Wyatt v. Hauser et al

Filing 99

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 76 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by C.O. Gunther, Capt. Dreher, Superintendent Mason, A. Rodriguez, J. Macknight, Major Sokaloski, Mr. C. Counselor, Deputy White, C aptain Banks, Adam Fritzinger, Lieutenant Davis, Amy Bing, N. Guzenski, Sgt. Evans, F. Walter, J. Mahally, Joeseph Flynn, Joseph DuPont, Angela Landmesser, John Chuna, Christina Hauser, 80 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Tariq Wyatt Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 3/11/2025. (gg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TARIQ WYATT,

:

Plaintiff
v.
CHRISTINA HAUSER, et al.,
Defendants

:

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-CV-92

:

(JUDGE MANNION)

:
:

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Tariq Wyatt, who was incarcerated at the State Correctional
Institution at Mahanoy in Frackville, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Mahanoy”) during
the times relevant to this lawsuit, filed this pro se Section 1983 action on
January 18, 2022. (Doc. 1). He asserts First, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims against multiple prison officials, alleging that Defendants
violated his rights due to a series of events, which include a nurse handing
him medications without wearing gloves, his temporary placement in a
Psychiatric Observation Cell (“POC”), the issuance of misconduct reports for
his behavior and related sanctions, cold conditions in the Restricted Housing
Unit (“RHU”), and the taking of some of his property. This alleged campaign
of abuse against him was inflicted, in part, as “preemptive” retaliation for
grievances he had not yet filed about prison officials’ behavior towards him.

Presently pending before this Court is Defendants’ and Plaintiff’s motions for
summary judgment. (Docs. 76 and 80, respectively). For the following
reasons, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
80) and GRANT Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 76).
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Tariq Wyatt, is a state prisoner who was housed at the State
Correctional Institution at Mahanoy, SCI-Mahanoy. On January 18, 2022,
Wyatt filed a pro se complaint naming approximately twenty-one correctional
officials as defendants. (Doc. 1). An Amended Complaint was filed
establishing the identities of several Doe defendants. (Doc. 50). Plaintiff has
suffered from mental illness while in custody, and has alleged that he had
been subjected to unfair treatment by correctional staff due to his
impairments in the pasts. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 27-43).
On October 5, 2021, Plaintiff had a dispute with a member of the
medical staff, Defendant nurse Amy Bing, who placed Wyatt’s medication in
a cup without wearing gloves. According to Wyatt, Defendant Bing was
dispensing the medications for all other inmates in similar fashion. (Doc. 92,
Ex. B, p. 19). Wyatt, believing the medication was dispensed in an unsafe
and unsanitary fashion, requested Bing to provide him with “a different pill”
since she “ha[d] no gloves on.” (Id., p. 12). At such point, Defendant Bing
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returns to her cart, where the medications are held, and retrieves, out of
Wyatt’s sight, medication in a cup and says “here.” (Id.). Wyatt believes that
Defendant Bing, with sleight of hand, pretended to replace the medication
with a different cup but instead simply brought back the same medication in
the same cup. (Id., p. 20). Consequently, Wyatt begins to yell and scream
for his medication. (Id.). Defendant Bing asserted that she had placed
another medication capsule in a different paper cup to divert negative
behavior from Wyatt and that Wyatt began screaming “Give me my fucking
pills. I want my fucking pills” while holding a threatening stance over her.
(Doc. 92, Ex. C, p. 9).
Wyatt contends that he did not curse but does admit he yelled and
screamed at Defendant Bing “want[ing] everybody to hear it, hear [him] loud
and clear” that he wanted his medication. (Doc. 92, Ex. B, p. 22). Wyatt
received a misconduct report from this incident, which he claims was
“bait[ed]” by Defendant Bing to get her “little hit off of [him],” (Id., p. 23), and
as “preemptive retaliation” for Wyatt filing a grievance against her despite the
fact that he had not yet filed a grievance or had any interaction with
Defendant Bing previous to that incident. (Id., pp. 34-36). Wyatt ultimately
submitted a grievance regarding this matter, and among the numerous

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defendants he implicates, he included Defendant Nurse Hauser for simply
having responded to his grievance in a manner he disapproved. (Id., p. 30).
Due to Wyatt’s erratic behavior, he was assigned to a Psychiatric
Observation Cell, POC, where he was seen by medical staff until his release
the next day. (Id., p. 26; see also Doc. 92, Ex. E). Wyatt named Defendant
Lieutenant Davis for placing him in the POC “as a punishment for not
cooperating,” (id., p. 26), and Defendant Dreher, the shift commander, for
not handling the misconduct in the manner Wyatt would have preferred –
which is to discount Defendant Bing’s report and find, Wyatt contends, that
“‘stand[ing] in a threatening manner’ … is not a reason to send somebody to
the RHU.” 1 (Id., p. 28). Wyatt contends that he would have to threaten with
words “to them or their family or something like that” to warrant being placed
in the POC. (Id., p. 29).
Wyatt contends that, while in POC, Defendant Correctional Officer
Fritzinger denied him access to hygiene supplies at first, but Wyatt also
admits having received such supplies the next day. (Doc. 92, Ex. B, pp. 3940). Another named Defendant, Correctional Officer Flynn, provided Wyatt
with the supplies he requested. (Id., p. 41). Wyatt was in POC for a single

Though Plaintiff said RHU (Restrictive Housing Unit) during his
deposition, he was not sent to the RHU but the POC after the incident.
1

