Hoover et al v. Kijakazi

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 1 Complaint filed by Corey Hoover, Sheri Lynn Hoover. Signed by Chief MJ Daryl F. Bloom on January 6, 2025. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
COREY HOOVER, for
SHERI LYNN HOOVER, deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,1
Defendant.

: Civil No. 1:23-CV-1871
:
:
:
:
:
:
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
:
:
:
:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

Introduction
On October 24, 2020, Sheri Hoover filed an application for disability

and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act.
A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), who
found that Hoover was not disabled from her alleged onset date, October
20, 2020, to August 3, 2022, the date the ALJ issued his decision.

1 Carolyn Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration on November 30, 2024. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Carolyn Colvin
is substituted for Martin O’Malley as the defendant in this suit.

Hoover2 now appeals this decision, arguing that the decision is not
supported by substantial evidence. After a review of the record, we
conclude that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
Therefore, we will remand this matter for further consideration by the
Commissioner.
II.

Statement of Facts and of the Case
On October 24, 2020, Hoover applied for disability and disability

insurance benefits, alleging disability due to gastrointestinal issues,
bulging discs, arthritis, and anxiety. (Tr. 62). Hoover was 52 years old
on her alleged onset date of disability, had at least a high school
education, and had past work as a sales representative and a building
service manager. (Tr. 31, 61).
The medical records3 underlying Hoover’s appeal revealed that
Hoover underwent a mental status evaluation in connection with her

2 Corey Hoover, Sheri’s spouse, took over the appeal after Sheri’s passing

in November of 2022. (Doc. 7 at 3).
3 We limit our discussion of the medical records to records involving
Hoover’s mental health impairments because, as we will discuss, we are
remanding this matter due to the ALJ’s failure to adequately explain the
omission of certain mental limitations in the RFC determination.
2

disability application on May 10, 2021, with Dr. John Kajic, Psy.D. (Tr.
489-532). Dr. Kajic noted that Hoover had just started outpatient
psychiatric treatment and was going five days per week. (Tr. 491). Hoover
reported panic attacks, concentration difficulties, excessive worrying,
irritability, and fatigue in conjunction with her depression and anxiety.
(Tr. 492). A mental status examination revealed an anxious mood,
coherent and goal directed thought processes, intact attention and
concentration, and intact recent and remote memory. (Tr. 493-94).
Hoover reported being able to engage in personal care, make simple
meals, clean, shop, and do laundry. (Tr. 494). Dr. Kajic opined that
Hoover had a mild limitation in her ability to make judgments on
complex work-related decisions, as well as mild limitations in interacting
with others. (Tr. 496-97).
In October of 2021, Hoover was hospitalized following an incident
in which she overdosed on Ambien, had access to a gun, and threatened
suicide. (Tr. 641). She then began a partial treatment program at
Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute (“PPI”). (Id.). It was noted that
Hoover had feelings of hopelessness and worthlessness, trouble sleeping,
3

and poor concentration. (Id.). A mental status examination at her initial
intake revealed a depressed and anxious mood, dysphoric affect, normal
thought content, impaired attention and concentration, and fair insight
and judgment. (Tr. 647). Treatment notes from November indicate that
Hoover continued to suffer from decreased concentration, depression,
sleep disturbance, and stress, and she exhibited impaired attention and
concentration on examination. (Tr. 655-56, 658). Her medication
compliance was noted to be “fair,” and the treatment notes indicate that
she took a double dose of her medication to help her with sleep. (Tr. 656,
658).
Around this time, Hoover underwent a consultative examination
with Dr. Kathleen Ledermann, Psy.D. (Tr. 686-93). Dr. Ledermann noted
Hoover’s October 2021 hospitalization, and that she was currently
participating in a partial hospitalization program. (Tr. 686). Hoover
reported difficulties with sleep, excessive worry, memory, and
concentration. (Tr. 687). On examination, Hoover was cooperative and
reported an anxious mood; her attention and concentration were intact;
her memory skills were impaired; and her insight and judgment were
4

