Diahn et al v. United States of America et al

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed by David Smith, Trokon Diahn. Signed by Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson on 1/3/2025. (ve)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TROKON DIAHN, et al.,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et
al.,
Respondents.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil No. 1:23-CV-00004

Judge Jennifer P. Wilson

MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Trokon Diahn’s (“Petitioner”) petition
for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
(Doc. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be dismissed as moot
without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
On November 30, 2022, while incarcerated at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Camp Hill”), Petitioner commenced
the above-captioned action by filing a Section 2254 petition. (Doc. 1.) The
petition is not signed by Petitioner, but the certificate of service is signed by
Petitioner’s father, David S. O. Smith. (Id., p. 10.)1 The court received the petition
on January 3, 2023. (Id.) On January 17, 2023, the court entered an order serving
a copy of the petition on Respondents. (Doc. 3.) Respondent filed a response to

1

For leave of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.
1

the petition on February 3, 2023, seeking denial of the petition because it is
unsigned and because Petitioner is not in the custody of the Department of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Doc. 8.)
Following the Respondent’s filing, the court reviewed the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) Inmate Locator, which revealed that
Petitioner is no longer in DOC custody. The DOC inmate locator is available at
the following website: https://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov/#/. Thus, on December 2,
2024, the Court issued an order directing Petitioner to show cause why his petition
should not be dismissed as moot. (Doc. 10.) Petitioner has been released from
custody and has not updated the court of his address.2 The court’s December 2,
2024 order has been returned to the court as “released.” (Doc. 11.)
DISCUSSION
“Article III of the [United States] Constitution limits federal ‘judicial Power’
to the adjudication of ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’” Abreu v. Superintendent
Smithfield SCI, 971 F.3d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp.
of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2)).
In order “[f]or a case or controversy to exist, a petitioner, throughout each stage of
the litigation, ‘must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable

2

On January 4, 2023, Petitioner was notified of the affirmative obligation to update the court
with any change in address. (Doc. 2.)
2

to the [respondent] and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’”
See id. (quoting DeFoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 2005)) (quoting
Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). Consequently, “a habeas
corpus petition generally becomes moot when a prisoner is released from custody
because the petitioner has received the relief sought.” See id. (citing DeFoy, 393
F.3d at 441).
Nevertheless, a petitioner who has been released from custody “may obtain
judicial review of a [habeas] petition by showing that he continues to suffer from
secondary or collateral consequences of his conviction,” see id. (citations omitted),
or sentence, see Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2009). Generally
speaking, “collateral consequences will be presumed when the [petitioner] is
attacking his conviction while still serving the sentence imposed for that conviction
[and] where the [petitioner] is attacking that portion of his sentence that is still
being served.” See id. (citing United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 242 (3d Cir.
2008)).
Once a petitioner has been released, however, the court does “not presume
that a conviction carries collateral consequences.” See Abreu, 971 F.3d at 406
(citing Burkey, 556 F.3d at 148). Instead, the Court “must ‘address[ ] the issue of
collateral consequences in terms of the likelihood that a favorable decision would
redress the injury or wrong.’” See id. (quoting Burkey, 556 F.3d at 148). For that
3

reason, “[i]t is not enough if ‘collateral consequences proffered by the petitioner’
amount to ‘a possibility rather than a certainty or even a probability.’” See id.
(quoting Burkey, 556 F.3d at 148).
Consistent with these principles, the court finds that, while the instant
petition is generally moot, as Petitioner appears to have been released from
custody, Petitioner may still obtain judicial review of his sentence if he can show
that he continues to suffer from secondary or collateral consequences of that
sentence. See id. Here, the period of time granted for Petitioner to demonstrate
that he continues to suffer from secondary or collateral consequences of his
sentence has passed, and Petitioner has failed to respond. As a result, his petition
will be dismissed as moot.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), unless a circuit justice or judge issues a
certificate of appealability (“COA”), an appeal may not be taken from a final order
in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A COA may issue only if the applicant
has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of
reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional
claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327
4

(2003). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds
without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should
issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court
was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000). Here, jurists of reason would not find the procedural disposition of this
case debatable. Accordingly, no COA will be issued.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Petitioner’s Section 2254
petition will be dismissed without prejudice as moot. An appropriate order
follows.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Date: January 3, 2025

5