Huggler v. Saul

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 1 Complaint filed by Linda Huggler. Signed by Magistrate Judge Susan E. Schwab on July 29, 2022. (kjn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LINDA MAE HUGGLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
KILOLO KIJIKAZI,1
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

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CIVIL NO: 1:20-CV-02322
(Magistrate Judge Schwab)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

Introduction.
This is a social security action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff

Linda Mae Huggler (“Huggler”) seeks judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her claim for a period
of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security
Act. We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). For the

1

Kilolo Kijakazi is now the Commissioner of Social Security, and she is
automatically substituted as the defendant in this action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)
(providing that when a public officer sued in his or her official capacity ceases to
hold office while the action is pending, “[t]he officer’s successor is automatically
substituted as a party”); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action instituted in accordance
with this subsection shall survive notwithstanding any change in the person
occupying the office of Commissioner of Social Security or any vacancy in such
office.”).

reasons set forth below, we will vacate the Commissioner’s decision and remand
the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II.

Background and Procedural History.
We refer to the administrative transcript provided by the Commissioner. See

docs. 15-1 to 15-12.2 On March 16, 2018, Huggler filed an application for Social
Security disability benefits, alleging disability beginning October 20, 2012. Admin
Tr. at 12. Huggler’s claim was initially denied on August 23, 2018. Id. Huggler
filed a written request for a hearing on September 26, 2018. Id. The
Administrative Law Judge Stanley Chin (“ALJ”) dismissed the request for a
hearing in part for the time period from October 20, 2012 to July 23, 2015, and
found that adjudication for the claimant’s disability began on July 24, 2015. Id.
The hearing covering that timeframe was held on November 12, 2019; the same
ALJ presided over the hearing from Baltimore, Maryland, while Huggler appeared
via video from Endicott, New York. Id.

2

Because the facts of this case are well known to the parties, we do not
repeat them here in detail. Instead, we recite only those facts that bear on
Huggler’s claims.
2

On December 31, 2019, the ALJ determined that Huggler had not been
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act from the alleged onset date
of October 20, 2012, through September 30, 2019, the date last insured. Id. at 23.
Benefits were denied accordingly. Id. Huggler appealed the ALJ’s decision to the
Appeals Council, which denied her request for review on October 13, 2020. Id. at
1. This makes the ALJ’s December 31, 2019 decision the final decision of the
Commissioner, and subject to judicial review by this court.
Huggler initiated this action on December 11, 2020, by filing a complaint
claiming that “the conclusions and findings of fact of the defendant are not
supported by substantial evidence and are contrary to law and regulation.” Doc. 1.
at ¶ 7. Huggler requests that the court find her entitled to disability benefits under
the Social Security Act, remand the case for a further hearing, award attorneys’
fees on the grounds that the Commissioner’s actions in this case were not
substantially justified, or order such other and further relief the Court deems just
and proper. Doc. 1 at ¶ 13(a)–(c). The Commissioner filed an answer and a
certified transcript of the administrative proceedings that occurred before the
Social Security Administration. Docs. 15, 16. The parties consented to proceed
before a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and the case was referred
to the undersigned. Doc. 12. The parties have filed briefs, and this matter is ripe
for decision. See docs. 15, 17, 18, 19.
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III.

Legal Standards.
A. Substantial Evidence Review—The Role of This Court.
When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s

application for benefits, “the court has plenary review of all legal issues decided by
the Commissioner.” Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012).
But the court’s review of the Commissioner’s factual findings is limited to whether
substantial evidence supports those findings. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v.
Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2019). “[T]he threshold for such evidentiary
sufficiency is not high.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154. Substantial evidence
“means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of
New York v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
Substantial evidence “is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more
than a mere scintilla.” Jesurum v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995). A single piece of evidence is not substantial
evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict
created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993).
But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be
“something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s] finding
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from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n,
383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In determining if the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.”
Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
The question before this court, therefore, is not whether Huggler is disabled,
but whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s and Commissioner’s findings
that she is not disabled and whether the Commissioner correctly applied the
relevant law.

B. Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the ALJ.
To receive benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, a claimant
generally must be “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §
416.905(a). To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or
mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any
other substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a).