good. (Tr. 688-89). She reported an ability to engage in personal care,
cook simple meals, and clean, and that she was unable to shop, manage
money, or lift heavy things. (Tr. 689). Dr. Ledermann opined that Hoover
had moderate limitations in her ability to understand or carry out
complex instructions and moderate to marked limitations in her ability
to make judgments on complex work-related decisions, citing Hoover’s
memory and concentration difficulties, and mild limitations in
interacting with others. (Tr. 691-92).
Hoover continued to treat at PPI for outpatient therapy. (Tr. 786).
Treatment notes from December of 2021 indicate that Hoover was
experiencing worsening insomnia following her hospitalization, as well
as impaired concentration. (Tr. 786-87). A mental status examination
revealed a depressed and anxious mood, intact attention, impaired
concentration, and fair insight and judgment. (Tr. 788). She was placed
on a medication management regimen and scheduled to follow up in one
month. (Tr. 790). Treatment notes from February of 2022 indicate that
Hoover continued to complain of concentration issues, although her
mental status examination revealed intact concentration and attention,
5

as well as fair insight and judgment. (Tr. 792, 795-96). Hoover was
ultimately discharged from PPI in April of 2022 at which time it was
noted that she had “disengaged from treatment.” (Tr. 803-04),
It was against the backdrop of this evidence that the ALJ conducted
a hearing on July 13, 2022, during which Hoover and a Vocational Expert
testified. (Tr. 37-60). Following the hearing, on August 3, 2022, the ALJ
issued a decision denying Hoover’s application for benefits. (Tr. 16-36).
At Step 1 of the of the sequential analysis that governs Social Security
cases, the ALJ concluded that Hoover did not engage in substantial
gainful activity between October 20, 2020—the alleged onset date of
disability—and the date the decision was issued. (Tr. 21). At Step 2, the
ALJ found that Hoover suffered from the following severe impairments:
degenerative disc disease, depression, and anxiety. (Id.). At Step 3, the
ALJ concluded that none of Hoover’s severe impairments met or equaled
the severity of a listed impairment under the Commissioner’s
regulations.

(Tr. 22-23). The ALJ found that Hoover had moderate

limitations in the four broad areas of mental functioning. (Id.).
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ concluded that Hoover:
6

[H]a[d] the residual functional capacity to perform light work
as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except occasional postural
movements and work that is limited to simple and routine
tasks, involving only simple, work-related decisions, and with
few, if any, work place changes, no production pace work, and
only occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and
the public.
(Tr. 23).
In reaching this RFC determination, the ALJ considered the
objective medical record detailed above, the medical opinion evidence,
and Hoover’s reported symptoms. (Tr. 24-30). With respect to the medical
opinion evidence regarding Hoover’s mental impairments, the ALJ
considered four medical opinions—those of Dr. Kajic and Dr. Ledermann,
as well as the state agency consulting sources, Dr. Small and Dr. Jonas.
The ALJ found Dr. Small’s June 2021 opinion partially persuasive, in
that the opinion—which found that Hoover was mildly limited in three of
the four areas of mental functioning—was consistent with Hoover’s
presentation at the time the opinion was rendered. (Tr. 29). However, the
ALJ noted that the medical evidence showed a worsening of Hoover’s
condition following Dr. Small’s assessment. (Id.). The ALJ also found Dr.
Ledermann’s opinion partially persuasive, concluding that this opinion
7

indicated that Hoover could perform work within the RFC and noting
that Dr. Ledermann’s examination revealed impaired memory but
otherwise normal mental status findings. (Id.). With respect to Dr. Kajic’s
opinion, the ALJ found that this opinion was supported by Hoover’s
presentation at that examination, but the ALJ ultimately found Hoover
more limited than Dr. Kajic opined.4 (Tr. 28-29).
The ALJ found Dr. Jonas’ November 2021 opinion persuasive. (Tr.
29-30). Dr. Jonas examined the record on reconsideration and found that
Hoover had understanding and memory limitations, in that she was
moderately limited in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out
detailed instructions. (Tr. 96-97). Dr. Jonas opined that Hoover was able
to carry out short, simple instructions and perform simple task-related
decisions. (Tr. 100). He further found that Hoover was not precluded from

