Lucas, Jr. v. SCI-Smithfield Mental Health et al

Filing 61

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 55 MOTION for Entry of Default filed by Eddie C. Lucas, Jr., 53 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Poulpolmueller, Shafer, Davis, Toxey, Webster. Signed by Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson on 3/12/2025. (ve)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EDDIE C. LUCAS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
TOXEY et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 1:23-CV-01458

Judge Jennifer P. Wilson

MEMORANDUM
Before the court are Defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended
complaint and Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default. (Docs. 53, 55.) The court
will deny Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default because Defendants timely filed
the pending motion to dismiss in response to the second amended complaint.
Additionally, the court will deny in part and grant in part the motion to dismiss the
second amended complaint.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 1, 2023, the court received a complaint from Plaintiff, an
inmate who was housed at the State Correctional Institution Greene (“SCIGreene”) in Waynesburg, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1.) The complaint raised cruel and
unusual punishment and deliberate indifference claims under the Eighth
Amendment, due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claims, retaliation claims under the First

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Amendment, and an undefined discrimination claim regarding the denial of his
psychiatric medications following his transfer to SCI-Smithfield. (Id.) As
defendants, Plaintiff named “SCI-Smithfield/Mental Health Parole Department.”
(Id.) Plaintiff also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 6.) On
September 25, 2023, the court screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and
dismissed the complaint with leave to renew because he failed to name proper
defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 13.)
On October 5, 2023, the court received Plaintiff’s amended complaint
raising claims associated with the denial of psychiatric medications at SCISmithfield and naming SCI-Smithfield Mental Health as a defendant along with
Ms. Fawn (“Fawn”), a “mental health practitioner” and nurse, Ms. Smith
(“Smith”), titled “psychology/mental health”, and Superintendent Chad Wakefield
(“Wakefield”). (Doc. 14, pp. 1–2.)1 The court dismissed all claims raised in the
amended complaint and gave Plaintiff the opportunity to file a second amended
complaint. (Doc. 22.)
The court received and docketed the second amended complaint on January
12, 2024. (Doc. 25.) This complaint names five psychiatrists as defendants: (1)

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For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.
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Toxey (“Coxy”); (2) Webster (“Weber”); (3) Shafer (“Saffer”); (4) Davis; and (5)
PoulPolueller (“Polmueller”). (Doc. 25, pp. 2–3.)2 Plaintiff alleges that while he
was housed at Monroe County Jail, he was taking psychiatric medications,
including 450 milligrams of Seroquel each day and 750 milligrams of Depakote.
(Id., p. 4.) Plaintiff also alleges that when he was not incarcerated, he attended
REDCO group in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania for intensive mental health treatment.
(Id.) He alleges that on October 26, 2022, he was transferred from Monroe County
Jail to SCI-Smithfield. (Id.) He states that the information concerning his previous
treatment was confirmed by SCI-Smithfield doctors on October 26, 2022. (Id.)
Plaintiff states that “on 10-31-2022 said defendants, [Psychiatric Team Doctors]
stoped [sic] providing Eddie Lucas mental health serious medications of Seroquel
and Depakote.” (Id., p. 5.) Plaintiff alleges that on November 10, 2022, he had a
suicide attempt by hanging in a cell. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he does not
remember his actions, only waking up in a helicopter while being transferred to a
county hospital where he underwent an extensive number of tests and x-rays. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that after 11 hours of medical and mental health treatment, he was
transferred back to SCI-Smithfield. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that “this clear
negligence and abuse of these named defendants could have been avoided.” (Id.)

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Defendants identified themselves as Douglas Weber, M.D., Margaret Shaffer, Davis, John
Coxy, and Eugene Polmueller, M.D. (Doc. 54, p. 1.)
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Based on these facts, Plaintiff raised claims under the ADA, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment. (Id., pp. 5–6.)
On June 21, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim. (Doc. 53.) Plaintiff filed a response on August 23, 2024.
(Doc. 59.) Plaintiff filed an unsupported motion for entry of default on July 1,
2024, and it was received and docketed by the court on July 5, 2024. (Doc. 56.)
On July 8, 2024, Defendants filed a brief in opposition. (Doc. 56.) The court will
now address the pending motions.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
The court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1331, which allows a district court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction in civil
cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Venue
is proper in this district because the alleged acts and omissions giving rise to the
claims occurred at the State Correctional Institution Smithfield (“SCI-Smithfield”)
in Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania, which is located within this district. See 28
U.S.C. § 118(b).
MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

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v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Conclusory allegations of liability are insufficient” to
survive a motion to dismiss. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir.
2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79). To determine whether a complaint
survives a motion to dismiss, a court identifies “the elements a plaintiff must plead
to state a claim for relief,” disregards the allegations “that are no more than
conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and determines
whether the remaining factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) abrogated on other
grounds by Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311 (3d. Cir. 2020).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must
“accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of
the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings,
Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). In addition to reviewing the facts
contained in the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the
complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents”
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attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon
these documents. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196
(3d Cir. 1993)).
The pleadings of self-represented plaintiffs are to be liberally construed and
held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 193
(3d Cir. 2015), as amended (Mar. 24, 2015). Self-represented litigants are to be
granted leave to file a curative amended complaint even when a plaintiff does not
seek leave to amend, unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.
See Est. of Lagano v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., 769 F.3d 850, 861 (3d Cir.
2014); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245. A complaint that sets forth facts which
affirmatively demonstrate that the plaintiff has no right to recover is properly
dismissed without leave to amend. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d
103, 106 (3d Cir. 2002).
DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Will Be Denied.
Default judgments are governed by a two-step process set forth under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 55. An entry of default by the Clerk of Court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)
is a prerequisite to a later entry of a default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).

