Ali v. Harry et al

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) Signed by Honorable Julia K Munley on 5/8/24. (sm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
No. 1 :23-CV-0691

MUSTAFA ALI,
Plaintiff

(Judge Munley)
v.
DR. STANISH, et al.,
Defendants

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MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Mustafa Ali initiated the above-captioned pro se civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 Ali alleges that prison medical providers violated his
Eighth Amendment rights by exhibiting deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs. Defendants move to dismiss Ali 's claims or alternatively for
summary judgment. They contend that his complaint fails to state a claim for
relief, is barred by the statute of limitations, and contains claims that were not
properly exhausted through the administrative remedy system . The court will
grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment because Ali failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies.

1

Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs committed by
state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights ; it serves as a mechanism for
vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe , 536 U.S. 273 ,
284-85 (2002).

I.

BACKGROUND
In his complaint, Ali asserted the following unrelated claims: (1) alleged

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs by medical providers Dr.
Stanish, Donald O'Brien , Dr. Baddick, Christine Houser, Michelle Donovan, and
Wellpath LLC concerning his diagnosis and treatment of Parsonage Turner
Syndrome, (Doc. 1

,m 16-106); (2) alleged unconstitutional conditions of

confinement against Corrections Facility Maintenance Manager C. Marhelko, (&

1m 124-41 ); (3) alleged First Amendment free exercise and Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) violations by Secretary of the
Department of Corrections Laurel Harry concerning religious feasts and prayer
practices, (id. 1J1J 142-85); (4) an alleged First Amendment free exercise violation
by Chaplain Scott and dietary supervisor Mr. Connolly for failing to provide a
proper Kosher diet, (& 1J1J 186-95); and (5) an alleged state-law negligence claim
against unidentified "Crisis and Emergency Response Team" officials at SCI
Mahanoy for losing or destroying personal property, (& 1J1J 196-210).
The court2 screened Ali 's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). It
first held that Ali had plausibly stated an Eighth Amendment medical indifference
claim against two of the six targeted medical Defendants: Dr. Stanish and
Well path LLC. (See Doc. 10 at 5-10). The court then dismissed the state-law

2

This case was previously assigned to the Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo.

2

negligence claims against the unidentified "CERT team ," noting that such claims
were unrelated to the Section 1983 claims and therefore the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to entertain them . (See

& at 10 (citing 28 U.S.C . § 1367(a)).

Finally, the court explained that Ali 's other Section 1983 claims were unrelated to
his medical indifference claims and targeted different Defendants, and therefore
they violated the joinder rules provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
20(a)(2)(B). (See & at 10-1 1).
In closing its July 26, 2023 decision , the court granted Ali limited leave to
amend , giving him 21 days to file an amended complaint with respect to his
Eighth Amendment medical indifference claims . (See & at 11 -12; Doc. 11 ,I 6).
His other unrelated claims, the court admonished , must be brought in separate
civil rights lawsuits. (See Doc. 10 at 10-11 , 12). The court further explained that
if Al i did not timely file an amended complaint, his case would proceed "only as to
his Eighth Amendment medical indifference claims against Dr. Stanish and
Wellpath ." (kl at 12).
On August 29, 2023, the court issued an order directing service on Dr.
Stanish and Wellpath , explaining that the case would proceed against only those
defendants because Ali had not filed an amended complaint. (Doc. 13 at 1).
Following service, Dr. Stanish and Wellpath moved to dismiss Ali 's complaint

3

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )(6) or alternatively for summary
judgment. (See Doc. 17; Doc. 18 at 15).
In their motion , Defendants raise- among other defenses-the affirmative
defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies . (See Doc. 18 at 14-19).
The court issued the requisite notice to Ali that it would act as a factfinder for the
issue of administrative exhaustion and provided him additional time to respond to
Defendants' motion . (See Doc. 21 ).
The court also denied Defendants' motion to stay discovery, noting that
discovery may be necessary with respect to the failure-to-exhaust defense. (See
id . ,I 4 ). The court 3 subsequently clarified that discovery would be limited to the
issue of administrative exhaustion , as the other defenses raised by Defendants
relied solely on the allegations in the complaint. (See Doc. 26 & n.1 ); see also
Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 271 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that it
"make[s] sense from an efficiency standpoint that exhaustion determinations be
made before discovery, or with only limited discovery" and quoting Pavey v.
Conley, 544 F.3d 739 , 742 (7th Cir. 2008), for the proposition that "in the ordinary
case discovery with respect to the merits should be deferred until the issue of
exhaustion is resolved . If merits discovery is allowed to begin before that

3

On November 7, 2023 , this case was reassigned to the undersigned judicial officer.