4 The plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in assigning this opinion

“partial weight” rather than a degree of persuasiveness in accordance
with the post-March 2017 regulations. While we ultimately do not reach
the merits of this argument, as we are remanding this matter on a
different issue, we note that it appears the ALJ considered the
supportability and consistency of this opinion with the medical evidence
despite using the word “weight” rather than “persuasive.”
8

meeting the basic demands of simple routine tasks on a sustained basis.
(Id.).
The ALJ reasoned that Dr. Jonas’ opinion was “fully supported” by
his review of the medical records, and that it was consistent with
additional evidence received at the hearing. (Id.). Specifically, the ALJ
noted that Dr. Jonas opined that Hoover had a moderate limitation in
her ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions,
and that she was able to carry out short, simple instructions and make
simple, task-related decisions. (Tr. 29).
The ALJ also considered Hoover’s symptoms, but ultimately found
that the statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of her impairments were not entirely consistent with the medical
evidence. (Tr. 20-22). In making this determination, the ALJ considered
Hoover’s adult function report, as well as her hearing testimony, in which
she reported memory and concentration difficulties. (Tr. 270). The ALJ
noted that Hoover reported no issues with following spoken and written
instructions, and that she was found to present with intact memory and
concentration at her May and November 2021 consultative examinations,
9

despite complaining of memory and concentration difficulties. (Tr. 22-23,
25).
Having made these findings, at Step 4 the ALJ found that Hoover
could not perform her past work but found at Step 5 that Hoover could
perform jobs in the national economy, such as a classifier, laundry; a
marker; and a mail clerk, non-postal. (Tr. 31-32). Accordingly, the ALJ
found that Hoover had not met the stringent standard prescribed for
disability benefits and denied her claim. (Tr. 32).
This appeal followed. On appeal, Hoover argues that the ALJ erred
in his consideration of the opinion evidence and failed to include adequate
mental limitations in the RFC—specifically, a limitation to short, simple
instructions. After consideration, we conclude that the ALJ’s opinion is
not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we will remand this
matter to the Commissioner for further consideration.
III.

Discussion

A. Substantial Evidence Review – the Role of This Court
This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits
is limited to the question of whether the findings of the final
10

decisionmaker are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See
42 U.S.C. §405(g); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d
Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012).
Substantial evidence means less than a preponderance of the evidence
but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable
amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Pierce v.

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ
“ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence.”

Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Kent v.
Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)) (internal quotations
omitted).

However, where there has been an adequately developed

factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the
weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision] from
being supported by substantial evidence.”
11

Consolo v. Fed. Maritime

Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). The court must “scrutinize the record
as a whole” to determine if the decision is supported by substantial
evidence. Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
The Supreme Court has explained the limited scope of our review,
noting that “[substantial evidence] means—and means only—‘such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.’” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154 (quoting Consolidated

Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Under this standard, we
must look to the existing administrative record to determine if there is
“‘sufficient evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Id.
Thus, the question before us is not whether Hoover is disabled, but rather
whether the Commissioner’s finding that he or she is not disabled is
supported by substantial evidence and was based upon a correct
application of the law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014
WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an
ALJ’s errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence”) (alterations
omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981)
(“The Secretary’s determination as to the status of a claim requires the
12

correct application of the law to the facts”); see also Wright v. Sullivan,
900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal
matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (“[T]he court has
plenary review of all legal issues . . . .”).
When conducting this review, “we must not substitute our own
judgment for that of the fact finder.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 611
(3d Cir. 2014) (citing Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir.
2005)).

Thus, we cannot reweigh the evidence.

Instead, we must

determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
findings. In doing so, we must also determine whether the ALJ’s decision
meets the burden of articulation necessary to enable judicial review; that
is, the ALJ must articulate the reasons for his decision. Burnett v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000). This does
not require the ALJ to use “magic” words, but rather the ALJ must
discuss the evidence and explain the reasoning behind his or her decision
with more than just conclusory statements. See Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Ultimately, the
ALJ’s decision must be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory
13

explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700,
704 (3d Cir. 1981).
B. Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the ALJ
To receive disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a
claimant must show that he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(A); see also
20 C.F.R. §§404.1505(a), 416.905(a). This requires a claimant to show a
severe physical or mental impairment that precludes him or her from
engaging in previous work or “any other substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy.”