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See 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 2682 (4d ed. 2022) (“Prior to obtaining a default judgment under either Rule
55(b)(1) or Rule 55(b)(2), there must be an entry of default as provided by Rule
55(a).”). Once the Clerk of Court has entered a default, the party seeking the
default may then move the district court to enter a default judgment under Rule
55(b)(2). Entry of default does not entitle a claimant to default judgment as a
matter of right. See U.S. v. Coy, No. 1:21-cv-01337, 2021 WL 6134468 *2 (Pa.
M.D. Dec. 29, 2021) (citing 10 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice
§ 55.31 (Matthew Bender ed. 2010)). Indeed, it is well settled that decisions
relating to the entry of default judgments are committed to the sound discretion of
the district court. See Emcasco Ins. Co.v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 74 (3d Cir.
1987).
Here, Plaintiff is asking the Clerk to enter default pursuant to Rule 55(a).
(Doc. 55.) Plaintiff alleges that since Defendants did not file an answer, default is
appropriate. (Id.) However, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This is a responsive pleading that must be filed prior to an
answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (“A motion asserting any of these defenses must be
made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed.”). Therefore, the filing
of the motion to dismiss was required prior to an answer and postpones the
deadline for the answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4). By filing the motion to dismiss
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on June 21, 2024, Defendants timely appeared before the court and responded to
the complaint. Plaintiff’s motion for default will be denied for this reason.
B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Will Be Denied In Part and Granted
In Part.
In the second amended complaint, Plaintiff raises constitutional claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claims under the ADA. (Doc. 25.) Defendants argue that
Plaintiff fails to allege personal involvement on the part of any of the Defendants
to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that he failed to state an ADA
claim. (Doc. 54.)
1. Section 1983 Claims–Lack of Personal Involvement Argument
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must meet two threshold
requirements. He must allege: 1) that the alleged misconduct was committed by a
person acting under color of state law; and 2) that as a result, he was deprived of
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). It is also well established that “[a]
defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation
which he or she neither participated in nor approved.” See Baraka v. McGreevey,
481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007).
Here, Plaintiff makes a single general statement that “on 10-31-2022 said
defendants, [Psychiatric Team Doctors] stoped [sic] providing Eddie Lucas mental
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health serious medications of Seroquel and Depakote.” (Doc. 25, p. 5.)
Defendants argue that this is insufficient to establish the individual involvement of
each Defendant as the court cannot identify the alleged action that each Defendant
took on October 31, 2022. (Doc. 54, pp. 3–4.)
The court generally agrees that when a plaintiff makes a broad accusation
about a group or category of defendants without specific allegations as to
individual conduct, dismissal of such a claim would be warranted. However, in
order for Plaintiff to specify which doctor or doctors engaged in the conduct at
issue in his complaint, Plaintiff must have access to his own treatment records. At
this stage in the litigation, it is not clear that Plaintiff has access to those records.
See Mercaldo v. Wetzel, No. 1:13-CV-1139, 2016 WL 5851958, *6 (M.D. Pa. Oct.
6, 2016) (noting that the Department of Corrections carefully guards against
release of inmate’s mental health records); Banks v. Beard, No. 3:CV-10-1480,
2013 WL 3773837, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 17, 2013) (noting concerns militating
against release of inmate mental health records). Therefore, the court will not
dismiss the Section 1983 claims for failing to allege sufficient personal
involvement on the part of the individual defendants, but instead will allow these
claims to proceed to discovery.

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i. The Fourteenth Amendment Claim Will Be Dismissed.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff attempts to bring a Fourteenth
Amendment claim based on the termination of his psychiatric medication. (Doc.
25, p. 6.) There are situations in which a due process claim premised on the lack
of medical treatment can succeed, but that situation is limited to a pretrial detainee.
An inmate awaiting sentencing must look to either the Fifth Amendment’s or the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause for protection. See Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979). However, Plaintiff was not a pretrial detainee at
the time of the relevant events. Instead, Plaintiff alleges in his second amended
complaint that he was a convicted and sentenced state prisoner. (Doc. 25, p. 2.)
The Eighth Amendment applies when an inmate has been both convicted of and
sentenced for his crimes. See Graham v. Connor,490 U.S. 386, 392 n. 6 (1989);
Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005). Therefore, the proper
recourse for Plaintiff’s failure to provide medical treatment claim is the Eighth
Amendment. As a result, the court will dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment claim
with prejudice.
ii. The Eighth Amendment Claim Will Not Be Dismissed.
Plaintiff alleges that the discontinuance of his psychiatric medications
violates the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 25, p. 6.)