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day. (Id.). Furthermore, Wyatt alleged that that the POC “was kind of cold”
when he first got in there, as well as the RHU and the whole facility, because
“[t]he heat went off that day, and [he] think[s] they were trying to fix it.” (Id.,
p. 39).
On October 8, 2021, Wyatt had a hearing on the misconduct reported
three days prior, where the hearing examiner, Defendant Dupont, found that
Plaintiff was guilty of using abusive language and found the testimony of
Defendant Nurse Bing to be credible. (Doc. 92, Ex. D, p. 1). Wyatt contends
that he was unfairly treated because he was denied a witness (Correctional
Officer Alexy) who would have allegedly confirmed Wyatt’s version of events;
i.e., that he didn’t curse when he was screaming at the nurse. (Doc. 92, Ex.
B, pp. 42-43). However, according to Wyatt himself, Alexy himself told Wyatt
that he was not going to serve as his witness. (Id., p. 61). Nevertheless,
Wyatt was consequently placed in RHU for his misconduct.
That same day, Wyatt covered the windows of his cell door in RHU
with toilet paper and sheets of paper – obstructing any prison officials from
seeing within – because Wyatt was frustrated that staff members “keep
telling [him] that everything [was] going to be okay” when he was not allowed
a witness for his misconduct hearing. (Id., pp. 43-44; Doc. 92, Ex. F). Wyatt
was given multiple direct orders to uncover his door but Wyatt refused to
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comply and was unresponsive. (Doc. 92, Ex. F, p. 10). Consequently, prison
officials deployed OC spray to gain his compliance. (Id., pp. 5, 10). Wyatt
received another misconduct based on this behavior to which he pled guilty
to the charge presented in the report. (Doc. 92, Ex. G).
After the spraying, Wyatt was removed from the cell and triaged by a
medical

staff

member,

Defendant

Nurse

Landmesser.

Defendant

Landmesser began a standard medical check up of Wyatt, asking him where
he is injured, if at all, and when she was instructed to decontaminate Wyatt
from the OC spray, she did so. This chain of events took about five minutes.
(Doc. 92, Ex. H at 4:55). Wyatt contends that Defendant Landmesser was
abusively dithering instead of counteracting the painful effects of the OC
Spray. However, this contention is belied by the video evidence. Wyatt
contends that fifteen to twenty minutes passed as Defendant Landmesser
refused to assist him, but the video evidence clearly shows that she flushes
his eyes as soon as it is brought to her attention that she is to do so, which
occurs less than five minutes after her arrival. (Id.). Defendant Captain Banks
placed Wyatt on paperwork restriction for his use of such to cover up his
window. (Doc. 92, Ex. B, p. 55). Wyatt believed that this treatment was unfair
and contends that he should have been restricted from only toilet paper for
his behavior and not paperwork, which would include legal paperwork that
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he can use to file a lawsuit, and thus accuses Defendant Banks for violating
his constitutional rights. (Id., p. 55-56). The restriction was temporary.
Afterwards, when Wyatt was taken to RHU to serve the time for his
misconduct, his property was to be stored away after being inventoried. (Id.,
pp. 63-69). Defendants Rodriguez, Guzenski and Evans, among others,
were involved in the inventorying of Wyatt’s property and the handling of his
filed grievance regarding such property. (Id.). The property taken from Wyatt
included, among others, “some books and magazines,” a television, a
religious medallion and art supplies. (Id., p. 69). The only property that Wyatt
took issue with being taken was the medallion, art supplies and television.
(Id.). All the property was returned or replaced. (Id.). Defendant Dreher was
the shift commander at the time, and his involvement is limited to that role.
(Id., pp. 26-28).
Wyatt implicates numerous defendants for responding to his
grievances in a manner he disagreed. For example, Wyatt named Defendant
Mason, the Superintendent of SCI-Mahanoy, because Defendant Mason told
Wyatt to appeal his misconduct sanction but ultimately upheld the sanction.
(Id., pp. 58-59). Defendant nurse Hauser is implicated for reviewing Wyatt’s
grievance against Defendant Bing, for which Wyatt believes is improper
given both Defendants Hauser and Bing make part of the same medical staff.
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(Id., pp. 30-31). Defendants White, MacKnight and Chuma make part of the
Program Review Committee and their implication in the suit is due to their
decision to affirm the judgment on Wyatt’s misconducts. (Id., pp. 56-57).
Defendants Mahally, Walter and Guzenski’s involvement is limited to
responding to Wyatt’s grievances in a manner that Wyatt disagrees. (Id., pp.
69, 71, 73). Wyatt was unsure what Defendant Sokaloski’s involvement in
the lawsuit was and believes he might have mixed him up with Defendant
Guzenski. (Id., p. 73).
The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) has established
a formal policy and a procedures manual for inmates, which must be followed
by inmates who file grievances while incarcerated at state correctional
institutions operated by the DOC. The purpose of a grievance is to allow an
inmate to bring concerns and complaints to the attention of prison officials.
The grievance procedures are set forth in the DOC’s Administrative Directive
804 (“DC-ADM 804”), titled Inmate Grievance System. (Doc. 92, Ex. J).
Pursuant to the DC-ADM 804, the DOC has a three-tiered grievance system
which serves as an inmate’s administrative remedy: (1) an initial review by a
Grievance Officer, (2) appeal to the Facility Manager or designee; and (3)
appeal to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievance and Appeals for final
review. (Id.). Pursuant to DC-ADM 804, a grievance must be submitted in
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writing, using the grievance form available on all housing units or blocks,
within 15 working days after the events noted in the grievance. (Id.). A
grievance must include the following: a statement of facts relevant to the
claim during the date and approximate time and location of the event(s)
giving rise to the grievance; the identity of any individuals who were directly
involved in the event(s); any claims the inmate wishes to make concerning
violations of DOC directives, regulations, court orders, or other law; and any
compensation or legal relief desired. (Id.). Upon receipt, the Facility
Grievance Coordinator assigns each grievance (even a rejected grievance)
a tracking number and enters it into the Automated Inmate Grievance
Tracking System. (Id.). If an inmate is dissatisfied with the initial response,
he or she may appeal that decision to the Facility Manager. (Id.). The Facility
Manager then provides a written response to the grievance. The Facility
Manager may uphold the response, uphold the inmate, dismiss the
grievance (either as untimely or on the merits), or uphold in part or deny in
part. The Facility Manager may also remand the Initial Review Response for
further investigation or consideration. (Id.). If an inmate is not satisfied with
the decision of the Facility Manager, he or she may submit an appeal to the
Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals. Only issues raised in
both the original grievance and the appeal to the Facility Manager may be
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appealed at this level. (Id.). The Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and
Appeals reviews the original grievance, the Initial Response Review, the
appeal to the Facility Manager, the Facility Manager’s response thereto, and
the appeal to final review. (Id.). The Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances
and Appeals then may uphold the response, uphold the inmate, dismiss, or
uphold in part and deny in part. Alternatively, the Chief Grievance Officer
may remand the grievance to the facility for further investigation or
reconsideration or may refer the appeal to a different bureau. (Id.).
Among the 154 grievances Wyatt has filed while incarcerated at SCIMahanoy, eight grievances were filed regarding the series of events related
to this matter; particularly, grievances numbered:
• 949383, regarding Defendant Bing not wearing gloves when
giving Plaintiff his medication;
• 950467, regarding Defendant Evans for allegedly “stealing”
Plaintiff’s television when such television was ultimately
replaced;
• 950481, regarding the taking of Plaintiff’s religious medallion
which was ultimately returned;
• 950547, regarding the incident with OC spray and the cold
conditions;
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• 950549, regarding Plaintiff’s stay in POC;
• 950824, regarding a comment made by Defendant White;
• 951864, regarding responses to grievances by Defendant
Mahally;
• 952020, regarding property being taken from Plaintiff.
(Doc. 92, Ex. I). None of the grievances were appealed by Wyatt for
final review.
After the filing of the Complaint, Defendants moved for dismissal of the
action. (Doc. 17). Defendants’ motion was denied, and the parties were
permitted to proceed with discovery. (Doc. 28). Discovery closed on May 31,
2024. (Doc. 85). Defendants filed a motion for Summary Judgment on April
1, 2024. (Doc. 76). Plaintiff filed a motion for Summary Judgment on April
15, 2024. (Doc. 80). Defendants filed a statement of facts on July 31, 2024.
(Doc. 92). Plaintiff filed his statement of facts in the form of exhibits to his
brief in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 91, Ex. A) which
are selected pages of his misconduct reports that show the Plaintiff had
requested witnesses for his misconduct hearing (specifically, CO Alexy) and
that Defendant Banks approved of Plaintiff’s temporary placement in RHU
with a restriction on use of paperwork. With all briefs submitted, the motions
are ripe for review.
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II.

