Wyatt v. West et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 14 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Dennis Wiederhold, C.O. Green, Sgt. Hemperly, C.O. West, C. Toms, RNS, C.O. Cespeda, Deputy Superintendent Banta Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 8/29/2024. (gg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TARIQ WYATT,

:
Plaintiff

: CIV. ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-1457

v.

:

C.O. WEST, et al.,

(JUDGE MANNION)

:

Defendants

:

MEMORANDUM
Presently before the court in this prisoner civil rights case is
defendants’ motion to dismiss, which the court has previously converted to
a motion for summary judgment with respect to the issue of whether plaintiff
exhausted administrative remedies prior to filing this case. For the reasons
set forth below, defendants will be granted summary judgment based on
plaintiff’s failure to exhaust and this case will be closed.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Tariq Wyatt, is currently incarcerated in Benner Township

State Correctional Institution (“SCI-Benner Township”) but was incarcerated
in Mahanoy State Correctional Institution (“SCI-Mahanoy”) at all relevant
times. He filed the instant lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 on August 27,

2023, 1 alleging civil rights violations arising out of a purported pattern of
harassment by defendant West, a correctional officer in SCI-Mahanoy. (See
Doc. 1). He also alleges several other civil rights violations during his time in
SCI-Mahanoy, though the nature of these claims and whether they are
factually connected to the alleged pattern of harassment by West are
somewhat unclear from the allegations in the complaint. (See id.)
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on January 8, 2024, and,
after being granted an extension of time, filed a brief in support of the motion
on February 16, 2024. (Docs. 14, 21). Defendants argue dismissal is
appropriate because Wyatt failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to
filing suit and because his claims fail to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted. (Doc. 21). Defendants alternatively move for a more definite
statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). (Id.) Wyatt
opposed the motion on March 19, 2024. (Doc. 24).
On April 4, 2024, the court issued an order in which it noted that
defendants’ exhaustion argument would require consideration of matters
outside of the pleadings that could not properly be considered on a motion
to dismiss. (Doc. 25). The court accordingly converted the motion to a motion
The complaint is deemed filed on the date it was submitted to prison
officials pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule. Pabon v. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d
385, 391 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011).

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for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 to the
extent the motion asserted failure to exhaust administrative remedies and
directed the parties to file statements of material facts and supplemental
briefs in connection with the motion for summary judgment. (Id.) Defendants
filed a statement of material facts and a supplemental brief on May 10, 2024.
(Docs. 29-30). Wyatt filed a supplemental brief on May 24, 2024, and a
response to the statement of material facts on July 5, 2024. (Docs. 32, 34).
The motion is now ripe for the court’s review.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Motion to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true,
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the
plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009 (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231
(3d Cir. 2008)). While a complaint need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and detailed factual
allegations are not required, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
3

(2007), a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[L]abels and conclusions” are not
enough, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and a court “is not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id.
In resolving a motion to dismiss, the court thus conducts “a two-part
analysis.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. First, the court separates the factual
elements from the legal elements and disregards the legal conclusions. Id.
at 210-11. Second, the court determines “whether the facts alleged in the
complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for
relief.” Id. at 211 (quotations omitted).
Courts must liberally construe complaints brought by pro se litigants.
Sause v. Bauer, 585 U.S. 957, 960 (2018). Pro se complaints, “however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

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B.

Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery [including,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file] and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335,
340 (3d Cir. 1990). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could
find for the non-moving party, and is material if it will affect the outcome of
the trial under governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ericksen, 903 F. Supp. 836,
838 (M.D. Pa. 1995). At the summary judgment stage, “the judge's function
is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but
to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 249; see also Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir.
2004) (a court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility
determinations). Rather, the court must consider all evidence and inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Andreoli
v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007).

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To prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must affirmatively
identify those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The moving party
can discharge that burden by showing that “on all the essential elements of
its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could
find for the non-moving party.” In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir.
2003); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving party meets this initial
burden, the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to material facts,” but must show sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor. Boyle v. County of Allegheny,
139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). However, if the non-moving
party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant]
will bear the burden of proof at trial,” Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary
judgment because such a failure “necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23; Jakimas v. Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007).

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III.

MATERIAL FACTS2
Wyatt filed his complaint on August 27, 2023. (Doc. 29 ¶ 1; Doc. 34 ¶

1). Wyatt did not exhaust administrative remedies prior to that date. (Doc. 29
¶ 2; Doc. 34 ¶ 2). He contends that he fully exhausted administrative
remedies after filing the complaint on August 27, 2023. (Doc. 34 ¶ 2).
IV.

DISCUSSION
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), prisoners

complaining about the conditions of their confinement must exhaust
available administrative remedies before they may file suit in federal court.
42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). The PLRA requires proper exhaustion, meaning
plaintiffs must administratively grieve their claims in accordance with the
procedural rules of the prison in which they are incarcerated. Downey v. Pa.
Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548
U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an

Local Rule 56.1 requires a motion for summary judgment to “be
accompanied by a separate, short and concise statement of the material
facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there
is no genuine issue to be tried” and requires that the party opposing a motion
for summary judgment file a statement responding to the numbered
paragraphs in the movant's statement of material facts, which “shall include
references to the parts of the record” that support the nonmovant’s
opposition to the motion. M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. The facts in this section are
derived from the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements. (Docs. 29, 34).

