Williford v. Carlisle Borough Police Dept. et al

Filing 58

MEMORANDUM OPINION (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 46 motion to dismiss filed by Christopher Collare. Signed by Chief MJ Daryl F. Bloom on March 12, 2025. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
STEVEN JAMAL WILLIFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTOPHER COLLARE,
Defendant.

: Civ. No. 1:23-CV-431
:
:
:
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
:
:
:
:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

Introduction
This case comes before us on a motion to dismiss filed by the
defendant, Christopher Collare.

(Doc. 46).

The plaintiff, Steven

Williford, sued Collare alleging that, while working as a detective for
Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, Collare committed the torts of false
arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution against Williford.
(Doc. 16). Williford points to Collare’s 2021 criminal convictions as
evidence that the prosecution against Williford, where Collare was both
an affiant and a critical witness, was corrupt, and therefore Williford’s
resulting arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment amounted to torts
against his person. (Id.).

Collare filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 46). He argues, inter alia,
that Williford has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. (Id.).
After consideration, we conclude Williford has failed to allege
sufficient facts to support his claims. Accordingly, we will grant Collare’s
motion to dismiss.
II.

Background
This controversy began in 2023 and relates to Williford’s 2016
conviction for possession of heroin with intent to distribute. (Doc. 16 ¶
1). Williford alleges that then-detective Christopher Collare made false
statements in the affidavit of probable cause that was the basis for a
warrant on which Williford was arrested. (Id. ¶ 8). Williford also alleges
that Collare lied on the stand at Williford’s trial. (Id. ¶ 16). On December
14, 2016, Williford was convicted by a jury, and on June 30, 2017, he was
sentenced to three to ten years’ imprisonment. (Id. ¶ 1).
On January 16, 2020, Collare was indicted for criminal conduct
pursuant to his activities while employed as a detective for the Carlisle
Borough Police Department (“CBPD”). United States v. Collare, 1:20CR-17, Doc. 1. He was eventually found guilty by a jury on nine counts,

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including false statements, bribery, and distribution of heroin, all
connected to his behavior as a police detective. Id., Doc. 99. Williford
alleges that this conviction shows that Collare “made false statements
and false testimonys (sic)” at Williford’s trial, and that state officials
should have sought “relief for (ANY) defendant convictions that
Christopher Collare was involved in. Especially if it had anything to do
with distribution of drugs, confidential informants, and controlled buys,
or if Mr. Collare testify (sic) on record.” (Doc. 16 ¶ 18). That allegation
gets to the heart of the instant matter: Williford claims that because
Collare was engaged in criminal behavior at the time of Williford’s
conviction, it follows that Collare must have been lying about Williford,
who claims he is therefore innocent and was falsely arrested, imprisoned,
and prosecuted. (See generally Doc. 16).
Williford sued Collare, District Attorney Jamie Keating, Assistant
District Attorney Courtney Hair LaRue, and the CBPD.

(Doc. 16).

Keating, LaRue, and CBPD filed motions to dismiss the complaint, which
we granted. (Docs. 17, 27, 39). Collare then moved to dismiss. (Doc. 46).
After Williford failed to respond, despite receiving an extension of time,
we ultimately granted Collare’s motion. (Doc. 51). Williford moved for

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reconsideration of our order, arguing that he had not been served with
the motion in question nor our order for him to respond. (Doc. 53). We
granted that motion and permitted Williford to respond to Collare’s
motion to dismiss. (Doc. 55). Accordingly, the motion is now fully briefed
and ripe for disposition. (Docs. 47, 56, 57).
After consideration, we find that Williford has failed to allege
sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Accordingly, we will grant Collare’s motion to dismiss.
III.

Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss – Standard of Review
The defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6)
permits the court to dismiss a complaint if the complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under
federal pleading standards, a complaint must set forth a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under
this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the

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complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250,
1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal
conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”

Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice”).
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a twopart analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim
should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any
legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then
determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for
relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more
than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint
has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips,
515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal,
“[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint
has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility”
determination will be “a context-specific task that requires

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the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Id.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on
the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public
record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court
can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant
attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are
based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.