LEGAL STANDARD

“One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to
isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment is
appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those “that could alter the outcome”
of the litigation, and “disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a
rational person could conclude that the position of the person with the burden
of proof on the disputed issue is correct.” EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc.,
618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clark v. Modern Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d
321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993)); Matsushista Electric Industrial Company, Ltd. v.
Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (“[w]here the record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial”).
At the Rule 56 stage, the Court’s function is not to “weigh the evidence
and determine the truth of the matter” but rather “to determine whether there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
249 (1986). The Court must view the facts and evidence presented “in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party” and must “draw all reasonable
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inferences in that party’s favor.” Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d
217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014). A “scintilla of evidence” supporting the nonmovant’s
position is insufficient; “there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the [nonmovant].” Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d
181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252) (alteration
in original). Similarly, it is well-settled that: “[o]ne cannot create an issue of
fact merely by ... denying averments ... without producing any supporting
evidence of the denials.” Thimons v. PNC Bank, NA, 254 F. App’x 896, 899
(3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

Thus, “[w]hen a motion for summary

judgment is made and supported ..., an adverse party may not rest upon
mere allegations or denial.” Fireman’s Ins. Co. of Newark New Jersey v.
DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1982); see Sunshine Books, Ltd. v.
Temple University, 697 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1982). “[A] mere denial is
insufficient to raise a disputed issue of fact, and an unsubstantiated doubt as
to the veracity of the opposing affidavit is also not sufficient.” Lockhart v.
Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1969). Furthermore, “a party resisting
a [Rule 56] motion cannot expect to rely merely upon bare assertions,
conclusory allegations or suspicions.” Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d
Cir. 1985) (citing Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir. 1981)); Nat’l
Labor Rel. Bd. v. FES, 301 F.3d 83, 95 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[The plaintiff's]
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testimony ... amounts to an unsupported, conclusory assertion, which we
have held is inadequate to satisfy the movant’s burden of proof on summary
judgment.”).
III.

DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that Wyatt cannot meet his Rule 56 burden
because he cannot adduce any competent evidence to support his bare
allegations. The Court agrees.
Defendants have asserted that Wyatt failed to exhaust the prison
grievance process, cannot produce any admissible evidence that would
establish the elements of his First, Fifth, 2 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
claims other than his own self-serving, conclusory allegations, and Wyatt has
not identified any record evidence that would rebut this assertion. The Court
agrees. Wyatt has not, for example, pointed to a declaration or affidavit other
than his own repeated bare allegations, or any other evidence that could
sustain a verdict in his favor. At summary judgment, “the non-moving party
must oppose the motion and, in doing so, may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleadings but, instead, must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Bare assertions,
Defendants contend that there does not appear to be a claim under
the Fifth Amendment relevant to this action. After review of all the filings in
this matter, the Court agrees, and this claim is dismissed.
2