4

resolution , the statutory goal of sparing federal courts the burden of prisoner
litigation until and unless the prisoner has exhausted his administrative remedies
will not be achieved. ").
Following several extensions of time , Ali submitted his brief in opposition
and supporting evidence. (See generally Doc. 31 ). Defendants timely filed a
reply brief. (Doc. 32). Defendants' motion to dismiss or alternatively for
summary judgment is now ripe for disposition.
II.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.

Motion to Dismiss under FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6)

In deciding a Rule 12(b )(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire
"whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to
offer evidence to support the claims. " Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 236
(1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1996). The court must
accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Phillips v.
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). In addition to the facts
alleged on the face of the complaint, the court may also consider "exhibits
attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly
authentic documents" attached to a defendant's motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's
claims are based upon these documents. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230

5

(3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus. , 998
F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a
three-step inquiry. See Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780 , 787 (3d
Cir. 2016) (internal citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted). At step
one , the court must "tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state
a claim."

~

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662 , 675 (2009) (alterations in

original)). Second, the court should distinguish well-pleaded factual allegationswhich must be taken as true-from mere legal conclusions, which "are not
entitled to the assumption of truth" and may be disregarded.

~

(quoting

19.!2.ill,

556 U.S. at 679). Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations
"and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. "

19..: (quoting 19.!2.ill, 556 U.S. at 679). Deciding plausibility is a "context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense."

19.!2.ill, 556 U.S.

at 681.

Because Ali proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed
and his complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]" Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89 , 94 (2007) (citations omitted). This is particularly true when the prose

6

litigant, like Ali , is incarcerated. See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366 , 374 (3d
Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
B.

Motion for Summary Judgement'

"One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate
and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. " Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate where
"the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIv. P. 56(a).
Material facts are those "that could alter the outcome" of the litigation, and
"disputes are 'genuine' if evidence exists from which a rational person could
conclude that the position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed
issue is correct." EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys ., Inc., 618 F.3d 253,262 (3d Cir.
2010) (quoting Clark v. Modern Grp. Ltd ., 9 F.3d 321 , 326 (3d Cir. 1993)).

4

The court provides its standard of review for summary judgment with respect to Defendants'
claim of failure to exhaust administrative remedies . The parties have been informed that the
court will consider administrative exhaustion in its role as a factfinder. (See Doc. 21 ). The
parties have also been provided additional time to supplement the record with relevant evidence
or other supporting materials. (See k:L_) . Consideration of evidence outside the pleadings moves
this portion of Defendants' motion from motion-to-dismiss territory into that of summary
judgment. See FED . R. CIv. P. 12(d) ("If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated
as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity
to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion. "). Accordingly, Defendants' motion to
dismiss with respect to administrative exhaustion is converted to a motion for summary
judgment. All other defenses raised by Defendants remain subject to the standard of review for
a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

7

At the Rule 56 stage , the court's function is not to "weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter" but rather "to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial. " Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986). The court must view the facts and evidence presented "in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party" and must "draw all reasonable inferences in
that party's favor. " Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty. , 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir.
2014). This evidence , however, must be adequate-as a matter of law- to
sustain a judgment in favor of the nonmoving party on the claim or claims at
issue. Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 250-57; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co . v. Zenith
Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986). A "scintilla of evidence" supporting
the nonmovant's position is insufficient; "there must be evidence on which the
jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant]. " Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila .,
776 F.3d 181 , 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252)
(alteration in original). Succinctly stated , summary judgment is "put up or shut up
time" for the nonmoving party. Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC , 861 F.3d 382 , 391 (3d
Cir. 2017) (quoting Berkeley Inv. Grp. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir.
2006)).
Ill.