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Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act with deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104–05 (1976). To sustain a constitutional claim under the Eighth Amendment
for inadequate medical treatment, a plaintiff must make (1) an objective showing
that his medical needs were serious, and (2) a subjective showing that the
defendants were deliberately indifferent to those medical needs. See Pearson v.
Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017). A serious medical need is
“one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or is so obvious
that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst'l Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346–47 (3d Cir.
1987) (citation omitted). A prison official is deliberately indifferent when he or
she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s second amended complaint merely pleads a
disagreement with the medical treatment received and not deliberate indifference.
(Doc. 54, p. 7.) The court disagrees.
“Prison medical authorities are given considerable latitude in the diagnosis
and treatment of medical problems of inmates and courts will ‘disavow any
attempt to second guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of
treatment . . . which remains a question of sound professional judgment.’” Byrd v.
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Shannon, No. 1:09-CV-1551, 2010 WL 5889519, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2010)
(quoting Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d
Cir.1979)). Mere disagreement over proper treatment does not state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990);
Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst'l Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346 (“Courts, determining what
constitutes deliberate indifference, have consistently held that mere allegations of
malpractice do not raise issues of constitutional import. . . Nor does mere
disagreement as to the proper medical treatment support a claim of an eighth
amendment violation.”). Here, Plaintiff clearly alleges that Defendants simply
stopped providing him the medications that were prescribed for him when he was
at another facility. (Doc. 25, p. 5.) He does not allege that Defendants determined
he no longer required the medications, or that they changed his medications.
Therefore, liberally construing the second amended complaint, the court will deny
the motion to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claims.
2. ADA claim–No Individual Liability
The ADA claim will be dismissed because there is no individual liability
under the ADA.
But first, the court notes that Plaintiff does not allege which title of the ADA
is the source of his claim. Nearly all of the Third Circuit’s decisions regarding
personal liability under the majority of ADA’s titles point toward the absence of
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individual liability. See Kokinda v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 779 F. App’x 938, 942 (3d
Cir. 2019) (nonprecedential) (finding that plaintiff’s claims “for individual
damages liability under Title II of the ADA fail for the simple reason that there is
no such liability”); see also Williams v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 870 F.3d
294, 299 & n.27 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that Title VII and ADA claims cannot be
brought through a “back door to the federal courthouse” via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
noting that Title VII and ADA claims are intended to impose liability on
employers, not individuals); Fasano v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 457 F.3d 274,
289 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting in dicta that “neither the ADA nor 12 U.S.C. § 1831j
permit individual damages liability on the part of employees”); Koslow v.
Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 178 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting in dicta that “there appears
to be no individual liability for damages under Title I of the ADA”); Emerson v.
Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that individual defendants
did not own, lease, or operate Thiel College and thus were “not subject to
individual liability under Title III of the ADA”); N'Jai v. Floyd, 386 F. App'x 141,
144 (3d Cir. 2010) (nonprecedential) (noting individual defendant could not be
held liable under ADA); Wardlaw v. Phila. Street's Dep't, 378 F. App’x 222, 225
(3d Cir. 2010) (nonprecedential) (explaining that plaintiff’s ADA claims “were not
actionable against the individual defendants”). The court acknowledges that the
Third Circuit has not directly answered the question of whether there can be
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individual liability under Title II of the ADA. See Brown v. Deparlos, 492 F.
App’x 211, 215 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential) (“This Court has yet to
address individual liability under Title II of the ADA[.]”). However, other circuit
courts of appeals have found no individual liability under Title II of the ADA. See
Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001);
Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n.8 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
The court will follow this pattern and dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants
under the ADA for lack of personal liability.
This highlights the court’s previous orders dismissing claims against SCISmithfield because the facility did not qualify as a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(Docs. 13, 22.) In doing so, the court erroneously lumped all Plaintiff’s claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and dismissed claims brought under the ADA. (Id.) In
fact, this was an error because the ADA claims were properly raised against SCISmithfield. The claims were dismissed without looking at the factors required to
plead each claim, which was an error. (Id.) However, the error was harmless
because Plaintiff’s claims under the ADA concerning the termination of his
medication are not valid ADA claims. “[D]ecisions about a prisoner’s medical
treatment generally do not give rise to a claim under the ADA.” Nunez v. Prime
Care Health, Inc., No. 19-cv-859, 2019 WL 1400466, at *1 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27,
2019) (collecting cases). Indeed, such claims would fail because the ADA
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“prohibits disability-based discrimination, not inadequate treatment for the
disability.” Kokinda v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 663 F. App'x 156, 159 (3d
Cir. 2016)(quotation omitted). Therefore, the ADA claims must be dismissed in
any event.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the court will deny Plaintiff’s motion for entry
of default. The court will grant the motion to dismiss in part, but deny the motion
to dismiss as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.
An appropriate order follows.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: March 12, 2025

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