Machicote v. Smith et al

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry 18 ) re 13 MOTION to Dismiss - SEE MEMORANDUM FOR COMPLETE DETAILS. Signed by Honorable Yvette Kane on 7/16/21. (dmn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTHONY LEE MACHICOTE,
Plaintiff
v.
BARRY SMITH, et al.,
Defendants

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No. 1:20-cv-1315
(Judge Kane)

MEMORANDUM
On July 30, 2020, pro se Plaintiff Anthony Lee Machicote (“Plaintiff”), who is presently
confined at the State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale in Houtzdale, Pennsylvania (“SCI
Houtzdale”), initiated the above-captioned case by filing a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 asserting an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim regarding an incident where nonparty Inmate Barry Lewis punched him. (Doc. No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff names as Defendants
Superintendent Barry Smith, Deputy Superintendent Bobby Jo Salamon, Deputy Superintendent
David Close, and Mental Health Supervisor Dr. Walmer. (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff states that he has
named these defendants because they have a duty to protect prisoners under their care and to
enact appropriate safeguards to prevent inmate assaults. (Id. at 4.)
After Plaintiff filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court
granted the motion and issued an order directing service of the complaint on defendants dated
August 17, 2020. (Doc. No. 9.) Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on October
16, 2020. (Doc. No. 13.) Plaintiff filed an opposition and supplemental reply to the motion on
November 2 and 3, 2020. (Doc. Nos. 15, 16.) Defendants have not filed a reply, and the time
for doing so has since passed. The motion to dismiss is thus ripe for disposition. For the
following reasons, the Court will grant the motion and dismiss the complaint without prejudice,
with leave to amend granted.

I.

BACKGROUND
In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on September 28, 2019, he was in dining hall

number 2 at SCI Houtzdale eating breakfast when Inmate Barry Lewis approached his table and
asked if anyone wanted his coffee pack, to which everyone responded, “No.” Inmate Lewis said,
“alright . . . cool” and then punched Plaintiff in the eye. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff was knocked
back and had to be escorted to medical by a corrections officer. (Id.). He alleges that Inmate
Mills was a witness to the incident. (Id.) Plaintiff sustained a black eye, which was swollen
shut. (Id.) He states that there are photographs to document his injury as well as a video
recording of the incident. (Id.)
Relevant to the defendants included in the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that:
Every defendant mentioned are responsible for this incident because the[y]
allowed this inmates [sic] to live in housing units that do not correspond to
this individual[’s] needs, and place all other inmates in harm way. They
knew of his assault tendencies and they should’ve never allow[ed] this
inmate to live near me or to even interact with me. The “risk factor” was
evidence and the records wills how the other inmates this inmate Lewis
has assaulted. The deliberate indifference is proven by their knowledge of
his prior assaults and that the[y] ignored their own policies and placement
of mental illness patient[s] to their own blocks and they knowingly place
Barry Lewis on my pod unit putting me at risk and any other inmate living
in JA.
(Id. at 5.)
Defendants argue in their motion that Plaintiff has failed to allege their personal
involvement sufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983. (Doc. No. 14 at 1.) In Plaintiff’s
opposition, he provides significantly more information regarding the involvement of defendants,
which is not included in the complaint. (Doc. No. 15.)
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide the defendant notice of

the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
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232 (3d Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must present facts that, accepted as true, demonstrate a
plausible right to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) requires “only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief,” a complaint may nevertheless be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for its “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts as true all
factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them,
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679
(2009); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). To prevent
dismissal, all civil complaints must set out “sufficient factual matter” to show that their claims
are facially plausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009). The plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility that the
defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct: “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has
not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Accordingly, the Third Circuit has identified the following steps that a district court must
take when reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion: (1) identify the elements that a plaintiff must plead to
state a claim; (2) identify any conclusory allegations contained in the complaint that are “not
entitled” to the assumption of truth; and (3) determine whether any “well-pleaded factual
allegations” contained in the complaint “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” See
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citations and quotation

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marks omitted). The Third Circuit has specified that in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached
to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the
complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” See Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223,
230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d
1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
In the context of pro se prisoner litigation, the court must be mindful that a document
filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A
pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can be dismissed for failure to state a claim only if it
appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that
would entitle him to relief. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has brought his constitutional claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which

provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
“To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [a plaintiff] must demonstrate a violation of a
right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States [and] that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Moore v. Tartler, 986
F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993).

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“A defendant in a civil rights action ‘must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs to be liable,’ and ‘cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or
she neither participated in nor approved.’” See Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d
Cir. 2007); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Further, supervisory liability cannot be imposed under § 1983 by
respondeat superior. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009); Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991
F.2d 64, 69 n.14 (3d Cir. 1993). “Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her
title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. A
plaintiff must show that an official’s conduct caused the deprivation of a federally protected
right. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 3
(3d Cir. 1970) (A plaintiff “must portray specific conduct by state officials which violates some
constitutional right.”). Notably, a supervisory official has no affirmative constitutional duty to
supervise or discipline subordinates so as to prevent the violation of constitutional rights. See
Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff’s complaint is defective because he has failed to show how each defendant was
personally involved in the allegations supporting his failure to protect claim. Plaintiff discusses
the defendants collectively and fails to identify the actions that each took personally and how
that defendant was involved in failing to protect Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s brief in opposition contains
much more information regarding the involvement the defendant; however, the Court can only
consider the allegations included in the complaint.
Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal . . . should receive leave to
amend unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.” See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,
293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). Because it is possible that Plaintiff can remedy his pleading

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deficiencies in an amended complaint, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended
complaint. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff should be careful to detail each defendants’
personal involvement in his failure to protect claim.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted (Doc. No. 13),

the complaint (Doc. No. 1) will be dismissed without prejudice, and leave to amend will be
granted. An appropriate Order follows.

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