DISCUSSION

Defendants assert three defenses in their motion to dismiss: (1) failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted ; (2) failure to exhaust

8

administrative remedies ; and (3) expiration of the statute of limitations. The court
need not address Defendants' first argument. It has already screened Ali 's
complaint pursuant to Section 1915A(a) and determined that he plausibly stated
a claim for relief with respect to his Eighth Amendment claims against Dr. Stanish
and Well path . (See Doc. 10 at 8-9). There is no occasion to revisit this prior
decision , nor have Defendants provided any basis or argument for
reconsideration . The court will thus consider Defendants' remaining two
defenses in turn.
A.

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et
seq. , requires prisoners to exhaust available administrative remedies before
suing prison officials for alleged constitutional violations. See & § 1997e(a);
Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S . 632 , 639 , 642 (2016) (explaining that only "available"
remedies must be exhausted). Proper exhaustion is mandatory, even if the
inmate is seeking relief- like monetary damages- that cannot be granted by the
administrative system . See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 , 85 (2006) . The
exhaustion process is governed by the contours of the prison grievance system
in effect where the inmate is incarcerated . Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218
(2007); see also Woodford , 548 U.S. at 90-91.

9

Pennsylvania's Department of Corrections (DOC) employs a three-step
grievance process that must be completed to properly exhaust administrative
remedies in most cases. See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 , 292 n.2 (3d Cir.
2002); COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEP'T OF CORR., INMATE GRIEVANCE SYS. , Policy
No. DC-ADM 804 (May 1, 2015) (hereinafter "DC-ADM 804"). If informal
resolution attempts do not resolve the problem, the first step is to file a written
grievance (using form DC-804 , Part 1) with the Facility Grievance Coordinator
within 15 working days after "the event upon which the claim is based. " DC-ADM
804 § 1(A)(3)-(5), (8). An adverse decision by the grievance coordinator may be
appealed to the Facility Manager within 15 working days of the initial-review
response or rejection. kl§ 2(A)(1 ). Finally, an adverse decision by the Facility
Manager may be appealed to "Final Review" with the Secretary's Office of
Inmate Grievances and Appeals (SOIGA) , and again must be submitted within 15
working days of the date of the Facility Manager's decision. kl§ 2(8)(1 ).
The DOC has specific requirements for grievances submitted by inmates.
Those requirements include, among other things , that the grievance "be legible
[and] understandable"; "include a statement of the facts relevant to the claim " as
well as "the date, approximate time, and location of the event(s) that gave rise to
the grievance"; that the prisoner "identify individuals directly involved in the
event(s)" ; and that the grievance sets forth "the specific relief sought," including

10

"compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court. " kl§
1(A)(11).
Defendants maintain that Ali only filed and exhausted one relevant
grievance regarding inadequate medical care-grievance number 949398-in
October 2021 , approximately two years after his allegedly deficient treatment by
Dr. Stanish. (See Doc. 18 at 15). They further argue that this grievance does
not request monetary relief and "does not mention Wellpath ." (kl)
Ali counters these arguments by claiming that he submitted an earlier
grievance dated February 13, 2020, in which he complained about Dr. Stanish 's
refusal to treat his pain and the intentional delay in treatment. (See generally
Doc. 31-4). That grievance additionally complains about Wellpath (formerly
"Correct Care Solutions"5), alleging that Wellpath had a "statewide custom/policy
to deny inmates necessary medical treatment in order to save money and
maximize profits." (kl at 2). The grievance requests injunctive relief in the form
of additional medical care and "monetary compensation" in the amount of
"$500,000." (kl)

5

See Wilson v. Pa . Dep't of Corr., No. 1:21-CV-2136, 2023 WL 424268, at *3 n.1 (M.D . Pa . Jan .
26 , 2023) (Conner, J.) (taking judicial notice that Correct Care Solutions is "now known as
Wellpath pursuant to a 2018 corporate merger with Correctional Medical Group" (citations
omitted)).

