Williford v. Carlisle Borough Police Dept. et al

Filing 51

MEMORANDUM OPINION (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 46 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Christopher Collare. Signed by Magistrate Judge Daryl F. Bloom on May 9, 2024. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
STEVEN JAMAL WILLIFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTOPHER COLLARE,
Defendant.

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Civ. No. 1:23-CV-431

(Magistrate Judge Bloom)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

Introduction
The pro se inmate-plaintiff, Steven Williford, filed this prisoner
civil rights action on March 13, 2023. (Doc. 1). On January 30, 2024, the
remaining defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. (Doc. 46).
After the plaintiff failed to respond to the motion to dismiss, we entered
an order directing the plaintiff to respond on or before March 15, 2024.
(Doc. 50). This order warned the plaintiff in clear terms that “[a] failure
to comply with this direction may result in the motion being deemed
unopposed and granted.” (Id.).
The deadline has passed with no response from Williford.
Accordingly, because Williford has failed to respond to the motion and
court orders or further prosecute his case, we believe that dismissal

under the Local Rules and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) is
warranted. Accordingly, we will dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint.
II.

Discussion
A. Under this Court’s Local Rules, the Motion will be Deemed
Unopposed and Granted.
The Local Rules of this court provide that a party opposing a motion
to dismiss must respond to the motion and “file a brief in opposition
within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant’s brief. . .” Local
Rule 7.6. Rule 7.6 further admonishes that “[a]ny party who fails to
comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion.” Id. It
is well established that courts may grant a motion to dismiss under Rule
7.6 “if a party fails to comply with the [R]ule after a specific direction to
comply from the court.” Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d
Cir. 1991).
In this case, the plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 7.6 and this
court’s Standing Practice Order because he has not filed a timely
response to the instant motion. This procedural default compels us to
consider “a basic truth: we must remain mindful of the fact that ‘the
Federal Rules are meant to be applied in such a way as to promote

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justice.’” Lease v. Fishel, 712 F. Supp. 2d 359, 371 (M.D. Pa. 2010)
(quoting McCurdy v. American Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 197
(3d Cir. 1998)). Thus, we must ensure that a party’s failure to comply
with the rules does not prejudice those parties who follow the rules.
Here, because the plaintiff has failed to respond to the motion to
dismiss, under Rule 7.6 this motion will be deemed unopposed.
B. Dismissal Under Rule 41 is Warranted.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court
to dismiss a civil action for failure to prosecute or to comply with the
Federal Rules or court orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Dismissal under this
rule rests with the discretion of the court and will not be disturbed absent
an abuse of discretion. Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d
Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). The court’s discretion is governed by what
are commonly referred to as the Poulis factors:
To determine whether the District Court abused its discretion
[in dismissing a case for failure to prosecute], we evaluate its
balancing of the following factors: (1) the extent of the party’s
personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary
caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond
to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the
conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith;
(5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which
entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the
meritoriousness of the claim or defense.
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Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190 (citing Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.,
747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984)).
In making this determination, “no single Poulis factor is
dispositive.” Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003).
Moreover, “not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied” to dismiss a
complaint for failure to prosecute. Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373
(3d Cir. 1992). As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[i]n balancing the

Poulis factors, [courts] do not [employ] a . . . ‘mechanical calculation’ to
determine whether a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a
plaintiff’s case.” Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373).
In this case, an analysis of the Poulis factors leads us to conclude
that this case should be dismissed. Consideration of the first factor—the
party’s personal responsibility—indicates that the delays are entirely
attributable to the plaintiff, who has failed to abide by court orders and
respond to the instant motion.
The second factor—prejudice to the adversary—also weighs heavily
in favor of dismissal. This factor is entitled to great weight as the Third
Circuit has explained:
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“Evidence of prejudice to an adversary would bear substantial
weight in support of a dismissal or default judgment.” Adams

v. Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Employees’ Pension Trust
Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Generally, prejudice includes
“the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of
witnesses’ memories, or the excessive and possibly
irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.”
Id. at 874 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). . . . . However, prejudice is not limited to
“irremediable” or “irreparable” harm. Id.; see also Ware v.
Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Curtis T.
Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. Int’l Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683,
693-94 (3d Cir. 1988). It also includes “the burden imposed by
impeding a party’s ability to prepare effectively a full and
complete trial strategy.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222.

Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 259-60. Here, the defendant is plainly prejudiced by
the plaintiff’s failure to comply with court orders or litigate this case, and
we find that this factor weighs in favor of dismissal. See e.g., Tillio v.

Mendelsohn, 256 F. App’x 509 (3d Cir. 2007) (failure to timely serve
pleadings compels dismissal); Reshard v. Lankenau Hospital, 256 F.
App’x 506 (3d Cir. 2007) (failure to comply with discovery compels
dismissal); Azubuko v. Bell National Organization, 243 F. App’x 728 (3d
Cir. 2007) (failure to file amended complaint prejudices defense and
compels dismissal).
Considering the plaintiff’s history of dilatoriness, dismissal is
appropriate. As the Third Circuit has stated, “[e]xtensive or repeated
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delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as
consistent non-response . . . , or consistent tardiness in complying with
court orders.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 260-61 (quoting Adams v. Trustees of

New Jersey Brewery Employees’ Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874
(3d Cir. 1994)) (quotations and some citations omitted). In the instant
case, it is undisputed that the plaintiff has failed to file a response to the
motion or comply with court orders.
We further conclude that the fourth factor—whether the conduct of
the party was willful or in bad faith—weighs in favor of dismissal. With
respect to this factor, we must assess whether the party’s conduct is
willful, in that it involved “strategic,” “intentional or self-serving
behavior,” or a product of mere inadvertence or negligence. Adams, 29
F.3d at 875. Here, where the plaintiff has failed to comply with our
instructions directing him to act, we are compelled to conclude that these
actions are not inadvertent but reflect an intentional disregard for our
instructions and for this case.
The fifth factor—the effectiveness of lesser sanctions—also cuts
against the plaintiff in this case. Cases construing Poulis agree that when
confronted with a pro se litigant who refuses to comply with court orders,

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lesser sanctions may not be an effective alternative. See e.g., Briscoe, 538
F.3d at 262-63; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191. Here, by entering our prior
order and advising the plaintiff of his obligations, we have tried lesser
sanctions to no avail. Accordingly, dismissal is the only appropriate
sanction remaining.
Finally, we are cautioned to consider the meritoriousness of the
plaintiff’s claim. However, we find that consideration of this factor cannot
save the plaintiff’s claims, as he has been wholly noncompliant with his
obligations as a litigant. The plaintiff may not refuse to address the
merits of his claims and then assert the untested merits as grounds for
denying a motion to dismiss his claims. As we have explained, no one

Poulis factor is dispositive, and not all factors must be satisfied for the
plaintiff’s case to be dismissed. See Ware, 322 F.3d at 222; Mindek, 964
F.2d at 1373. Accordingly, in our view, the untested merits of the
plaintiff’s claims, standing alone, cannot prevent the dismissal of those
claims.

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III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc.
46) is deemed unopposed and GRANTED, and this action will be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE due to the plaintiff’s failure to
prosecute this case.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule
72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or
matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a
habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.
The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall
apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or
her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge
may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or
recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.

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Submitted this 9th day of May 2024.

s/ Daryl F. Bloom
Daryl F. Bloom
United States Magistrate Judge

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