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conclusory allegations, or suspicions will not suffice.” Jutrowski v. Township
of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2018) (alteration omitted)
(quoting D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268-69 (3d Cir.
2014)). The Court will nevertheless address each of the parties’ arguments
in turn.
A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies and his claims are consequently procedurally defaulted. The Court
agrees.
Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner may not
bring an action with respect to prison conditions “until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). Exhaustion
is mandatory, see Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007); see
also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (holding that the exhaustion
requirement of the PLRA applies to grievance procedures “regardless of the
relief offered through administrative procedures”); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d
65, 67 (3d Cir. 2000) (same), and “applies to all inmate suits about prison
life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and
whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle,
534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion must also be “proper,” the prisoner
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must comply with all administrative requirements so that the agency can
address the issues on the merits. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006);
Williams, 482 F.3d at 639. Claims that have not been properly exhausted are
procedurally defaulted. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004);
Couch v. Tritt, 2016 WL 278776 at *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2016) (“Inmates
who fail to fully, or timely, complete the prison grievance process, or who fail
to identify the named defendants, are barred from subsequently litigating
claims in federal court.”). To determine whether a prisoner has “properly”
exhausted a claim, the court must evaluate the prisoner’s compliance with
the prison’s administrative regulations governing inmate grievances. Id. “[I]t
is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries
of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007); see also
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91.
Here, the applicable procedural process governing inmate grievances
and appeals is the DOC Administrative Directive 804 (DC-ADM 804). The
process begins with the submission of a grievance form and a response
thereto. If an inmate is dissatisfied with the initial response to his grievance,
he may file an appeal to the facility manager in writing, within fifteen working
days from the date of the initial review/rejection. An inmate dissatisfied with
the decision of the facility manager may appeal to final review with the chief
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of SOIGA within fifteen working days from the date of the facility manager’s
decision.
Wyatt was well aware of the grievance process when he used it 154
times while incarcerated at SCI-Mahanoy. (Doc. 92, Ex. I, ¶9). Among the
154 grievances Wyatt has filed, eight relate to the claims Wyatt raised in his
Complaint:
• 949383, regarding Defendant Bing not wearing gloves when
giving Plaintiff his medication;
• 950467, regarding Defendant Evans for allegedly “stealing”
Plaintiff’s television when such television was ultimately
replaced;
• 950481, regarding the taking of Plaintiff’s religious medallion
which was ultimately returned;
• 950547, regarding the incident with OC spray and the cold
conditions;
• 950549, regarding Plaintiff’s stay in POC;
• 950824, regarding a comment made by Defendant White;
• 951864, regarding responses to grievances by Defendant
Mahally;
• 952020, regarding property being taken from Plaintiff.
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(Doc. 92, Ex. I). None of the grievances were appealed by Wyatt for
final review. Wyatt has not alleged any facts that demonstrate he was
somehow unable to appeal his grievances. Due to Wyatt’s failure to exhaust
his administrative remedies, his claims are procedurally defaulted and
summary judgment should be granted in favor of the Defendants on that
ground alone. However, given the fatal flaws existent in Wyatt’s claims above
the procedural defect, this Court will nevertheless continue through its
analysis demonstrating the other grounds upon which summary judgment
will be granted in favor of the Defendants.
B. Lack of Personal Involvement
Defendants submit that the record is devoid of evidence from which a
reasonable factfinder could conclude that certain defendants were
personally involved in any of the alleged constitutional violation. Specifically,
with respect to Defendants Sokaloski, Flynn, Dreher, Hauser, White,
MacKnight, Chuma, Mason, Mahally, Walter and Guzenski.
Section 1983 provides that persons acting under color of state law may
be held liable if they deprive an individual of “any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. See
42 U.S.C. §1983. To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead two
essential elements: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a
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person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the
plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v.
George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). Individual liability can be imposed
under Section 1983 only if the state actor played an “affirmative part” in the
alleged misconduct, and “cannot be predicated solely on the operation of
respondeat superior.” Evancho v. Fishser, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005)
(quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)). In other
words, a defendant “must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs
... shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge
and acquiescence[.]” See Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 270 (3d Cir.
2003) (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).
Allegations of personal involvement must be made with appropriate
particularity in that the complaint must allege the particulars of conduct, time,
place, and personal responsibility. Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354; Rode, 845
F.2d at 1207-08. Subsequent knowledge of an incident is insufficient to
demonstrate that a state actor played an “affirmative part” in the alleged
misconduct. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08 (the after-the-fact submission
of a grievance is “simply insufficient” to establish a defendant's knowledge of
an underlying constitutional violation at the time it occurred); Dooley v.
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Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (Grievance Coordinator and
Superintendent's involvement in review and denial of grievance insufficient
to establish personal involvement). It is the plaintiff's burden to “show that
each and every defendant was ‘personal[ly] involve[d]’ in depriving him of his
rights.” Kirk v. Roan, No. 1:04-CV-1990, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa.
Sept. 14, 2006) (quoting Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353). Allegations that broadly
implicate multiple defendants without delineating individual conduct are
legally insufficient. See Van Tassel v. Piccione, 608 F. App'x 66, 69-70 (3d
Cir. 2015). Accordingly, against this precedential backdrop, the Court will
review whether each of the aforementioned defendants had the requisite
personal involvement to be liable under §1983.
1) Administrative Respondents
Plaintiff has alleged that the following defendants violated his rights for
either responding to grievances he filed or affirming the decision on
grievances and misconduct reports. To wit:
• Defendant Hauser is a nurse, and her involvement is only
responding to grievances. (Doc. 92, ¶18).
• Defendants White, MacKnight, and Chuma are the Program
Review Committee; their involvement is limited to upholding
Plaintiff’s misconducts. (Doc. 92, ¶19).
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• Defendant Superintendent Mason supervises SCI-Mahanoy, and
in this action appears to be limited to having once told Plaintiff to
appeal a sanction that she later upheld anyway. (Doc. 92, ¶20).
• Defendants Mahally, Walter, and Guzenski’s involvement is
limited to responding to grievances. (Doc. 92, ¶21).
Thus, the allegations against these Defendants amount to their
responses to grievances and misconducts in a manner that the Plaintiff is
unhappy with. “[T]he failure of a prison official to act favorably on an inmate’s
grievance is not itself a constitutional violation.” Little v. Mottern, 2017 WL
934464, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2017) (quoting Rauso v. Vaughn, 2000 WL
873285, at *16 (E.D. Pa., June 26, 2000). Such allegations are insufficient to
establish the above-named Defendants’ personal involvement in the
challenged conduct under Section 1983. See Watkins v. Horn, 1997 WL
566080 at *4 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (concurrence in an administrative appeal
process is not sufficient to establish personal involvement); Mitchell v.
Keane, 974 F.Supp. 332, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“it appears from the
submissions before the court that [Plaintiff] filed grievances, had them
referred to a prison official, and received a letter reporting that there was no
evidence to substantiate his complaints. [Plaintiff]'s dissatisfaction with this
response does not constitute a cause of action.”); Caldwell v. Beard, 2008
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WL 2887810, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 23, 2008) (“Such a premise for liability
[i.e., for performing a role in the grievance process] fails as a matter of law.”),
aff’d, 2009 WL 1111545 (3d Cir. April 27, 2009); Orrs v. Comings, 1993 WL
418361, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1993) (“But an allegation that a defendant
failed to act on a grievance or complaint does not state a Section 1983
claim.”). Accordingly, the claims against such Defendants will be dismissed.
2) Defendant Dreher
Plaintiff only brought an action against Defendant Dreher for his role
as shift commander. (Doc. 92, ¶17). As explained above, a defendant must
have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be
predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). “Personal involvement
can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence; however, allegations of knowledge and
acquiescence must be made with appropriate particularity.” Id. Additionally,
a plaintiff must show that “some affirmative conduct by the supervisor played
a role in the discrimination.” Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469,
1478 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976)
(supervising officials do not violate the constitutional rights of the victims
unless they have played an “affirmative part” in the misconduct). Plaintiff has
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made no such showing and, accordingly, summary judgment will be granted
in favor of Defendant Dreher.
3) Defendant Sokaloski
During his deposition, Plaintiff admitted that he was unsure why he
even named Defendant Sokaloski, and may have confused him with another
Defendant. (Doc. 92, ¶22). Given that Plaintiff has shown no personal
involvement of Defendant Sokaloski, summary judgment will be granted in
favor of Defendant Sokaloski.
4) Defendant Flynn
During his deposition, Plaintiff admitted that Defendant Flynn came to
him while he was at POC and provided Plaintiff with the supplies he
requested, such as hygiene products. (Doc. 92, Ex. B, p. 41). Thus, Plaintiff
has neither established any violation of his rights nor any personal
involvement of Defendant Flynn in any constitutional violations. Accordingly,
summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendant Flynn.
C. Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claims
1) Verbal Abuse
Plaintiff has alleged that he has been verbally harassed or referred to
as a “snitch” by certain Defendants (i.e., Defendants White (Doc. 92, Ex. B,
pp.61-62), Counselor (id., pp. 59-58), Evans (id., pp. 64-65), Fritzinger (id.,
- 23 -