42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C.

§1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1505(a), 416.905(a). To receive benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or
she is under retirement age, contributed to the insurance program, and
became disabled prior to the date on which he or she was last insured.
42 U.S.C. §423(a); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a).
14

In making this determination, the ALJ follows a five-step
evaluation.

20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a), 416.920(a).

The ALJ must

sequentially determine whether Hoover: (1) is engaged in substantial
gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has a severe impairment
that meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) is able to do his or her past
relevant work; and (5) is able to do any other work, considering his or her
age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity (“RFC”).
20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also determine Hoover’
residual functional capacity (RFC). RFC is defined as “that which an
individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her
impairment(s).” Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121 (citations omitted); see also 20
C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).

In making this assessment, the ALJ must

consider all Hoover’ medically determinable impairments, including any
non-severe impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of the analysis.
20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2).

Our review of the ALJ’s

determination

is

of

the

plaintiff’s

15

RFC

deferential,

and

that

determination will not be set aside if it is supported by substantial
evidence. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 2002).
Hoover bears the burden at Steps 1 through 4 to show a medically
determinable impairment that prevents him from engaging in any past
relevant work. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. If met, the burden then shifts
to the Commissioner to show at Step 5 that there are jobs in significant
numbers in the national economy that Hoover can perform consistent
with Hoover’ RFC, age, education, and work experience.

20 C.F.R.

§§404.1512(f), 416.912(f); Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.
With respect to the RFC determination, courts have followed
different paths when considering the impact of medical opinion evidence
on this determination. While some courts emphasize the necessity of
medical opinion evidence to craft a claimant’s RFC, see Biller v. Acting

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 962 F. Supp. 2d 761, 778–79 (W.D. Pa. 2013), other
courts have taken the approach that “[t]here is no legal requirement that
a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the
course of determining an RFC.” Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x
6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006).

Additionally, in cases that involve no credible
16

medical opinion evidence, courts have held that “the proposition that an
ALJ must always base his RFC on a medical opinion from a physician is
misguided.” Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D. Pa.
2015).
Given these differing approaches, we must evaluate the factual
context underlying an ALJ’s decision.

Cases that emphasize the

importance of medical opinion support for an RFC assessment typically
arise in the factual setting where well-supported medical sources have
found limitations to support a disability claim, but an ALJ has rejected
the medical opinion based upon an assessment of other evidence. Biller,
962 F. Supp. 2d at 778–79. These cases simply restate the notion that
medical opinions are entitled to careful consideration when making a
disability determination. On the other hand, when no medical opinion
supports a disability finding or when an ALJ relies upon other evidence
to fashion an RFC, courts have routinely sustained the ALJ’s exercise of
independent judgment based upon all the facts and evidence.

See

Titterington, 174 F. App’x 6; Cummings, 129 F. Supp. 3d at 214–15.
Ultimately, it is our task to determine, considering the entire record,
17

whether the RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence.

Burns, 312 F.3d 113.
C. Legal Benchmarks for the ALJ’s Assessment of Medical Opinions
The plaintiff filed this disability application in October of 2020 after
Social Security Regulations regarding the consideration of medical
opinion evidence were amended. Prior to March of 2017, the regulations
established a hierarchy of medical opinions, deeming treating sources to
be the gold standard. However, in March of 2017, the regulations
governing the treatment of medical opinions were amended. Under the
amended regulations, ALJs are to consider several factors to determine
the persuasiveness of a medical opinion: supportability, consistency,
relationship with the claimant, specialization, and other factors tending
to support or contradict a medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c).
Supportability and consistency are the two most important factors,
and an ALJ must explain how these factors were considered in his or her
written decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2); Blackman

v. Kijakazi, 615 F. Supp. 3d 308, 316 (E.D. Pa. 2022). Supportability
means “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and
18

supporting explanations . . . are to support his or her medical opinion(s)
. . . . the more persuasive the medical opinions . . . will be.” 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). The consistency factor focuses on how
consistent the opinion is “with the evidence from other medical sources
and nonmedical sources.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2).
While there is an undeniable medical aspect to the evaluation of
medical opinions, it is well settled that “[t]he ALJ – not treating or
examining physicians or State agency consultants – must make the
ultimate disability and RFC determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011). When confronted with several
medical opinions, the ALJ can choose to credit certain opinions over
others but “cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.”

