Gurdine v. Mason et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry). Signed by Honorable Christopher C. Conner on 5/8/2024. (mw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAMAR GURDINE,
Plaintiff
v.
BERNADETTE MASON, et al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-262
(Judge Conner)

MEMORANDUM
This is a prisoner civil rights case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff,
Lamar Gurdine, alleges that defendants are violating his civil rights by failing to
provide a separate religious service for members of the Nation of Islam. The case is
proceeding on Gurdine’s amended complaint. Defendants have moved to dismiss
the amended complaint to the extent it asserts claims against defendant Mason.
The motion will be granted.
I.

Factual Background & Procedural History
Gurdine has been incarcerated in Mahanoy State Correctional Institution

(“SCI-Mahanoy”) at all relevant times. He filed his original complaint on January
24, 2023, in the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas. (Doc. 1-1). Defendants
removed the case to this district on February 13, 2023, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
(Doc. 1). Defendants moved to dismiss the original complaint on March 15, 2023.
(Doc. 5). We granted the motion in part and denied it in part on November 17, 2023,
dismissing all claims against defendant Mason without prejudice for failure to allege
personal involvement but denying the motion in all other respects. (Docs. 10-11).

We granted Gurdine leave to file an amended complaint on or before December 17,
2023. (Id.) Gurdine did so on December 13, 2023, and the court received and
docketed the amended complaint on December 20, 2023. (Doc. 12).
According to the amended complaint, Gurdine, a member of the Nation of
Islam, filed a request for separate Nation of Islam religious services in SCIMahanoy on September 9, 2019. (Doc. 12 ¶ 8). The request was approved on
January 3, 2020, by Reverend Ulli Klemm, the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections’ Bureau of Treatment Services designee. (Id. ¶ 9). Because no faith
leader could be located to lead the Nation of Islam service, the prison arranged for
sixty-minute video services to begin in March 2020. (Id. ¶ 10). The start date was
postponed, however, when the DOC implemented a statewide lockdown in March
2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (Id. ¶ 11).
On November 11, 2020, Gurdine sent a request for Nation of Islam services to
begin; for him to be allowed to purchase Nation of Islam religious material; and for
an outside faith leader in the Nation of Islam to be contacted to lead the religious
services. (Id. ¶ 12). Defendant Scott, SCI-Mahanoy’s chaplaincy program director,
allegedly responded to the request on December 9, 2020 and stated that no visitors
could enter the prison until COVID-19 restrictions were lifted, that the prison had
previously contacted a local mosque to inquire about a religious leader who could
lead Nation of Islam services but had received no response, and that Nation of
Islam library material would be available in the prison library in the near future.
(Id. ¶¶ 6, 13).

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The prison allegedly resumed religious services in October 2021 but did not
begin conducting services for the Nation of Islam. (Id. ¶ 14). Gurdine requested
that the prison begin conducting Nation of Islam services again on December 28,
2021. (Id. ¶ 15). Defendant MacKnight, the prison’s corrections classification and
programs director, allegedly denied the request, stating that the services could not
begin until an outside faith leader could be found who could conduct the services.
(Id. ¶¶ 5, 16). The amended complaint names as defendants Scott, MacKnight, and
Mason, SCI-Mahanoy’s superintendent. (Id. ¶¶ 4-6). The complaint alleges that
defendants violated Gurdine’s right to freedom of religion under the First
Amendment, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”), the Pennsylvania Constitution, and Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom
Protection Act (“RFPA”) and violated his right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 21-24). Gurdine seeks damages and a permanent
injunction requiring defendants to allow Nation of Islam religious services to
commence in SCI-Mahanoy. (Id. ¶¶ 25-27).
Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint in part on January 2,
2024, seeking dismissal of Gurdine’s claims against defendant Mason for failure to
allege personal involvement. (Docs. 13-14). Briefing on the motion is complete and
it is ripe for review. (Docs. 14, 16).
II.

Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the

dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
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court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County
of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings,
Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). In addition to reviewing the facts
contained in the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the
complaint, matters of public record, [and] undisputedly authentic documents if the
complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605
F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol.
Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court conducts
a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130-31
(3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, “the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’” Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of a
claim must be separated; well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, while mere legal
conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 131-32; see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578
F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual
allegations, it must determine whether they are sufficient to show a “plausible claim
for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550
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U.S. at 556. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts “that allow[]
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Courts must liberally construe complaints brought by pro se litigants. Sause
v. Bauer, 585 U.S. 957, 960 (2018). Pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976)).
III.

Discussion
Gurdine brings his constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983

creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs committed by
state officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute is not a source of substantive rights, but
serves as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law.
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d
1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state a Section 1983 claim, plaintiffs must show a
deprivation of a “right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States . . . by a person acting under color of state law.” Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1204
(quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995)).
A defendant cannot be liable for a violation of a plaintiff’s civil rights unless
the defendant was personally involved in the violation. Jutrowski v. Twp. of
Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 289 (3d Cir. 2018). The defendant’s personal involvement
cannot be based solely on a theory of respondeat superior. Rode v. Dellarciprete,
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather, for a supervisor to be liable for the
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actions of a subordinate, there must be allegations of personal direction or actual
knowledge and acquiescence. Id.
We agree with defendants that the amended complaint again fails to allege
the personal involvement of defendant Mason. The only allegations Gurdine has
added to the amended complaint to show that Mason was personally involved in the
alleged violations of his civil rights are that Mason “failed to adequately instruct,
supervise, and discipline subordinates at SCI-Mahanoy,” failed “to provide an
approved [Nation of Islam] religious service at SCI-Mahanoy,” and “should have
known that her staff were inadequately trained, supervise[d], and disciplined.”
(Doc. 12 ¶¶ 17-19). These conclusory allegations of personal involvement are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[T]he tenet that a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). And even if the allegations were entitled to the
assumption of truth, they would merely establish that Mason held a supervisory
role in the prison, which is not a sufficient basis to allege personal involvement. See
Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. We will accordingly dismiss the claims against Mason for
lack of personal involvement.
Before dismissing a civil rights claim for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless the
amendment would be inequitable or futile. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245. We will deny
leave to amend the claims against Mason as futile. Gurdine has had multiple
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opportunities to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Mason and
has failed to do so.
IV.

Conclusion
We will grant defendants’ partial motion to dismiss and dismiss the claims

against defendant Mason without further leave to amend. The case shall proceed as
to Gurdine’s claims against defendants MacKnight and Scott. An appropriate order
shall issue.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated:

May 8, 2024

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