11

There is no dispute that this February 13, 2020 grievance was not
appealed to the Facility Manager or to final review with the SOIGA. Ali argues
that prison officials made the grievance process "unavailable" insofar as they did
not respond to this grievance or answer his later requests for tracking information
or status updates. (See Doc. 31 at 8-9; Doc. 31-5 ; Doc. 31-6 ; Doc. 31-7).
The insurmountable problem for Ali is that there is no proof that he ever
filed this February 13, 2020 grievance. The grievance form to which Ali cites
does not contain a grievance number (which ordinarily would be supplied by
DOC officials upon receipt), a signature of the Facility Grievance Coordinator
indicating that the "grievance has been received and will be processed in
accordance with DC-ADM 804 ," or a date of receipt by the Facility Grievance
Coordinator. (See Doc. 31-4 at 1; Doc. 32-31J1l 3-4 (affidavit of Jennifer Mahally,
Grievance Coordinator at SCI Retreat and, subsequently, SCI Mahanoy)). In
other words, while Ali has provided evidence that he drafted this grievance on
February 13, 2020, there is no evidence that he ever filed it.
Ali contends that he was transferred from SCI Retreat to SCI Mahanoy
before he received his copy of the grievance with the grievance tracking number.
(See Doc. 31 at 8-9). He asserts that he wrote to the Facility Grievance
Coordinator at SCI Retreat (Jennifer Mahally) in March 2020, inquiring about the
tracking number. (See & at 9; Doc. 31-5; Doc. 31-7). Ali further alleges that he

12

received no response from Mahally, so he wrote to Kerri Moore, the DOC 's Chief
Grievance Officer, in April 2020. (See Doc. 31 at 9; Doc. 31-6 ; Doc. 31-7). Ali
does not state whether he received a response from Moore regarding his April
2020 inquiry. (See Doc. 31 at 9).
There are two fatal flaws with Ali 's argument that administrative remedies
were unavailable to him and therefore administrative exhaustion is satisfied.
First, and most importantly, the court finds that the record evidence establishes
that Ali never filed the February 13, 2020 grievance. As noted above, there is no
indication on the grievance itself that it was ever received or processed by the
Facility Grievance Coordinator. No response was issued by the DOC, nor was
any appeal taken. Moreover, Jennifer Mahally-who was the Grievance
Coordinator at SCI Retreat during the relevant time and later became the
Grievance Coordinator at SCI Mahanoy (where Ali was transferred)-has
provided an affidavit averring the following:
I was given a copy of an alleged grievance filed by Mustafa Ali dated
February 13, 2020. I have no record of receiving this grievance. If it
had been filed, then a grievance number would have been placed on
the grievance, it would be dated with the date of receipt and by whom.
There is no such acknowledgement that the grievance was ever filed.
[A] grievance is also recorded so we can keep track of it. There is no
recording of [this grievance]. I have no record ... that the February
13, 2020 grievance was ever filed .
(Doc. 32-31J1l 2-5). No countervailing evidence or affidavit has been submitted
by Ali. Consequently, Defendants have established by a preponderance of the
13

evidence that the February 13 grievance was never filed and therefore Ali failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies . See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc.
v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal. , 508 U.S. 602 , 622 (1993) ("The
burden of showing something by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' the most
common standard in the civil law, 'simply requires the trier of fact to believe that
the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence before [he] may
find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade the [fact finder] of the
fact's existence."' (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 371 -72 (1970) (Harlan ,
J. , concurring)).
Because Ali did not properly file the February 13, 2020 grievance, his
argument that the DOC defaulted by failing to respond to it or to provide an
update about it, (see Doc. 31 at 8, 9 (citing Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356
(3d Cir. 2019))), is unavailing . Cf. Shifflett, 934 F.3d at 365 (requiring strict
compliance by prison officials with time limits set forth in prison 's own polices and
holding that prison's untimely response to "a properly submitted grievance or
appeal" rendered administrative remedies unavailable and exhaustion complete).
To the contrary, the record is clear that Ali "knew of, and was able to access , [the
DOC]'s grievance procedures ," Small , 728 F.3d at 272 , but Ali failed to properly
file the February 13 grievance. Hence, "administrative remed ies were available
to him ," id. , but he did not avail himself of them .