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The ALJ follows a five-step sequential-evaluation process to determine
whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Under this process, the ALJ
must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial
gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the
claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether the
claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is
able to do any other work, considering his or her age, education, work experience,
and residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)–(v).
The ALJ must also assess a claimant’s RFC at step four. Hess v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 198 n.2 (3d Cir. 2019). The RFC is ‘“that which an
individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her
impairment(s).’” Burnett v Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 359 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also 20
C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all the
claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including any non-severe
impairment identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her analysis. 20 C.F.R. §
416.945(a)(2).
“The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four” of the
sequential-evaluation process. Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 634 (3d
Cir. 2010). But at step five, “the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner,
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who must . . . show there are other jobs existing in significant numbers in the
national economy which the claimant can perform, consistent with her medical
impairments, age, education, past work experience, and residual functional
capacity.” Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 39 (3d Cir. 2001).
The ALJ’s disability determination must also meet certain basic substantive
requisites. Most significantly, the ALJ must provide “a clear and satisfactory
explication of the basis on which” his or her decision rests. Cotter v. Harris, 642
F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). “The ALJ must indicate in his decision which
evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for his finding.”
Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999). The
“ALJ may not reject pertinent or probative evidence without explanation.” Johnson
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 204 (3d Cir. 2008). Otherwise, ‘“the
reviewing court cannot tell if significant probative evidence was not credited or
simply ignored.’” Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121 (quoting Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705).

IV.

The ALJ’s Decision Denying Huggler’s Claim.
On December 31, 2019, the ALJ determined that Huggler was not disabled

under §§ 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act through her last date insured
and denied her claim for benefits. Admin Tr. at 23. Before beginning the five-step

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analysis, the ALJ found that Huggler last met the insured status requirements of the
Social Security Act on September 30, 2019. Id. at 14–15. At step one of the
sequential-evaluation process, the ALJ found that Huggler had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity while insured. Id. at 15. After the dismissal of
Huggler’s proposed onset date of October 12, 2012, the ALJ’s adjudication
covered from July 24, 2015, the new alleged onset date, through September 30,
2019. Id. At step two of the sequential-evaluation process, the ALJ found that
Huggler had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease,
scoliosis, gastroesophageal reflux disease (“GERD”), peptic ulcer, hypertension,
obesity, and anxiety. Id. at 15–16. At step three of the sequential-evaluation
process, the ALJ found that Huggler did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. at 16.
The ALJ then determined that Huggler had the RFC to perform the full
range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b).3 Id. at 18. The ALJ

“Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with
frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the
weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good
deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some
pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of
performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do
substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine
that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting
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further found that Huggler could stand, sit, and walk for six hours out of the eighthour workday. Id. The ALJ found Huggler could “occasionally climb ladders,
ropes, scaffolds, ramps, and stairs,” and could “occasionally stoop and crawl.” Id.
Huggler could also “frequently balance, kneel, and crouch.” Id. The ALJ found
that Huggler was “limited to frequent exposure to extreme cold and heat,” and she
was limited to “frequent use of moving machinery and frequent exposure to
unprotected heights.” Id. Finally, she was limited to “occasional interaction with
the public, coworkers, and supervisors.” Id. In making this RFC assessment, the
ALJ considered all of Huggler’s symptoms that reasonably could be accepted as
consistent with the evidence of record and medical opinions. Id.
Next, the ALJ determined that Huggler was not capable of performing past
relevant work as “a waitress, . . . a cashier 2, . . . a home attendant,” and an “order
clerk.” Id. at 21. The ALJ found that these positions required the performance of
work-related activities precluded by Huggler’s RFC. Id. In making this
determination, the ALJ relied on the testimony of the vocational expert and the
other evidence of record. See id. at 21–22. Further, the ALJ concluded that
Huggler was a “younger individual age 45–49, on the last date insured,” but
“subsequently changed age category to closely approaching advanced age.” Id. at

factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.” 20
C.F.R. 404.1567(b).
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22. The ALJ found that Huggler had “at least a high school education” and was
“able to communicate in English.” Id. Transferability of job skills was not material
to the ALJ’s determination of whether or not Huggler was disabled because “using
the Medical-Vocational rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is
‘not disabled,’ whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills.” Id.
Finally, the ALJ determined that after considering “the claimant’s age,
education, work experience, and residual functional capacity,” there were jobs that
existed in significant numbers in the national economy she was capable of
performing. Id. at 745–46. The vocational expert testified that a hypothetical
individual with Huggler’s age, education, work experience, and RFC would have
been capable of performing the requirements of representative occupations such as:
1. Marker (DOT 209.587-034), which is light, unskilled
work with a Specific Vocational Preparation (SVP) of 2, of
which there are about 339,000 jobs nationally that she could
perform;
2. Checker I (DOT 222.687-010), which is light,
unskilled work with a SVP of 2, of which there are about
31,000 jobs nationally that she could perform; and
3. Router (DOT 222.587-038), which is light, unskilled
work with a SVP of 2, of which there are about 3,000 jobs
nationally that she could perform.
Id. at 22–23. The ALJ found that the expert’s testimony was “consistent with the
information contained in the Directory of Occupational Titles.” Id. In sum, the

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ALJ concluded that Huggler was not disabled at any time from October 20, 2012,
through the last date insured. Id. Thus, the ALJ denied benefits. Id.

V.

Discussion.
In her complaint, Huggler asserts that “the conclusions and findings of fact

of the defendant are not supported by substantial evidence and are contrary to law
and regulation.” See doc. 1 at 1. In her plaintiff’s brief, Huggler elaborates on her
complaint, arguing that the ALJ “failed to consider the medical opinion of
plaintiff’s treating provider, Physician’s Assistant Debra Carr.” See doc. 17 at 6.
Because Huggler’s claims concern the ALJ’s handling of opinion evidence,
we start with a brief overview of the regulations regarding opinion evidence. The
regulations in this regard are different for claims filed before March 27, 2017, on
the one hand, and for claims, like Huggler’s, filed on or after March 27, 2017, on
the other hand. Specifically, the regulations applicable to claims filed on or after
March 27, 2017, (“the new regulations”) changed the way the Commissioner
considers medical opinion evidence and eliminated the provision in the regulations
applicable to claims filed before March 27, 2017, (“the old regulations”) that
granted special deference to opinions of treating physicians. Here, Huggler filed

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her initial claim on March 16, 2018, and so the new regulations govern in this case.
See Admin. Tr. at 12.
The new regulations have been described as a “paradigm shift” in the way
medical opinions are evaluated. Densberger v. Saul, No. 1:20-CV-772, 2021 WL
1172982, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2021). Under the old regulations, “ALJs were
required to follow regulations which defined medical opinions narrowly and
created a hierarchy of medical source opinions with treating sources at the apex of
this hierarchy.” Id. But under the new regulations, “[t]he range of opinions that
ALJs were enjoined to consider were broadened substantially and the approach to
evaluating opinions was changed from a hierarchical form of review to a more
holistic analysis.” Id.
Under the old regulations, the ALJ assigns the weight he or she gives to a
medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). And if “a treating
source’s medical opinions on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a
claimant’s] impairments is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in [the claimant’s] case record,” the Commissioner “will give it
controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). Under the old
regulations, where the Commissioner does not give a treating source’s medical
opinion controlling weight, it analyzes the opinion in accordance with a number of
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factors: the “[l]ength of the treatment relationship and the frequency of
examination,” the “[n]ature and extent of the treatment relationship,” the
“[s]upportability” of the opinion, the “[c]onsistency” of the opinion with the record
as whole, the “[s]pecialization” of the treating source, and any other relevant
factors. Id. at §§ 404.1527(c)(2)–(c)(6), 416.927(c)(2)–(c)(6).
Under the new regulations, however, the Commissioner “will not defer or
give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical
opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from [the
claimant’s] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Rather
than assigning weight to medical opinions, the Commissioner will articulate “how
persuasive” he or she finds the medical opinions. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b),
416.920c(b). And the Commissioner’s consideration of medical opinions is guided
by the following factors: supportability; consistency; relationship with the claimant
(including the length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examinations,
the purpose of the treatment relationship, the extent of the treatment relationship,
and the examining relationship); specialization of the medical source; and any
other factors that tend to support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520c(c), 416.920c(c). The most important of these factors are the
“supportability” of the opinion and the “consistency” of the opinion. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). As to supportability, the new regulations
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provide that “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting
explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical
opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the
medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). And as to consistency, those regulations
provide that “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative
medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical
sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2),
416.920c(c)(2).
The ALJ must explain how he or she considered the “supportability” and
“consistency” of a medical source’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2),
416.920c(b)(2). Generally, the ALJ may, but is not required to, explain his or her
consideration of the other factors. Id. But if there are two equally persuasive
medical opinions about the same issue that are not exactly the same, then the ALJ
must explain how he or she considered the other factors. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520c(b)(3), 416.920c(b)(3).

