Vargas v. Christensen

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM re Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 7 filed by Juan Benjamin Vargas (Order to follow as separate docket entry) Signed by Honorable Keli M. Neary on 3/12/25. (ma)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JUAN BENJAMIN VARGAS,
Petitioner
v.
WARDEN D. CHRISTENSEN,
Respondent

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-CV-302
(Judge Neary)

MEMORANDUM
This is a habeas corpus case filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner, Juan
Benjamin Vargas, challenges several disciplinary sanctions imposed by the United
States Bureau of Prisons that resulted in him losing good conduct time credit. The
petition will be dismissed for Vargas’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
I.

Factual Background & Procedural History
Vargas is serving a 210-month sentence of imprisonment imposed by the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for possession of an
unregistered firearm, assault on a law enforcement officer, and carjacking. (Doc. 8-3
at 3). He is housed in Allenwood United States Penitentiary (“USP-Allenwood”).
Vargas filed the instant case on February 12, 2024, and his petition was
received and docketed on February 20, 2024. (Doc. 1). The case was initially
assigned to United States District Judge Christopher C. Conner. Vargas filed an
amended petition on March 14, 2024. (Doc. 7). In his amended petition, Vargas
challenges four disciplinary sanctions that have resulted in him losing good time
credit that would have entitled him to an earlier release. (Id.)

Respondent responded to the petition on April 3, 2024, arguing that it should
be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and that it otherwise
fails on its merits. (Doc. 8). Vargas has not filed a reply brief, and the deadline for
doing so has expired. The case was reassigned to the undersigned on January 21,
2025, following Judge Conner’s retirement.
II.

Discussion
Although there is no explicit statutory exhaustion requirement for Section

2241 habeas petitions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
consistently held that exhaustion applies to such claims. Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d
627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir.
1986)); Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996).
Exhaustion allows the agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise,
conserves judicial resources, and provides agencies the opportunity to “correct
their own errors” thereby fostering “administrative autonomy.” Id. at 761-62. The
BOP has a specific internal system through which federal prisoners can request
review of nearly any aspect of their imprisonment. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-.19. That
process begins with an informal request to staff and progresses to formal review by
the warden, appeal with the regional director, and—ultimately—final appeal to the
general counsel. Id. §§ 542.13-.15. No administrative remedy is considered fully
exhausted until reviewed by the general counsel. Id. § 542.15(a).
Exhaustion is the rule in most cases, and failure to exhaust will generally
preclude habeas review. See Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761. Only in rare circumstances is
exhaustion of administrative remedies not required. For example, exhaustion is
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unnecessary if the issue presented is one that consists purely of statutory
construction. See Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433-34 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing
Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981)). Exhaustion is likewise not
required when it would be futile. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516 n.7 (1982).
Respondent argues that Vargas’s petition should be dismissed for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies because none of the five administrative remedy
requests he filed during the relevant period pertain to the disciplinary sanctions he
challenges in this petition and none of them were appealed through any stages of
the BOP’s appellate process. (Doc. 8 at 11). Respondent has attached several
exhibits to support the contention that Vargas failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. (See Docs. 8-2 – 8-16). Vargas has not responded to this argument
through a reply brief or any other means, nor has he advanced any argument that
his failure to exhaust administrative remedies was due to the administrative
remedy process being unavailable. Accordingly, his petition will be dismissed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
III.

Conclusion
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. An appropriate order shall issue.
/S/ KELI M. NEARY
Keli M. Neary
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated:

March 12, 2025

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