Rivera v. Knapp et al

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 28 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by David Durst, Correctional Officer Hayles, Correctional Officer Anna, Michael Knapp, Correctional Officer Steberger, Lt. Chris Myers . For the reasons described above, the Court will grant summary judgment to defendants Myers, Anna, and Hayles, but deny summary judgment to defendants Knapp, Steberger, and Durst. An appropriate order follows. Signed by District Judge Joseph F Saporito, Jr on 1/7/25. (ms)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANGEL RIVERA,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:22-cv-00673

v.

(SAPORITO, J.)

MICHAEL KNAPP, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Angel Rivera filed a complaint alleging that six
correctional officers and medical personnel at SCI-Rockview retaliated
against him for filing grievances. Defendants now move for summary
judgment (Doc. 28), arguing that Rivera failed to exhaust administrative
remedies and cannot present sufficient evidence of retaliation. Because
the record indicates genuine disputes of material fact on both issues, but
also that three of the named defendants were not personally involved in
any retaliation, the Court will grant defendants’ motion in part.
I.

LEGAL STANDARDS
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary

judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome
of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all
inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the
movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.” Pastore v. Bell

Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994). The party seeking
summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence
of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant
must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that
“the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to
the jury.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must first
determine if the moving party has made a prima facie showing that it is
entitled to summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex, 477 U.S.

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at 331. Only once that prima facie showing has been made does the
burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex, 477
U.S. at 331. Both parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the
record,

including

depositions,

documents,

electronically

stored

information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
II.

MATERIAL FACTS 1
Rivera suffers from PTSD and antisocial personality disorder

(Rivera Dep. (Doc. 37-2), 9:5-11:13), and the DOC has classified him as
“seriously mentally ill.” (Doc. 37-1 at 2). At all times relevant, he was
incarcerated in SCI-Rockview’s “Behavioral Management Unit” (BMU),
which accommodates inmates with mental illnesses who are deemed

Rivera did not respond directly to defendants’ statement of
material facts, but filed a response brief along with further evidence.
Where Rivera has failed to present competent evidence to demonstrate a
genuine dispute of material fact, Defendants’ fact statements are deemed
admitted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. The Court also
refers to evidence submitted by the parties but not directly cited in the
briefs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
1

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unfit for the general population. The BMU classifies inmates in “phases”
and grants them increasing privileges and autonomy based on their
progress through the phases. After arriving at SCI-Rockview in May
2021, Rivera filed 18 grievances between September 27, 2021 and
December 6, 2021, on topics such as COVID-19 protocols, library access,
and disputes with staff, including the defendants in this case. (Doc. 373).
The case essentially turns on the parties’ differing accounts of the
events of December 22, 2021, when Rivera was issued a misconduct
charge for “threatening an employee . . . with bodily harm.” The charge,
written by defendant C.O. Steberger, indicates that when Steberger
approached Rivera’s cell to give him a meal tray, Rivera “began screaming
and stated ‘Open this [f***ing] door, open the [f***ing] door now and we
will see what you’re about, you’re not cut like that and if you open the
door you’ll find that out. I’ll take out you, Anna and Hayles right now.’”
After Steberger left Rivera’s cell, Rivera “continued to scream and make
threatening remarks” toward Steberger. (Doc. 37-6).
Rivera, by his own affidavit, disputes this version of events. Rivera
avers that at approximately 10:50 a.m., defendant Michael Knapp and

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another officer “approached” Rivera and asked if he would “sign off on”
(i.e., withdraw) various grievances and complaints against defendants
Steberger, Knapp, David Durst, C.O. Anna, and C.O. Hayles. Rivera
refused. Knapp “informed [Rivera] that he was going to launch a
campaign of harassment against him,” and have his “phase taken” for
verbal abuse (i.e., give Rivera a more restrictive status within the BMU).
Knapp said that he did not need “evidence” of verbal abuse, that all he
needed was for a staff member to say it happened, and that he had
already directed Steberger to “write [Rivera] up on a frivolous
misconduct,” which Hayles and Anna would corroborate. Knapp said that
Steberger would visit Rivera in “a few minutes” to give him a chance to
change his mind, but when Steberger arrived, Rivera again refused to
withdraw the grievances. (Rivera Aff. (Doc. 41-3), ¶¶ 4-9).
Later that day, Rivera was placed on “accountability status,” which
is a form of short-term solitary confinement with varying restrictions
based on the inmate’s behavior. Although the “restriction form” indicates
that “restrictions MUST relate to identified problem behaviors,” Rivera
was denied access to a telephone, reading material, showers, “cell
cleaning,” and “exercise,” among others. (Doc. 37-7). Rivera avers that