p. 41) and Rodriguez (id., pp. 66, 68, 69)). Statements and verbal threats,
without action, cannot as a matter of law violate a prisoner’s rights.
Rodriguez v. Wetzel, 2015 WL 1033842 at *8 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (“it is well
established that the use of words, no matter how violent, vulgar or
unprofessional, is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. §1983”) (citing Dunbar v.
Barone, 487 Fed. Appx. 723 (3d Cir. 2012)). Verbal harassment in the
correctional setting, while unprofessional and not condoned, simply does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Gandy v. Reeder, 2019 WL
2537923, at *2 (3d Cir. 2019) (“…mere insults, without more, cannot
constitute as an Eighth Amendment violation.”); Aleem-X v. Westcott, 347 F.
App'x 731, 731 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Verbal abuse of a prisoner, even of the lewd
variety [ ], is not actionable under § 1983”). Accordingly, to the extent any of
Plaintiff’s claims allege constitutional violations related to verbal harassment
or verbal abuse, such claims will be dismissed.
2) The Dispensation of Medication and Resulting Misconduct
Plaintiff admits to having “yelled” and “screamed” at Defendant
Bing “want[ing] everybody to hear it, hear [him] loud and clear” that he
wanted his medication and refused to take the medication she provided him
on two separate occasions because he believed, without seeing, that she
dispensed his medication without gloves. (Doc. 92, Ex. B, p. 22). He received
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a misconduct due to his behavior. Because of these events, Plaintiff claims
that his constitutional rights have been violated. Defendants submit that to
the extent that Defendant Bing should have been wearing gloves Plaintiff
“does not seem to have the expertise necessary to offer an opinion on” the
matter and that Defendant Bing “would be shielded by qualified immunity”
regardless. (Doc. 92, p. 13). The Court agrees with Defendants.
Despite their participation in constitutionally impermissible conduct,
government officials “may nevertheless be shielded from liability for civil
damages if their actions did not violate ‘clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Hope
v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity ensures that before officers are
subjected to suit, they have notice that their conduct is unlawful. Id. “Qualified
immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “If the
law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail,
since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing
his conduct.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19.
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The qualified immunity analysis has two prongs. Pearson, 555 U.S. at
232. One prong of the analysis is whether the facts that the plaintiff has
alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right. Id. The other
prong of the analysis is whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
“To determine whether a right was ‘clearly established,’ we conduct a
two-part inquiry.” Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2021).
“First, we must ‘define the right allegedly violated at the appropriate level of
specificity.’” Id. (quoting Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012)).
“This requires us to frame the right ‘in light of the specific context of the case,
not as a broad general proposition.’” Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).
“Second, we must ask whether that right was ‘clearly established’ at the time
of its alleged violation, i.e., whether the right was ‘sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.’” Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). “This is an ‘objective (albeit
fact-specific) question,’ where ‘[an officer]'s subjective beliefs ... are
irrelevant.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)).
“To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently
clear foundation in then-existing precedent.” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63
(2018). In other words, “[t]he rule must be ‘settled law,’ which means it is
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dictated by ‘controlling authority’ or ‘a robust ‘consensus of cases of
persuasive authority.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). “It is not enough that
the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent.” Id. Rather, “[t]he precedent
must be clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to
establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” Id.
Defendants submit that there is certainly not a robust consensus of
case law indicating that a nurse must wear gloves when dispensing pills to
prison inmates. The Court agrees. Furthermore, if the law did not put the
defendant on notice that her conduct would be clearly unlawful, qualified
immunity is appropriate. Bayer v. Monroe County Children & Youth Services,
577 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2009). “In other words, ‘existing precedent must
have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’” Reichle
v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 741 (2011)). “This exacting standard ‘gives government officials
breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments’ by ‘protect[ing]
all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” City
& Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 (2015) (quoting alKidd, 563 U.S. at 743). Given the exacting standard, Defendant Bing’s
conduct does not rise to the level of plain incompetence and a knowing
violation of law. Accordingly, Defendant Bing is shielded by qualified
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immunity and the claim against her regarding the manner in which she
dispensed Plaintiff’s medication will be dismissed.
Turning to the misconduct against Plaintiff, Plaintiff offers a convoluted
theory of his and Defendant Bing’s motivations—namely, that Defendant
Bing goaded him into a misconduct, apparently for her own sinister
amusement to get her “little hit off of [him]” and as preemptive retaliation for
Plaintiff’s intended not yet filed (nor announced) grievance against her. (Doc.
92, Ex. B, p. 23). 3 Plaintiff’s support for this claim is conclusory, stating,
“[p]eole do it all the time …” and commented on the curious way Defendant
Bing was handling the medication he was to take. (Id., pp. 22-24). Plaintiff
finally noted that “[p]eople be in a certain mood and that they want to write a
[misconduct] on somebody. That’s what it feels like.” (Id., p. 24). Regardless
of Plaintiff’s feelings on the matter, his suspicions are not evidence.
Plaintiff’s goading theory is circular, for a jury to believe that Defendant
Bing filed a false misconduct against him to preemptively head off Plaintiff
from filing a grievance against her would require such a jury to forego reason
and adopt a belief in mind reading. Ultimately, the premise to Plaintiff’s
circular conclusion is weakened by Plaintiff’s own admission that he doesn’t

