Pauletta v. Officer Sanguinito et al

Filing 26

*Vacated Per Order 27 * MEMORANDUM ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Paulettas motion for injunctive relief (Doc. 8 ) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the defendants motions to dismiss Paulettas original complaint (Docs. 3 , 6 ) are DISMISSED AS MOOT given the plaintiffs filing of an amended complaint. Signed by Chief MJ Daryl F. Bloom on November 22, 2024. (kjn) Modified on 11/22/2024 (kjn).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROBERT PAULETTA,
Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICER SANGUINITO, et al.,
Defendants.

: Civil No. 1:24-CV-1299
:
:
: (Judge Wilson)
:
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
:
:
:

MEMORANDUM ORDER
The background of this order is as follows:
The pro se plaintiff, Robert Pauletta, filed this action against the
defendants in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania in July of 2024.
(Doc. 1-2). This action was removed to this court on August 2, 2024. (Doc.
1). The defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint (Docs. 3, 6), and
the plaintiff subsequently filed an “emergency motion for injunctive
relief.” (Doc. 8). In his motion, Pauletta requests that this court enjoin
state magisterial district court proceedings, and further, sanction the
defendants. (Id.). Bewilderingly, it appears that the plaintiff’s complaints
arise out of the fact that he was not named as the defendant in the

magisterial district court proceedings.1
Pauletta is requesting relief that we simply cannot grant. The AntiInjunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, “generally prohibits the federal courts
from interfering with proceedings in the state courts[.]” Chick Kam Choo

v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 145 (1988). In fact, the Act lists only three
exceptions to this general prohibition: “. . . as expressly authorized by Act
of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Pauletta provides no legal
bases or argument that his requested relief fits into one of the three
narrow exceptions and we cannot find any of the exceptions apply.
Accordingly, the Anti-Injunction Act bars Pauletta’s requested relief.
More fundamentally, Pauletta has not met the substantive
requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 to show he is
entitled to any preliminary injunctive relief. “A party seeking a
preliminary injunction must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the

1 While not entirely clear, the defendants’ response to the instant motion

indicates that Pauletta’s complaints arising out of Pennsylvania’s
window tint laws stem from a magisterial district court action brought
against another individual, Earl Barry. (Doc. 13-2). It appears that Mr.
Barry may have been cited for a window tint violation while driving the
plaintiff’s vehicle. (Doc. 13 at 7).
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merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied;
(3) that granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm
to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such
relief.” Kos Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d
Cir. 2004) (citing Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158
(3d Cir. 1999)). The Supreme Court has underscored that “a preliminary
injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not
be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (citation
and quotation marks omitted).
Notwithstanding the fact that Pauletta has filed an amended
complaint, and several defendants have filed motions to dismiss (Docs.
17, 21, 22), Pauletta has not shown that he will suffer irreparable harm
if injunctive relief is not granted. To the contrary, Pauletta’s filings seem
to assert that he does not need to show irreparable harm while vaguely
asserting that he “will continue to still be subject to the Defendant’s
racial profiling and illegal stop and frisk” policies. (Doc. 14 at 5). We note
for the plaintiff that it is well settled that “a showing of irreparable harm
is insufficient if the harm will only occur in the indefinite future. Rather,
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the moving party must make a ‘clear showing of immediate irreparable
harm.’” Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir.
1992) (quoting Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989), cert denied,
493 U.S. 848 (1989) (emphasis added)). The plaintiff has made no such
showing here, and as such, is not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief.
Finally, as to the plaintiff’s request for sanctions, it appears that
Pauletta is requesting sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11. (See Doc. 14 at 6). He asserts that the defendants misrepresented to
him that he would be substituted as the defendant in the underlying
magisterial district court action, and that because they did not do so,
sanctions are warranted. (Id.). However, Rule 11 provides for the
imposition of sanctions on attorneys with respect to filings. The Supreme
Court has explained: “It is now clear that the central purpose of Rule 11
is to deter baseless filings in district court, and thus, . . . streamline the
administration and procedure of the federal courts.” Cooter & Gell v.

Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990).
Rule 11 sanctions are plainly not applicable in this context, where
the plaintiff alleges that the defendants’ actions, or lack thereof, in state
court, are the basis for his request. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s request for
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sanctions will be denied.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Pauletta’s motion
for injunctive relief (Doc. 8) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED
THAT the defendants’ motions to dismiss Pauletta’s original complaint
(Docs. 3, 6) are DISMISSED AS MOOT given the plaintiff’s filing of an
amended complaint.
So ordered this 22nd day of November 2024.

s/ Daryl F. Bloom

Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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