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defendant Durst told him that Durst and Knapp had decided on the
restrictions together and “the only thing [Durst] cared about was that
[Rivera learned his] lesson about filing grievances against them.” (Rivera
Aff. ¶ 12). Rivera was also demoted from “Phase 2” to “Phase 2 Modified.”
As a result of this demotion, he was denied access to the dayroom, lost
his job within the prison, and had to eat and exercise in his own cell,
among other restrictions. (Rivera Dep. 58:8-59:12).
Rivera filed two grievances directed to the events of December 22.
The prison grievance system operates through three ascending levels of
review: initial review by a Grievance Officer, appeal to the Facility
Manager, and final review by the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances
and Appeals. Rivera’s grievances were denied on initial review as
“frivolous.” The grievance officer reported that he interviewed the staff
implicated in the grievances and was “unable to verify” Rivera’s
allegations. The responses indicate that Rivera had been found guilty of
the misconduct charge after a hearing, and that certain restrictions were
imposed to prevent Rivera from “constructing weapons,” since he was
found to have threatened staff with injury. (Doc. 37-5 at 76, 83).
On appeal, Rivera was denied relief by the Facility Manager. Rivera

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prepared appeals to final review for both grievances and placed them “in
a closed envelope with attached cash slips for processing.” He gave the
envelope to Steberger, but never received confirmation that the
grievances were processed. (Rivera Aff. ¶ 13). He then made a series of
written inquires to prison employees asking what happened to the
appeals. The responses indicated that the employees were unaware of the
mailings or that no such mailings were processed. (Docs. 41-6, 41-7, 418). Ultimately, the DOC’s records indicate that Rivera’s grievances were
not appealed to final review.
III.

DISCUSSION
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendants request summary judgment on the basis that Rivera

has not exhausted available administrative remedies. Under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), prisoners complaining about the
conditions of their confinement must exhaust available administrative
remedies before they may file suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
The PLRA requires proper exhaustion, meaning plaintiffs must
administratively grieve their claims in accordance with the procedural
rules of the prison in which they are incarcerated. Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of

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Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
81, 88 (2006)).
A prisoner is only required to exhaust administrative remedies that
are “available.” Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 268 (3d Cir. 2018)
(citing Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93). An administrative remedy is
unavailable, and administrative exhaustion is thus excused, in three
situations: “(1) when ‘it operates as a simple dead end—with officers
unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved
inmates’; (2) when it is ‘so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking,
incapable of use,’ such as when no ordinary prisoner can discern or
navigate it; or (3) when ‘prison administrators thwart inmates from
taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,
misrepresentation, or intimidation.’ ” Id. at 266-67 (quoting Ross v. Blake,
578 U.S. 632, 643-44 (2016)).
Here, Rivera presents evidence that he attempted to appeal his
grievance to final review, but the mailing was never sent for reasons
beyond his control. His inquiries to prison employees, asking what
happened to his mailing, support the same inference. Defendants do not
argue that Rivera followed the wrong procedure for mailing a grievance

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appeal, nor is that apparent from the grievance policy. Defendants’
exhaustion argument is premised on the fact that the DOC’s own records
show that no appeal was properly exhausted. 2 However, a remedy may
be unavailable if the process is thwarted because the grievances are
mishandled or not properly processed by the prison staff. See, e.g., Coit

v. Luther, No. 1:19-CV-02036, 2021 WL 5792697, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 7,
2021); Abney v. Younker, No. 1:13-CV-1418, 2018 WL 398323, at *15-16
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2018); Lane v. Rozum, No. 3:13-CV-268-KRG-KAP,
2016 WL 1212782, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2016), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:13-CV-268-KRG-KAP, 2016 WL 1259102
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2016). The Court finds that Rivera has established a
genuine issue of fact as to whether any further administrative remedy
was available to him, and therefore denies summary judgment on this