Mason, 994 F.2d at 1066. Further, the ALJ can credit parts of an opinion
without giving credit to the whole opinion and may formulate a
claimant’s RFC based on different parts of different medical opinions, so
long as the rationale behind the decision is adequately articulated. See

Durden v. Colvin, 191 F. Supp. 3d 429, 455 (M.D. Pa. 2016). On the other
hand, in cases where no medical opinion credibly supports the claimant’s
19

allegations, “the proposition that an ALJ must always base his RFC on a
medical opinion from a physician is misguided.” Cummings, 129 F. Supp.
3d at 214–15.
D. The ALJ’s Decision is Not Supported by Substantial Evidence.
As we have noted, the ALJ’s decision must be accompanied by “a
clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests,” Cotter,
642 F.2d at 704, and the ALJ must “indicate in his decision which
evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for his
finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F. 3d 429, 433 (3d Cir.
1999).

After

consideration,

we

conclude

that

the

ALJ’s

RFC

determination is not supported by an adequate explanation.
Here, Hoover contends that the ALJ erred in failing to include a
limitation in the RFC to “short, simple instructions” despite finding the
opinion of Dr. Jonas persuasive. Instead, the RFC limited Hoover to
“work that is limited to simple and routine tasks, involving only simple,
work-related decisions[.]” (Tr. 23). While we believe this to be a close case,
we conclude that the ALJ’s failure to explain the omission of “short,
simple instructions” from the RFC determination warrants a remand.
20

While an ALJ is not required to accept every limitation set forth in
an opinion that is found to be persuasive, the decision must adequately
explain the rationale behind the RFC determination. Durden, 191 F.
Supp. 3d at 455. Here, the ALJ found Dr. Jonas’ opinion persuasive. The
ALJ specifically noted Dr. Jonas’ findings that Hoover could carry out
short, simple instructions, and that she was moderately limited in her
ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions. (Tr.
29-30). The ALJ determined that Dr. Jonas’ opinion was “fully supported”
by his review of the claimant’s record. (Id.). However, the ALJ failed to
include a limitation to short, simple instructions in the RFC, instead
limiting Hoover to simple, routine tasks and simple work-related
decisions.
In our view, the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence. In making this finding, we are persuaded by at least one case
in this circuit that considered this same issue. In Cowher v. O’Malley,
2024 WL 3161865 (W.D. Pa. June 24, 2024), the court considered a
similar argument by the plaintiff. In that case, the ALJ found persuasive
two opinions that limited the plaintiff to “very short and simple
21

instructions,” but failed to include such a limitation in the RFC, instead
limiting the plaintiff only to “simple instructions.” Id. at *7. The court
first noted that “a difference exists between an individual capable of
following ‘simple instructions,’ and an individual only capable of
following ‘very short and simple instructions (i.e., perform one and two
step tasks)[.]’” Id. (citations to the record omitted). The court then
considered how the Dictionary of Occupation Titles (“DOT”) defines the
different “reasoning development” levels associated with certain
occupations: “Jobs at Reasoning Development Level 1 (‘R1’) require an
employee to ‘[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out simple

one- or two-step instructions[,]’ while Jobs at Reasoning Development
Level 2 (‘R2’) require the ability to ‘[a]pply commonsense understanding
to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions[.]’” Id.
(citing Appendix C – Components of the Definition Trailer, 1991 WL
688702 (emphasis in original)).
The Cowher court went on to conclude that a limitation to “very
short and simple instructions” was likely inconsistent with reasoning
level 2 occupations. Cowher, 2024 WL 3161865 at* 7. The court further
22

