Elam, rashaan, mechelle v. Shapiro et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM re Miscellaneous Case 1 Filed filed by Elam, rashaan, mechelle (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 9/6/18. (ma)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ELAM, RASHAAN, MECHELLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOSH SHAPIRO, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 1: 18-mc-0501
Judge Sylvia H. Rambo
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the court is the Honorable Jessica Brubaker, the Honorable
Edward Guido, the Honorable Christylee Peck, and the Honorable Thomas
Placey’s (“Judicial Defendants”) motion to dismiss (Doc. 11) a document filed by
Plaintiff Elam Rashaan Mechelle (“Plaintiff”), which the court will construe as a
complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief (“Complaint”). The Complaint
apparently implores this court to declare all Pennsylvania statutes unconstitutional,
with a particular emphasis on certain statutes that require Plaintiff to register her
name and other identifying information with the Commonwealth. (Doc. 1, p. 6.)
For the reasons that follow, the court will dismiss the Complaint.
I.
Background
Initially, the court notes that this matter was docketed as a “Miscellaneous
Case.” It is unclear whether Plaintiff chose this designation in an effort to avoid
paying the full amount of the filing fee for filing a complaint or if this was merely
a clerical error. Regardless, the only thing that is clear from Plaintiff’s filing is that
it was an attempt to initiate a civil proceeding in this court. The court will direct
the clerk of court to properly assign this case a civil docket number and will
require Plaintiff to pay the balance of the initial filing fee of $350 as well as any
other applicable fees if she chooses to pursue her claim. 1 Alternatively, Plaintiff
may seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915; Local Rule 4.3.
Other than the fact that Plaintiff is seeking declaratory and injunctive relief,
it is difficult to glean much else from the voluminous pages of her various filings.
(Docs. 1-10.) Plaintiff has submitted myriad puzzling documents such as “Notice
of Affidavit of Facts to Right to Travel,” “Formal Notice Requesting Article III
Judge/Circuit Rider be Assigned to Case,” and “Notice and Demand for
Clarification of the Filing Record.” (Docs. 2, 5, 9.) Plaintiff makes references to
the Hague Convention, the Uniform Commercial Code, and the Magna Carta
throughout the filings. As best this court can tell, Plaintiff is arguing that the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution invalidates any and all laws enacted by the
Pennsylvania legislature. (Doc. 1, p. 6.) Plaintiff also appears to argue that the
right to Freedom of Religion enshrined in the First Amendment precludes
enforcement of any laws “that violate [her] religious beliefs,” which apparently
include any law requiring her to register identifying information with the
1
See http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/district-court-miscellaneous-fees.
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Commonwealth or obtain a driver’s license in order to lawfully operate a motor
vehicle. (Id.) The impetus for Plaintiff’s request appears to stem from a criminal
action in the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas in which Plaintiff was
charged with possessing a “Firearm Not to be Carried Without a License,”
“Obstructing the Administration of Law,” “Disorderly Conduct,” and other
summary traffic offenses.
(Doc. 3.)
This case appears to be ongoing.
See
Commonwealth v. Elam, No. 21-cr-1262-2018 (Cumberland Cnty. Ct. Com. Pls.
Filed May 7, 2018).
II.
Discussion
To the extent Plaintiff’s Complaint is comprehensible, it is patently frivolous
and without merit. However, insofar as the Complaint makes factual allegations,
the court takes those allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in
Plaintiff’s favor. See Wisniewski v. Johns–Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271 (3d
Cir.1985). Setting aside Plaintiff’s drastic misapprehension of the Supremacy
Clause and the First Amendment, Plaintiff essentially requests that this court
intervene in an ongoing state criminal prosecution. The Judicial Defendants argue,
inter alia, that principles of comity require this court to decline to intercede in
Plaintiff’s criminal case.
The Supreme Court has long held that a district court should refrain from
exercising jurisdiction when a petitioner invokes federal jurisdiction in an effort to
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restrain state criminal proceedings. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). “The
doctrine of Younger abstention ‘reflects a strong federal policy against federalcourt interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary
circumstances.’” Wattie-Bey v. Attorney Gen.'s Office, 424 F. App'x 95, 96 (3d
Cir. 2011) (quoting Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Twp., 970 F.2d
1195, 1200 (3d Cir. 1992)). Younger abstention is proper when: “(1) there are
ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings
implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate
opportunity to raise the federal claims.” Gwynedd Properties v. Lower Gwynedd
Twp., 970 F.2d at 1199.2 In the instant case, each prong of the Younger test has
clearly been met.
Plaintiff has expressly stated and provided docket sheets for her pending
criminal charges in Cumberland County. (See Doc. 3.) 3 Thus, the first prong is
met. It is clear that Pennsylvania has an important interest in construing and
enforcing its own laws and preventing criminal activity within its borders. Bey v.