2 Both of Rivera’s appeals to the Facility Manager were denied as

untimely because they were received more than 15 working days after
the initial grievance was denied. (Doc. 37-5 at 73, 80). It is unclear when
Rivera submitted the appeals, and the grievance policy appears
ambiguous as to whether grievances must be “received,” or merely sent,
within 15 working days. See (Doc. 37-4 at 22). Absent further argument
from defendants, the Court will not grant summary judgment on this
basis. See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 77-78 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that
failure to exhaust can be excused by “substantial” compliance with the
grievance rules).
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ground.
B. Retaliation
Rivera proceeds on claims of retaliation in violation of the First
Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides in pertinent
part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must
establish that the defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived
the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution. Mark

v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995). “[E]ach named
defendant must be shown . . . to have been personally involved in the
events or occurrences which underlie a claim.” Millbrook v. United States,
8 F. Supp. 3d 601, 613 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). As explained by
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals:
A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal
involvement in the alleged wrongs . . . . [P]ersonal
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involvement can be shown through allegations of
personal direction or of actual knowledge and
acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual
knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made
with appropriate particularity.

Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
To state a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation, a
prisoner must show that (1) he was engaged in constitutionally protected
conduct, (2) he suffered an “adverse action” by prison officials sufficient
to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First
Amendment rights, and (3) the plaintiff ’s protected conduct was a
“substantial or motivating factor” in the prison officials’ decision to take
the adverse action. Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2017)
(citations and quotations omitted). Typically, the plaintiff must show
“unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity
and the allegedly retaliatory action,” or “a pattern of antagonism coupled
with timing to establish a causal link.” Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417,
424 (3d Cir. 2016). In some cases, causation can be established “from the
evidence gleaned from the record as a whole.” Id. Even if a prisoner
demonstrates causation, the prison officials may still prevail by proving
that they would have made the same decision absent the protected

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conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological
interest. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001). This is referred
to as the “same decision defense.” Watson, 834 F.3d at 422.
Initially, the defendants argue that Rivera has not shown the
personal involvement of defendants Durst, Myers, Anna, and Hayles.
Rivera’s affidavit indicated that Durst participated in devising the
accountability status restrictions. However, the record is devoid of
evidence that Myers, Anna, or Hayles took any adverse action against
Rivera.3 Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted to those three
defendants. As for the remaining defendants, the movants concede that
Rivera’s grievances were constitutionally protected conduct but seek
summary judgment on the basis that their actions against him were not
“adverse actions,” and that he has failed to show that any such action
was the result of his grievances.
The potential adverse actions are Rivera’s disciplinary charge, his
placement on “accountability status,” and his demotion to a more

3 Although Rivera alleges that Steberger told him Anna and Hayles

would corroborate Steberger’s account of the verbal abuse, the record
does not indicate that they ultimately contributed to the misconduct
charge or were otherwise involved in his discipline.
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restrictive phase within the BMU. Defendants argue that Rivera is in a
“specialized program, and moving through that program in either
direction is a normal event while incarcerated.” But they have not
presented any evidence to that effect, and in any event, that would not
determine whether their actions were adverse. Rather, the test is
whether the actions would “deter a person of ordinary firmness from
exercising his First Amendment rights.” Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220,
225 (3d Cir. 2000) (quotation and citation omitted). “An adverse
consequence ‘need not be great in order to be actionable[;]’ rather, it need
only be ‘more than de minimis.’” Watson, 834 F.3d at 423 (quoting McKee

v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original). “[B]eing
placed in lockdown, being moved to restricted housing, and being issued
misconduct charges are more than ‘de minimis’ adverse actions.” See

Palmore v. Hornberger, 813 F. App’x 68, 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam)
(quoting McKee, 436 F.3d at 170). By this standard, Rivera has raised a
genuine issue of fact as to whether his disciplinary charge, and the
attendant consequences, constituted adverse actions.
Next, the Court considers whether Rivera’s grievances were a
“substantial or motivating factor” in the defendants’ actions. Defendants

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argue that Rivera’s evidence of retaliation is “essentially just his own selfserving testimony, purporting a series of inculpatory comments to various
Defendants without any extrinisic [sic] evidence of this.” It is wellestablished that “conclusory, self-serving” testimony, via affidavit or
deposition, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Irving v.

Chester Water Auth., 439 F. App’x 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2011); Kirleis v.
Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted). However, “the testimony of a litigant will almost
always be self-serving since few litigants will knowingly volunteer
statements that are prejudicial to their case . . . [T]hat has never meant
that a litigant’s evidence must be categorically rejected by the fact finder.”