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A. The ALJ’s determination of Huggler’s RFC was not supported by
substantial evidence.
Huggler alleges that the ALJ’s decision “is not supported by substantial
evidence and is the product of legal error.” Doc. 17 at 9. More specifically,
Huggler asserts a single argument that the ALJ failed to consider the medical
opinion of the treating Physician’s Assistant (“PA”), Debra Carr. Id. at 6. Huggler
contends that the opinions of Carr are inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC
determination, and thus the ALJ erred at step four of the sequential evaluation
process by not supporting his decision with substantial evidence as well as by legal
error. Id. at 8; see also doc. 19 at 1.

1. The ALJ failed to consider the medical opinion of PA Carr.
By way of background, Huggler was treated for her various conditions in
numerous locations by a number of treating physicians and nurses from 2012 to the
date of the ALJ’s decision. See Admin. Tr. at 12–23. Notably, the ALJ did not
consider in this case the period from October 12, 2012, to July 23, 2015, in his
disability determination, as this period had already been dismissed from the claim
previously by the same ALJ. See id. at 12–13. Because of the dismissal, that
period was not considered for purposes of the ALJ’s decision because of the

15

doctrine of res judicata. Id. at 12. What remained was the period from July 24,
2015, to September 30, 2019, the last date insured.
Huggler asserts that the ALJ failed to consider or discuss the medical
opinions of Debra Carr, identified as the treating medical PA. Doc. 17 at 6.
Huggler submitted what was alleged to be Carr’s medical opinion to the ALJ
before the administrative hearing. Admin. Tr. at 322. The alleged medical opinion
derives from a visit by Huggler to the Galeton Health Center, operated by UPMC
in Galeton, Pennsylvania, where Carr served as a PA. See id. The documents
Huggler alleges are Carr’s medical opinions consist of two impairment
questionnaires, filled out by Carr on June 18, 2019. See Admin Tr. at 318–324.
One document appears to be a mental impairment questionnaire, and the other a
physical impairment questionnaire. Id. The mental impairment questionnaire is not
disputed, only the physical impairment questionnaire. See doc. 17 at 6–7.
In Carr’s report, Carr recommended that Huggler could only stand or walk
for 1–2 hours of an eight-hour workday. Id. at 7; Admin. Tr. at 323. Further, Carr
opined that Huggler should walk around some for circulation improvement. Admin.
Tr. at 323. Carr also stated that Huggler could only lift up to 5 pounds
occasionally and should never lift anything greater than 5 pounds due to her
scoliosis. Id. Finally, Carr believed that Huggler’s impairments would cause her to

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be off task for 10 to 15 percent of the time and require her to be absent from work
two days a month. Id.
Huggler asserts that these recommendations from Carr’s opinion are
inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC finding. See doc. 17 at 7. Huggler supported this
proposition by referencing a program policy statement from the Social Security
Administration,4 and asserting that “[L]ight work requires, among other things, an
ability to stand and/or walk up to 6 hours per day, lift no more than 20 pounds at a
time, and frequently lift or carry objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” See id. Carr’s
opinion recommends standing for no more than 2 hours, and never to lift more than
5 pounds. See Admin. Tr. at 323. Notably, the CFR provides that “[e]ven though
the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good
deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some
pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.” 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b). The
characterization of Huggler’s capacity of only standing for 1–2 hours and never
lifting more than 5 pounds is inconsistent with the description of “light work” in
the CFR. Thus, we find that the ALJ’s RFC determination is inconsistent with
Carr’s opinion, as a matter of law. The question then turns on how the ALJ
handled this inconsistent opinion.