Defendants correctly note that Plaintiff remains responsible for his
own actions, even if he was provoked (or believed to be so).
3

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even believe anything would have happened to Defendant Bing regardless
of whether or not he filed a grievance against her. When confronted with this
inconsistency, the following exchange occurred:
Q: Why would staff bother to retaliate against you for filing
grievances if nothing ever happens with the grievances anyway?
A (Plaintiff): Well, that’s what I think, because something does
sometimes happen, but they don’t tell us, or people tell them -- I
really, really believe that this is what happens when somebody
does something that you could put a grievance in on. I believe
that people are looking at them and they’re telling them -- looking
at them like they're being weird, like, "You did that?" And I believe
that’s really their motivation for coming back and trying to
retaliate first, because they just want to get you back somehow.
Q: So they retaliate against you preemptively for filing
grievances. But you don’t know if they get in trouble for getting
grievances or not, you’re not sure?
A (Plaintiff): I feel like, sometimes, if you tell somebody in
Medical, "Oh, you're giving this guy poison. She's giving
somebody poison"; right? -- so then I believe somebody come
over to tell them, "Listen, don't do that no more. You give people
poison, what’s wrong with you? We took care of it, but --” you
know what I mean? It’s kind of hard to explain.
(Doc. 92, Ex. B, pp. 35-36). As fantastical as Plaintiff’s theory may be,
even granting him, arguendo, that Defendant Bing issued a false or