White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally,
if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically
attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the
court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v.

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002).
However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when
deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
B. The Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss will be Granted.
As we have explained, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff
must allege sufficient facts for this court to see the plaintiff has a
“plausible claim of relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “Threadbare recitals”
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of the elements of a cause of action do not suffice. Id. Thus, Williford’s
complaint needs to outline facts which, if believed, would tend to show
the elements of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution. We conclude that the complaint fails to do so. Therefore,
we will grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
“To bring a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must establish (1) that
there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable
cause.” Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199 (3d. Cir. 2020). In a
similar vein, a plaintiff alleging false imprisonment “must establish: (1)
that he was detained; and (2) that the detention was unlawful.” Id. at
202. Additionally, to state a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must
establish:
(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the
criminal proceeding ended in [the plaintiff’s] favor; (3) the
defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4)
the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than
bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered
deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as
a consequence of a legal proceeding.

Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 296-297 (3d. Cir. 2014).
For all three of these claims, Williford must allege facts
establishing a lack of probable cause. As explained above, the absence of

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probable cause is an essential element of false arrest. In the amended
complaint, Williford alleges in a bare and conclusory fashion that Collare
“put false statements in the affidavit of probable cause” and “lied on the
stand.”

(Doc. 16 ¶ 8).

He does not identify what statements were

allegedly false or what Collare testified to that was allegedly untrue. Yet,
from these bare allegations, he invites us to conclude that he was
arrested and prosecuted without probable cause. This is simply not
enough for us to find that this amended complaint states sufficient facts
to support a claim for false arrest or malicious prosecution. See e.g.,

Basile v. Twp. of Smith, 752 F. Supp. 2d 643, 657-58 (W.D. Pa. 2010)
(finding that conclusory allegations that the defendants falsified
affidavits of probable cause were insufficient to state a claim for false
arrest); Gentles v. Borough of Pottstown, 2023 WL 4993198, at *2 (3d Cir.
Aug. 4, 2023) (affirming the district court’s conclusion that bare
allegations of a falsified affidavit of probable cause was insufficient to
state false arrest and malicious prosecution claims).
We similarly conclude that the absence of facts from which we can
infer a lack of probable cause defeats Williford’s false imprisonment
claim.

As we have explained, to sufficiently state a claim for false

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imprisonment, Williford must allege facts showing that “police lack[ed]
probable cause to make an arrest[.]” Lozano v. New Jersey, 9 F.4th 239,
246 (3d Cir. 2021) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In
this case, since Williford has failed to allege facts to support his claim
that Collare lacked probable cause to arrest him, it necessarily follows
that Williford’s false imprisonment claim based on that arrest fails.
Accordingly, because Williford’s complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, we will grant Collare’s motion to dismiss.
While we are granting Collare’s motion to dismiss, given that the
plaintiff is proceeding pro se, we will permit him one final opportunity to
amend his complaint to endeavor to state a claim against this defendant.
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to amend
a pleading once as a matter of course, if amended within a particular
timeframe, and with either consent of the opposing party or leave of court
in all other cases. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Leave to amend should be freely
given “when justice so requires.” Id. However, the decision to permit
amendment lies within the discretion of the court. Shane v. Fauver, 213
F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). A court may deny a party’s request to amend

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if amendment would result in undue delay, is motivated by bad faith, or
would be futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Here, while Williford has already amended his complaint once, we
believe that permitting one final amendment would not result in undue
delay, prejudice the defendant, or be futile. Accordingly, we will permit
the plaintiff one final opportunity to amend his complaint to endeavor to
state a claim against Defendant Collare.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc.
46) will be granted.

The plaintiff will be permitted to amend his

complaint provided that he acts within 20 days of our dismissal order.
An appropriate order follows.

s/ Daryl F. Bloom
Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: March 12, 2025

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