Lupyan v. Corinthian Colleges Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 321 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2014).
When a non-movant attempts to defeat summary judgment through their
own testimony, courts consider whether that testimony, “juxtaposed with
the other evidence, is sufficient for a rational factfinder to credit [it]
despite its self-serving nature.” See Hricenak v. Mickey Truck Bodies, No.
4:21-CV-00694, 2024 WL 1604650, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2024)
(citations omitted); Whitnum v. Meadows at Stroud for Nursing &

Rehab., LLC, No. 3:18-CV-02137, 2020 WL 7773906, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec.

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30, 2020).
Rivera’s affidavit, although self-serving, is not “conclusory”; it lists
specific factual allegations of statements4 and actions that, if taken as
true, support a reasonable inference that he was retaliated against for
filing grievances. Rivera’s “accountability status” restrictions could
support the same inference, given that he was deprived of privileges
apparently unrelated to the charge of threatening staff. 5 Ultimately, the
overall record lacks the “other evidence” required to disregard Rivera’s
testimony and affidavit. Any such finding would be premised on
inferences about witness credibility, which are not permitted at the
summary judgment stage. See Doe v. Pennsylvania State Univ., No. 4:21CV-01862, 2023 WL 7287217, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2023) (where “the
bulk of the ‘other evidence’ are deposition testimony and affidavits,” the

4 It appears that most, if not all the relevant statements would be

admissible at trial to demonstrate the declarants’ state of mind or as
admissions by a party opponent. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2), 803(3);
Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge 1 v. City of Camden, 842 F.3d 231, 238 (3d
Cir. 2016) (“[H]earsay statements can be considered on a motion for
summary judgment if they are capable of being admissible at trial.”).
5 While the grievance officer indicated that the restrictions were

imposed to prevent Rivera from fashioning a weapon, a reasonable juror
could find that some of them, such as the denial of showers and exercise,
were not imposed for that purpose.
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court cannot disregard the plaintiff ’s self-serving testimony in favor of
the defendant’s).
The remaining defendants would still be entitled to summary
judgment if they demonstrated that, regardless of any evidence of
retaliation, they would have charged and disciplined Rivera for reasons
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Rauser, 241 F.3d
at 334. However, they have not met that burden.
The grievance paperwork indicates that Rivera was found guilty
after a disciplinary hearing, which is generally considered “strong
evidence that the misconduct report was issued for a legitimate
penological reason.” Drumgo v. Reese, No. 3:20-CV-02434, 2022 WL
4295442, at *15 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2022) (citations omitted). However, to
foreclose a retaliation claim, a disciplinary finding must be accompanied
by “a meaningful written statement of the evidence relied on and the
reasons for the action taken.” Williams v. Folino, 664 F. App’x 144, 14849 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished). The ultimate question is whether the
violation is “so ‘clear and overt’ . . . that [Rivera] would have been written

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up if he had not also” engaged in protected conduct.6 See Watson, 834
F.3d at 426 (quoting Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 158-59 (3d Cir.
2002)).
Other than the passing reference to the hearing in the grievance
paperwork, the record is silent as to the evidence presented and the basis
for the guilty finding. The grievance officer investigated Rivera’s
allegations and was “unable to verify” them after interviewing staff. But
this investigation occurred after the alleged retaliation, and there is no
showing that the defendants relied on witness interviews when they took
the allegedly adverse actions. Clearly, Steberger’s allegations alone could
have motivated the defendants to discipline Rivera in service of a
legitimate penological interest, but the defendants have not met their
burden at the summary judgment stage to “prove” that they did so. See

Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333-34; Watson, 834 F.3d at 426 (“[A] plaintiff can
make out a retaliation claim even though the charge against him may

6

See also Burton v. Wetzel, No. 1:19-CV-01574, 2023 WL 5831848,

at *7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2023) (“We reject the defendants’ suggestion that
anytime a prisoner is found guilty of a misconduct and there is a
meaningful statement of the evidence and the reasons for that finding,
there is a quantum of evidence that necessarily satisfies the same
decision defense.”); Ivy v. Johnson, No. 1:18-CV-1506, 2022 WL 3647264,
at *11 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2022).
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have been factually supported.”).
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons described above, the Court will grant summary

judgment to defendants Myers, Anna, and Hayles, but deny summary
judgment to defendants Knapp, Steberger, and Durst. An appropriate
order follows.

Dated: January 7, 2025

s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge

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