concluded that the ALJ failed to adequately explain the omission of such
a limitation despite finding the opinions setting forth such a limitation
persuasive, finding that the ALJ never addressed his decision to limit the
plaintiff to only “simple” instructions, nor explained his rejection of the
more restrictive limitation to “very short and simple instructions.” Id. at
*8. However, in that case, the court ultimately found that this error was
harmless, as the ALJ identified at least one occupation at Step 5 with a
reasoning level 1 that the plaintiff could perform. Id. at *9-10.
Here, we similarly find that the ALJ’s omission of the limitation to
“short, simple instructions” was not adequately explained in the decision.
This is particularly so where the ALJ found Dr. Jonas’ opinion setting
forth this limitation persuasive and fully supported by Dr. Jonas’ review
of the record. Despite finding this opinion persuasive, the ALJ failed to
explain why he rejected the limitation to “short, simple instructions” and
instead limited Hoover to “work that is limited to simple and routine
tasks, involving only simple, work-related decisions.” (Tr. 23). As we have
noted, while the ALJ is not required to accept every limitation set forth
in an opinion he finds persuasive, he must at a minimum explain the
23

rationale behind the RFC determination. Durden, 191 F. Supp. 3d at 455.
Further, the ALJ may not “reject evidence for no reason or the wrong
reason.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999). Here, we
conclude that the ALJ’s omission of the “short, simple instructions”
limitation was not adequately explained in the decision, and therefore, is
not supported by substantial evidence.
We further conclude that this error is not harmless. Social Security
appeals are subject to harmless error analysis. See Holloman v. Comm’r

Soc. Sec., 639 F. App’x 810, 814 (3d Cir. 2016). Under the harmless error
analysis, a remand is warranted only if the error “prejudices a party’s
‘substantial rights’”; that is, if the error “likely affects the outcome of the
proceeding, . . .” Hyer v. Colvin, 72 F. Supp. 3d 479, 494 (D. Del. 2014).
In this case, the ALJ’s decision at Step 5 identified three jobs that Hoover
could perform—classifier, laundry, which requires reasoning level 2
(DOT 361.687-014, 1991 WL 672991); marker, which requires reasoning
level 2 (DOT 209.587-034, 1991 WL 671802); and mail clerk, non-postal,
which requires reasoning level 3 (DOT 209.687-026, 1991 WL 671813).
As discussed in Cowher, as well as in several other cases we find
24

persuasive, a limitation to short, simple instructions can (but does not
always) preclude jobs requiring reasoning level 2, as such jobs require
that an individual be able to carry out “detailed but uninvolved written
or oral instructions.” See Cowher, 2024 WL 3161865, at *9-10; see also

Leach v. Kijakazi, 70 F.4th 1251, (9th Cir. 2023) (“A level-two job with
‘detailed but uninvolved ... instructions’ could require an employee to
follow lengthy simple instructions. On the present record, then, we
cannot determine whether the level-two jobs identified by the vocational
expert require only short, simple instructions.”); Thomas v. Berryhill, 916
F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 2019) (“We believe that Thomas, being limited to
short, simple instructions, may not be able to carry out detailed but
uninvolved instructions.”).
Here, the jobs identified by the ALJ at Step 5 require a reasoning
level 2 or 3, which could be inconsistent with a limitation to short, simple
instructions. Further, we have concluded that the ALJ did not adequately
explain the omission of the short, simple instructions limitation.
Accordingly, given that such a limitation could preclude the jobs

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identified by the ALJ at Step 5, we find that the failure to explain this
omission is not harmless and requires a remand.
Accordingly, a remand is required for further consideration of these
issues. While we reach this conclusion, we note that nothing in this
Memorandum Opinion should be deemed as expressing a judgment on
the ultimate outcome of this matter. Rather, that task is left to the ALJ
on remand.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner will be

REMANDED for further consideration.
An appropriate order follows.

s/ Daryl F. Bloom

Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

Date: January 6, 2025

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