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affirmative defense that defendants must plead and prove; it is not a pleading
requirement for plaintiffs. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007).
A prisoner is only required to exhaust administrative remedies that are
“available.” Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 268 (2018) (citing
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93). An administrative remedy is unavailable, and
administrative exhaustion is thus excused, in three situations: “(1) when ‘it
operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling
to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates’; (2) when it is ‘so opaque that it
becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use,’ such as when no ordinary
prisoner can discern or navigate it; or (3) when ‘prison administrators thwart
inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,
misrepresentation, or intimidation.’” Id. at 266-67 (quoting Ross v. Blake, 578
U.S. 632, 643-44 (2016)). If defendants establish failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the
administrative remedy process was unavailable. Id. at 268.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies must be completed before a
plaintiff files suit in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a) (“No action shall
be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title,
or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
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exhausted.” (emphasis added)); Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 210 (3d
Cir. 2002) (holding that “the filing of a suit before administrative exhaustion”
does not constitute substantial compliance with a prison’s grievance process
that could result in administrative remedies being deemed exhausted).
Numerous panels of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit have held that completing an administrative grievance process after
the filing of a complaint in federal court does not constitute exhaustion of
administrative remedies under the PLRA. See, e.g., Washington v. Gilmore,
852 F. App’x 639, 641 (3d Cir. 2021); Jenkins v. Dancha, 723 F. App’x 174,
175 (3d Cir. 2018); Turner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., 683 F. App’x 180,
182 n.1 (3d Cir. 2017); Victor v. Lawler, 565 F. App’x 129, 130 (3d Cir. 2014);
Wallace v. Miller, 544 F. App’x 40, 42 (3d Cir. 2013); Rowann v. Coleman,
481 F. App’x 44, 46 (3d Cir. 2012); Sharpe v. Medina, 450 F. App’x 109, 112
(3d Cir. 2011); Toney v. Bledsoe, 427 F. App’x 74, 77 (3d Cir. 2011); Nifas
v. Beard, 374 F. App’x 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2010); Lockett v. DeRose, 355 F.
App’x 582, 584 (3d Cir. 2009); Austin v. Beard, 351 F. App’x 780, 783 n.3
(3d Cir. 2009); Panton v. BOP, 281 F. App’x 113, 115-16 (3d Cir. 2008);
Banks v. Roberts, 251 F. App’x 774, 776 (3d Cir. 2007); Roscoe v. Dobson,
248 F. App’x 440, 442 (3d Cir. 2007); Oriakhi v. United States, 165 F. App’x
991, 993 (3d Cir. 2006). As one panel of the court of appeals recognized,
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completion of a grievance process after the plaintiff has already filed suit in
federal court “defeats ‘the basic purpose of the grievance filing mechanism,
which is to notify officials of a problem and provide an opportunity for efficient
correction.’” Victor, 565 F. App’x at 130 (quoting Small v. Camden County,
728 F.3d 265, 273 (3d Cir. 2013)). 3
In this case, Wyatt acknowledges that he did not complete the DOC’s
grievance process for any of his claims prior to filing this case. (See Doc. 29
¶ 2; Doc. 34 ¶ 2). He has accordingly failed to exhaust administrative
Contrary to these cases, the Third Circuit suggested in dicta in Garrett v.
Wexford Health, that complaints filed before the completion of exhaustion
may be dismissed without prejudice and reinstated upon the completion of
exhaustion. See Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 81 n.16 (3d Cir.
2019). This procedure appears to run contrary to the plain language of the
PLRA and the Third Circuit’s holding in Ahmed. See 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a)
(“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section
1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted.” (emphasis added)); Ahmed, 297 F.3d at 210
(holding that “the filing of a suit before administrative exhaustion” does not
constitute substantial compliance with a prison’s grievance process that
could result in administrative remedies being deemed exhausted).
Furthermore, as the Victor court noted, allowing a plaintiff to file a complaint
before he completes the exhaustion process defeats the basic purpose of
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement because it denies prisons the
opportunity to efficiently resolve issues before any litigation is necessary.
See Victor, 565 F. App’x at 130. The court accordingly follows the plain
language of the PLRA, the Third Circuit’s precedential decision in Ahmed,
and the numerous nonprecedential decisions of the Third Circuit stating that
a grievance process must be completed before suit is filed to exhaust
administrative remedies and that completion of the grievance process after
filing of the case is not sufficient.
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remedies, and any steps that he took to complete the grievance process after
the filing of this case are irrelevant. See, e.g., Washington, 852 F. App’x at
641; Jenkins, 723 F. App’x at 175; Victor, 565 F. App’x at 130.
Because the record establishes that Wyatt failed to exhaust
administrative remedies before filing suit, the burden shifts to him to show
that the grievance process was unavailable. Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 268. Wyatt
has not met this burden. He vaguely asserts in his complaint that the
grievance process was unavailable, (see Doc. 1 at 35), but he has not offered
any evidence at the summary judgment stage to support this argument and
appears to have abandoned it. (See Docs. 32, 34). Accordingly, because the
record shows that Wyatt failed to exhaust administrative remedies and he
has not shown that the grievance process was unavailable, the court will
grant summary judgment to defendants and close this case.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on the issue of administrative exhaustion and close this
case. An appropriate order shall issue.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

Malachy E. Mannion
United States District Judge
Dated:
23-1457-01

August 29, 2024
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