14

Second, even if Ali had filed the February 13, 2020 grievance as he
contends, he would still face exhaustion problems with respect to Dr. Stanish. In
his complaint, Ali alleges that his neck, shoulder, and arm problems began in
October 2019 while at SCI Retreat. (Doc. 1 ,I 16). He avers that he was seen in
"November 2019" by Dr. Stanish, who told him that he would not receive any
outside treatment (e.g., an MRI or orthopedic consult) for his pain until he was
transferred to a different prison and because he was "troublesome" for having
filed a lawsuit against other SCI Retreat medical staff. (~ ,I,I 20-23).
Defendants have confirmed through Al i's medical records that this visit with Dr.
Stanish occurred on November 26, 2019. (See Doc. 32-1 at 6-7). Ali then
recounts that he was transferred to SCI Mahanoy in "February 2020,"
presumably sometime after drafting the February 13 grievance. (Doc. 1 ,I 25).
DC-ADM 804, however, requires that an inmate "submit a grievance to the
Facility Grievance Coordinator/designee . .. within 15 working days after the
event upon which the claim is based ." DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(8). Thus, if Ali
believed that Dr. Stanish 's refusal to provide treatment on November 26, 2019,
violated the Eighth Amendment (as he now claims), he was required to grieve
that issue within 15 working days of the event, i.e., by December 17, 2019. It is
thus clear from the Rule 56 record that even if the February 13, 2020 grievance

15

had been filed , it would have been patently untimely with respect to Ali 's Eighth
Amendment claims against Dr. Stanish.
Finally, Ali cites DC-ADM 804 and asserts that "if an inmate who has filed a
grievance is transferred , paroled or released prior to the appeal process being
completed[,] the inmate may continue to pursue the grievance or appeal by
notifying the Facility Manager of the facility where the grievance was originally
filed ." (Doc. 31 at 9). Ali maintains that he followed these guidelines by writing to
Mahally at SCI Retreat in March 2020 following his transfer to SCI Mahanoy.
(See id.).
Ali appears to be referencing Section 2(B)(2)U) of DC-ADM 804, which
states , "If an inmate who has filed a grievance is transferred , paroled , or released
prior to the appeal process being completed , the inmate may continue to pursue
the grievance or appeal by notifying the Facility Manager of the facility where the
grievance was originally filed. " DC-ADM 804 § 2(B)(2)U) (emphasis added). This
argument puts the cart before the horse. As explained above, the record
demonstrates that Ali did not file the February 13, 2020 grievance. Thus, DCADM 804 § 2(B)(2)U) simply does not apply.
In sum , Ali has not established that administrative remedies were
unavailable to him. Thus , his Eighth Amendment claims regarding his treatment
in late 2019 at SCI Retreat required proper exhaustion through final review with

16

the SOIGA. That exhaustion did not occur, so Ali procedurally defaulted his
claims. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230-31 (3d Cir. 2004 ). Ali provides no
valid excuse for his procedural default, as he has not shown that administrative
remedies were unavailable. Therefore, summary judgment must be granted in
Dr. Stanish's favor due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies , as it is
undisputed that Dr. Stanish had no further involvement with Ali 's medical
treatment after Ali 's transfer to SCI Mahanoy in February 2020.
This leaves for discussion Ali 's October 7, 2021 grievance-number
949398. This grievance-as opposed to the February 13, 2020 grievance-is
confirmed by the Facility Grievance Coordinator as being received on October 8,
2021 , and it contains a tracking number supplied by the DOC. (See Doc. 18-2 at
5). Thus, it was properly filed. Moreover, there is no dispute that Ali fully
exhausted this grievance through final appeal with the SOIGA. (See generally
Doc. 18-2).
Defendants contend that th is grievance has material deficiencies as well.
They assert that the grievance does not mention Wellpath and does not seek
monetary relief. (See Doc. 18 at 15). Ali does not address grievance 949398 or
respond to Defendants' arguments at all.
Upon review of grievance 949398 and its appeals , the court finds that
Defendants are correct. Nowhere in this grievance or its appeals does Ali

17

mention Wellpath or the unconstitutional policy described in his complaint. (See
generally Doc. 18-2). Nor does Ali ever request monetary damages. (See id.).
In fact, his initial grievance specifically states that "[t]he requested relief is to be
immediately evaluated by the medical director [or] by an outside medical
provider." (Doc. 18-2 at 5). Grievance 949398 also does not identify or mention
Dr. Stanish , likely because Ali had been transferred to a different prison. Ali
references the "medical director" in grievance 949398 , but Dr. Stanish was not
the medical director at SCI Mahanoy where the events complained of occurred.
Thus , grievance 949398 is no help to Ali regarding exhaustion of his claims
against Dr. Stanish or Wellpath . Summary judgment, therefore, must likewise be
granted in Wellpath 's favor, as Al i failed to exhaust his unconstitutional policy
claim against that entity.
B.