4

Titles II & XVI: Determining Capability to Do Other Work—the MedicalVocational Rules of Appendix 2, SSR 83-10 (S.S.A. 1983), at *5.
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Under the new regulations, “[A] medical opinion is a statement from a
medical source about what you can still do despite your impairment(s) and whether
you have one or more impairment-related limitations or restrictions.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1513(a)(2). The question then turns on whether a PA is an “acceptable
medical source,” and “under the old regulations, a physician assistant's opinion
would never be entitled to controlling weight, as a physician assistant was not
considered an ‘acceptable medical source.’” Martinez v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL
1062984, at *6 n.8 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2022). However, under the new regulations,
an “[A]cceptable medical source means a medical source who is a: . . . (8)
Licensed Physician Assistant for impairments within his or her licensed scope of
practice (only with respect to claims filed (see § 416.325) on or after March 27,
2017).” 20 C.F.R. § 416.902(a)(8); see also Martinez, 2022 WL 1062984, at *6
n.8. And as stated above, since the new regulations apply here, a PA is an
acceptable medical source, and the question is not one of weight allotted to an
opinion but one of consistency and supportability.
Per the CFR, the ALJ “will articulate in our determination or decision how
persuasive we find all of the medical opinions and all of the prior administrative
medical findings in your case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b). As mentioned
above, the ALJ must discuss the factors of consistency and supportability of a
given acceptable medical source’s opinions. Further, “an ALJ is obligated to
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consider and explain all pertinent, relevant, and probative evidence.” Wolfe v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2013 WL 5328343, at *10 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 2013) (quoting
Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 204 (3d Cir.2008)). This
requirement is “particularly acute” if the evidence or opinion conflicts with other
probative evidence in the record. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706 (3d
Cir.1981).
In certain circumstances, an ALJ may overlook medical evidence because it
is neither pertinent, relevant, nor probative. Johnson, 529 F.3d at 204. In such
cases, remand is not required where an ALJ's decision not to consider medical
evidence had no affect on the outcome of the case. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399
F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir.2005). Further, “an explanation from the ALJ of the reason
why probative evidence has been rejected is required so that a reviewing court can
determine whether the reasons for rejection were improper.” Cotter, 642 F.2d at
706. These circumstances, however, are not present here.
As mentioned above, we have found that Carr’s acceptable medical opinion
was inconsistent with the RFC determination. In the instant matter, however,
discussion of Carr’s opinion was omitted from the ALJ’s decision entirely, with no
explanation given as to why the opinion was omitted. We cannot say for certain
whether an examination of Carr’s opinion by the ALJ would not have affected the
ALJ’s findings; the ALJ’s decision left us nothing to review to determine whether
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the “reasons for rejection were improper.” Thus, we find that this is reversible
error.

B. Huggler’s case should be remanded.
The question then is whether we should remand the case to the
Commissioner for further proceedings or we should award benefits to Huggler, as
she requests. See doc. 1 at 2 (requesting that benefits be awarded). We conclude
that remand is the appropriate remedy.
Under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court has the “power to enter,
upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying,
or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing.” Thus, although a remand is often the
appropriate remedy, the court may also enter an order awarding the claimant
benefits. See Brownawell v. Comm’r Of Soc. Sec., 554 F.3d 352, 358 (3d Cir.
2008) (remanding the case to the district court with directions to enter an order
awarding the payment of benefits); Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir.
2000) (same); Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 223 (3d Cir. 1984) (same).
But an “award [of] benefits should be made only when the administrative record of
the case has been fully developed and when substantial evidence on the record as a
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whole indicates that the claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits.” Podedworny,
745 F.2d at 221–22. Whether there has been excessive delay and/or prior remands
also bears on whether to award benefits or remand for further proceedings. Diaz v.
Berryhill, 388 F. Supp. 3d 382, 391 (M.D. Pa. 2019). “Thus, in practice any
decision to award benefits in lieu of ordering a remand for further agency
consideration entails the weighing of two factors: First, whether there has been an
excessive delay in the litigation of the claim which is not attributable to the
claimant; and second, whether the administrative record of the case has been fully
developed and substantial evidence on the record as a whole indicates that the
claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits.” Id.
Here, there has not been excessive delay in the litigation of Huggler’s claim,
and we cannot say that substantial evidence on the record as a whole indicates that
Huggler is disabled and entitled to benefits. Rather, the ALJ’s error here was
failing to adequately explain his reasoning, indeed failing to examine a medical
opinion at all, which may be remedied on remand. Thus, we will remand the case
to the Commissioner for further proceedings.

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VI.

Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the Commissioner’s decision and

remand the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings pursuant to sentence
four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). An appropriate order follows.

S/Susan E. Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
United States Magistrate Judge

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