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fabricated misconduct, it still does not state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
“To invoke the Due Process Clause, an inmate must first identify
a liberty interest that has been violated. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545
U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393, 162 L.Ed.2d 174, 189
(2005). It is well established that the act of filing a false
disciplinary misconduct does not itself violate a prisoner's
constitutional rights even if it may result in the deprivation of a
protected liberty interest. See Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949,
951 (2d Cir.1986) (A “prison inmate has no constitutionally
guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of
conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty
interest.) However, inmates do have the right not to be deprived
of a protected liberty interest without due process of law. Id. at
952. Accordingly, “so long as certain procedural requirements
are satisfied, mere allegations of falsified evidence or
misconduct reports, without more, are not enough to state a due
process claim.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d
Cir.2002) (citing Freeman, 808 F.2d at 953).
Hutchinson v. Kosakowski, 2015 WL 373765 at * 4 (M.D. Pa. Jun. 15,
2015). The Hutchinson court found the inmate plaintiff in that matter, who
also alleged that his due process rights were violated when he was issued a
false or fabricated misconduct and denied witnesses at his misconduct
hearing, was not deprived of a protected liberty interest and “fail[ed] to state
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a due process, or any other, claim against [the defendant].” 2015 WL 373765
at * 5. Similarly here, even assuming, arguendo, that Defendant Bing issued
Wyatt a false or fabricated misconduct, “so long as certain procedural
requirements are satisfied, mere allegations of falsified evidence or
misconduct reports, without more, are not enough to state a due process
claim.” Id. (citing Smith, 293 F.3d at 654).
Thus, turning to the misconduct hearing itself, due process protections
attach in prison disciplinary proceedings in which the loss of good-time
credits is at stake. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1974). In
Wolff, the Supreme Court held that an inmate must receive “(1) advance
written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent
with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the
factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary
action.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). Because Wyatt
does not allege that he suffered a loss of good conduct time, the Wolff
protections are inapplicable. Furthermore, the Third Circuit in Watson v.
Rozum, noted that “to determine whether prison officials’ decision to
discipline an inmate for his violations of prison policy was within the broad
discretion [ ] afford[ed] [to] them,” the court must evaluate “the quantum of
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evidence” of the misconduct. 834 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2016). Here,
Defendant Dupont explicitly noted that Defendant Bing presented testimony
that was more credible than Plaintiff. Defendant Dupont relied upon that
testimony in finding Wyatt’s guilt, which is sufficient. Beyond that, Plaintiff
admits that he was “yelling” and “screaming” at Defendant Bing with all his
might. Not allowing additional witnesses would not have made a difference
since Plaintiff essentially admits to the violation for which he was convicted.
Moreover, the Due Process Clause does not provide protection against
the imposition of discipline, including disciplinary confinement and the loss
of various privileges inasmuch as these other forms of discipline do not
“impose[ ] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.” Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 150-51 (3d
Cir. 2002) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486). Confinement in administrative or
punitive segregation is insufficient, without more, to establish the kind of
“atypical” deprivation of prison life necessary to implicate a liberty interest.
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486; see Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706-07 (3d
Cir. 1997). Here, Wyatt alleges that he was denied witness testimony of CO
Alexy. However, Wyatt does not allege that he was subjected to an atypical
and significant hardship. Moreover, placement in disciplinary confinement
(such as the RHU or POC) does not impose an atypical and significant
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hardship on an inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
Accordingly, no aspect of this incident constitutes a constitutional violation
and summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendants on all claims
relating to it.
3) POC Placement
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s brief placement in POC for less than
day is not a constitutional violation. The Court agrees.
In order to succeed on a claim as to one's conditions of confinement,
a plaintiff must establish that: “(1) he was incarcerated under conditions
imposing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the defendant-official was
deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to his health and safety, and
(3) the defendant-official’s deliberate indifference caused him harm.” Bistrian
v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2015) abrogated on other grounds by
Bistrian v. Levi, 912 F.3d 79, 96 (3d Cir. 2018). “[T]he Constitution does not
mandate comfortable prisons.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349. Therefore,
conditions of imprisonment violate the Eighth Amendment only if they, “alone
or in combination...deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measures of life's
necessities.” See id. at 347. Such necessities include “adequate food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994). Thus, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions- 33 -

of-confinement claim.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. However, “[s]ome conditions
of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in
combination’ when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a
mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single,
identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise.” Mammana v.
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 372 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Wilson,
501 U.S. at 304 and Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).
Here, Plaintiff had an overnight stay in POC where he was temporarily
denied hygiene supplies but received them the day after. The conditions of
such a confinement do not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Court
has previously found that denial of showers for 15 days does not rise to the
level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Fortune v. Hamberger, 379 Fed.
Appx. 116, 122 (3d Cir. 2010). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held
that “[i]t is well settled that the decision where to house inmates is at the core
of prison administrators' expertise.” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002).
Wyatt was briefly placed in POC for his erratic and aggressive behavior, for
which he admits to, and was then appropriately tended to by medical staff.
Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendant
Fritzinger relating to the Eighth Amendment claim.

