of a pregnant inmate to be free from shackles
during labor, delivery, and post-partum recovery was not clearly established at the
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time of this case. (Id. at 9–17.) Defendants note that no binding precedent from
the Supreme Court or the Third Circuit has found such a right. (Id. at 12.)
The court will overrule this objection. Although Defendants are correct that
issues of qualified immunity should be resolved “at the earliest possible stage in
litigation,” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 376 n.2 (2007) (quoting Hunter v.
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)), this does not mean that qualified immunity
must be resolved before the relevant facts have been developed. See Toriskey v.
Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438, 448 (3d Cir. 2006) (denying qualified immunity defense
at motion to dismiss stage where relevant questions of fact were unresolved). As
the report and recommendation notes, “it is generally unwise to venture into a
qualified immunity analysis at the pleading stage as it is necessary to develop the
factual record in the vast majority of cases.” (Doc. 59 at 26 (quoting Newland v.
Reehorst, 328 F. App’x 788, 791 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009))). Here, the court agrees with
the magistrate judge’s conclusion that additional factual development is necessary
with regard to Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity.
The moving corrections Defendants’ argument that the right at issue was not
clearly established also fails. Although Defendants argue that there is no binding
precedent from the Supreme Court or the Third Circuit establishing the right, this
does not automatically entitle them to qualified immunity. Where the existence of
a right is “obvious,” it may be “deemed clearly established even without materially
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similar cases.” Kane v. Barger, 902 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). In the report and recommendation, Judge
Saporito concludes that the present case might present a situation where the right at
issue is so obvious as to permit a finding that it is clearly established. (Doc. 59 at
26–27 (citing E.D. v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 308 (3d Cir. 2019))). The court finds
no error in this conclusion and will accordingly overrule the Defendants’ objection.
The moving corrections Defendants next argue that the report and
recommendation errs by finding that they are not entitled to immunity from
Remlinger’s IIED claim under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8545. (Doc. 61 at 19–23.) Section
8545 provides that employees of a local government agency are entitled to
immunity from state law suits to the same extent that the agency would be. 42
Pa.C.S. § 8545. Immunity under § 8545 does not extend to government employees
who commit intentional torts. Dull v. West Manchester Twp. Police Dep’t, 604 F.
Supp. 2d 739, 754 n.11 (M.D. Pa. 2009); Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, 87
A.3d 1014, 1023 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014). Here, the report and recommendation
correctly concludes that immunity under § 8545 is inapplicable because
Defendants allegedly committed an intentional tort. (See Doc. 59 at 34–35.)
Accordingly, the court will overrule the moving corrections Defendants’ objection.
The moving corrections Defendants’ third objection is that the report and
recommendation errs by not dismissing Remlinger’s IIED claim for failure to state
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a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 61 at 23–26.) To state an IIED
claim upon which relief may be granted under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must
allege (1) that the defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) that
the defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress; and (3) that
“the defendant acted intending to cause such distress or with knowledge that same
was ‘substantially certain’ to occur.” Dobson v. Milton Hershey Sch., 356 F. Supp.
3d 428, 439 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205,
217–18 (3d Cir. 2001)).
In this case,1 the report and recommendation concludes that Remlinger has
stated an IIED claim upon which relief may be granted because (1) the alleged use
of shackles during labor and delivery is sufficient to allege extreme and outrageous
conduct, (2) Remlinger allegedly suffered severe emotional distress as a result, and
(3) the Defendants were, at the very least, aware that Remlinger was likely to
suffer such severe emotional distress. (Doc. 59 at 37.) Upon conducting a de novo
review, this court agrees with the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Remlinger
states an IIED claim upon which relief may be granted. The moving Defendants’
objection will accordingly be overruled.

1

As noted above, the court will adopt Judge Saporito’s recommendation and dismiss the IIED
claim to the extent that it is based on the use of solitary confinement and to the extent that it is
based on the use of restraints prior to Remlinger’s labor and delivery. Accordingly, this
discussion is limited to the IIED claim arising from the use of restraints during Remlinger’s
labor, delivery, and post-partum recovery.
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Finally, the moving corrections defendants argue that Defendants McHale
and Seyfert should be dismissed from this case because the report and
recommendation recommends dismissing all claims against them. (Doc. 61 at 27.)
Defendants are correct. The only allegations in the amended complaint against
Defendants McHale and Seyfert 2 pertain to their involvement in Remlinger’s
solitary confinement. (See Doc. 24 ¶¶ 41, 44.) As noted above, all claims
pertaining to the use of solitary confinement will be dismissed. Accordingly,
Defendants McHale and Seyfert will be dismissed from this action.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the moving corrections Defendants’ objections
are overruled, the report and recommendation is adopted in its entirety, the motion
to dismiss filed by Lebanon County and Karnes is denied, and the motion to
dismiss filed by the moving corrections Defendants is granted in part and denied in
part. An appropriate order follows.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Court Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: June 11, 2020

2

Defendants McHale and Seyfert are identified in the amended complaint only by their first
names. (See Doc. 24 ¶¶ 16–17.)
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