2
If the three-prong test is met, a court may still conclude that Younger abstention is
inappropriate if “(1) the state proceedings are being undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of
harassment or (2) some other extraordinary circumstances exist. . .” Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d
101, 106 (3d Cir.1989). No extraordinary circumstances exist in this case, and Plaintiff has
made no allegations or demonstration that the state court proceedings were brought in bad faith
or for purposes of harassment.
3
The court notes that, even if Plaintiff did not file the docket sheets of her criminal proceedings,
the court is empowered to take judicial notice of state court docket sheets. Haynes v. Kerestes,
No. 14-cv-5623, 2017 WL 2729185, *1 n.2 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 2017).
4
Pa., No. 10-cv-2290, 2011 WL 332497, *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2011), report and
recommendation adopted, 10-cv-2290, 2011 WL 318089 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2011).
Thus, the second prong is met. Finally, the Supreme Court has held that state
courts present an adequate forum for adjudicating constitutional challenges to state
laws. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977) (stating that Younger requires
only “an opportunity to present federal claims in a state proceeding”); Pennzoil Co.
v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1987) (holding that the “burden [] rests on the
federal plaintiff to show that state procedural law barred presentation of its
claims.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)).4
Thus, all prongs of the
Younger abstention doctrine are met in this case, and this court must decline to
exercise jurisdiction where doing so would directly interfere with ongoing state
law criminal proceedings.
Although the instant motion to dismiss was filed only by the Judicial
Defendants, “[a] court may sua sponte dismiss claims against nonmoving
defendants ‘where nonmoving defendants are in a position similar to that of a
4
The Judicial Defendants additionally raise defenses specific to members of the judiciary. Were
this court not dismissing the Complaint pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine, the court
would dismiss the claims against the Judicial Defendants pursuant to the doctrine of absolute
judicial immunity. Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006). Moreover, judges are
not proper defendants to constitutional challenges to state laws as they are neutral adjudicators
and have no authority to amend or create state laws. Brandon E. ex. rel. Listenbee v Reynolds,
201 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2000); Douris v. Schweiker, 229 F.Supp. 2d 291, 410 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
Accordingly, the court finds that the Complaint is legally insufficient to state a claim against the
Judicial Defendants and that any amendment would be futile. See United States v. Union Corp.,
194 F.R.D. 223, 237 (E.D. Pa. 2000). Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed with
prejudice as to the judicial defendants.
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moving defendants [sic] or where the claims against all defendants are integrally
related.’” Futterknecht v. Thurber, No. 14-cv-7395, 2015 WL 4603010, *3 n.1
(D.N.J. July 30, 2015) (quoting Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 162 (7th
Cir.1993)). Moreover, “[i]t is well settled that a district court has the inherent
power to dismiss a complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim as to nonmoving defendants when those claims are frivolous.” Brown v. City of Phila., No.
04-cv-5163, 2005 WL 1971875, *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2005) (citing Fitzgerald v.
First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 264 n.2 (2d Cir. 2000) (“We
conclude that the District Court properly determined that it possessed the power to
dismiss the instant action sua sponte, notwithstanding the fact that [Plaintiff] had
paid the [] filing fee rather than requesting permission to proceed in forma
pauperis. If [Plaintiff] had sought to proceed in forma pauperis, dismissal would
have been mandatory under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).”); see also Mallard v. U.S.
Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 307-308 (1989) (“Section 1915 . . . authorizes courts to
dismiss a frivolous or malicious action, but there is little doubt they would have
power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision.”); McKinney v.
Oklahoma, 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir.1991) (holding that court may dismiss
complaint sua sponte “when it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not
prevail on the facts alleged”); Jefferies v. Velasquez, No. 88-cv-1384, 1988 WL
16959 at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 1988).
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The court’s analysis under the Younger abstention doctrine would be
identical with respect to remaining defendants. Accordingly, the court exercises its
inherent power to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety with respect to all
defendants. 5
III.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the court finds that application of the Younger
abstention doctrine is proper in this matter. Accordingly, the court will grant
Judicial Defendants’ motion to dismiss and will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in its
entirety. An appropriate order will follow.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
SYLVIA H. RAMBO
United States District Judge
Dated: September 6, 2018
5
Because Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution is ongoing, any constitutional claims raised by
Plaintiff have not been fully adjudicated by the state courts. The Third Circuit has held that
where state courts have not considered the same constitutional claims raised by a plaintiff in her
federal case, dismissal pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine must be without prejudice.
Eldakroury v. Attorney Gen. of N. J., 601 Fed. Appx. 156, 158 (3d Cir. 2014) (distinguishing Lui
v. Comm’n on Adult Entm’t Establishments, 369 F.3d 319, 327 (3d Cir.2004)).
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