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4) Cold Temperature in the RHU
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim that the RHU is cold does not
state a constitutional claim. The Court agrees.
The Third Circuit has held that it “is questionable if having a cold cell”
is an atypical and significant hardship when “much more harsh conditions”
do not violate the Eighth Amendment. Burkholder v. Newton, 116 Fed. Appx.
358, 363 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Sandlin, 515 U.S. at 484). Both the Supreme
Court and the Third Circuit have held that low cell temperatures may satisfy
the objective deprivation requirement of an Eighth Amendment claim, but
only if the low cell temperature is exacerbated by other mutually enforcing
conditions that deprive the inmate of adequate shelter. See Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1991) (low cell temperature at night combined with
failure to issue blankets may establish violation); Sampson v. Berks Co.
Prison, 117 Fed. Appx. 383, 385-86 (3d Cir. 2006) (low cell temperature
combined with refusal to provide additional clothing, move to warmer cell, or
take any other measures to ameliorate the cold sufficient to survive motion
to dismiss).
Here, Plaintiff never alleged any facts that show the low cell
temperature was exacerbated by other mutually enforcing conditions that
would deprive him of adequate shelter. If anything, based on his deposition,
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he stated that it “was kind of cold” when he first got in there and that “[t]he
heat went off that day, and [he] think[s] they were trying to fix it,” (Doc. 92,
Ex. B, p. 39), effectively mitigating (not exacerbating) the conditions of his
confinement. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are unsupported
by any evidence and summary judgment will be granted in favor of the
Defendants.
5) Use of OC Spray and Second Misconduct
On October 8, 2021, Plaintiff covered the windows of his cell and was
unwilling to uncover or respond when asked to by prison officials.
Accordingly, OC spray was used to gain his compliance. As a result of this
incident, Plaintiff was issued a misconduct, to which he pled guilty. In his
complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the spray was used as punishment, and the
manner in which he was later “detoxed” was violative of his constitutional
rights because Defendant Landmesser, Plaintiff alleges, cruelly dithered
instead of counteracting the painful effects of the OC spray. Plaintiff has
neither alleged sufficient facts to constitute a cognizable claim nor has any
presented any evidence to support his conclusory allegations. If anything,
the record evidence flatly contradicts Plaintiff’s allegations.
As previously explained, prison officials are entitled to qualified
immunity which extends to the use of OC spray. “Qualified immunity
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balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. “Thus, so long as an official
reasonably believes that his conduct complies with the law, qualified
immunity will shield that official from liability.” Sharp, 669 F.3d at 159 (3d Cir.
2012) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244). Here, as part of Defendant
Gunther’s duties to gain compliance of an inmate, he may use OC spray,
and the deployment of it was reasonable given Plaintiff’s behavior of covering
the windows of his cell and purposely refusing to respond. (Doc. 92, Ex. B,
p. 43) (“I put something on the door so they couldn't see me, and they
sprayed me.”).
If Plaintiff is arguing that this was excessive force, the core inquiry of
an excessive-force claim is “‘whether force was applied in a good-faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm.’” Fennell v. Cambria County Prison, 607 F. App’x 145, 148 (3d Cir.
2015) (quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam). In
conducting that inquiry, a court must examine the need for the application of
force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force used, the
extent of injury inflicted, the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and
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inmates, and any efforts to temper the severity of a forceful response. Id.
(citing Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000)). As made clear, the
use of force was applied in a good faith attempt by Defendant Gunther to
restore discipline and the following efforts of the nurse, Defendant
Landmesser, in performing a standard medical checkup of Plaintiff were
meant to temper (and counter) the severity of the effects of OC spray.
Furthermore, the resulting issuance of the misconduct is clearly supported
by the quantum of evidence; a misconduct to which Plaintiff pled guilty to.
As to Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Landmesser particularly,
that she allegedly cruelly and purposefully dithered instead of counteracting
the painful effects of the OC spray, such allegations are belied by the video
evidence. (Doc. 92, Ex. H). Plaintiff contended that fifteen to twenty minutes
passed as Defendant Landmesser refused to assist him, however, the video
shows that Defendant Landmasser performs a standard medical checkup of
Plaintiff, asking him where he is injured and then flushes his eyes as soon
as it is brought to her attention that she is to do so; which is less than five
minutes after her arrival. (Id.; see also Doc. 92, ¶15). When an opposing
party’s side of the story is “blatantly contradicted” by clear video evidence on
the record, “so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary
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judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007); see, e.g., Fennell,
607 F. App’x at 148 (ruling that “the District Court properly relied on the
videotape of the incident to resolve any factual disputes” between an officer
and a state prisoner in an excessive force case). Accordingly, summary
judgment will be granted in favor of the Defendants regarding any claims
related to the events of October 8, 2021.
6) Property
Plaintiff claims that he had property taken from him but only takes issue
with a medallion, a television and art supplies, all of which were either
returned or replaced. (Doc. 92, ¶16). From Plaintiff’s deposition, the following
interaction occurred:
Q: Okay. And you said what you took issue with was the TV or
religious medallion and your art supplies?
A (Plaintiff): Right.
Q: Did you ever get any of that stuff back?
A (Plaintiff): Yeah, I ended up getting my art supplies back and
my chain. And the TV, I ended up getting a different TV.
(Doc. 92, Ex. B, p. 69). Not only is there no claim stated but also no
damages. Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in favor of the
Defendants.

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7) Retaliation
To state a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of the First
Amendment, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: “(1)
constitutionally protected conduct, (2) retaliatory action sufficient to deter a
person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, and (3)
a causal link between the constitutionally protected conduct and the
retaliatory action.” Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d
Cir. 2006); see also Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 263 (3d Cir. 2001);
Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2000). To
amount to retaliation, the conduct must be “sufficient to deter a person of
ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights.” McKee v.
Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Although the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim remain
constant, the underlying concepts that they signify will vary with the setting—
whether activity is ‘protected’ or an action is ‘adverse’ will depend on
context....” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999). The
fact of incarceration and the valid penological objectives of deterrence of
crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security justify limitations
on the exercise of constitutional rights by inmates. See Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974). Thus, a prison inmate “retains [only] those rights
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that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system.” Id. at 822.
Plaintiff claims, to some extent, that all of the transpiring events make
part of the same overarching retaliatory conspiracy against him for filing
grievances. As severe as such allegations may sound, they are completely
conclusory and vague, and Plaintiff makes no attempt to allege any particular
facts connecting any of the alleged retaliatory acts against him to his
grievance filings. When Plaintiff was asked for supporting evidence, he
responded with the following:
“Because that's all they do in there. So it become a habit. Now,
if I tell somebody that somebody's doing something, first they try
to act like they don't believe me; then when I say I'm putting in
the paperwork, I end up in a POC. Like I said, everybody knows
-- most of the people was walking around telling me that this CO
was coming to be a witness, but I can't understand how that didn't
happen. You know what I'm saying? I couldn't understand that.
The only thing that I could believe right now is, this is all one
thing, they all working together. Because there's nothing to say
that they wasn't -- you know what I mean? It's like, why did this
happen at this point in time? It's only one reason I could see.”
(Doc. 92, Ex. B, p. 50). The filing of grievances is a protected activity
under the First Amendment, Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir.
2003), however, at the outset, it is also clear that Plaintiff “consistently
- 41 -

display[s] a preternatural, global, subjective sensitivity to alleged retaliation,
… ascribing some retaliatory motive to virtually every action that occurs at
the prison.” Smith v. Price, 2012 WL 6541008, at *17 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 21,
2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 6553651 (M.D. Pa.
Dec. 14, 2012). Accordingly, with no competent evidence of retaliation
presented, summary judgment will be granted in favor of the defendants.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 80) and GRANT Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 76). An appropriate order will issue.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
DATE: March 11, 2025
22-92-01

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