Statute of Limitations

Ali 's Section 1983 claim against Dr. Stanish fails for an additional reason.
It is clear from the face of his pleadings that his Eighth Amendment medical
indifference claim is time-barred.
The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania is
two years. See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN . § 5524(2) , (7). For Section 1983 claims, that two-year period accrues
(or begins to run) when the plaintiff "knew or should have known of the injury

18

upon which his action is based," Sameric Corp. of Del. v. City of Philadelphia,
142 F.3d 582 , 599 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted), and "the last act needed to
complete the tort occurs," Nguyen v. Pennsylvania, 906 F.3d 271, 273 (3d Cir.
2018).
Here, the alleged unconstitutional conduct by Dr. Stanish occurred in
November 2019. There is no further treatment or mistreatment alleged by Ali in
the complaint regarding his remaining two and a half months at SCI Retreat. 6
Thus , Ali 's claim against Dr. Stanish accrued in November 2019 and must have
been filed by November 2021. Even assuming Dr. Stanish provided subsequent
deficient medical care at SCI Retreat, such care definitively ended in February
2020, when Ali pleads that he was transferred to SCI Mahanoy. Accordingly, the
latest possible date of accrual is February 2020, which means that Ali's Section
1983 action needed to be filed-at the very latest-by February 2022. Ali ,
however, did not file the instant lawsuit until April 2023, more than a year out of
time. (See Doc. 1 at 26, 27).
It is true that the statute of limitations is tolled while a prisoner exhausts
administrative remedies. See Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 158 (3d Cir.

6

In his opposition brief, Ali alleges that he was treated by Dr. Stanish "on subsequent occasions ."
(Doc. 31 at 4) . However, those allegations do not appear in his complaint, and it is well settled
that a plaintiff cannot amend his pleadings through a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss.
Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 201 -02 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Pa . ex rel. Zimmerman v.
PepsiCo, Inc. , 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988)).

19

2017) (citing Pearson v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 603 (3d Cir. 2015)).
Yet, as thoroughly explained above, Ali never filed the February 13, 2020
grievance against Dr. Stanish , so it did not toll the statute of limitations for Ali 's
Eighth Amendment claim against him.
Ali argues that the "continuing violation" doctrine-a narrow, equitable
exception to the statute of limitations-applies to his claims. (See Doc. 31 at 910). With respect to his Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Stanish , however,
he is wrong.
The continuing violation doctrine provides that "when a defendant's conduct
is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act
evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in such an
instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would otherwise
be time barred ." Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286 , 292 (3d Cir. 2001)
(quoting Brenner v. Loe. 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. , 927
F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir. 1991)). To benefit from the continuing violation
doctrine, the plaintiff "must establish that the defendant[s'] conduct is more than
the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts. "

kt (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted) . As the Third Circuit has explained , the doctrine is intended for
causes of action that require acts to be aggregated to make out a claim , i.e.,
when the cumulative effect of those acts creates a cause of action (for example ,

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a hostile work environment discrimination claim). See O'Connor v. City of
Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Nat'I R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101 , 113 (2002)).
Ali 's claim against Dr. Stanish involves a discrete and isolated act. He
alleges that, in November 2019, Dr. Stanish intentionally denied necessary
medical care based on retaliatory animus and a desire to save money. In other
words, Ali alleges that Dr. Stanish denied him necessary medical treatment for
"non-medical reasons. " Durmer v. O'Carroll , 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993).
Following that incident, Ali had a complete cause of action against Dr. Stanish for
a Section 1983 claim sounding in deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs. Indeed , the existence of an actionable claim is further evidenced by the
institutional grievance Ali drafted but did not file. Therefore , the continuing
violation doctrine does not save Ali 's Section 1983 claim against Dr. Stanish from
being time-barred .7
Ali's Section 1983 claim against Dr. Stanish, therefore, is facially barred by
the statute of limitations. Nevertheless, that is not the rationale for this court's
ultimate decision. Rather, summary judgment will be granted in Defendants'

7

The court need not address the application of the continuing violation doctrine to Wellpath , as
it is clear that Ali failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his constitutional claim against
that entity.

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favor based on Ali 's failure to exhaust administrative remedies , the dispositive
issue in this case.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing , the court will grant summary judgment in
Defendants' favor on all remaining Section 1983 claims because Ali failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. An appropriate Order follows .

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